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Abstract

This article examines the unintended consequences of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act − a political agreement among the 35 participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The primary objective of this article is to explain the unintended consequences of the CSCE security regime in terms of path emergence. 'Path emergence' is presented as a conceptual apparatus to explain the emergent properties exhibited within a complex adaptive system. The path emergence theory highlights four explanatory metaphors: morphogenetic fields, self-organized criticality, social resonance, and co-evolution. These metaphors serve as conceptual linchpins for the case analysis of the unintended consequences of the CSCE security regime. This article suggests that the CSCE embedded within it the properties of path emergence, which in turn contributed to the end of the Cold War in Europe.

Keywords

CSCE, path dependency, path emergence, security regime

Introduction

This article examines the unintended consequences of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act − a political agreement among the 35 participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE security regime was structured around four groupings of issues called Baskets: (i) questions relating to security in Europe, encompassing ten basic principles guiding relations among the participating states and a number of confidence-building measures (CBMs); (ii) cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment; (iii) cooperation in humanitarian and other fields; and (iv) follow-up of the conference. Many skeptics doubted at that time that the Helsinki Agreement would do anything but reinforce the status quo. However, unexpectedly, the agreement's commitment to respect for human rights, provisions for human contacts, and follow-up mechanism all fostered the development of a transnational network

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that played an important role in shaping political and social change in Europe in the late 1980s. It is generally agreed that the Helsinki effects significantly contributed to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, which in turn precipitated German reunification and ultimately influenced the end of the Cold War in Europe. Indeed, the evolutionary trajectory of the Helsinki Final Act was not foreseen by most of those who had signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.

The primary objective of this article is to unveil the causalities underlying the unintended consequences of the CSCE security regime in terms of path emergence. It is noteworthy that the CSCE security regime was created in Europe under a specific morphogenetic field shaped during the early 1970s. The CSCE security regime reinforced and adapted itself, with discernible punctuations, corresponding to the changing external environment. In the end, the CSCE security regime significantly contributed to the end of the Cold War in Europe through path emergence mechanisms.

This article points to the fact that the unintended consequences of the CSCE security regime have not been dealt with aptly by the path dependency theory. Traditionally, path dependency theory tends to focus on mechanisms that anchor and stabilize institutional trajectories. It pays less attention to institutional changes and emergent properties exhibited by complex interactions between entities. Recently, a number of analysts have pointed to this deficiency and have sought to modify the concept of path dependency. However, despite their efforts, well-developed responses to the questions of why and how emergent properties are generated within a complex adaptive system have not yet been formulated satisfactorily.

To attempt to rectify the theoretical lapse, the term ‘path emergence’ has been coined as a conceptual apparatus to explain the emergent properties that tend to be exhibited within a complex adaptive system. Thus, path emergence is defined as causal sequences which unfold emergent properties within a complex adaptive system. The underlying assumption of path emergence theory is that the manifestation of emergent properties within a complex adaptive system can be better understood by articulating the explanatory metaphors such as morphogenetic fields, self-organized criticality, social resonance, and co-evolution, which are theoretical terms originally developed to explain the forces of nature and used in relation to natural phenomena.

This article consists of four main sections. The first characterizes the CSCE security regimes as a complex adaptive system. The second explores the concept of ‘path emergence’ by examining variations of path dependency theory. The third analyzes the evolutionary trajectory of the CSCE security regime from the perspective of path emergence. Lastly, the concluding section draws a number of theoretical insights on path emergence from the case study and puts forward suggestions for the future study of path emergence.

The CSCE security regimes as a complex adaptive system

A security regime is described as a set of stabilized agreements among states that aim to regulate national actions within a particular area of security (Hong, 1996). In this article, the term ‘regime’ is used interchangeably with the term ‘institution’ in a broad sense. Security regimes are assumed to adapt strategically to changing environments through complex interactions among the components of the system. This property of security regimes originates from the nature of security fields. Security fields are intricately characterized by security dilemmas. In general, a security dilemma means that an increase in one state’s security makes the security of another state decrease (Jervis, 1978).

Given the definition mentioned above, security fields entail a high degree of complexity. This can be explained as follows: security is defined as the absence of threats to acquired values; the

level of security of an actor is determined by sequential interactions between an external threat and the internal retreating capability ($O_s = O_c/O_t$, where O_s = overall security, O_c = overall retreating capability, and O_t = overall threat). The overall threat imposed upon an actor could be expressed by the sum total of objective threats multiplied by the subjectively estimated probability of the threat as follows: $O_t = T_{o1} \times T_{s1} + T_{o2} \times T_{s2} + \ldots + T_{on} \times T_{sn}$ (n = specific security issue area in comprehensive security dimension, i.e., military, political, economic, societal, environmental, etc.).

On the other hand, the retreating capability of an actor could also be considered in terms of objective and subjective capabilities. Objective capability is the physical capability of defending an actor against threats, whereas subjective capability is the psychological capability of defending himself against threats. In the same vein, overall retreating capability can be expressed by the sum total of objective retreating capabilities multiplied by the sum total of subjectively motivated retreating capabilities as follows: $O_c = C_{o1} \times C_{s1} + C_{o2} \times C_{s2} + \ldots + C_{on} \times C_{sn}$ (n = specific security issue area in a comprehensive security dimension, i.e., military, political, economic, societal, and environmental).

Security fields become even more complex owing to two crosscutting effects. First, each security issue area interacts horizontally, so that it becomes very difficult to separate them clearly in practice. For example, armed offences could be caused by any issue in the comprehensive security dimension. In addition, any threat in one dimension could easily have spill-over effects into another. Second, security fields can be addressed at different levels of analysis such as individual, national, regional, and international (Buzan, 1983). In the complex dynamics of security dilemmas, inputs and outputs are not proportional, cause and effect are not evident, and security relations are unpredictable. Confronted with the nonlinear dynamics of security dilemmas, states agree to forge security regimes to ameliorate security dilemmas (Stein, 1982).

This means that security regimes display the properties of a complex adaptive system in many areas (Ruhl, 1997). First of all, security regimes are constituted by more than two states as agents that dynamically act correlationally and interdependently. Each state's individual behavior is constrained by the regularity it shapes. A security regime tends to adapt itself to the changing external environment with its own self-organized criticality. Moreover, the memory shared by agents within the security fields is cumulative so that the regularity becomes increasingly repetitive (Sheldrake, 1995). In this sense, security regimes are susceptible to social resonance by sharing habitus among agents. At the same time, in the process of self-organization, security regimes co-evolve with their external environment, tending to exhibit unintended consequences.

From this perspective, the CSCE security regime is defined as a complex adaptive system marked by the properties mentioned above. The CSCE security regime, which was created to regulate the security relations among the 35 participating states, has evolved gradually by adapting itself to the changing environment in Europe with its own dynamics of self-organized criticality. It has formulated its own regularity in and constraint on the security activities among the participating states through building cumulative and resonant habitus among themselves. As this article shows later on, the CSCE security regime significantly contributed to the structural shifts in Europe in the late 1980s, culminating in the end of the Cold War in Europe. This consequence was originally unpredicted, at the time when the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975.

A path from dependency to emergence

Path dependency has been used by political scientists as a conceptual tool to understand and explain particular characteristics of a complex social world (Mahoney, 2000; Mahoney and Schensul, 2006; North, 1990; Page, 2006; Pierson, 2000, 2004; Thelen, 1999, 2003). However, the concept

of path dependency has been treated differently by various analysts in the literature, making it difficult to come to terms with what exactly the concept means. This article uses path dependency as self-reinforcing sequences in which initial steps in a particular direction induce further movement in the same direction, such that over time it becomes difficult or impossible to reverse direction (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000). This usage connotes the idea of increasing returns, and self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes (Arthur, 1994).

In theory, path dependency involves three phases: the first is the critical juncture in which 'prior events' or 'initial conditions' trigger a move toward a particular path; the second is the period of reproduction, i.e., the period in which positive feedback mechanisms reinforce the movement along one path; and, finally, the path comes to an end when new events dislodge the long-lasting equilibrium. Thus, every path begins and ends with a critical juncture, or what has also been frequently referred to as a punctuated equilibrium (Deeg, 2001; Pierson, 2000). It is important to note that 'selection processes during a critical juncture period are marked by contingency, which refers to the inability of theory to predict or explain, either deterministically or probabilistically, the occurrence of a specific outcome' (Mahoney, 2000).

In this version of the path dependency argument, the logic that characterizes the moment of origin of the path is totally different from the logic of its stabilization and reinforcement (Djelic and Quack, 2007). In short, the selection of the path is likely to be somewhat contingent but it eventually leads to a near-deterministic path. The proponents of this logic tend to pay more attention to the issue of entrenchment and reproduction mechanisms, while acknowledging the possibility of changes within the path. For them, a change is presumed to be highly unlikely except through external shocks. The logic of path dependency does not successfully explain the emergent properties of a complex adaptive system.

In the face of this deficiency, some analysts suggest alternative concepts to path dependency. Among them, three recent contributions are worth mentioning here. Johnson (2001) proposes the concept of 'path contingency' to reconcile the possibility of choice and chance and the importance of past paths and institutional legacies. It is contingent in the sense that the relative importance of institutional legacies is decided by the types of policy choices made by state actors. Instead of positing the primacy of either agency or structure, his argument focuses on the dynamic interaction between the two. However, as Johnson admits, the concept has limited applicability to periods of extraordinary politics, in which states experience immediate and intense political and economic uncertainty.

Garud and Karnøe (2001) argue that the concept of path dependency does not account for agency and real time influences. In order to rectify this theoretical lapse they offer the alternative notion of 'path creation.' From their point of view, the notion of path dependency neglects the important role played by conscious human agents in the development of the historical path actually followed. In posing the question of what role human agents play in historical paths, they reformulate the insights of path dependency theory so as to take account of these 'mindful deviations.' In short, path creation theory combines the notions of cumulative causation, history as an endogenous variable, and increasing returns on account of human agents' mindful deviations and real time influences to explain phenomena in the making. However, the theory of path creation is also limited in that it focuses on entrepreneurial activity in technology fields. It falls short of being a conceptual tool to explain the unintended consequences of the CSCE security regime.

Djelic and Quack (2007) propose the concept of 'path generation' as a process of dynamic combination and recombination where legacies play an important but non-deterministic role. This theory points to the cumulative effects of a highly complex phenomenon, culminating in the unintended effects of behavior, that is, emergent qualities. Djelic and Quack not only incorporate

reflexive agency and cumulative processes of gradual change from Garud and Karnøe's (2001) concept of 'path creation,' but also recognize a combination of different mechanisms such as transfer, diffusion, conversion, layering, and dormant logics as multiple points of pressure for change (Crouch, 2005; Schneiberg, 2007; Sorge, 2005; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). They also point to increasing co-evolutionary interaction between national path transformation and transnational path creation. However, this theory lacks theoretical parsimony to the extent that it relies on a combination of different mechanisms to explain crooked paths as unintended consequences.

As an alternative, the concept of 'path emergence' is presented here for a better explanation of the conditions for emergent properties exhibited within a complex adaptive system. Thus the path emergence theory suggests four metaphors as an explanatory tool to account for emergent properties exhibited within a complex adaptive system.

First, path emergence premises specific morphogenetic fields. Specific morphogenetic fields can be thought of as complexes of organizing factors that cause the originally indefinite course of morphic units to become definite and specific, and furthermore, cause this to occur in compliance with a typical pattern (Sheldrake, 1995). In the morphogenesis of a particular morphic unit, one or more of its characteristic parts becomes surrounded by, or embedded within, the morphogenetic field of the entire morphic unit. These morphogenetic fields order the systems with which they are associated by affecting events that appear to be indeterminate or probabilistic; they impose patterned restrictions on the possible evolutionary trajectory of a complex adaptive system. This formative causation is derived from the morphogenetic fields associated with previous systems: the morphogenetic fields of all systems become present to any subsequent similar system; the structure of past systems affects subsequent similar systems by a cumulative influence that acts across both time and space (Sheldrake, 2009). The morphogenetic field is analogous to what Bohm (1980) called the 'implicate order.' The implicate order is extended to a multidimensional reality. This unknown totality endlessly unfolds a totality of forms into infinite dimensionalities. It is these forms that make up our manifest world called 'explicate order.' Thus, the morphogenetic field is regarded as basic for path emergence from implicate order to explicate order.

Second, path emergence entails self-organized criticality. The basic idea of self-organized criticality is that 'large systems naturally evolve, or self-organize, into a highly interactive, critical state where a minor perturbation may lead to events, called avalanches, of all sizes' (Bak and Paczuski, 1995). This idea is captured by a model which has become the paradigm of self-organized critical behavior. The model represents the following situation. Consider a pile of sand on a table, where sand is added slowly. As the pile builds, its sides can become steeper, but only until the slope attains a critical value. Once that critical slope is reached, the addition of more sand starts to produce avalanches that reduce the height of the pile. If the slope is greater than the critical value, an unstable situation results, in which avalanches occur very readily and reduce the slope until it reverts to a critical value. In this state, it is impossible to predict what will happen to the system after each single grain addition (Ramos et al., 2010). The idea of self-organized criticality offers a strong metaphor for explaining the adaptability of a complex system in social fields. In path emergence, external shocks are considered to be a source of energy causing self-organized criticality.

Third, path emergence unfolds by way of social resonance. In natural fields, energetic resonance is described as the tendency of a system to oscillate at maximum amplitude at certain frequencies (Jones and Flaxman, 2009). In social fields, the very notion of social resonance implies the synchronization of the 'habitus' among agents, which is composed of a set of dispositions, normative schemas, and forms of practical and contextual knowledge (Bourdieu, 1990). Social resonance takes place on the basis of similarity in habitus. As Elder-Vass (2007) explains, 'all those who share a given social position are exposed to similar opportunities and necessities, and they tend to develop

a similar habitus, and behave in way that reproduce the existing practices and hence the existing structure.' The more similar the patterns of habitus, the more specific and effective will the social resonance be. Social resonance may be portrayed as a dominant logic generated within a morphogenetic field. A dominant logic is shaped as a shared cognitive map (or set of schemas) among the dominant coalition of agents (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). When the saliency of a dominant logic exceeds a certain threshold, it serves as a trigger for sudden changes in a complex adaptive system.

Fourth, path emergence posits that the dynamics of self-organized criticality triggers co-evolutionary dynamism, producing a far-reaching change in a complex system (Garnsey and McGlade, 2006). In biology, co-evolution is the mutual evolutionary influence between two or more interdependent species, reflected in structural, physiological, or behavioral changes in the species related to their interaction. Classical examples include the mutual adaptation of flowers and pollinating insects for fostering cross-fertilization of plants and food for insects. In path emergence, a complex system and its environment interact and create dynamic, emergent realities. Co-evolution occurs when a system's sensitivity to environmental changes increases at the interface as the environment pushes the system farther and farther away from the point of the bifurcation (Choi et al., 2001).

The concept of path emergence draws on the basic tenets of the concepts of path dependency, path contingency, path creation, and path generation. Path emergence incorporates the logic of institutional reinforcement derived from the path dependency theory as it avoids a reductionist approach. Path emergence resembles the concepts of path contingency and path creation, respectively, in that it recognizes interactions between agency and structure and the coexistence of chance and choice at the initial condition as well as during the period of reproduction. Path emergence also resembles the concept of path generation in that it incorporates the notion of complexity and emergent property. The most salient difference between path generation and path emergence lies in the explanatory mode of emergent property. Path generation does not explain why and how 'the paths are likely to develop emergent qualities, i.e., characteristics not directly intended by any of the actors involved' (Djelic and Quack, 2007). In contrast, path emergence uncovers emergent properties within a complex adaptive system by highlighting four varieties of causality.

In what follows, the path emergence approach will be applied to an empirical case, the evolution of the CSCE security regime known as the 'Helsinki Process.' This case analysis is designed to show how the CSCE security regime was created, evolved, and effected the end of the Cold War in Europe as an unintended consequence.

Unfolding path emergence in the Helsinki Process

A morphogenetic field

The pan-European security regime known as the CSCE emerged with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The successful creation of the regime is attributed to the specific morphogenetic field formed during the early 1970s in Europe in which the 'implicate order' of the Cold War in Europe was to unfold into the Post-Cold War in Europe. The morphogenetic field of the CSCE security regime is characterized by the complex interactions among states as agents, and events and ideas during the critical juncture of the early 1970s in Europe. The evolutionary trajectory of the CSCE security regime was unpredictable to the extent that it was sensitive to the temporal and political conditions of that time. The morphogenetic conditions of the CSCE security regime are summarized next.

The morphogenetic field of the CSCE security regime was constructed historically by the spatial division of Europe at that time. Europe was institutionally demarcated by two military blocs, NATO and the WTO, as a result of Cold War rivalry. However, this does not necessarily mean that there were only two groups of agents. Despite the official rule of individual participation, the states grouped together in like-minded delegations and displayed group behavior in regime negotiations. The most apparent groups were NATO, the WTO, the EC, the Berlin Group, the N/N, the Nordic Caucus, and the Mediterranean Group (Maresca, 1985). In particular, the EC members played a pivotal role in making the development of human contacts and circulation of ideas and information an object of international relations. They did not aim at a breakthrough in the existing situation, but at starting a process of normalization in European human relations without which détente had a poor chance of lasting (Romano, 2009).

The CSCE security regime might not have emerged without the particular temporal condition of détente in the early 1970s. It was during the détente period, rather than during the belligerent period of the Cold War, that some of the favorable preconditions for the CSCE developed. In this regard, it is notable that the Nixon−Brezhnev 1972 summit meeting paved the way for the opening of the CSCE (Wenger and Mastny, 2008). This meeting produced an extensive array of bilateral agreements, highlighted by the Basic Principles of Mutual Relations and the SALT I accord (Garthoff, 1985). Movement toward the CSCE was supported in this summit meeting. The US−Soviet communiqué called for the opening of multilateral consultations on the CSCE as soon as the final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin could be signed, and it stated that the CSCE should be convened 'at a time to be agreed by the countries concerned, but without undue delay' (Maresca, 1985). In the midst of détente, the final precondition of security regime formation became clear, namely the qualified acceptance of the territorial status quo, though the political status quo was not accepted by either side (Davy, 2009). Along with the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, the FRG treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland were both ratified on 23 May 1972. They opened the way for the modus vivendi between the East and the West by settling key territorial issues caused by WWII. This conclusion is supported by the fact that, right after this ratification, NATO foreign ministers gave a formal approval to the opening of multilateral preparatory talks in Helsinki on 31 May 1972.

The CSCE security regime was envisioned as a pan-European security regime from the outset. This idea was supported by the East from the beginning. However, this does not necessarily mean that there was a consensus on the path of the CSCE security regime. The participating states envisioned differing paths for the CSCE security regime (Ferraris, 1979). With these different approaches, the participating states assumed different positions on the substantive provisions of the CSCE security regime. Their different positions were ironed out through complex negotiations into four Baskets of the Helsinki Final Act. The signing of the Helsinki Final Act by 35 European and North American parties, and in particular the document's publication in Eastern Europe, spurred the development of a network devoted to ensuring its implementation (Snyder, 2011). The evolutionary trajectory and consequences of the Final Act, on all sides, were unpredicted and unexpected at that time.

Evolutionary trajectory

The evolutionary trajectory of the Helsinki Process (1972−1994) is marked by four discernible punctuations that may be labeled as 'regime creation,' 'regime development,' 'regime transition,' and 'regime transformation' (Hong, 1997). The first phase of the Helsinki Process (1972−1975)

was completed with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The major achievement of the Final Act was salient in the non-military security dimension on the one hand, and the military security dimension on the other hand, i.e., the inclusion of a principle of human rights in a landmark East–West document and a set of initial confidence-building measures. In fact, the principal trade-off in the Final Act was between a qualified general recognition of the geopolitical status quo in Europe and an equally qualified agreement that human rights are a legitimate element of East–West relations, without which détente cannot advance (Maresca, 1985). The Final Act also legitimized the possibility of peaceful change of frontiers, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement. As soon as the West recognized the existing realities on the continent, it put sound bases for a change in place (Romano, 2009).

Human rights are dealt with in two ways in the Final Act: as a theoretical matter in the seventh principle, 'Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, including the Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion or Belief,' and as a very practical matter in the first two sections of Basket III, human contacts and information. Most significant to the development and influence of a transnational Helsinki network was Eastern agreement to this principle, committing them to respect human rights, and to the human contacts provisions. Eastern concession on these points gave rise to surprising and unintended consequences, heightening human rights activism in the USSR and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc (Snyder, 2011).

In parallel to human rights, the Final Act also introduced a set of confidence-building measures such as prior notification of military maneuvers and the exchange, on a voluntary and bilateral basis, of observers attending military maneuvers. Even though the Helsinki CBMs were explicitly 'voluntary,' they were honored by the participating states during the period of 1975–1986 (Ghebali, 1989). With a clear political commitment, however, the role of the Helsinki CBM regime was still limited in its effectiveness to the extent that the provisions on CBMs in the Final Act were neither militarily significant nor obligatory in nature, containing only informative measures (Hong, 2009).

The second phase of the Helsinki Process (1977–1986) may be labeled as 'regime development.' Basically, the security issues covered by the CSCE security regime remained little changed in this phase. Military security was reinforced by the adoption of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Stockholm (17 January 1984 – 19 September 1986), whereas non-military security was also strengthened as a balance to the events in Madrid. Reconfirming the provisions of the Final Act, the Concluding Document of Madrid laid down a number of new agreements concerning human rights and the humanitarian dimension (Sizoo and Jurrjens, 1984).

The most salient achievement of this phase was the adoption of the second generation of the CSBMs and its extension of applicability to all of Europe, including the entire European part of Soviet territory up to the Ural Mountains. It was an extended set of CSBMs, including on-site inspection and constraining measures. Whereas the CBMs in the Final Act were mainly of a voluntary nature, the CSBMs laid down in the Stockholm Document were politically binding. It was significant because it paved a way to link operational measures and structural measures in the CSCE security regime.

The third phase of the Helsinki Process (1986–1990) may be labeled as 'regime transition.' It was the Vienna Follow-up Meeting (4 November 1986 – 19 January 1989) that paved the way to the 'transition' of the CSCE security regime. The use of the term 'regime transition' is justifiable for two reasons: first, owing to the drastic changes of international environment surrounding the regime, which were mainly provoked by Mikhail Gorbachev's new thinking; second, as a consequence of the dramatic changes of the CSCE security regime itself. Evidence of regime transition was epitomized by the Soviet proposal at the Vienna Follow-up Meeting to host a conference on human rights in Moscow, as well as subsequent efforts to secure consensus for the proposed

meeting. This signaled that Gorbachev was incorporating respect for human rights as an element of *perestroika* (Snyder, 2011).

The achievements of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting balanced both the human and military dimensions. The main achievement in the human dimension was the adoption of a far-reaching supervisory mechanism, the so-called Vienna mechanism. By adopting a mechanism for the permanent monitoring of the implementation of human rights commitments, the human rights issue gained a new dimension as a security issue in the CSCE. It signaled an end to the traditional confrontation of two incompatible value systems and established human rights as a common value of European politics.

Meanwhile, the main achievement in the dimension of military security was undoubtedly the agreement on the mandate for the negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The CFE, for the first time, opened the way for negotiating the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe. Even though the participants in the negotiation process were limited to the 23 states that belonged to military alliances, the Vienna Concluding Document clearly provided that the CFE negotiations should take place in the framework of the CSCE process. Parallel to the CFE, the Vienna Concluding Document also mandated Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Compared with the first generation of the Helsinki CBMs and the second generation of the Stockholm CSBMs, the Vienna CSBMs were expanded, more clearly specified, more militarily significant, more sophisticated (computerized), and institutionalized (an annual implementation assessment meeting in the context of a Conflict Prevention Centre). Whereas the Vienna Document was only politically binding, the CFE Treaty achieved the autonomous status of a legally binding international treaty.

The fourth phase of the Helsinki Process (1991−1994) may be labeled as 'regime transformation.' After the Paris Summit in November 1990, the CSCE gained a new dynamism, ultimately resulting in a transformation of the regime from merely a 'process' into an 'international organization.' This transformation was highlighted in the Budapest Review Meeting (10 October – 2 December 1994) by changing the name from the CSCE to the OSCE (Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe). Regime transformation in the fourth phase is characterized by 'institution and mechanism building' as a comprehensive security regime.

There are several reasons for the transformation of the CSCE security regime: First of all, the NATO states no longer feared the CSCE as a potential rival of the Atlantic Alliance; they discovered that the CSCE was an appropriate forum to address the security concerns of the Central and East European countries. Second, the Central and East European countries also saw the CSCE as an alternative security framework to fill the power vacuum after the collapse of the WTO and the Soviet Union. This coincidence of interests increased the need for more effective CSCE institutions and mechanisms (Lehne, 1991). This envisioned the transformation of the CSCE security regime into an operational comprehensive security regime at the Pan-European level, even though hopes were disappointed.

Self-organized criticality

The evolutionary trajectory of the Helsinki Process can be seen as a consequence of the regime's self-organized criticality. The CSCE security regime had adapted itself through interactions with changes in the international environment. It turned out that the self-organized criticality of the CSCE security regime was particularly susceptible to the changing international environment.

For instance, the general set-back of the Belgrade Follow-up Meeting (4 October 1977 – 9 March 1978) was attributed to the deteriorating international environment and the emergence of

the Carter administration, on the one hand, and monitoring groups of the Helsinki Final Act in the East, on the other. After the signing of the Final Act, the West realized that the East had achieved its goal in recognition of the qualified territorial status quo in Europe in the Final Act, whereas the Western goal, that is, the establishment of human rights in Europe, was not yet achieved (Bloed, 1990). With the advent of monitoring groups in Eastern Europe, the West, and especially the United States, began to re-evaluate the importance of the Final Act in this respect. The West began to use the meeting as a platform from which to show its commitment to human rights. The West raised a number of cases of human rights violations in East European countries, especially in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. This Western strategy provoked the East, and as a result tension between the East and the West heightened around the Belgrade meeting. Consequentially, tension on the issue area of human rights had a negative impact upon the Helsinki Process as a whole. The only achievement in Belgrade was the agreement on convening the next follow-up meeting in Madrid.

The Madrid Follow-up Meeting (11 November 1980 – 9 September 1983) was convened against the background of a further deteriorated international environment. In particular, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the increasing violations of human rights provisions in the East European countries, the American boycott of grain exports to the Soviet Union in 1980, a series of boycotts of the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980, and the Polish imposition of martial law in December 1981 overshadowed the Madrid Follow-up Meeting. After the opening of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting in late 1980, the negotiation procedures, which took almost three years to create, underwent many fluctuations in parallel to the changing East−West relations. Nevertheless, the Madrid Follow-up Meeting made progress in the military security realm by reaching an agreement on convening a Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm and added meaningful provisions to the Basket III area.

The agreement on convening the Stockholm Conference is attributed to the development of military technology which triggered off a nuclear arms race between the two military blocs, and tensions escalated especially during the late 1970s and early 1980s. It was against this background that the CSCE security regime was developed during the Stockholm Conference. In the face of prevailing tensions in Europe, the successful conclusion of CSBMs in Stockholm emerged as a pressing item on the agenda because it was a precondition for disarmament negotiations (Mastny, 1992). In addition, the sense of frustration felt at the Belgrade Follow-up Meeting, much greater Western solidarity as a result of Soviet violations and bullying tactics, more public pressure, and the need to ally public opinion behind the deployment of new weaponry generated an acceptance of the imperative nature of the process in Madrid, resulting in a new momentum in the Madrid Follow-up Meeting (Hong, 1997; Korey, 1993). This demonstrates that the CSCE security regime worked despite external conditions and some actors' Cold War attitude. This fact suggests the capacity of the regime to adapt and not only survive but even confirm and strengthen its scope.

The Stockholm CDE Conference was overshadowed by the easing Cold War at the beginning of the conference and by the emerging entente at its end. At the beginning of the conference, it was apparent that the deployment of Pershing and GLCM by NATO irritated the WTO. This resulted in a sharp contrast between the negotiation positions of NATO and the WTO. However, as leadership in the Soviet Union changed, the international environment also began to shift. Facing a number of internal problems, Gorbachev attempted to improve East−West relations. The first sign of the new Soviet attitude was revealed in Gorbachev's speech in January 1986. Gorbachev declared the Soviet Union's readiness to allow, for the first time, on-site inspection of its nuclear test facilities. The second sign was his speech in East Berlin in April 1986. On this

occasion, the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to engage in negotiations to reduce conventional forces in Europe, where the zone of application was defined as stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. The overall change in the international environment had a positive impact on the Stockholm CDE negotiations.

The results of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting also corresponded to the changed international environment. It is worth noting that US−Soviet relations gained momentum in the middle of 1986 at the time of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting. For example, the Warsaw Pact's 'Budapest Appeal' of 11 June paved the way for conventional force reductions in Europe, the Stockholm conference was about to be successfully concluded, and the negotiations on strategic and space weapons in Geneva were under way. These positive movements culminated in the Reykjavik summit meeting (11−12 October 1986). However, this meeting failed to break a deadlock. The failure of the Reykjavik summit meeting notwithstanding, this series of dialogues assured both sides a shared common ground on which they could compromise on remaining problems in the future. Considering that the Vienna Follow-up Meeting convened only three weeks after Reykjavik, the prevailing mood of the US−Soviet dialogues was necessarily reflected in the Vienna Follow-up Meeting and afterwards. Therefore, as mandated in the Vienna Follow-up Meeting, the Vienna CSBMs and CFE negotiations were successfully concluded and finally adopted in the Paris Summit in 1990. The Paris Summit heralded the emergence of a new community of values through a common commitment to a pluralist democracy and the rule of law, the historic achievement of German unity, and a full-fledged security regime.

It is evident that the fluctuating, but continuous reproduction of the CSCE security regime was a consequence of self-organized criticality by which the regime adapted to the changing environment. This is attributed to the self-adaptive feedback mechanisms that are institutionalized in the form of follow-up meetings and the consensus-based decision-making rule. The negotiators in the follow-up meetings evaluated the implementation records of the provisions in the Final Act and shared the information throughout the negotiations. If their expectations were not fulfilled, they moved to modify the security regime through a reflexive negotiation process. In this process, all decisions needed the consensus of each participating state. As Snyder (2011) correctly points out, this dynamic heightened the level of compromise and manifested itself in the constant balancing of Soviet-favored security issues with Western-desired humanitarian provisions − an exchange that was embedded in the Helsinki Final Act.

Social resonance

Traditionally, the end of the Cold War in Europe has been explained by a multitude of factors including economic decline, imperial overstretch, military competition, nationalism, the transmission of Western culture, scientific and educational contacts, and the personalities of key leaders, among others (Bozo et al., 2008; Snyder, 2011; Villaume and Westad, 2010). This article argues that the social resonance set in motion by the CSCE security regime was critical in the transformation of Europe in the late 1980s. In particular, the human rights norms of the Helsinki Final Act were the most conspicuous source of social resonance that facilitated the rise of organized dissent in Eastern Europe, freedom of movement for East Germans, and improved human rights practices in the Soviet Union. The change in the international normative environment created unprecedented opportunities for human rights advocacy across the communist bloc. Helsinki activists challenged the repressiveness of the party-state by organizing human rights 'watch groups' and opposition coalitions focused on human rights, and by engaging the influence of otherwise uninterested foreign governments and media. The resulting domestic and transnational social resonance shaped a

dominant logic for delegitimizing the arguments that sustained repressive, one-party rule. In the end, the communist rule succumbed to the convergence of popular demands for change and the initiatives of within-system reformers in communist bloc countries.

The social resonance in the human dimension is a consequence of two combined dynamics of top-down reforms and bottom-up protest: in other words, the mobilization of human rights movements across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the transformation of the diplomatic agenda for East–West relations. The expansion of civil society under the banner of human rights, the 'boomerang' effect of dissent on the legitimacy of the party-state, and Western governments' insistence on linking diplomatic relations to implementation of human rights norms contributed to Gorbachev's thinking of the necessity for political reforms. These reforms amplified resonant frequency for social mobilization and organized opposition that pushed political change well beyond the intensions or expectations of Gorbachev, and ultimately overwhelmed the weakened party-states' hold on power in the Soviet Union and across Eastern Europe (Snyder, 2011; Thomas, 2001).

Meanwhile, the effect of the social resonance in the military security dimension is not negligible. The participating states' habitus on mutual confidence was solidified through reciprocal compliance with the rules and procedures of the CSBM regime. Since the Helsinki CBMs launched, the participating states were gradually assured by enhanced transparency and predictability in military activities. The solidified habitus on confidence building consequently led to the incorporation of CFE talks into the framework of the CSCE security regime. Thus the CSCE security regime became endowed with the mandate for both operational control and structural control. In fact, the increased confidence in the military activities among the participating states, together with the synergetic effect of the social resonance in the human dimension, significantly contributed to a reduction in the possibility of surprise attacks in the CSCE area, which ended up with the adoption of 'The Charter of Paris for a New Europe' in 1990.

Co-evolution

The co-evolutionary process between the CSCE security regime and the changing environment was expedited through a complex chain of interrelated factors in social resonance and epitomized by the name change from the CSCE to the OSCE. An inquiry into the co-evolution between the CSCE security regime and its environment calls for examination from two perspectives: the structural shifts in Europe and their impact on the CSCE security regime.

As a consequence of the revolutions throughout Eastern Europe in 1989 and the consequent collapse of the WTO and demise of the Soviet Union, the structure of power distribution underwent drastic changes. The impact of structural changes is twofold: the declining leadership of the United States in European affairs and the disappearance of Russian leadership in the Eastern bloc. NATO lost its raison d'être and consequently found its new roles with the cessation of the threat from the WTO. US intervention in European affairs was consequently reduced. This gave rise to serious disarray in the Western alliance, weakening alliance cohesion. Meanwhile, Russia kept a low profile in the CSCE negotiations. This led to the loss of traditional alliance under the leadership of the Soviet Union. These overall changes in alliance cohesion made the negotiations much more complex than ever before. For example, the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (24 March – 8 July 1992) faced a fundamental difficulty caused by the lack of overall leadership. The strong powers included the United States, Germany, the UK, France, and the Russian Federation. In most instances the big five were split among themselves, and even then a balance of power between two competing groups failed to emerge. With no clear leadership in the meeting, the EC and the United States vied

for such a role on many substantive issues. This was not conducive to quick or far-reaching results (Heraclides, 1993).

The post-Cold War era primarily brought about three changes in the perception of the CSCE negotiators. First, security became less divisible than ever before. For example, ethnic tensions, social disturbances, internal struggles, and conflicts were no longer internal affairs. Second, some European states saw a revival of nationalistic policies. Third, as a consequence, European states began to see a common perception of threat. All these changed perceptions influenced the CSCE security regime transformation. This was especially true in the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting and Summit Meeting, which marked a drastic transformation of the CSCE security regime 'from Helsinki I to Helsinki II.'

The most pressing task facing the CSCE security regime was to develop its capability for conflict prevention, settlement, and crisis management for the whole of Europe in the turbulent conditions of the post-Cold War era. Regarding this issue, in general, two different approaches emerged. One was the maximalist approach, and the other the minimalist approach. The former envisioned the CSCE security regime as a legally based organization capable of providing security guarantees, whereas the latter rejected such ambitious ideas and merely held on to a flexible political process. For example, during the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, France strongly advocated that the CSCE have legal status, whereas the United States opposed the move, defining it as fundamentally undermining the essential political, non-bureaucratic nature of the CSCE. As a result of the package deals between France and the United States, an agreement was made to grant international recognition to the CSCE Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Center, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). In addition to this, a number of institutions and mechanisms were built within the CSCE security regime. Thus, it can be said that the overall structural shifts at that time shifted the CSCE security regime toward a comprehensive security regime, changing in function from 'principle and norm setting' towards 'rule and mechanism building,' and from a 'process' to an 'international organization.' Therefore, it can be concluded that the CSCE security regime contributed to the structural shifts in the international environment in Europe, which in turn brought about transformation of the CSCE security regime itself.

Conclusions

The theoretical implications drawn from this case study suggest that the concept of path emergence allows for a better explanation of causations underlying emergent properties generated by complex interactions between entities than the concepts of path dependency, contingency, creation, and generation. The existent variations of path dependency theory do not successfully explain the emergent properties exhibited within a complex adaptive system. For example, in the case of the CSCE security regime, they do not aptly explain the unintended effect of the Helsinki Final Act which served as a clue to the end of the Cold War in Europe. In contrast, the path emergence theory provides an epistemological roadmap to account for the 'Helsinki effect' more substantially and systematically. The path emergence theory suggested in this article highlights four metaphors to account for emergent properties: morphogenetic fields, self-organized criticality, social resonance, and co-evolution. Indeed, the four metaphors can be a valuable conceptual tool to analyze unintended consequences resulting from any type of institutional evolution. The empirical case study in this article generates several theoretical insights.

First, the institutional form of a complex adaptive system can emerge as a consequence of complex interactions among spatial–temporal particularities embedded within a specific morphogenetic field. The specific morphogenetic field enfolds an implicate order which may be unfolded

into a multidimensional explicate order. Path emergence regards evolutionary trajectory of the path as contingent in the sense that it is unpredictable at the stage of morphogenetic germ. Moreover, path emergence does not rule out the possibility of coexistence between chance and choice while at the same time recognizing the reflexive interactions between agency and structure. Second, the evolutionary trajectory of an institutional path within a complex adaptive system is governed by self-organized criticality. Self-organized criticality is manifested by institutional review mechanisms which are a consequence of aggregated interactions among agents. Owing to the dynamics of self-organized criticality, an institution maintains its equilibrium by adapting itself to the changing environment in the face of external shocks. As the case study shows, self-organized criticality is sometimes marked by punctuated equilibrium. Third, the path emergence theory claims its originality by presenting social resonance as a key mechanism underlying emergent properties. Resonance in the social field implies the synchronization of the habitus shared by agents. Social resonance shapes a dominant logic that serves as a trigger for sudden changes in the path when it exceeds a certain threshold. Social resonance is a key to unlock the enigma of unforeseen and unintended consequences of social change. Fourth, the manifestation of emergent properties within a complex adaptive system is explained by co-evolution. Ultimately, a system and its environment interact and generate dynamic and emergent properties. Co-evolution describes how the parts interplay with the whole in an infinite cycle of path emergence.

In short, the path emergence theory is designed to capture the complex interactions occurring within a complex adaptive system where an implicate order evolves into an explicate order, exhibiting emergent properties. The path emergence theory shows that this evolution tends to end up with seemingly unintended consequences. In this sense, we can say that the path emergence theory has the potential to be developed into a generic theory of institutional morphogenesis. It must be noted, however, that this article is simply an initial piece of research on path emergence. Since most concepts in path emergence are adopted from natural science, they need to be more appropriately redefined for social science and empirically verified by more case studies. Further studies are expected to follow in order to build upon and test theoretical lacunas in this article.

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