



Why do citizens want the UN to decide? Cosmopolitan ideas, particularism and global authority

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Abstract

Why do citizens support or reject the idea of global authority? The article addresses this question by examining individual attitudes about UN authority in a comparative perspective. Using data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (2005–2007), the analysis shows that global public support for UN authority largely depends on a cosmopolitan understanding of global interdependence and moral universalism. However, the analysis of contextual variables also suggests that a “particularist” calculus of national costs and benefits explains citizens’ support for (and rejection of) UN authority to a significant extent. Most remarkably, citizens of powerful states favor UN authority much more than do those from weaker countries – a possible indication that UN authority is expected to further privilege the former to the disadvantage of the latter.

Keywords

United Nations, public opinion, public awareness, cognitive mobilization, political support, cosmopolitanism, World Values Survey

Introduction

Why do some citizens support the idea of the UN as a global political authority? Why do others want political authority to be placed solely at state or regional level? These questions become pressing as some international institutions begin to acquire political authority; that is, as states increasingly recognize that these institutions can make competent judgments and binding decisions in world politics (Zürn et al., 2012). The United Nations is a prominent case in point: since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council has increasingly approved Chapter VII measures, including military intervention to resolve conflicts, which “now seems well within the Security Council’s legitimate authority” (Philpott, 1999: 588). The Council has established international criminal courts and transitional administrations that are widely held to exercise “a degree of authority over the domestic arrangements in post-conflict societies that is unprecedented in the history of the

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United Nations” (Zaum, 2006: 455). With respect to agenda-setting and monitoring, states and publics alike recognize various UN agencies and actors like the Secretary General, the High Commissioners for Refugees (UNHCR) or Human Rights (UNHCHR) as the most credible sources of information and judgment on major international political matters (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2010).

One outcome of these shifts has been that international governance in general and the UN in particular are said to be politicized; that is, the subjects of increasing public awareness and contestation (Schmitter, 1969; Zürn et al., 2012). Growing public expectation that international institutions will be able to solve pressing political problems as well as the increasingly feared costs of abdicating national sovereignty are thought to play a crucial role in the formation of public attitudes (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012; Hooghe and Marks, 2009). However, empirical accounts of what citizens think about international institutions and why they do so are rare, at least with respect to global institutions like the UN (see also Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2011; Gravelle, 2011; Machida, 2009; Millard, 1993).

This paper aims to address this lacuna through a comparative analysis of individual attitudes toward UN authority. My theoretical discussion focuses on two competing perspectives on international institutions – political cosmopolitanism and what I tentatively call “particularism.” According to cosmopolitans, political problems have become increasingly transnational in scope due to functional interdependencies fostered by globalization and normative duties engendered by a commonly shared universalist morality (Archibugi, 2004; Habermas, 1998; Held, 1995). International institutions are presumed to do better at managing global tasks and problems than nation states alone. Consequently, political cosmopolitanism has suggested ways to build a just and efficient global order that distributes political authority at various levels including the global one, typically by strengthening the UN. Cosmopolitanism may therefore be a promising starting point from which to think about why citizens think favorably about UN authority.

Nevertheless, having a cosmopolitan worldview per se may not be necessary or sufficient for supporting the idea of global authority. Public opinion can be more narrowly focused on national (or individual) costs and benefits of shifting authority to the global level, if we follow a more particularist line of reasoning about international institutions (see e.g. Grieco, 1997; Krasner, 1991). Policy preferences and perceived power asymmetries in the current make-up of global order may therefore play a decisive role in how citizens position themselves vis-à-vis global authority.

These alternative explanations are tested using data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (2005–2007). I find strong empirical evidence that a favorable public attitude toward UN authority is significantly linked to a cosmopolitan worldview. The extent to which citizens believe that nation states fail to properly address pressing global political matters is strongly connected to public support for UN authority. This is good news for the proponents of political cosmopolitanism who seek social legitimacy for its basic constitutional principles. Nevertheless, there is ample empirical evidence that particularist logic also drives citizens’ attitudes toward the idea of UN authority. Citizens seem to place considerable weight on the benefits and costs of UN actions in the past whenever they make determinations about UN authority at present. Most remarkably, citizens of powerful states favor UN authority much more than do those from weaker countries – a possible indication that UN authority is expected to further privilege the former to the disadvantage of the latter.

Public cosmopolitanism or particularism?

There is widely shared skepticism about the role of citizens in international affairs; public opinion is believed to be superfluous and volatile because citizens are thought to be generally ignorant about what happens outside their own domestic realms. Following what Holsti (1992) has termed

the “Almond–Lippmann consensus” on foreign issues, international institutions can be said to “waltz before a blind audience” (cf. Aldrich et al., 1989). Most citizens seem to lack the information necessary to form factually based opinions about processes that are typically criticized for their lack of transparency (Florini, 2005). But, contrary to this supposition, a raft of studies has shown that European institutions have already become widely accessible objects of public attention (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Weßels, 1995). A similar conclusion can be drawn from studies that use survey evidence to prove that public attitudes on global institutions like the UN are consistently structured according to theoretical expectations (Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2011; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012; Furia, 2005; Gravelle, 2011; Millard, 1993; Norris, 2000).

If citizens become aware of UN authority and start to use available information to form and revise their attitudes toward it, then how could information lead them to support it? A good starting point here is the school of thought that presumably favors global authority the most, namely, political cosmopolitanism (Archibugi, 2004; Cabrera, 2004; Habermas, 1998; Held, 1995). Echoing almost century-old ideas from earlier writings in international relations (IR) theory and economics (see Baldwin, 1980; Keohane and Nye, 1977), cosmopolitan writers typically claim that the need for international institutions derives from functional interdependence caused by globalization; that is, “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens, 1990: 64). The plethora of risks and opportunities brought on by globalization are said to gradually transform national communities into a plurality of transnational “communities of fate” (Held, 2002). Citizens are deemed vulnerable to the costs imposed by globalization because national governments are incapable of regulating it unilaterally. Political cosmopolitans therefore tend to assume that globalization not only defines the agenda of public issues, but also compels and propels the “creation of political organizations and mechanisms that would provide a framework of regulation and law enforcement across the globe” (Held, 2002: 34).

The inability of individual nation states to regulate global problems efficiently is just one reason for political cosmopolitans to argue for the redistribution of political authority from the national to the international level; a second is universalism. Drawing upon a broader tradition of cosmopolitan thinking, they acknowledge “some notion of common humanity that translates ethically into an idea of shared or common moral duties toward others by virtue of this humanity” (Lu, 2000: 245). It is for this shared sense of humanity that all sorts of human suffering should be of concern to everyone who is aware of them, irrespective of whether or not one has any particular ties to those suffering (Nussbaum, 1994; O’Neill, 2000).

Regarding transnational politics, the public significance of universal obligations has been the starting point for a variety of humanitarian as well as development agencies and for large-scale private donorship (Linklater, 2007). What is more, justice and fairness of international order has become a moral concern, for instance, for many of those who identify strongly with the global justice movement (della Porta, 2007) and others who consider themselves to be cosmopolitan proponents of global institutions (Pogge, 2002). Because state-dominated international politics is held responsible for a plethora of injustices worldwide, cosmopolitans typically argue for more global authority to efficiently promote and implement human rights, to fulfill our obligation to assist those in need, and to establish fairness in international trade (Beitz, 1979; Cabrera, 2004).

In accordance with this line of thinking, we may expect cosmopolitan-derived support for global authority to be linked to two types of beliefs. The first type leads citizens to define salient political problems as inherently global; this includes beliefs in functional interdependence as well as universal obligations. The second type is belief about the inefficacy of nation states in tackling global problems; that is, that there is a political authority vacuum at the global level, which only global institutions would be able to fill. Such a cosmopolitan model of public support for global authority

has observable implications that can be tested. The following three hypotheses are assumed to capture the most important implications in order to determine whether public opinion follows the cosmopolitan model in any significant way:

H1.1: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the more they perceive salient political problems to be driven by global functional interdependence.

H1.2: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the more they commit themselves to norms of global solidarity and justice.

H1.3: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the less capable they perceive their own nation state to be in solving salient political problems.

However, citizens might come to favor or reject global authority for non-cosmopolitan reasons, which can be subsumed tentatively under the label of “political particularism.” For example, as realists have claimed for decades, cosmopolitan advocates of international institutions tend to obscure their distributional consequences in terms of power as well as policy outcomes (Krasner, 1991). Political cosmopolitans have rejected the criticism on normative as well as empirical grounds (Archibugi, 2004); however, any attempt to theorize public support for global authority has to account for citizens’ egocentric calculations regarding the costs and benefits of shifting authority to the global level. In any case, we would need to know how much of the current support for global authority (or lack thereof) is due to a narrow focus on individual or national costs and benefits if we are to believe that empirical evidence for cosmopolitan support of global authority is not simply an artifact produced by omitting particularist variables from the analysis.

First, on a particularist account, citizens might expect *direct material benefits* from empowered institutions. In the case of the UN, the least developed countries of the so-called global (political) South have experienced UN authority more directly in terms of UN-administered aid and development programs than has the global (political) North (Duffield, 2005). Similarly, UN peacekeeping missions in the global South have significantly increased in number, scale, and mandate since the end of the Cold War (Benner et al., 2011). Citizens of countries that receive UN aid or host UN peacekeeping missions are probably more likely to view UN authority as beneficial, rather than detrimental, in terms of sovereignty costs. We may therefore expect those societies for which the UN is an important source of aid or security to favor UN authority.

Second, citizens’ support may derive from their *country’s success in pushing for its agenda and policy preferences* in the UN system, which fosters a public perception of the UN as being a like-minded (and therefore fertile) environment for global cooperation (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004: 143). Conversely, citizens might receive information about political initiatives that have been blocked or resolutions that run counter to citizens’ own preferences; this should lead them to perceive the UN as a potentially “dangerous place” of political marginalization (Moynihan, 1976). Consequently, perceptions of the UN as a like-minded environment can be expected to foster public support for a shift of authority to the global level, while perceptions of the UN as politically hostile should foster public opposition to such an authority shift.

A third proposition is based on the notion of *power asymmetries*. Realists have argued that less powerful countries are tempted to support international institutions in order to exploit “voice opportunities” (Grieco, 1997). However, global institutions are widely criticized for being dominated by the highly developed countries of the global North with its institutional privileges and its economic and military advantages (Glenn, 2008). Accordingly, citizens can plausibly be expected to favor the shifting of political authority to global institutions the higher their prospects are of controlling such new centers of global authority. Institutionalized privileges like a permanent seat on the UN Security Council may be a strong case in point (Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2011). Beyond

tangible institutionalized privilege, we can assume a diffuse understanding of power asymmetries in global politics that may shape citizens' attitudes toward UN authority to a significant extent. For example, such understanding could be based on educated guesses about how economic power and military strength translates into an advantageous position in controlling global authority's agenda and decisions.

This leads me to expect three observable implications of particularist shaped public opinion on UN authority:

H2.1: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the higher the benefits of UN membership for their society through UN programs and missions.

H2.2: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the more other states behave like-mindedly in UN bodies.

H2.3: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the more power asymmetries in global politics are in their country's favor.

Data and variables

To examine the impact of various factors influencing attitude formation on UN authority, I use data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (2005–2007)¹. I test hypotheses by regressing various sets of explanatory variables and controls on public preferences for UN authority. Preferences regarding UN authority are measured by responses to the following question:

Some people believe that certain kinds of problems could be better handled by the United Nations or regional organizations rather than by each national government separately. Others think that these problems should be left entirely to the national governments. I'm going to mention some problems. For each one, would you tell me whether you think that policies in this area should be decided by the national governments, by regional organizations, or by the United Nations?

Responses used refer to international peacekeeping, protection of the environment, aid to developing countries, refugees, and human rights. To measure the strength of an overall preference for UN authority, "Preference for UN authority" is calculated counting the number of issue areas for which the respondent chose the UN as the preferred locus of decision-making.

Regarding *cosmopolitanism*, I measure the perceived scope of major political problems using a set of related variables on environmental problems. The question reads as follows:

Now let's consider environmental problems in the world as a whole. Please, tell me how serious you consider each of the following to be for the world as a whole. Is it very serious, somewhat serious, not very serious, or not serious at all?

Answers were solicited on global warming, loss of plant and animal species, and pollution of rivers, lakes, and oceans. These variables were used to construct the index "Global problems," which is assumed to measure issue salience through the cumulative responses in z-standardized form (Cronbach's α 0.81).

Two sets of items from the World Values Survey questionnaire seem to plausibly touch on *cosmopolitan definitions of universal obligations*, including the more demanding variants of justice that go beyond the mere obligation to assist. The first indicator for cosmopolitan morality, "Millennium goals," is based on a set of items related to the priority respondents believe that their own country's leaders should give to global poverty, education, child mortality, HIV, and housing – the core list of the UN Millennium development Goals.

I'm going to read out a list of global problems, and goals that world leaders have set to reduce them. Indicate for each of these goals how high a priority your own country's leaders should give to it.

The index "Millennium goals" is an aggregate variable constructed from the cumulative responses to all five items in z-standardized form (Cronbach's α 0.80).

Respondents were asked in addition about their support for official development aid. This is measured two-fold, beginning with the following question.

In 2003, this country's government allocated [percentage] of the national income to foreign aid – that is, [monetary amount] per person. Do you think this amount is too low, too high, or about right?

In the event that respondents chose "too low," a second question was posed wherein they were asked to indicate how much more foreign aid the country should contribute. The constructed variable "More aid" translates both answers into a scale of factors by which current aid should be multiplied to meet future need and satisfy the respondents' desire for a more appropriate sum. The range is from 0.5 to 5, where "too high" is coded as 0.5, "about right" as 1, "one-and-a-half as much" as 1.5, "twice as much" as 2, etc., up to "more than four times as much" which is coded as 5.

To test for varying degrees to which citizens are confident in the nation state's capacity to solve important political problems, I use answers about how confident the respondent is in the armed forces, the police, the justice system, parliament, government and civil services. Items have been z-standardized and aggregated into an index on "State confidence" (Cronbach's α 0.86).

Concerning *particularism*, the explanatory power of realist intuitions about what might drive respondents to support UN authority or hold them back from doing so is tested using four types of information. One possible source for particular interests would be direct benefits from UN action as measured by the variables "UN flows" and "UN mission." The variable "UN flows" equals the sum of net official aid flows from UN agencies per hundred inhabitants in a specific country over the last five years preceding the survey and is based on data provided by the World Bank. "UN mission" equals the maximal number of UN personnel per thousand inhabitants in a specific country over the last 10 years preceding the survey, as provided by the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations.

A second test of particularism focuses on fears of being outvoted and politically marginalized in an empowered UN system. Similarly to the manner in which Koenig-Archibugi's measure of "policy conformity" (2004: 143) was derived, "UNGA like-mindedness" is generated from UN General Assembly (UNGA) roll-call data provided by Voeten and Merdzanovic.² This measure is constructed by gathering information for every vote that took place over the last 10 years before the World Values Survey was conducted. The variable "UNGA like-mindedness" equals the mean percentage of states that voted in accordance with the respondent's country in this 10-year span.

Third, to account for interests that derive from institutionalized power asymmetries in the UN decision-making system, I use the variable "UNSC permanent member" indicating a country's having a permanent seat and veto power on the UN Security Council (UNSC) (0/1). Similarly, "UNSC elected member" refers to countries that served as elected Council members in the 10-year period leading up to the survey. Fourth, to account for more diffuse beliefs on the distribution of power at a global level, I use data on the absolute amounts of national military expenditures as provided by the Correlates of War Project and countries' GDP per capita as provided by the World Bank.

Regarding control variables, I use three variables – "Political interest," "Education," and "Political communication" – to account for different degrees of cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1970). Political interest is based on responses to the question "How interested would you say you

Table 1. Descriptives.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Preference for UN authority	63561	2.07	1.55	0	5
Global problems	63754	-.02	.87	-3.78	.76
State confidence	67229	.05	.79	-1.95	1.90
More aid	14464	1.56	1.09	.50	5.00
Millennium goals	22027	-.01	.75	-3.30	.87
UN flows (US\$ per 100 inhab.)	64957	.07	.15	.00	.65
UN mission (N staff per 1000 inhab.)	68188	.06	.23	.00	1.59
UNGA like-mindedness	64897	77.97	10.58	34.17	89.94
UNSC permanent member	68188	.05	.21	0	1
UNSC elected member	68188	.41	.50	0	1
Military expenditures (US\$, logged)	67185	14.73	2.06	9.21	20.02
Development (GDP per capita, logged)	67937	41.79	16.57	15.00	98.00
Political interest	66719	1.38	.97	0	3
Political communication	65897	-.01	.60	-2.68	1.60
Education	67680	5.20	2.53	1	9
Male	68092	.48	.50	0	1
Postmaterialism	64699	1.78	.63	1	3
UN confidence	59421	1.47	.91	0	3

are in politics?" (V95). Political interest ranges from 0 ("not at all interested") to 3 ("very interested"). Education is based on a nine-point scale in the World Values Survey data set, ranging from "no formal education" (1) to "university level with degree" (9). Third, I use items on respondents' intensity of political communication activities. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they used a specific source last week "to learn what is going on in their country and the world." Information on respondents' use of daily newspapers, news broadcasts on radio or TV, printed magazines, in-depth reports on radio or TV, internet/email and discussions with friends or colleagues about political issues all refer to possible channels through which respondents may acquire information on the UN. Answers are aggregated in the index "Political communication," which ranges from 0 (none used last week) to 6 (respondents claimed to have used all six sources). To control for variances in overall confidence in the UN, I introduce the variable "UN confidence," which is based on respondents' answers about the extent to which they feel confident in the UN. Additional controls include survey information provided by the original World Values Survey data set on postmaterialism (Postmaterialism, 4-item version), gender (male) and age (see Table 1).

Analysis

The theoretical arguments outlined above suggest that factors at both levels – individual and country-level – may be important for the formation of citizens' attitudes towards UN authority. I therefore present a set of multilevel ordered logit regression models that allow me to jointly test the explanatory power of individual and country-level variables (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). A country-specific random intercept is included to account for (country-level) unobserved heterogeneity between respondents. This random intercept can be thought of as the combined effect of country-specific covariates omitted from the analysis, which may cause some respondents to show more support for UN authority than others.³ Note that some of the context variables are missing or

constant for many countries with insufficient overlap to allow for joint testing of hypotheses accordingly (see table A2 in the online appendix⁴ for countries included in the various models).

Turning to specific estimates, the results are largely consistent with expectations. Regarding *cosmopolitanism*, the results suggest that cosmopolitan attitudes all play a significant role in explaining citizens' preferences (Table 2). To expand on the interpretation I turn directly to predicted probabilities in Table 3. Using estimates of models 2.1 to 2.3, the predicted probabilities are simulated for minimum and maximum values of key variables, assuming the random intercept to be zero and holding all other variables at their mean values. Predictions indicate that changes in global problems alone relate to a shift in expected probabilities (that respondents prefer UN authority for more than two issue areas) of about .12 (Table 3). This is in line with my first cosmopolitanism hypothesis, according to which citizens support the idea of UN authority the more global (i.e. driven by global functional interdependence) they perceive the salient political problems to be (H1.1). Estimates also support expectations regarding the relevance of a cosmopolitan morality in this context (H1.2). The more the respondents want their political leaders to address global inequalities ("Millennium goals") the more they want the UN to be in charge. The same holds for the estimated effects of preferred levels of foreign aid ("More aid"). The more that the respondents want the share of their respected national incomes that goes for foreign aid to be increased, the more we observe that they prefer UN authority. Comparing respondents with minimal and maximal values for one of these two variables results in a change in the simulated probability of finding strong preference for UN authority of about .10 (Table 3).

Finally, a lack of confidence in national political institutions as measured by "State confidence" is estimated to be significantly related to an increased likelihood that we observe a strong preference for UN authority. This matches the third cosmopolitan hypothesis according to which citizens support the idea of global authority more, the less capable they perceive their own nation state to be in solving salient global political problems (H1.3). To evaluate the overall explanatory power of cosmopolitanism regarding the formation of supportive attitudes towards UN authority, predicted probabilities show changes of .26, .35, and .40 for different combinations of extreme values in cosmopolitanism variables. This is strong support for my expectation that the cosmopolitan narrative is an important ideological context underlying public support for UN authority worldwide.

These results are consistent but do not rule out the possibility that a substantial share (or lack) of public support for UN authority is due to *particularism*. Unfortunately, we lack individual-level data on citizens' views on costs and benefits that derive from UN authority. Therefore, we have to fall back on contextual information to test for particularist motives underlying public support for UN authority. Moreover, important variables are strongly correlated to each other (see Table A1 in the online appendix⁵). While the full model presented in Table 4 (model 4.5) shows some signs of multicollinearity (variance inflation factor of 3.47), results of partial models (4.1–4.4) warn us that omitting some of these variables from the equation leads to strongly biased results.

Given this significant handicap, there is nevertheless substantial empirical evidence that particularism explains a great deal with respect to citizens' support for UN authority. In line with expectations (H2.1), results for UN flows suggest that financial aid administered by UN agencies significantly increases the mean level of support for UN authority in a given society, at least when controlling, for example, for development (full model 4.6). Estimates for change in predicted probability is, again, substantial (+.24).

Even if the financial benefits from UN membership seem to work in the expected direction, estimates also suggest a reversed – albeit moderate – effect for UN peacekeeping ("UN mission"). The more UN peacekeepers per thousand inhabitants a country has had to host, the less one finds support for UN authority within its citizenry. The predicted probability of having a preference for UN authority in more than two (of five) issue areas only moderately decreases by $-.07$, if one

Table 2. Multilevel ordered logit regression analysis of cosmopolitanism variables.

Dependent variable:	N of issue areas for which respondents prefer UN authority (0–5)		
	Model:	2.1	2.2
<i>Cosmopolitanism</i>			
Global problems	0.12*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)
More aid		0.10* (0.04)	
Millennium goals			0.11** (0.03)
State confidence	−0.18*** (0.03)	−0.14* (0.07)	−0.21** (0.07)
<i>Controls</i>			
Political interest	−0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.03)
Political communication	0.08* (0.03)	0.02 (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)
Education	0.05*** (0.01)	0.06** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)
Male	0.13*** (0.02)	0.12** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.03)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Postmaterialism	0.00 (0.02)	0.06# (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)
UN confidence	0.19*** (0.03)	0.33*** (0.07)	0.18*** (0.04)
<i>Constants</i>			
Cut1	−0.91*** (0.13)	−0.30# (0.18)	−1.12*** (0.17)
Cut2	0.03 (0.13)	0.62*** (0.19)	−0.16 (0.16)
Cut3	1.08*** (0.14)	1.64*** (0.23)	0.92*** (0.16)
Cut4	2.15*** (0.16)	2.68*** (0.26)	2.03*** (0.17)
Cut5	3.10*** (0.19)	3.65*** (0.33)	2.93*** (0.22)
S.D. of random intercept	0.60	0.72	0.62
Intraclass correlation (ρ)	0.09	0.12	0.09
Bic	176843.52	44249.71	59578.45
Aic	176710.51	44159.76	59453.72
Log likelihood	−88340.25	−22067.88	−29710.86
N respondents	52439	13301	17956
N countries	46	12	19

Note: Robust standard errors clustered over countries are given in parenthesis. See Table A2 in the online appendix available at <<http://ips.sagepub.com>> for countries included in the respective models.
$p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 3. The impact of change in cosmopolitanism variables on the predicted probability of preferring UN authority for more than two (of five) issue areas.

	Predicted probabilities		
	... at minimum	... at maximum	Difference (min to max)
Global problems	.31	.42	+.12
Millennium goals	.36	.46	+.10
More aid	.41	.52	+.10
State confidence	.49	.33	-.16
Joint impact of changes in...			
... Global problems and State nonconfidence*	.24	.51	+.26
... Global problems and State nonconfidence* and More aid	.26	.60	+.35
... Global problems and State nonconfidence* and Millennium goals	.19	.59	+.40

Note: Estimated first differences in predicted probabilities assuming the random intercept to be zero and holding all other variables at their mean. Estimates are based on models presented in Table 2.

*In line with H1.3 probabilities in the "at minimum" ("at maximum") cell are estimated combining the maximum (minimum) of "Confidence in state" with other variables at their minimum (maximum).

compares the sample maximum case, Cyprus (1.59 peacekeepers per thousand inhabitants), with countries that hosted no UN mission over the five-year period preceding the survey. What one may read from these estimates is that UN peacekeeping is more often perceived as a cost than a benefit. This suggests an unexpected, but no less particularist, way of reasoning about UN authority.

In the case of estimates for UNGA like-mindedness, results match expectations according to which citizens would tend to support the idea of UN authority the more they perceive that their own governments have successfully pushed for their positions in the UN General Assembly (H2.2). That is, the likelihood that we would find citizens more supportive of UN authority is significantly higher in states that have been less frequently outvoted than others in UN roll calls. The simulated effect of like-mindedness is impressive, suggesting an increase in the probability of a strong preference for UN authority of about .44.

The last set of particularism variables is designed to test whether *power asymmetries* in global politics can explain the variance in how citizens think about UN authority (H2.3). Regarding a seat on the UN Security Council as measured by the dummy variables "UNSC permanent member" and "UNSC elected member," the estimates are not stable over different specifications of the models. However, if we assume the full model 6.5 to adequately control for important alternative factors (and model 6.3 to be severely biased because it omits them), we do find strong empirical support that *institutional power asymmetries* in the UN system itself lead citizens to favor UN authority.

Similarly, the estimates for "Development" and "Military Expenditures" suggest that there is a much broader mechanism at work here that links citizens' perceptions of whether they belong to the powerful or the weak in global politics to their attitudes for or against UN authority. The effects of both variables are estimated to be positive and statistically significant. That is, citizens seem to support the idea of UN authority the more they perceive power asymmetries in global politics to be in their country's favor, be it in terms of belonging to the highly developed global North or being militarily strong (H2.3). The overall impact of the power variables is remarkable (Table 5). Simulating the predicted probability for different combinations of extreme values in these variables suggests that the difference between citizens from most powerful and least powerful countries is about .49.

Table 4. Multilevel ordered logit regression analysis of particularism variables.

Dependent variable:	N of issue areas for which respondents prefer UN authority (0–5)				
Model:	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.5
<i>Particularism</i>					
UN flows (US\$ per 100 inh.)	-0.73*** (0.13)				1.70*** (0.16)
UN mission (N staff per 1000 inh.)	-0.31*** (0.04)				-0.18*** (0.05)
UNGA like-mindedness		0.01*** (0.00)			0.04*** (0.00)
UNSC permanent member			-0.84*** (0.08)		0.50*** (0.10)
UNSC elected member			0.16*** (0.04)		0.08# (0.05)
Military expenditures (US\$, log)				0.03 (0.06)	0.10*** (0.01)
Development (GDP per capita)				0.03 (0.09)	0.20*** (0.02)
<i>Controls</i>					
Political interest	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Political communication	0.08* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)	0.06# (0.03)
Education	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
Male	0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Postmaterialism	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
UN confidence	0.18*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)

(Continued)

Table 4. (Continued)

Dependent variable:	N of issue areas for which respondents prefer UN authority (0–5)				
State confidence	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.20*** (0.03)
Global environmental problems	0.12*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
Constants					
Cut1	-0.98*** (0.12)	-0.00 (0.18)	-0.68*** (0.09)	-0.28 (0.64)	4.65*** (0.30)
Cut2	-0.04 (0.12)	0.93*** (0.20)	0.26** (0.10)	0.66 (0.65)	5.58*** (0.31)
Cut3	1.02*** (0.14)	1.99*** (0.22)	1.31*** (0.11)	1.72** (0.65)	6.64*** (0.34)
Cut4	2.08*** (0.15)	3.05*** (0.24)	2.37*** (0.13)	2.78*** (0.65)	7.72*** (0.37)
Cut5	3.03*** (0.19)	4.01*** (0.27)	3.33*** (0.16)	3.73*** (0.66)	8.67*** (0.40)
S.D. of random intercept	0.61	0.52	0.32	0.61	0.52
Intraclass correlation (ρ)	0.09	0.07	0.03	0.09	0.07
bic	167041.92	166634.34	176976.14	167041.55	160859.28
aic	166892.12	166493.38	176825.39	166891.75	160666.22
Log likelihood	-83429.06	-83230.69	-88395.69	-83428.87	-80311.11
N respondents	49607.00	49518.00	52439.00	49607.00	47818.00
N countries	43	44	46	43	42

Note: Robust standard errors clustered over countries are given in parenthesis. See Table A2 in the online appendix available at <<http://ips.sagepub.com>> for countries included in the respective models. UNGA: UN General Assembly; UNSC: UN Security Council.
$p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 5. The impact of change in particularism variables on the predicted probability of preferring UN authority for more than two (of five) issue areas.

	Predicted probabilities of preferring UN authority for more than two (of five) issue areas		
	... at minimum	... at maximum	Difference (min to max)
UN flows	.52	.76	+ .24
UN mission	.55	.49	-.07
Like-mindedness of UNGA	.21	.65	+ .44
Development (GDP per capita)	.40	.68	+ .28
Military expenditures (logged)	.42	.67	+ .26
UNSC permanent member (0/1)	.54	.65	+ .11
Joint impact of changes in "power" variables (Development, Military Expenditures, UNSC Permanent Member)*	.35	.83	+ .49

Note: Estimated first differences in predicted probability assuming the random intercept to be zero and holding all other variables at their mean. Estimates are based on models presented in Table 4. UNGA: UN General Assembly; UNSC: UN Security Council.

*Estimated for values of Burkina Faso and the US, the most extreme combination of values in the sample.

In sum, for particularism, even if the analysis is based only on a contextual measurement, the estimates nevertheless suggest that the impact of non-cosmopolitan motives for (and against) UN authority is substantial and statistically significant. Expectations of direct costs (peacekeeping) and benefits (aid) seem to play a role, as do perceptions of a like-minded policy environment at the UN level and power asymmetries enhanced by UN authority to one's advantage or disadvantage.

Conclusions

The analysis of data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey offers important insights into the kinds of reasons that lead citizens to look favorably or unfavorably on UN authority. A first insight is that public support for UN authority is strongly linked to an individual's having a cosmopolitan worldview according to which pressing political problems are of a global scope owing to functional interdependencies and universal normative obligations. The extent to which the citizens perceive themselves as having been left vulnerable by the nation state plays an important role as well. Thus, a cosmopolitan narrative of why global authority is desirable empirically matches why many citizens come to support UN authority.

From a normative perspective this first result has enormous implications. As stressed at the beginning of this article, the creation of political authority beyond the national level is already underway (Cooper et al., 2008; Philpott, 1999). In light of this trend, political cosmopolitanism argues that democratic procedures are needed in order to uphold normative aspirations such as autonomy, non-domination, or consent (Archibugi, 2004; Held, 1995). It is nevertheless reasonable to suppose that democratic procedures alone cannot prevent the growth of an autocratic world order. The idea of democratizing global governance ultimately requires a significant level of global public consensus on the basic rationale of a cosmopolitan order, including the idea that to properly address salient global problems necessitates authoritative global institutions. The empirical results of this study call into question the stereotype of a seemingly elitist cosmopolitan project that lacks a real-world constituency to make a cosmopolitan democracy legitimate at all (Calhoun, 1995; Furia, 2005). The results

in fact provide important evidence that a cosmopolitan order has already got a supportive constituency, as regards some of its basic underlying principles, and this is a compelling standard for calling a political order “socially legitimate” (Beetham, 1991). Assuming that the process of globalization continues, the results suggest that increasing awareness of global interdependencies may even lead to further growth among those societal groups that expect global authority to more effectively manage global problems, thus placing calls for a cosmopolitan democracy on sounder footing for the future.

Second, this study has also shown how particularism explains important parts of citizens’ attitudes towards UN authority. Particular interests have substantial explanatory power if we consider the direct costs and benefits of UN action, or if we take into account the degree to which the UN General Assembly constitutes a like-minded body in a shared policy environment. Beyond that, global power asymmetries are also consistently linked to citizens’ attitudes towards UN authority. Citizens of powerful nations – in terms of institutional privilege, economic development, and military might – view UN authority much more favorably than those of weaker countries. Thus, there is ample evidence of a second, particularist logic behind at least some part of public support for (and rejection of) UN authority. This aspect must also be taken into account to guarantee a more balanced view of the social legitimacy of the current global order.

This second result is of normative significance as well, because it matches a more critical perspective on power-based global governance. According to this view, the institutional design of global governance more often than not reflects “the ability of great powers to establish international institutions and arrangements to further or preserve their interests and positions of advantage into the future” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 58; Krasner, 1991). Following this line of reasoning, citizens are indeed well advised to mistrust acts of delegation or pooling of authority on the international level – all the more so if they perceive themselves to be marginalized in current global politics. That people do respond in this way should serve as a warning to current apologists of global order that social legitimacy is already in short supply. It should also inform global governance architects that any attempt to simply “upload” authority to existing institutions is likely to lead to further politicization of global institutional arrangements, if matters of institutional inequality and skewed distribution of power are not convincingly addressed.

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Notes

1. Technical information on the Fifth Wave of the World Values Survey can be found on <<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>>.
2. Erik Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic, “United Nations General Assembly Voting Data,” <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379UNF:3:Hpf6qOkDdzvXF9m66yLTg==V1>.
3. For all models presented in Table 2 the likelihood-ratio test for testing the assumption that the intraclass correlation (ρ) is zero suggests that the inclusion of a random intercept is appropriate.
4. available at <<http://ips.sagepub.com>>
5. available at <<http://ips.sagepub.com>>

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