Motivating cosmopolitan helping: Thick cosmopolitanism, responsibility for harm, and collective guilt

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Abstract
Political theorists and philosophers have recently directed their attention to understanding how individuals may become motivated to act as ethical cosmopolitans. A prominent theory – termed "thick cosmopolitanism" – argues that the realization one's ingroup is responsible for causing harm to people in distant nations will increase cosmopolitan helping behavior. Additionally, thick cosmopolitanism suggests that guilt may explain this effect. This article presents the first experimental tests of these claims, and is the first research to use experiments to investigate cosmopolitan helping. Results demonstrate a substantial, but previously unrecognized, limitation to thick cosmopolitanism. Specifically, reminders of ingroup responsibility for causing harm not only increased individuals' acceptance of responsibility and collective guilt, which indirectly enhanced cosmopolitan helping (Studies 1 and 2), but simultaneously increased dehumanization of the harmed outgroup, which indirectly diminished helping (Study 2). These conflicting processes resulted in no overall increase in cosmopolitan helping, contrary to the predictions of thick cosmopolitanism.

Introduction

The ethical position of cosmopolitanism has experienced a renaissance in the political and social sciences in recent years (e.g. Cheah and Robbins, 1998; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2014; Linklater, 2001; Smith, 2008; Van Hooft, 2009), yet very little remains known about the causes and antecedents of cosmopolitan behavior. At its core, cosmopolitanism is the idea that all humans can, and/or should, consider themselves as belonging to a universal group that includes every person, and should treat

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all persons with equal moral concern (e.g. Nussbaum, 1997; Shapcott, 2010; Van Hooft, 2009). In practice, this demand is interpreted by many theorists to mean that cosmopolitans must help people who are suffering, even if those people belong to different national, racial, religious, or other groups (Beitz, 1988; Caney, 2000; Kleingeld and Brown, 2009; Lu, 2000; Pogge, 2002 Van Hooft, 2009). According to these theorists, the requirement that cosmopolitans help distant others is central to what it means to be a cosmopolitan (Kleingeld and Brown, 2009).[1]

Despite cosmopolitanism's long history, theorists have only recently begun to consider seriously how individuals might be encouraged to act as cosmopolitans in practice. Early cosmopolitan theorists did not entirely neglect to consider how individuals might be motivated to act as cosmopolitans, but their efforts to address this question have been characterized as merely "*malgré lui*, rather than as a key component of the cosmopolitan package" (Dobson, 2006: 165). A "motivational vacuum" has thus lain at cosmopolitanism's core (Dobson, 2006).

A recent theory, termed thick cosmopolitanism (Dobson, 2006; Lawford-Smith, 2012; Linklater, 2007), sought to fill this motivational vacuum. The theory argues that the realization that individuals' ingroups are responsible for causing harm to people in developing countries will increase cosmopolitan behavior in the form of willingness to help rectify the harm. Moreover, thick cosmopolitanism suggests that collective guilt may at least partially explain this effect (Linklater, 2006). A lingering problem, however, remains for thick cosmopolitanism: although several studies in social psychology have investigated the effect of guilt on other forms of helping (e.g. Branscombe and Doosje, 2004; McGarty et al., 2005; Zebel et al., 2009), no empirical studies have directly tested thick cosmopolitanism's central claim that collective responsibility and guilt actually motivate the sort of helping across national boundaries that is essential to cosmopolitanism.

Accordingly, this article uses two experimental studies to examine whether collective responsibility increases cosmopolitan helping in practice. The article makes two key contributions to understanding the causes of cosmopolitan helping. First, the studies reported here provide the first direct experimental evidence about the causes of cosmopolitan helping behavior. An experimental approach to the study of cosmopolitan helping has the distinct strength of allowing researchers to make credible estimates of causal effects with minimal assumptions (Druckman and Lupia, 2012; Druckman et al., 2011). Identifying the causes of cosmopolitan helping at the individual level assists scholars in building theories of cosmopolitan motivation, and developing interventions to increase cosmopolitan behavior.

Second, the current studies demonstrate a significant, but previously unrecognized, problem with thick cosmopolitanism's account of cosmopolitan motivation. Specifically, when individuals are reminded of their group's responsibility for harming a distant outgroup, they tend not only to express greater acceptance of responsibility and more collective guilt, but also to engage in increased dehumanization of the harmed outgroup. These processes are found here to work in opposite directions, and ultimately to result in no overall increase in the level of cosmopolitan helping following reminders of responsibility.

Thick cosmopolitanism

Thick cosmopolitanism (Dobson, 2006) argues that cosmopolitan behaviors are 'most likely to develop when actors believe that they are causally responsible for harming others and their physical environment' (Linklater, 2006: 111).[2] Proponents of thick cosmopolitanism argue that causal responsibility for harm is a powerful motivator of cosmopolitan helping that "offers a thicker account of the ties that bind and more compelling reasons for doing the right thing" than other approaches aiming to increase cosmopolitan behavior, such as appeals to common humanity (Dobson, 2006: 173).

A range of possible links of causal responsibility have been identified by proponents of thick cosmopolitanism. Dobson (2006), for example, identified poor working conditions in developing nations as one area in which links of causal responsibility might be found. Dobson (2006) described an Oxfam (2004) report which claimed that large multinational retailers were using their power in global supply chains to pressure suppliers to deliver products for lower costs and with more flexibility, ultimately leading to lower wages and fewer rights for the most vulnerable workers at the bottom of the supply chain. As such, Dobson (2006) claimed that any individual who shops at the retailers highlighted in the report – including Wal-Mart, Toys R Us, Tommy Hilfiger, and Tesco – was complicit in the harming of distant others. The recognition of this causal responsibility should – according to thick cosmopolitanism – make individuals likely to want to rectify the injustice, thus leading to cosmopolitan behavior in the form of helping.

Thick cosmopolitanism implies that attempts to rectify injustice by helping people who are suffering in distant nations are among the most important behavioral manifestations of cosmopolitanism. For example, Linklater (2007: 19) implies that "collective action to reduce unnecessary suffering in distant places" is an example of cosmopolitan behavior. Similarly, Dobson (2006: 179) mentions monetary transfers from people in high-carbon-emitting states (e.g. the USA and the UK) to people in low-carbon-emitting states that are being affected by the negative consequences of global warming as an example of cosmopolitan behavior. Indeed, many contemporary theorists argue that helping individuals who are suffering in distant parts of the globe is essential to cosmopolitanism (e.g. Beitz, 1988; Caney, 2000; Kleingeld and Brown, 2009; Lu, 2000; Pogge, 2002; Van Hooft, 2009). Thus, the current research uses willingness to help distant outgroups as the central measure of cosmopolitan behavior, as described below.

As yet, the efficacy of thick cosmopolitanism has not been investigated. The present studies thus represent the first direct experimental tests of the theory.

The effect of collective guilt on helping

Although thick cosmopolitanism has not been directly empirically tested, a substantial amount of research has been conducted by social psychologists on the link between guilt and helping. Of most relevance to thick cosmopolitanism is research that has been conducted on the effect of collective guilt on intergroup helping. Collective guilt arises when individuals feel personally or collectively responsible for the blameworthy actions of the groups to which they belong (Branscombe and Doosje, 2004; Faulkner, 2014; Iyer et al., 2004; Lickel et al., 2011). For example, European Australians may experience collective guilt associated with historical mistreatment of, and the current inequality facing, indigenous Australians (Leach et al., 2006, 2007; McGarty et al., 2005). Similarly, Dutch citizens may experience collective guilt associated with their nation's historical mistreatment of African slaves, or with the extent to which Jews were deported from Holland to Germany during World War II (Zebel et al., 2009).

Collective guilt has been found to be positively associated with willingness to provide compensation to harmed outgroups. For example, guilt about the Netherland's past colonization of Indonesia predicted Dutch participants' support for providing compensation to Indonesia (Doosje et al., 1998). Similarly, European Americans' collective guilt associated with the advantages they enjoy relative to African Americans predicted support for offering compensation (Iyer et al., 2003). Gunn and Wilson (2011) found that collective guilt associated with non-Aboriginal Canadians historical mistreatment of Aboriginal Canadians was positively associated with willingness to offer compensation. Finally, Zebel et al. (2008) found that collective guilt about Dutch soldiers' failure to stop Muslims being killed during the 1995 war in former Yugoslavia predicted Dutch participants' support for a government policy offering reparation and apologies to the victims' descendants.

Although these existing studies have investigated the effect of collective guilt on outgroup helping, further research is needed to determine if collective guilt and responsibility can motivate cosmopolitan helping. First, further research is needed because: (a) cosmopolitan helping necessarily requires help to be given to outgroups much larger than those used in previous research; and (b) prior research indicates that the larger a suffering group is, the more difficult it is to motivate help for that group (Dickert et al., 2014; Dunn and Ashton-James, 2008). This means that it is unclear if the findings from existing research on collective guilt will also apply in contexts relevant to cosmopolitanism. Second, further research is needed because: (a) most prior research on collective guilt has been conducted in contexts where both the ingroup and harmed outgroup belong to the same nation; and (b) recent research indicates that individuals typically care less about people outside of their own nation (Cikara et al., 2014). For these reasons, research is needed to establish whether reminders of responsibility for harming people from distant nations is capable of increasing willingness to help those people.

Consistent with both thick cosmopolitanism and existing social psychological research on collective guilt, the following hypotheses were identified:

H1. Providing reminders that an individual's ingroup is responsible for harming a distant outgroup will increase cosmopolitan helping in the form of willingness to help the harmed outgroup.

H2. Results will support a model whereby reminders of responsibility for harm increase acceptance of responsibility, which in turn increases collective guilt, which in turn increases cosmopolitan helping.

Potential weaknesses of using guilt to motivate helping

Although existing research in social psychology indicates that guilt motivates intergroup helping, there remain possible weaknesses in using causal responsibility and guilt as motivators of cosmopolitan helping. One such weakness is that individuals may attempt to avoid feeling guilt in the first place by using strategies that not only avoid guilt, but also reduce helping behavior. For example, individuals may dehumanize the harmed outgroup (Castano and Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Čehaijić et al., 2009; Zebel et al., 2008; also see Nussbaum, 2010), question the credibility of information claiming that they are responsible for harm (Ditto and Lopez, 1992; Petty et al., 1999), or derogate victims by evaluating them less positively (e.g. Katz et al., 1973; Lerner and Matthews, 1967). Each of these responses would conceivably decrease cosmopolitan helping if they were to arise, yet they have never before been considered in detail by proponents of thick cosmopolitanism. As such, the following hypotheses were identified:

H3. Highlighting responsibility will increase dehumanization and reduce outgroup evaluations and perceived article credibility.

H4. Dehumanization will be negatively associated with cosmopolitan helping, whereas outgroup evaluations and perceived article credibility will be positively associated with cosmopolitan helping.

The present research

Two experimental studies tested the hypotheses identified above. Both studies tested the effects of reminding individuals of their ingroup's role in causing harm to workers in developing nations,

since this context had been highlighted by proponents of thick cosmopolitanism (Dobson, 2006). Study 1 thus manipulated responsibility by providing reminders of ingroup responsibility to approximately half of the participants and measured acceptance of responsibility, collective guilt, and cosmopolitan helping. Study 2 investigated responses to highlighting responsibility that may reduce cosmopolitan helping. Study 2 again manipulated reminders of responsibility, and included measures of dehumanization, outgroup evaluations, and perceptions of the credibility of the article that contained reminders of responsibility in addition to measures of acceptance of responsibility, collective guilt, and cosmopolitan helping.

Study 1

Method

Participants were 223 USA-based individuals who were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (Berinsky et al., 2012; Buhrmeister et al., 2011; Goodman et al., 2012). Seven participants who indicated they were not of American nationality were excluded from the analyses reported below, thus leaving 216 remaining participants. Of these, 109 (50.5%) were male, 105 (48.6%) were female, and 2 (0.9%) did not specify their sex. Participants had a mean age of 36.6 (*SD* = 13.3). This was not a representative sample. However, in this study the purpose was not to make statistical generalizations to any particular population, but instead to test the theoretical relation between causal responsibility and cosmopolitan helping.

Participants were directed to an online study that was described as being interested in how individuals react to news articles. To minimize experimental demand, participants were told that they would first read an article that was randomly-chosen from a pool of articles about a variety of current events, before answering a series of questions about themselves, their attitudes, and their feelings.

After reading the plain-language information statement, participants were randomly presented with one of two versions of an article about working conditions in developing countries. The article reported on a study that had purportedly found that employment conditions in developing countries were "harsh and unhealthy." To manipulate responsibility, participants in the responsibility-highlighted condition were given a version of the article that included the following text in addition to the general information about harsh working conditions just noted:

> The study highlights that everyday citizens of developed nations, including the USA, are substantially but indirectly to blame for the poor working conditions being faced by workers in developing countries.

> Key author of the study, Sarah Dearing, explained that, "Citizens of developed nations frequently shop for low prices on the food and clothes they purchase."

> "Retailers respond to the demand for low cost products by using their power in global supply chains to pressure suppliers in developing nations to deliver products for lower costs and with more flexibility."

> Ultimately, this results in lower wages and fewer rights for the world's most vulnerable workers.

> "The purchasing patterns of everyday citizens in America are clearly causing harm to workers in developing countries," Dearing said.

Participants in the control condition were given an article that omitted the above information about responsibility, but was otherwise identical to the article given to participants in the responsibility-highlighted condition.

Table 1. Mean differences between experimental conditions, Study 1.

Measure	Mean (SD)		
	Control	Responsibility highlighted	*t*
Cosmopolitan helping	3.10 (3.02)	2.99 (2.64)	0.28
Acceptance of responsibility	4.37 (2.06)	5.46 (2.12)	3.83*
Collective guilt	0.56 (0.25)	0.58 (0.26)	0.46

Note: * *p* < 0.05.

Participants completed measures of collective guilt, cosmopolitan helping, and acceptance of responsibility for harm. Collective guilt was measured using a four-item scale. The scale included two items that were adapted from the Branscombe et al. (2004) measure of collective guilt ("I feel guilty about the negative things American people did to workers in developing countries" and "I can easily feel guilty about the bad outcomes for workers in developing countries that were brought about by American people"), and adapted versions of Zebel and colleagues' (2009) additions to the collective guilt scale ("I feel guilty when I am confronted with the negative things American people have done to workers in developing countries" and "The behavior of American people toward workers in developing countries makes me easily feel guilty"). These four items were summed and standardized to a scale where 0 was equal to the lowest possible level of collective guilt and 1 was equal to the highest possible level of collective guilt. As in past research, the scale exhibited very high internal consistency, $\alpha = 0.95$.

After completing the measure of collective guilt, participants were reminded that the article they read previously had mentioned that the "Universal Humanity Foundation" – which is a fictional organization that was described as "an international agency whose aim is to reduce poverty and injustice for all people, irrespective of nationalities or religions" – had started a campaign to improve working conditions in developing countries. To measure cosmopolitan helping, participants were asked how many hours they would be willing to volunteer in the Universal Humanity Foundation's campaign. The total number of hours could range from 0 = "None" to 9 = "9 or more."

The extent to which participants accepted that their group was responsible for harm was measured by asking participants to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statement: "American people are partially responsible for the plight of workers in developing countries" (from 1 = "strongly disagree" to 8 = "strongly agree").

Results

Results showed that participants in the responsibility-highlighted condition ($M = 5.46$, $SD = 2.12$) expressed significantly higher acceptance of responsibility than participants in the control condition ($M = 4.37$, $SD = 2.06$), $t (214) = 3.83$, $p < 0.001$. The manipulation of causal responsibility was therefore effective in increasing the extent to which participants perceived their group to be more responsible for harming people in developing countries

Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of collective guilt, cosmopolitan helping, and acceptance of responsibility measures in each condition. Contrary to thick cosmopolitanism, reminders of causal responsibility for harm did not significantly affect cosmopolitan helping, $t (213) = 0.28$, $p = 0.78$, or collective guilt, $t (213) = 0.46$, $p = 0.65$.

Although no significant direct effects of the manipulations on helping or guilt were found, one hypothesis was that causal responsibility would only have an indirect effect on cosmopolitan

Table 2. Scale intercorrelations of variables in path analysis, Study 1.

Variable	Correlations			
	1	2	3	4
1. Responsibility condition	–	−.03	.03	.06
2. Cosmopolitan helping		–	.41[*]	.48[*]
3. Collective guilt			–	.47[*]
4. Acceptance of responsibility				–

Note: n = 202. Listwise deletion was used to remove all participants with missing data. Responsibility condition was manipulated and coded as: 1 = responsibility not highlighted and 2 = responsibility highlighted.
*p < 0.05.

Figure 1. Path model showing the effects of reminders of responsibility, acceptance of responsibility and collective guilt on cosmopolitan helping, Study 1.
Note: n = 202. Values displayed above paths represent standardized estimates. For clarity, error terms are not shown.
* p < 0.05.

helping that operated via acceptance of responsibility and collective guilt. To test this hypothesis, structural equation modeling was utilized. Correlations between the four variables included in the model are presented in Table 2.

Non-parametric bootstrapping (with 2000 bootstrap samples) was used to assess the significance of indirect and total effects, as recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004) and detailed by Cheung and Lau (2008). I report significance levels obtained using the bias-corrected percentile method (Cheung and Lau, 2008; MacKinnon et al., 2004).

The model tested is presented in Figure 1.[3] All fit statistics indicated very good fit; $\chi^2 = 3.09$, $p = 0.38$, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) > 0.99, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.99, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.01. As predicted, highlighting responsibility had a positive, but weak, indirect effect on cosmopolitan helping (Standardized Indirect Effect = 0.04, $p = 0.001$, *95% confidence interval (CI) = 0.02; 0.07*). Specifically, highlighting responsibility increased the extent to which participants perceived their group as being responsible for harm (Standardized Direct Effect = 0.23, $p = 0.001$, *95% CI = 0.11; 0.33*), which predicted increased collective guilt (Standardized Direct Effect = 0.45, $p = 0.001$, *95% CI = 0.34; 0.55*), which in turn predicted cosmopolitan helping (Standardized Direct Effect = 0.41, $p = 0.002$, *95% CI = 0.30; 0.49*).

Discussion

Overall, findings from Study 1 partially or completely supported two of the hypotheses identified above. First, findings supported Hypothesis 2: highlighting responsibility increased the extent to which individuals accepted that their group was responsible for harm, which predicted collective guilt, which in turn predicted cosmopolitan helping. Second, results partially supported Hypothesis 1: highlighting responsibility had a positive indirect effect, but no direct effect, on cosmopolitan

helping. Although highlighting responsibility increased acceptance of responsibility, which was positively associated with collective guilt and cosmopolitan helping, highlighting responsibility did not change the extent to which individuals were willing to engage in cosmopolitan helping.

Results of Study 1 provided partial support for thick cosmopolitanism, but some important limitations must be noted. As shown by the path analysis reported above, findings support thick cosmopolitanism's claim that highlighting responsibility indirectly increases guilt. Moreover, guilt appears to encourage cosmopolitan helping, as indicated by the positive association between guilt and cosmopolitan helping. However, although path analysis indicated that highlighting responsibility had an indirect effect on helping, tests for differences in group means showed that participants in the responsibility-highlighted condition did not help significantly more than participants in the responsibility-not-highlighted condition. This finding indicates that highlighting responsibility alone does not directly increase cosmopolitan helping. It does, however, increase acceptance of responsibility, which is positively associated with collective guilt and cosmopolitan helping.

Study 2

Study 1 showed that although highlighting responsibility significantly increased acceptance of responsibility, it did not significantly increase cosmopolitan helping. Highlighting responsibility may have increased not only responsibility acceptance but also other factors (e.g. dehumanization) that may have diminished cosmopolitan helping. Study 2 included measures of some of these factors so that their associations with cosmopolitan helping could be measured.

Method

A total of 221 USA-based users of Amazon Mechanical Turk (Berinsky et al., 2012) participated in Study 2. Individuals who had participated in Study 1 were excluded from participating in Study 2 using the method described by Peer et al. (2012). Three participants who indicated they were not of American nationality and one participant who expressed suspicion about the dependent measure in an open-ended item after the study were excluded from the analyses reported below, thus reducing the sample to 217. Of these, 111 (51.6%) were male, 104 (47.9%) were female, and 2 (0.9%) did not specify their sex. Participants had a mean age of 32.5 (SD = 11.44). Participants were randomly assigned into either a responsibility-highlighted or a control condition using the same responsibility manipulation and procedure as Study 1.

Participants completed measures of cosmopolitan helping, acceptance of responsibility, collective guilt, dehumanization, outgroup evaluations, and perceived article credibility. Cosmopolitan helping was measured using the same measure as that used in Study 1.

Acceptance of responsibility was measured by asking participants to indicate their agreement (from 1 = "strongly disagree" to 8 = "strongly agree") with two statements: "American people are partially responsible for the plight of workers in developing countries," and "Poor working conditions in developing countries are partially caused by Americans." Responses were averaged to form a reliable scale, α = 0.90, r = 0.82.

Three items measured collective guilt (e.g. "I can easily feel guilty about the bad outcomes for workers in developing countries that were brought about by American people"). The items were averaged to form a reliable scale, α = 0.93.

A subtle form of dehumanization that occurs when outgroup members are deemed less capable of feeling uniquely-human emotions was measured using a scale validated by Čehajić et al. (2009). Participants were asked to indicate the extent (from 1 = "not at all" to 7 = "extremely") to which they believed workers in developing countries were likely, in general, to feel eight uniquely-human

Table 3. Mean differences between experimental conditions, Study 2.

Measure	Mean (*SD*)		
	Control	Responsibility highlighted	*t*
Cosmopolitan helping	2.55 (2.58)	3.01 (2.87)	1.21
Acceptance of responsibility	4.62 (1.95)	5.60 (1.77)	3.85*
Collective guilt	4.44 (1.92)	5.06 (1.84)	2.42*
Dehumanization	3.02 (1.16)	3.33 (1.29)	1.80†
Outgroup evaluations	6.67 (1.23)	6.72 (1.36)	0.31
Article credibility	5.55 (1.20)	5.75 (1.36)	1.16

Note: †$p < 0.10$, *$p < 0.05$.

secondary emotions: tenderness, hope, admiration, love, remorse, guilt, shame, and resentment. Scores for these items were averaged and inverted to form a reliable scale ($\alpha = 0.86$), with lower values indicating lower levels of dehumanization. This approach avoids problems associated with social-desirability biases that would be present if measures of blatant outgroup dehumanization were used (Čehaijić et al., 2009; Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2000).

Outgroup evaluations were measured using a scale adapted from Bettencourt and Dorr (1998). Participants were asked to evaluate the extent to which workers in developing countries were trustworthy, intelligent, capable, and hard-working (from 1 = "not at all" to 9 = "very much"). These four items were averaged to form a reliable scale ($\alpha = 0.86$), with higher scores indicating more-positive outgroup evaluations.

Perceived credibility of the article was measured by asking participants to indicate their agreement (from 1 = "strongly disagree" to 8 = "strongly agree") with four statements about the credibility of the article they read (i.e. "The article was … reliable, credible, convincing, trustworthy"). Responses were averaged to form a reliable scale, $\alpha = 0.91$.

Results

Table 3 reports the means of each variable in each experimental condition. As expected, reminders of responsibility significantly increased responsibility acceptance, thus indicating that the manipulation was effective $t(215) = 3.85$, $p < 0.001$. In contrast to Study 1, but in line with hypotheses, responsibility information significantly increased collective guilt, $t(215) = 2.42$, $p = 0.016$. Responsibility information also marginally increased dehumanization, $t(211) = 1.80$, $p = 0.074$, but had no significant effects on outgroup evaluations, perceived article credibility, or cosmopolitan helping, ps > 0.23.

To assess the total effects of responsibility reminders on cosmopolitan helping, and to test the hypothesis that responsibility information would indirectly increase cosmopolitan helping, structural equation modeling was again utilized. Correlations between the variables included in the model are presented in Table 4. The model tested is presented in Figure 2. Fit statistics indicated the model fit the data very well, $\chi^2 = 3.31$, $p = 0.65$, CFI > .99, GFI = 0.99, RMSEA < 0.01. In contrast to the findings of Study 1, responsibility information had no significant total effect on cosmopolitan helping (Standardized Total Effect = 0.02, $p = 0.41$, *95% CI* = −0.03; 0.06). Replicating Study 1, responsibility information increased acceptance of responsibility (Standardized Direct Effect = 0.25, $p = 0.001$, *95% CI* = 0.14; 0.36) which predicted increased collective guilt

Table 4. Scale intercorrelations of variables included in path analysis, Study 2.

Variable	Correlations				
	1	2	3	4	5
1. Responsibility condition	–	.08	.16*	.25*	.12†
2. Cosmopolitan helping		–	.30*	.24*	−.24*
3. Collective guilt			–	.68*	.02
4. Acceptance of responsibility				–	−.05
5. Dehumanization					–

Note: n = 213. Listwise deletion was used to remove all participants with missing data. Responsibility condition was manipulated and coded as 1 = "responsibility not highlighted" and 2 = "responsibility highlighted."
†p < 0.10, * p < 0.05.

Figure 2. Path model showing the effects of responsibility, collective guilt, and dehumanization on cosmopolitan helping, Study 2.
Note: n = 213. Listwise deletion was used to remove all participants with missing data. Responsibility condition was manipulated and coded as 1 = "responsibility not highlighted" and 2 = "responsibility highlighted." Values displayed above paths represent standardized estimates. For clarity, error terms are not shown.
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05.

(Standardized Direct Effect = 0.68, p = 0.001, *95% CI* = 0.61; 0.75), which in turn predicted increased cosmopolitan helping (Standardized Direct Effect = 0.31, p = 0.001, *95% CI* = 0.22; 0.38). However, responsibility information also marginally increased dehumanization (Standardized Direct Effect = 0.12, p = 0.07, *95% CI* = 0.01; 0.23) which in turn decreased cosmopolitan helping (Standardized Direct Effect = −0.24, p = 0.002, *95% CI* = −0.35; −0.11).

To examine the predictors of cosmopolitan helping, thus testing Hypothesis 4, linear regression analysis was performed with cosmopolitan helping as the outcome and collective guilt, acceptance of responsibility, perceived article credibility, outgroup evaluations, and dehumanization as predictors. Results are presented in Table 5. Only collective guilt (B = 0.41, p = 0.002) and dehumanization (B = −0.50, p = 0.001) predicted cosmopolitan helping independently of other constructs.

Discussion

Results of Study 2 showed that highlighting responsibility increased not only acceptance of collective responsibility but also marginally increased dehumanization. One reason for this effect is suggested by research on moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999, 2002), which posits that dehumanizing

Table 5. Predictors of cosmopolitan helping, Study 2.

Variable	B (SE)	β	p
Collective guilt	0.41 (0.13)*	0.28	0.002
Acceptance of responsibility	0.02 (0.13)	−0.03	0.889
Dehumanization	−0.49 (0.15)*	−0.22	0.001
Outgroup evaluations	−0.01 (0.16)	−0.00	0.957
Article credibility	0.05 (0.17)	0.03	0.748

$R^2 = 0.136$ ($R^2_{adj} = 0.115$).
*Note: n = 207. *p < 0.05.*

victims can allow perpetrators of harmful acts to avoid self-condemnation and self-sanctions for those acts. If victims are perceived to be less human, it is easier for perpetrators to ignore their plight. Accordingly, dehumanizing victims may allow perpetrators to maintain the perception that they are moral without requiring them to accept responsibility and help their victims. Consistent with past research (Castano and Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Čehaijić et al., 2009; Zebel et al., 2008) no significant association between acceptance of responsibility and dehumanization emerged, suggesting that these processes are separate responses to reminders of responsibility that operate independently of each other and provoke different behavioral responses.

In contrast to Study 1, Study 2 found that highlighting responsibility had no effect, indirect or otherwise, on cosmopolitan helping. Thus, thick cosmopolitanism's claim that identifying links of causal responsibility can increase cosmopolitan helping was not supported in Study 2. Findings did, however, support the claim that collective guilt predicts cosmopolitan helping.

General discussion

Thick cosmopolitans claim, first, that cosmopolitan behavior can be increased by identifying instances where individuals or their groups have caused harm to distant others. Second, they claim that guilt, which they expect to arise when individuals are reminded of harm they or their groups have caused to distant others, will motivate cosmopolitan behavior. Across two experimental studies, I found little support for the first claim, but substantial support for the second.

Reminders of ingroup responsibility for harm increased acceptance of responsibility[4] (Studies 1 and 2) and collective guilt (Study 2), but did not significantly increase cosmopolitan helping (Studies 1 and 2). One reason for this finding may be that highlighting responsibility not only increased acceptance of responsibility and collective guilt, but also increased dehumanization of the outgroup (Study 2). Although the specific indirect effect of highlighting responsibility on cosmopolitan helping operating via collective guilt was positive, the specific indirect effect via dehumanization was negative. Thus, the positive indirect effects operating via responsibility acceptance and collective guilt may have been cancelled out by the negative indirect effects via dehumanization. This finding is similar to existing research from social psychology (Castano and Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Čehaijić et al., 2009; Zebel et al., 2008), but extends it to contexts where the harm perpetrated has been indirect and directed against a much broader outgroup (people in developing nations) than those used in past research, which have typically investigated intra-national contexts of historical mistreatment. As in past research (Castano and Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Čehaijić et al., 2009; Zebel et al., 2008), dehumanization was not associated with acceptance of responsibility or collective guilt, thus indicating that these are separate processes that provoke different behavioral responses.

Thick cosmopolitanism's second claim – that guilt increases cosmopolitan action – was supported in both studies. Collective guilt was positively associated with cosmopolitan helping in both studies. This finding is consistent with past research that has examined the effect of collective guilt on helping behavior (e.g. Branscombe and Doosje, 2004; Iyer et al., 2004; Leach et al., 2006, 2007), but represents the first empirical evidence showing that collective guilt also predicts a form of cosmopolitan helping.

One limitation of the current research is that the chosen measure of cosmopolitan helping captured only one type of cosmopolitan helping: volunteering. This measure was chosen because it is consistent with both existing conceptualizations of cosmopolitan helping in political theory (e.g. Kleingeld and Brown, 2009; Van Hooft, 2009) and previous social psychological work on helping, which has used similar measures (e.g. Batson et al., 1997; De Wall et al., 2008: Study 2; Maner et al., 2002). Nonetheless, it is possible that individuals may be more willing to engage in other behaviors – such as donating money, attending political rallies, or signing petitions – that could also constitute cosmopolitan helping, but are not captured by the measure used here. However, prior research shows that individuals' willingness to volunteer for a cause is highly correlated with their willingness to engage in other activities for that cause, such as signing petitions and attending rallies (Iyer et al., 2007). For this reason, similar findings would likely emerge for other measures of cosmopolitan helping, but future research is needed to investigate this possibility directly.

The current studies make important empirical and theoretical contributions to research on cosmopolitanism. Empirically, in contrast to existing research on thick cosmopolitanism that has relied primarily on argumentation and logic, the two studies reported in this article provide the first direct experimental tests of thick cosmopolitanism's central claims. These experimental tests are consistent with calls for more empirical research on cosmopolitan practices (Phillips and Smith, 2008). Additionally, the current studies demonstrate that experimental methods represent a promising, but untapped, resource for future research on cosmopolitanism behavior. The current studies show that experimental techniques, given their unique ability to test causal claims (Druckman et al., 2011), can assist in filling cosmopolitanism's "motivational vacuum" (Dobson, 2006).

Beyond these empirical contributions, the current research also makes a substantial theoretical contribution to literature on cosmopolitan motivation. Not only do these findings indicate that reminders of responsibility are ineffective motivators of cosmopolitan helping, they also indicate why such reminders are ineffective. Specifically, these findings show that dehumanization poses a serious, possibly fatal, problem for thick cosmopolitanism's approach to motivating cosmopolitan helping.[5] Unless a technique can be developed that increases individuals' acceptance of responsibility and guilt without simultaneously increasing dehumanization, causal responsibility for harm is unlikely to be an effective way to motivate cosmopolitan helping.

Notes

1. Note that the individual-level cosmopolitanism discussed by these theorists (and throughout the current article) can be contrasted with the state-level cosmopolitanism discussed by other theorists (e.g.

Archibugi, 2008; Habermas, 2001; Held, 1995). See Dower (2010) for a useful summary of the differences between these approaches.

2. Both thick cosmopolitanism and Linklater's (2006) "embodied cosmopolitanism" share the central idea that responsibility for harm will increase cosmopolitan behavior. For this reason, I refer to both of these theories as "thick cosmopolitanism."

3. Non-technical readers may find it useful to know that values above the path lines in Figures 1 and 2 (termed "standardized coefficients") indicate the average change in a dependent variable (measured in standard deviation units) when a predictor variable increases by one standard deviation. Positive coefficients indicate that one variable increased another, whereas negative coefficients indicate the opposite. Larger absolute standardized coefficients indicate stronger effects. The R^2 statistics in these figures indicate the proportion of the variance in a variable that is explained by all variables that precede it in the model. For example, in Figure 2, 15% of the variance in cosmopolitan helping can be explained by collective guilt and dehumanization combined.

4. This distinction between reminders of responsibility (which refers to providing the responsibility article) and individual acceptance of responsibility (which refers to individuals' self-reported perceptions) is important for understanding the conclusions drawn here. Although individual acceptance of responsibility was positively associated with cosmopolitan helping, providing reminders of responsibility was not.

5. These findings have potential implications for all theories of cosmopolitan motivation that use causal responsibility for harm as a means to encourage cosmopolitan helping. These theories primarily include those labelled thick cosmopolitanism here (e.g. Dobson, 2006; Lawford-Smith, 2012; Linklater, 2007), but the current research may also have implications for elements of Pogge's (2002) theory, subject to some limitations. Pogge (2002) emphasized that negative duties not to harm others (which Pogge claimed should arise when individuals contribute to harm) should increase individuals' willingness to rectify that harm. Although the current studies did not measure perceived duty (meaning that any indirect effects operating via perceived duty could not be assessed), results did show that informing individuals about their contribution to harm had no significant effect on their willingness to rectify that harm (at least in the form of volunteering). This means that the current studies did not find support for Pogge's broader claim that reminders of responsibility for harm should increase cosmopolitan behavior.

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