The rise of the cosmopolitan traditionalists: From the Arab Spring to a global countermovement?

Adam K. Webb
Johns Hopkins University (SAIS)–Hopkins-Nanjing Centre, China

Abstract

The revolutions of the Arab Spring, in contrast to the liberal third wave of the 1970s to 1990s, rest on a more popular and traditionalist base. Critics often depict these currents as insular and even xenophobic in outlook. This article engages the literature on democratisation, framing, and social movement globalisation, and challenges that assumption. It draws on in-depth interviews conducted with Islamists and other activists in Cairo during April and May 2012. It argues that the pressures of globalisation and the opportunities of democratic transition are forcing traditionalists on to more cosmopolitan terrain. These cosmopolitan traditionalist activists draw on inspiration from other parts of the world and express solidarity with revolutionary movements elsewhere. Unlike liberal cosmopolitans, however, they ground their mode of tolerance and cooperation on substantive traditional values. While the pressures of globalisation may limit the ability of post-revolutionary regimes to deliver on social aspirations, this shift of ideological framing may pave the way for new traditionalist networks that cut across borders. As global political opportunity structures emerge and frustrations build up within nation-states, this cosmopolitan traditionalist bloc is likely to have the numbers and influence to reshape world order.

Keywords

democratisation, cosmopolitanism, globalisation, Arab Spring, fourth wave, social movements, civil society

The long-term outcome of the Arab Spring remains uncertain. As a wave of democratisation, it may rival the last wave that remade Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. If it spreads beyond the Arab world to Africa and Asia, it could increase markedly the 60 per cent or so of the world's population living in democracies.

Corresponding author:
Adam K Webb, Resident Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS)–Hopkins-Nanjing Centre, Nanjing, China.
Email: adamkwebb@gmail.com

The novelty of this wave goes beyond its scale into its social and cultural alignments. These are the first major democratic ruptures to occur in the Arab world, which is more distant culturally from the West than were Latin America and Eastern Europe. The success of Islamist political movements also lends an ideological colouring very different from earlier waves. This contrast leads many in the western establishment (for example, Ehrenfeld, 2011; Muravchik, 2011; Trager, 2011) to lament the illiberal 'toxicity of Arab political culture'. They suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood's embrace of democracy, for example, is mere 'chameleonlike' insincerity, concealing a 'bloody history and declared goals of imposing shariah across the globe'. Journalistic coverage of the Egyptian revolution (for example, McGrath, 2011) has tended to play up sectarian conflict, including periodic flare-ups of violence against the 10–15 per cent Coptic Christian minority. The steady growth of influence by Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood and conservative Salafis since the 1980s is seen by many as a cause of sectarian strife. This discourse occurs against the backdrop of many years during which the regime of Hosni Mubarak, including in official media coverage, tarred Islamists of all stripes with the sectarian and 'extremist' brush (Iskander, 2012). Such has also been the discourse of the junta after the July 2013 coup.

Huntington (1997) is representative of many who doubt the democratic potential of traditionalist currents within the Muslim world. He argued that new electoral democracies often suffer from pandering to sectarian sentiment. These transitions might end in majoritarian imposition, the oppression of religious minorities, and xenophobic insularity. Yet growing evidence suggests otherwise. For several years before the Arab Spring, Islamist movements had allied with Christians and leftists against authoritarian regimes (Abdelrahman, 2009; Clark, 2010; Furman, 2000; Schwedler, 2007; Stilt, 2010; Wickham, 2004). This pattern recurred in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen. Diverse views exist on whether such alliances moderate, or 'tame', Islamist movements. Boukhars (2011) and Roy (2012) argue that they are less ideologically monistic than they are often portrayed to be. More fine-grained accounts (Glain, 2011; Sawhney, 2008) of internal divisions within Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood confirm that younger members have a more pluralistic vision of Islamic democracy. Indeed, the protests that toppled Mubarak in 2011 included a diverse coalition of Islamists and non-Islamists.

What these ad hoc alliances and ideological adaptations mean remains to be seen, given the recent vicissitudes of democracy in the region. But when we move beyond the nation-state as a unit of analysis, a bigger question arises. The misgivings of many onlookers about this social base rest on an assumption that it is predisposed to intolerance and insularity. In other words, traditionalists such as the Islamists are seen as being at odds with globalisation and cosmopolitanism. This view has a long genealogy. The global liberal narrative has treated the Islamic world as a stubborn holdout since the end of the cold war (Falk, 1997). More broadly, the purported clash between insular traditionalists and globally minded individualists has been highlighted. Franck (2001), for example, drew 'battle lines between the forces of communitarian conformity and the growing network of free-thinking, autonomy-asserting individualists everywhere'.

In this article, I shall use the term 'traditionalists' to denote those who frame their political and social aspirations with reference to an enduring ethical tradition. In the Arab Spring, Islam has occupied a central position, but traditionalism in general (and the critical depiction of it in liberal discourse) recurs across civilisations. I want to call into question this alleged tension between cosmopolitanism and politically assertive traditionalism. *Among some of the Arab Spring activists, I find evidence of a new kind of cosmopolitan traditionalism linked to opportunities opened up by the democratic transition.*

First, I suggest that this wave of revolutions represents the global rise of new social forces for which cosmopolitan traditionalism is likely to be particularly relevant. Second, I elaborate

the concept of cosmopolitan traditionalism, in contrast to more well-known liberal flavours of cosmopolitanism. Third, I flesh out the analysis in a specific case, and discuss patterns revealed during interviews in Cairo. Finally, I return to the global context. I suggest that this emerging tendency, if it recurs elsewhere in the world in response to parallel pressures, has vital implications for the trajectory of global social movements. While many of the aspirations of this wave of revolutions are likely to be frustrated within each polity, this new outlook could foreshadow a more ambitious political cosmopolitanism aimed at targets beyond the nation-state.

Contours of the fourth wave

The significance of democratic transitions is best understood in a global context and in relation to underlying social forces. The idea of waves of democratisation comes from Huntington (1991). The first wave, from the 1820s to the 1920s, saw suffrage expand in Northern Europe and North America. The second, after World War II, brought democracy to the defeated Axis powers and some post-colonial states. In the third wave, during the 1980s and 1990s, Latin America and Eastern Europe democratised. This wave coincided with neoliberal economic reforms. Indeed, many 1990s 'transitologists' (for example, Haggard and Kaufman, 1995) analysed how political and economic opening often aligned.

The third wave was a global liberal project with political, economic, and social dimensions. While broad coalitions of the middle and working classes often toppled dictators at the outset, narrower agendas triumphed in the long run. As I have argued elsewhere, its enduring social base was the cosmopolitan upper middle class (Webb, 2006a: 117–31). Its ideal was a minimalist Schumpeterian democracy (Schumpeter, 1950: 269–73) of individual rights and competitive elections. Many of these transitions ended in 'low intensity democracy', with popular participation limited and the social agenda neglected (Gills and Rocamora, 1992). Indeed, market reform sometimes trumped democracy. Mexican technocrats, certain of their own expertise, confined 'democracy within reason' (Centeno, 1997). The Chinese reformers avoided democracy altogether to ease the transition to capitalism. A survey in 2007 (Chen and Lu, 2011) found that the new Chinese middle class favoured property rights and the rule of law, but was nervous about disruptive mass participation.

In the post-2000 aftermath of the third wave, the relationship between power and money deepened. Inequality and corruption worsened, especially in fast-growing economies such as China and Tunisia. Against this global background, the Arab Spring has been largely a reaction against inequality, corruption, and limited or poorly distributed economic growth (Anderson, 2011; Beinin, 2011; Usher, 2011). The social question has come to the fore. As the same grievances recur elsewhere in the world, similar uprisings may arise from the same sources in due course. As a foreshadowing of what might come in China, for example, the peasants of Wukan, in Guangdong province, staged an unprecedented revolt in December 2011 and drove officials out for several weeks (Anderlini, 2011). Their anger stemmed from land confiscations and other abuses, which have catalysed thousands of small protests every year.

If such parallel pressures well up elsewhere, then the Arab Spring may be the start of a fourth wave. This wave would be distinct in its social base, and in its starting point as a backlash against rising inequality and unresponsive governments. Given that this social base is likely to be traditionalist in some sense, there may also be an elective affinity between the economic backlash and a cultural backlash against liberal modernity. *How this social base envisions its counterparts on the global landscape is crucial. It will affect how this wave might spread and the relationship among transitional polities.*

Cosmopolitan traditionalism

What I call 'cosmopolitan traditionalism' differs from a more conventional liberal cosmopolitanism. Political theorists such as Appiah (2006) and Nussbaum (1996) ground liberal cosmopolitanism on individual rights and the cross-cultural 'contamination' that the 'global village' promotes. Exposure to diversity disrupts 'the unexamined feeling that one's own preferences and ways are neutral and natural'. This flavour of cosmopolitanism has an affinity with global consumer culture. It brackets ethical commitments for the sake of tolerance and material interests. Indeed, it assumes that robust traditions often impede human wellbeing and cosmopolitan thinking, and welcomes their erosion.

History suggests that liberals have no monopoly on cosmopolitan thinking, however. The ancient Mediterranean and China (Lewis, 2009: 145–53, 163–72; Santosuosso, 2001: 83–112; Tarn, 1933), for example, witnessed civilisational understandings of universalism in which all human beings could gravitate to the centre. The Islamic world also had wide-ranging social networks that bound Muslim traders and clerics together around the Indian Ocean (Ho, 2002). At the margins, this cosmopolitan repertoire extended to intercivilisational encounters. Usually such attempts were rarefied and aristocratic in tone, as in the 1500s when Jesuit missionaries engaged Chinese elites (Spence, 1984) and the Mughal emperor Akbar oversaw dialogue among India's different faiths (Rizvi, 1975). The logic was different from modern liberal cosmopolitanism in that those encounters occurred not on the level of rights and interests, or by bracketing the substance of the respective traditions, but rather by seeking deeper equivalences.

In trying to identify cosmopolitan traditionalism today, there are four considerations: *logic, base, breadth*, and *depth*. First, a cosmopolitan traditionalism relies on the *logic* of claimed overlaps among traditions. Second, it rests on a traditionalist *base* unlike the social base of global liberalism. Third, it is likely to have the most global impact if its horizons have the *breadth* to transcend civilisational boundaries. Fourth, its political significance is likely to be greatest if it has the *depth* to engage concretely with the social aspirations of the public.

The *logic* of cosmopolitan traditionalism has to be examined in context, as I shall do later. But when it comes to base, breadth, and depth, some overall patterns frame any assessment one might undertake. The *base* of the fourth wave, especially in the Arab Spring, is largely traditionalist. This is the same base that has produced Islamist movements since the 1970s, in part due to the spread of mass literacy (Eickelman, 1992). More recent downward penetration of the Internet has also facilitated this base's activism. In contrast to the high-culture cosmopolitanism of the pre-moderns, such traditionalists have a more populist orientation. Islamist activists are more likely, for example, to have a lay education in engineering than in theology (Hoffman, 1995; Voll, 1991; Waltz, 1986). Conscious continuity with the bearers of cosmopolitan traditionalism in centuries past may thus be weak.

On the dimension of *breadth*, there is already ample evidence of what we might call 'intra-civilisational cosmopolitanism', meaning transnational Muslim identities. Much migration and trade cut across Middle Eastern countries (Keshavarzian and Hazbun, 2010). Rhetoric of pan-Arab solidarity with the Palestinians has been played up for three generations (Hijab, 2011). Jihadi groups have also recruited transnationally since the 1980s, with foreign fighters going first to Afghanistan, and then everywhere from Bosnia to the Philippines (Hegghammer, 2010). More recently, fighters have converged on Syria's civil war. Devout Muslims do not confine their imagination within countries, and are often suspicious of states' efforts to nationalise and domesticate religion (Jones and Mas, 2011; Mandaville, 2011). Since most people are not jihadis, the larger the scale of identity, the more it usually rests on imagination rather than experience. The media shape the public's long-distance imagination, as Anderson (1983) traced in his account of the rise of

nationalism. Viewers of transnational media such as al-Jazeera largely gravitate to a global Muslim, rather than a national or pan-Arab, identity (Nisbet and Myers, 2010). The rise of new media personalities has also blurred national boundaries among audiences (Echchaibi, 2011; Kersten, 2009). Most of these phenomena are confined within the Islamic world, however, and often emphasise boundaries with other civilisations.

Finally, the *depth* of cosmopolitan traditionalism has been limited so far. Indeed, breadth and depth have often been inversely correlated. Popular Islamists have worked in civil society on concrete local problems rather than reaching out farther afield. In contrast, intercivilisational dialogue, whether from a Confucian, Islamic, or Christian standpoint (for example, Du, 1986; Khatami, 1999; Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, 1997), has often been limited to intellectual abstractions and has rarely connected with social issues on the ground. In this vein, the adviser for dialogue at Sunni Islam's premier religious centre, al-Azhar, when asked whether dialogue could extend beyond Christians to Buddhists, Confucians, and Hindus, replied that while the outer circle of al-Azhar's mission was global, the 'habitual context' to motivate such efforts in Egypt was still lacking (Mahmoud Azab, personal communication).

This article brings these several dimensions together. In what ways might breadth and depth be combining on the new landscape of politically assertive traditionalism that the fourth wave is creating? How might the outreach to non-Muslims within countries, and the networking across borders among Muslims, expand to constitute cosmopolitan traditionalism? *I shall argue that the Arab Spring is making some activists engage across sectarian lines and contemplate global issues. The ever-tighter intertwining of the social question with globalisation is creating such an imperative. These tendencies suggest a breakthrough in traditionalist thinking, with long-term implications for global order.*

Research methods

I conducted interviews in Cairo to explore the contours of cosmopolitan traditionalism on the ground. While Cairo cannot represent all Arab Spring countries, it does make a suitable venue for exploring emerging world-views. Egypt has the largest population of these countries, and Cairo is regarded as one of the region's intellectual and political hubs. The most prominent Islamist network, the Muslim Brotherhood, has long centred on Cairo. Since Egypt has one of the more active civil societies in the Middle East, these social movements have deep roots. Moreover, the unfolding of the revolution in Egypt has encouraged forming alliances on a diverse landscape. All these factors suggest that attitudes in Cairo are likely to reflect a wide range of concerns, and that tendencies there are likely to have broader resonance beyond Egypt. This is particularly so given the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Muhammad Mursi, in the presidential elections of May 2012 and the Muslim Brotherhood's continuing centrality in opposition to the coup that toppled him just over a year later.

I interviewed a total of 33 individuals in April and May 2012. These included high-level activists within an array of political organisations, with particular emphasis on the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist currents that had split off from it during the transition. This emphasis had two rationales. First, the ideological centre of gravity of the Egyptian revolution has been traditionalist. While liberal upper-middle-class youth did play a leading role in initial protests, the initiative swiftly shifted to the Islamists. Indeed, political parties deploying Islamically inflected frames captured some two-thirds of the vote in subsequent elections, and represent an even more overwhelming proportion of those critical of the Mubarak era. This has also been the centre of gravity of opposition to other Arab dictators in Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and elsewhere. Second, this is the demographic most likely to be confronting issues at the intersection of tradition and

globalisation, and thus inclined to comment on those issues. I also spoke with leading members of a civil society organisation that had brought Salafis (adherents of a staunchly traditionalist interpretation of Islam) together with Coptic Christians, leftists, and others. To flesh out global perceptions, I included politically engaged students and instructors of Chinese, Spanish, and Urdu from across Cairo University, Ain Shams University, and Al-Azhar University. These three universities are by far the largest in Cairo and include a broad cross-section of the Egyptian public. Across all interviewees, the age ranged from twenties to fifties, but with a heavy concentration from late twenties to thirties, typical of the activist cohort. Some 27 per cent were female. To complement the interviews, I also attended activist gatherings as an observer.

My aim was not to generate a generalisably representative sample of Cairo's population, but rather to explore the contours of opinion within politically active traditionalist circles. Interviewees were approached initially by telephone or email, and recruited in a snowballing fashion. The resulting distribution covered a range of positions and affiliations, rather than reflecting recruitment within one or another closed circle. The prominence of many interviewees did mean, of course, that they often had interacted during the revolution. Interviews typically ranged from an hour to two and a half hours in length. They were conducted in cafés, at universities, or at the offices of the organisations, as convenient. I stressed at the outset that interviewees need not speak on behalf of any organisation, but rather about their own observations. All but one of the interviews were recorded. I spoke with most in Arabic, though a few who were fluent in English, Spanish, or Chinese opted to use those languages instead. Interviews relied on open-ended questions that allowed pursuing lines of enquiry based on responses. All interviewees were asked about foreign inspirations for the Arab Spring revolutions, identification of distant allies, prospects for transnational cooperation, and the more speculative themes of global justice and future world order.

In the article, specific interviewees are identified only by initials that do not correspond to their names. At the time of the interviews, the political context was such that neither they nor I perceived any risk to them from our conversations. Given the coup more than a year later, however, I have taken the discretionary measure of removing identifying names as an additional precaution.

Dialogue in civil society

One case was a civil society organisation called Salafyo Costa, after its erstwhile meeting place at a branch of the Costa Coffee chain. Salafyo Costa had gained media coverage during the months before my interviews, and had several hundred active participants, as well as some 19,000 members and 109,000 fans (up to 200,000 by 2013) on its Facebook page. It included 40–50 per cent Salafis and 25–30 per cent Coptic Christians, as well as some sympathetic leftists and liberals. The founders were young, educated, and mostly from Cairo, and a plurality were working in information technology. None were clerics. Coming from diverse religious backgrounds, they had met in Tahrir Square during the revolution. Repression under Mubarak had long sown mistrust among sects, but the transition opened up room for new interactions. As a Salafi co-founder put it, 'we managed to engage in a beautiful dialogue' (AB). To keep alive that spirit, the founders organised Salafyo Costa. They adopted a charter based on mutual respect despite doctrinal differences. 'Each one had the belief that the other one was going to hell as a non-believer, but despite that we had one goal, building this country' (AB). Another Salafi who was involved at the start said, 'Injustice is the same in every religion. Injustice is the same, and tyranny is the same. So we have to go out and stand together against injustice and help the poor … So there are many things in common' (BC). A Copt (CD) agreed that 'We're different in our doctrines. But there are a lot of common points, 80 per cent agreed and 20 per cent different … And we're willing to cooperate with each other on the ground.'

Salafyo Costa claimed no electoral ambitions because, as the Salafi co-founder said, 'We're good storytelling people, but we don't have the power' (AB). Individual members had diverse voting preferences. Some Salafis supported Hizb al-Nūr, a Salafi-founded party that gained a quarter of the vote in parliamentary elections. Yet one Salafi woman wearing a full face covering said that she favoured a more moderate Islamist party because, despite her own Salafi beliefs, 'it would be very hard for other people to accept that, and I'm not willing to force anybody … When you go to Allah, at the end it is what you believe in, it's not what you oblige [others] to do, force [others] to do' (DE). Some members were considering forming a 'social party' to address youth and welfare issues, but not to contest elections. Salafyo Costa members also volunteered in the slums of Cairo and the countryside. 'We decided that to get to the point of getting to know the Christians in Egypt, we had to create with them some common work. We decided on the idea that coexisting and knowing each other would happen by working together, in social service work.' The volunteer teams were mixed to cause a 'shock' and 'send a message to society'. When patients had their details taken down by a Salafi woman with a face covering, and then saw a Coptic Christian eye doctor named 'George', for example, the volunteers were breaking down psychological barriers (EF; AB; CD).

While Salafyo Costa's activities are, so far, confined to Egypt (though the websites have global reach), they do give it some social depth. It is not merely a discussion forum. But what about the logic of this group's openness? Members had different views on the philosophical underpinnings of their experiment. A liberal co-founder assimilated it to liberalism, asserting that 'the movement is basically liberal [because] it calls for accepting the other, it supports freedom of belief, and it supports freedoms in general' (FG). Yet for other members, the logic seemed instead to approach cosmopolitan traditionalism. One Salafi woman came back to religious foundations. 'Any religion in the world, for example, calls for no discrimination, no stereotyping, equality, justice. I mean, we do have a lot in common' (DE). A Salafi co-founder also hinted at substantive inspirations for tolerance in Salafyo Costa. 'We take from the liberals the interest in private freedom. We take from the socialists the aspects of development and solidarity and cooperation. We take from the Salafis the aspects of preserving identity, preserving traditions. We take from Christianity, charity and tolerance and the spirit of Christianity' (AB). This is a tolerance of interlocking strengths, not a minimalist liberal neutrality. Since none of the interviewees had any extended training in theology or philosophy, however, they did not elaborate the logic to the same degree as cosmopolitan traditionalists in earlier centuries often did. Had more members been trained in such fields, these fault lines over justification (even if not so much over practice) might have come to the fore.

In short, Salafyo Costa was only possible because of the space and energy of the revolutionary transition. Unlike a liberal neutrality, it found overlapping values beneath sectarian identities and a social agenda on which to cooperate. To be sure, Salafyo Costa might seem exceptional because some of the Arab Street finds ecumenism unappealing. One Salafi, for example, said that he knew of other Salafis outside Salafyo Costa who refused to work with Christians as equals (BC). From an outside standpoint, a secular socialist activist distinguished Salafyo Costa's openness from 'cold Salafis' (GH).

Revolution and circles of solidarity

Nonetheless, complementary patterns appeared elsewhere, including among non-Salafi Islamists. The political landscape diversified rapidly after Mubarak's fall, as new Islamist parties split from the Muslim Brotherhood (Vidino, 2011). In interviews with them, parallel themes came up. *Across the traditionalist spectrum, this suggests a common causal link between the political transition and cosmopolitan thinking.*

Interviewees' transnational horizons showed signs of broadening, in what I shall call 'inward cosmopolitanism' and 'outward cosmopolitanism'. Inward cosmopolitanism means taking inspiration from foreign sources, whether as revolutionary catalysts, generally admired societies, or concrete political models. Pan-Islamism was evident. Many respondents said that Tunisia's revolution precipitated the revolt against Mubarak, in diffuse ways via social media. All interviewees were asked with which more distant parts of the world they felt common ground. A political adviser to the campaign of offshoot Islamist (and former Muslim Brotherhood member) Abdul Moneim Abul Fotouh admired any society with 'values of freedom, values of fairness, values of equality … I don't think I see much difference in them across the whole world, across different civilisations.' When pressed, he said some Asian societies such as Malaysia and Japan stood out because 'they have moral values … the opposite of the western situation'. 'For us, [the model] certainly isn't the West or America' (HJ). A youth leader of the Muslim Brotherhood's FJP (Freedom and Justice Party) considered Europe and North America the most distant culturally, because 'the Egyptian street is by nature religious' (JK).

Beyond these broad sentiments, admiration of specific countries was more scattered. Many interviewees mentioned Turkey's Islamically inflected democracy, and a few India's religious pluralism. The emphasis of Brazil and some other Latin American countries on economic justice appealed to many. A co-founder of the Egyptian Current, an Islamist party that broke off from the Muslim Brotherhood, noted that one of his colleagues had visited Brazil in search of lessons (KL). Much as the revolution has impelled Islamists, Salafis, and others to reach out within Egypt, so too has it sparked curiosity about global best practices.

What about outward cosmopolitanism, or support for like-minded movements elsewhere? Unsurprisingly, the Muslim Brotherhood activists mentioned other Arab and Muslim countries at first. An FJP youth leader, for example, noted that 'the roots of the Muslim Brotherhood aren't only in Egypt', and that they had affiliates in 80 countries (JK). An FJP campaign operative joined others in mentioning the Tunisian Nahda Party (LM). A senior member of the General Conference extended solidarity with Muslims to Chinese-controlled East Turkestan (MN). Support for the Palestinians was also widespread.

Farther afield in the world, sympathies got murkier. The activists who had split off from the Muslim Brotherhood were most enthusiastic and specific about solidarities beyond the Muslim world. A co-founder of the Egyptian Current and a political adviser to Abul Fotouh's campaign, for instance, both admired the Occupy movements in the West and popular movements in Latin America, and criticised the Chinese government as 'repressive' and responsible for 'clear social injustice'. One said he would refuse to meet the Chinese ambassador; the other, that he would urge a future Egyptian government to support movements all over the world (KL; HJ). Muslim Brotherhood activists shared a general sympathy with 'anyone [in China] who talks about the regime [and] ends up with his throat cut', but differed from the offshoot Islamists in weighing economic interests more and 'not interfering in [Beijing's] internal affairs' (JK; LM; NP).

One important tendency in the interviews was that breadth often was at the cost of depth. The farther afield the common ground, the shallower the issues. Here the interviews with the politically engaged language students shed light, given their familiarity with other regions of the world. Many learning Spanish admired earlier struggles against dictatorship in Spain and Latin America. During the Egyptian revolution, Cairo University students shared tactical advice on Facebook with student protesters in Argentina and Chile, and discussed political freedom and youth issues such as education (PQ; PR; PS; PT). Among the Chinese speakers was a recent Ain Shams University graduate involved with the Muslim Brotherhood. Based on exchanges over social media, her feeling was that Chinese dissidents mostly wanted freedom of expression. In Egypt, 'the issue was not just freedom … The basic issue in the Egyptian revolution was freedom and justice, freedom and

livelihood and social justice.' She did not see social injustice in China comparable to that in Egypt (NP).

Solidarity thus had layers. First, interviewees saw real parallels with people struggling against dictatorship, as in the other Arab Spring countries or China, or demanding more responsive democracy, as in the Occupy movements or the youth protests in Latin America. Second, they knew less about the social question elsewhere. Some of their online interactions were unrepresentative. Those Chinese doing a language exchange with the Muslim Brotherhood Chinese-speaker, for example, were hardly poor. Common ground on the social question was murkier than the clash between tyranny and democracy.

Third, interviewees were least knowledgeable about ideas in other traditions. Two students of Spanish at al-Azhar University, for example, noted the liberalisation of Spanish society compared with the Middle East. I asked them if they thus felt more in common with traditional Spanish Catholics. Neither had thought much about it, and they said that it would depend on the issue. They wanted to learn about Christianity, but had little concrete motive as Muslims to engage with Spanish Catholics as such (TU; UV). Only one influential activist, a political adviser to Abul Fotouh, mentioned admiring Latin American liberation theology movements (HJ).

The most likely to mention other traditions explicitly were some older Salafis, because they had more exposure to, even if not formal training in, theology. One emphasised the common morality of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism (BC). In addition, a Salafi activist said that Christians (not the modern West as such) were closest to Muslims according to the Koran (VW). Still, no interviewee got into fine-grained discussion of traditionalist currents elsewhere.

Despite uneven knowledge of the world, a substantial majority of interviewees felt a global identity. This ran counter to stereotypes, though it does align them with the growing minority among Arab publics who identify in surveys primarily as 'citizens of the world' (Telhami, 2013). Among interviewees, views on global citizenship fell into three clusters. First, only a handful could not think beyond Egyptian citizenship or did not grasp the concept. 'Not at all. Global citizens, how? We're Egyptian citizens' (TU). Second, a majority felt they were global citizens in that they followed global issues and sympathised with distant suffering. As one young Copt in Salafyo Costa put it, 'This is the dream as far as I'm concerned, that there could be a global nationalism, with no borders between one country and another, that I'd be a citizen of the world and not of Egypt' (EF). Several Salafis invoked Islamic justifications. 'I hope the whole world can be like the Internet, without barriers and borders. This was what it was like in the first centuries, with no borders between countries … no difference between Muslim and Christian' (BC). 'I'm a citizen of the world and it's asked of me to spread the message [of Islam] to the ends of the earth, to the Eskimos and to the Comoros' (VW). 'Black or white, there's no difference, but we're all under the same framework, under the umbrella of Islam' (WX). Freedom of movement was a common aspiration (KL; AB). Yet as one Salafi woman with her face covered added, people like them were often not accepted in other countries. 'I could live anywhere; I could go anywhere; I don't have a problem. But how I dress, how I believe, I think others would not accept this' (DE). The third cluster, about a quarter to a third of the total, doubted whether they were fully global citizens because their voices did not count enough. As an instructor of Urdu put it, 'My understanding of citizenship is that I share and participate and give my opinion and my opinion has an effect; from that angle, I'm not a citizen' (XY).

Global citizenship is abstract, yet many interviewees wanted to act globally, too. Most affirmed a duty to aid the world's poor. So, while they saw a closer circle of obligation around the Arab world, they thought Egypt could assist Africa's poor. They were also open to giving global citizenship political teeth. I asked how they viewed direct elections to global institutions such as the United Nations. Some supported it by analogy to democratic aspirations at the national level.

Others noted the practical difficulties of running global elections, in light of Egypt's own chaotic democratic transition. Another cluster of respondents had misgivings about the United Nations as a tool of the major powers. One Salafi activist remarked, 'It's the idea of America and the Jews, to establish a world government' (VW). Yet there was no opposition to global democratisation in principle, merely pessimism about whether the powerful would allow it.

Finally, a distinction frequently was drawn between foreign governments and citizens. 'It was the West that installed these dictatorships,' said one Salafi activist (WX), and a co-founder of the Egyptian Current refused to meet Hillary Clinton because of the USA's support for Mubarak (KL). Beijing likewise was denounced for hostility to the uprisings in Egypt and Syria. But interviewees often stressed that such criticism did not apply to individual westerners or Chinese, because, as an FJP youth leader put it, 'the shared interests are with peoples and not with regimes' (JK). Even the widespread anti-Zionism was sometimes nuanced, such as when a Salafi activist clarified that his 'red lines' on cooperation were against 'the Zionists, not the Jews as Jews' (VW) and when an al-Azhar student said that he had liked Jewish Argentine expatriates he had met (UV).

This distinction between states and people suggests a shift from the survey findings of Furia and Lucas (2006) in Arab countries a decade ago. That study found that recent foreign policy events were the overriding determinant of public opinion towards other countries. My interviews, in contrast, suggest that the democratic transition highlighted the distinction between state and society, and the cross-border ties among societies. More broadly, the Middle East may be changing its position on the global landscape. Furia (2005) found lower levels of cosmopolitan sentiment in the region than in Africa and Latin America. If future research finds Arab public opinion mirroring my interviewees' views, then the Arab Spring has impelled a convergence of the region with levels of cosmopolitanism in Africa and Latin America.

Political transnationalism: the motivation gap

Cause and effect bear reviewing at this point. While the Mubarak-era security apparatus had hindered encounters across sectarian and other ideological boundaries, the Arab Spring made it imperative to cooperate across diversity. This shift was foreshadowed by some Islamists' outreach to Christians and others over the preceding few years, to resist repression, but it took the pitched struggle of revolution to bring the imperative fully to the surface. Perhaps the greatest impact has been on global engagement, however. While the Internet generation's horizons have broadened gradually, the revolution marked an acceleration. This was due in part to a freer flow of information and in part to a steepened learning curve of activists who now faced the real prospect of power and having to devise policy based on prior experience elsewhere. The global terrain became more visible to them.

Such cosmopolitan sentiments remain mostly abstract at present. Apart from social media, practical transnationalism in the Arab Spring has been weak. If this is the start of a fourth wave of democratisation, it is still playing out mainly within nation-states. *While this cosmopolitan shift of attitude runs against stereotypes, sentiments are not translating into action. There is a motivational gap. But what precisely is that gap and what long-term factors might narrow it?*

Several interviewees hinted at possibilities for practical cooperation farther afield. Two Salafis close to Salafyo Costa said they could work with Hindus and Buddhists, because the Koran urged cooperation with all humanity. One said he would be limited only by the rules in the scriptures, for example, that he could marry a Christian or a Jewish woman, but not an adherent of another faith, though that would not impede other collaboration (BC). The other declared, 'If a Buddhist or Hindu recruited me to fight the oppressor, I would go with him completely,' just as he admired foreign human rights activists who had died defending the Palestinians (VW). A Copt in Salafyo

Costa said he had not thought about working with Hindus and Buddhists, but 'it's possible, it's a nice idea'. He drew on Salafyo Costa's experience within Egypt. 'When we cooperate, we cooperate on something, I mean some sort of goal, like the country, the poor, wanting the revolution to succeed, wanting freedoms, not wanting another military government. So there are points we agree on, something we can work on. As for doing that with others, Hindus or so on, there aren't points … [But] if we were a big organisation, we might think about this, about the environment, about the planet' (CD).

Here lies a point of contact with the literature on political culture, tolerance, and learning. Tessler and Gao (2008) found through survey research that Arab publics largely have a 'parochial' orientation, weak on civic activism and tolerance of diversity. If the Arab Spring is pulling people out of such parochialism, then the causal link between revolution and attitudes comes to the fore. More broadly, Peffley and Rohrschneider's 17-country study (2003) found that micro-level 'democratic learning' of tolerance tends to happen via political activism in a context of expanded civil liberties. The Cairo interviewees' outreach to others was catalysed not by living under such a consolidated democracy, but by the need to form alliances amid a surge of protest. Such openness extends to abstract solidarity with the rest of the world, though practical cooperation with distant counterparts has yet to crystallise. Indeed, the sentiment of openness to the world is running ahead of practice, rather than experience driving ideas.

In any global wave of democratisation, the flow of ideas is a crucial factor (Markoff, 1996). The social movement literature offers the concept of 'framing' to describe the ideas, symbols, and rhetoric that bind movements together, and complement the other two dimensions of political opportunities and mobilising structures (Benford and Snow, 2000; Gerhards and Rucht, 1992; McAdam et al., 2001). In this case, the interviews suggest what breakthroughs have happened at the level of ideas and what lags in practice. The Cairo activists 'frame' their view of the global landscape along cosmopolitan traditionalist lines, even though the cross-border political opportunities and mobilising structures to match ideas and practice remain limited.

Within countries, coalitions of movements often form in response to external threats (Van Dyke, 2003). This also holds among traditionalists, such as the US coalitions of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews to fight battles over social policy since the 1970s (Hunter, 1991). Transnationally, leftist activist networks abound (Abdelrahman, 2011; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Landolt and Goldring, 2010; Rodio and Schmitz, 2010). Still, the literature notes difficulties in forming true transnational movements. According to Tarrow (2005: 35–76), most activists remain 'rooted cosmopolitans'. They draw on transnational networks and deploy 'global frames', but for the sake of aims within their own countries. He suggests elsewhere (Tarrow, 2001) that only after supranational institutions gain more clout will activists target them. Olesen (2005a, 2005b, 2005c) agrees that movements share information across borders, but only as 'a plurality of transnational publics rather than the singularity of a global civil society'. Social media can lubricate such interactions, but cannot motivate them (for example, Calhoun, 1998; Deibert, 2000; Diani, 2000).

What factors might narrow the gap between abstract cosmopolitan framing and practical transnational mobilisation? Here I shall extend my argument from some years ago (Webb, 2006b) that the age of revolutions is not over merely because most countries are now formally democratic and embedded in the global market. Rather, in a deep enough global economic crisis, popular frustrations could bypass neutered national governments and cause a global rupture. The idea that popular movements eventually will match capitalist globalisation is not new. Chase-Dunn et al. (2006), for example, predicted that anti-capitalist 'world parties' will emerge. In contrast to the leftist vision, however, I argued that global discontent is greatest among those of a populist and traditionalist bent.

The rise of the cosmopolitan traditionalists sheds further light on this landscape. The new framing of transnational solidarities suggests a growing openness to future transnational mobilisation.

If the fourth wave of democratisation runs into obstacles within nation-states, then activists might refocus upward over a generation or two. A fifth wave of democratisation might aim at making global institutions more responsive to the social question.

This scenario presumes that present fourth wave aspirations may well fail. In the flush of Egypt's first democratic elections, most interviewees expected that a new government could overcome obstacles. The coup a year later belied such optimism. More broadly, global pressures make it difficult for newly democratic governments to deliver the goods for their base. Western powers, along with the 'Authoritarian International' led by China and Russia, remain suspicious of these revolutions (Ambrosio, 2010; Brownlee, 2010, 2011; Freeland, 2011; French, 2011). Transnational cooperation among elites apprehensive of the Arab Spring has strengthened as well. Saudi and Emirati troops went into Bahrain in March 2011 to crush protesters. Since the upsurge of the first revolutions, surviving Arab dictators have become better at riding out turbulence (Heydemann and Leenders, 2011). The support for the Egyptian junta by the western powers and China fits into the same pattern.

Even without coups, the performance of new democracies is likely to be constrained more diffusely by the global market and supranational institutions. That globalisation subordinates democracy to the needs of capital is a well-worn point on the left (for example, Markoff, 1999). Supranational entities such as the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Union have tightened their oversight. Those supportive of such institutions (for example, Moravcsik, 2004) deny that they suffer from a 'democratic deficit', or that it matters. But Gill (2000) suggested that the 'new constitutionalism' of treaties on trade and investment fetter democracy within countries. He also noted (Gill, 2011) the imposition, on Greece and Italy, of technocratic prime ministers to carry out Eurozone-driven austerity.

All this suggests that the fourth wave will have difficulty fulfilling its social goals. As moneyed interests retreat upward from the nation-state, new governments either will push radical social agendas and face punishing consequences or will compromise with the world's power centres. While in power, the Muslim Brotherhood vacillated between the two. Mursi spoke up in support of the Syrian rebels, but also made his first foreign trip to China. The party's economic manifesto also affirmed international agreements (Saif and Abu Rumman, 2012). Such moderating impulses resemble the domestication of the Latin American left during the 1990s (for example, Castañeda, 1994). A possible countervailing force is that more radical traditionalists, among some of the Salafis and the offshoot Islamist parties, seemed less willing to compromise with power.

The practical impact of cosmopolitan traditionalism on world politics remains to be seen, therefore. Such emerging currents do not yet amount to a 'transnational public', as Olesen (2005c) terms it, or a full transnational countermovement against liberal globalisation. Transnational links among this kind of civil society are still weak, moreover, compared with the 'transnational competence' (Koehn and Rosenau, 2002) that has lubricated leftist networks such as the World Social Forum. But cross-sectarian experiments such as Salafyo Costa within Egypt may be a microcosm of global possibilities.

Future directions

However political events play out in the post-coup era, the underlying social forces and worldviews are perhaps most important. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists have decades of experience with repression, remain the core of an energetic opposition, and undoubtedly will influence any future electoral landscape. Cosmopolitan traditionalist currents will have to choose between retreating into sectarianism under pressure and broadening alliances against the junta. Two intriguing possibilities are that (1) the offshoot Islamist groups, with their somewhat more

radical transnational solidarities, could seize some space from the Muslim Brotherhood, and that (2) the extensive foreign convergences in Syria's strife could play a role similar to that of the 1930s Spanish Civil War in further broadening networks of cooperation.

More immediately, evidence from interviews in Cairo suggests a new outlook causally connected with the Arab Spring. While the prevalence of these views among some influential activists indicates that they are more than marginal, it is uncertain how far down the social scale it goes, and whether this outlook is emerging elsewhere in the world. If the pattern extends to other contexts, however, then the rise of the cosmopolitan traditionalists is a turning point in global political culture. It may anchor within a more global context movements that have been stereotyped as insular and xenophobic. It also represents a new perspective on global justice, among a social base sizable enough to shape the global landscape in coming decades.

Funding

Note

References

Abdelrahman, Maha (2009) 'With the Islamists? – Sometimes. With the state? – Never!' Cooperation between the left and Islamists in Egypt. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 36(1): 37–54.

Abdelrahman, Maha (2011) The transnational and the local: Egyptian activists and transnational protest networks. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 38(3): 407–24.

Ambrosio, Thomas (2010) Constructing a framework of authoritarian diffusion: Concepts, dynamics, and future research. *International Studies Perspectives* 11: 375–92.

Anderlini, Jamil (2011) Wukan villagers form own administration. *Financial Times*, 18 December. Available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6f975d8e-2983-11e1-a066-00144feabdc0.html (accessed 1 October 2012).

Anderson, Benedict (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflexions on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Anderson, Lisa (2011) Demystifying the Arab Spring. *Foreign Affairs* 90(3): 2–7.

Appiah, Kwame Anthony (2006) *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Beinin, Joel (2011) Working-class revolutions? *The Nation*, 12 September.

Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow (2000) Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology* 26: 11–39.

Boukhars, Anouar (2011) The Arab revolutions for dignity. *American Foreign Policy Interests* 33(2): 61–8.

Brownlee, Jason (2010) Authoritarianism after 1989: From regime types to transnational processes. *Harvard International Review* 31(4).

Brownlee, Jason (2011) The transnational challenge to Arab freedom. *Current History* 110(739): 317–23.

Calhoun, Craig (1998) Community without propinquity revisited: Communications technology and the transformation of the urban public sphere. *Sociological Inquiry* 68(3): 373–97.

Castañeda, Jorge (1994) *Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War*. New York: Vintage Books.

Centeno, Miguel Ángel (1997) *Democracy Within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Ellen Reese, Erika Gutiérrez et al. (2006) Global party formation in world historical perspective. Working paper No. 21. Institute for Research on World-Systems, UC–Riverside.

Chen, Jie and Chunlong Lu (2011) Democratisation and the middle class in China: The middle class's attitudes toward democracy. *Political Research Quarterly* 64(3): 705–19.

Clark, Janine A. (2010) Threats, structures, and resources: Cross-ideological coalition building in Jordan. *Comparative Politics* 43(1): 101–20.

Deibert, Ronald J. (2000) International plug 'n' play? Citizen activism, the Internet, and global public policy. *International Studies Perspectives* 1(3): 255–72.

Diani, Mario (2000) Social movement networks virtual and real. *Information, Communication, and Society* 3(3): 386–401.

Du, Weiming [杜维明] (1986) 从世界思潮的几个侧面看儒学研究的新动向 [Looking at New Trends in Confucian Studies from Several Aspects of World Thought] 九州学刊 [Chinese Culture Quarterly]1(1): 25–38.

Echchaibi, Nabil (2011) From audio tapes to video blogs: The delocalisation of authority in Islam. *Nations and Nationalism* 17(1): 25–44.

Ehrenfeld, Rachel (2011) The Muslim Brotherhood evolution: An overview. *American Foreign Policy Interests* 33(2): 69–85.

Eickelman, Dale F. (1992) Mass higher education and the religious imagination in contemporary Arab societies. *American Ethnologist* 19(4): 643–55.

Falk, Richard A. (1997) False universalism and the geopolitics of exclusion: The case of Islam. *Third World Quarterly* 18(1): 7–23.

Franck, Thomas M. (2001) Are human rights universal? *Foreign Affairs* 80(1): 191–204.

Freeland, Chrystia (2011) The Authoritarian International goes on the defensive. *Reuters*, 4 February.

French, Howard W. (2011) The view of Cairo from the Authoritarian International. *The Atlantic*, 11 February.

Furia, Peter A. (2005) Global citizenship, anyone? Cosmopolitanism, privilege, and public opinion. *Global Society* 19(4): 331–59.

Furia, Peter A. and Russell E. Lucas (2006) Determinants of Arab public opinion on foreign relations. *International Studies Quarterly* 50: 585–605.

Furman, Uriah (2000) Minorities in contemporary Islamist discourse. *Middle Eastern Studies* 36(4): 1–20.

Gerhards, Jürgen and Dieter Rucht (1992) Mesomobilisation: Organising and framing in two protest campaigns in West Germany. *American Journal of Sociology* 98(3): 555–95.

Gill, Stephen (2000) The constitution of global capitalism. Paper presented at the International Studies Association conference, Los Angeles.

Gill, Stephen (2011) Who elected the bankers? Interview available at: http://stephengill.com/news/category/new-constitutionalism (accessed 18 July 2012).

Gills, Barry and Joel Rocamora (1992) Low intensity democracy. *Third World Quarterly* 13(3): 501–23.

Glain, Stephen (2011) Fault lines in the Muslim Brotherhood. *The Nation*, 12 September.

Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman (1995) *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hegghammer, Thomas (2010) The rise of Muslim foreign fighters: Islam and the globalisation of jihad. *International Security* 35(3): 53–94.

Heydemann, Steven and Reinoud Leenders (2011) Authoritarian learning and authoritarian resilience: Regime responses to the 'Arab awakening'. *Globalisations* 8(5): 647–53.

Hijab, Nadia (2011) The rise of the intifada generation. *The Nation*, 12 September.

Ho, Eng-seng (2002) Names beyond nations: The making of local cosmopolitans. *Études rurales* 163–4: 215–31.

Hoffman, Valerie J. (1995) Muslim fundamentalists: Psychosocial profiles. In: Marty, M.E. and R.S. Appleby (eds) *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hunter, James Davison (1991) *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*. New York: Basic Books.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1997) After twenty years: The future of the third wave. *Journal of Democracy* 8(4): 3–12.

Iskander, Elizabeth (2012) The 'mediation' of Muslim–Christian relations in Egypt: The strategies and discourse of the official Egyptian press during Mubarak's presidency. *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 23(1): 31–44.

Jones, Carla and Ruth Mas (2011) Transnational conceptions of Islamic community: National and religious subjectivities. *Nations and Nationalism* 17(1): 2–6.

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kersten, Carool (2009) Islam, cultural hybridity, and cosmopolitanism: New Muslim intellectuals on globalisation. *Journal of International and Global Studies* 1(1): 89–113.

Keshavarzian, Arang and Waleed Hazbun (2010) Re-mapping transnational connexions in the Middle East. *Geopolitics* 15(2): 203–9.

Khatami, Muhammad (1999) The soul's East, reason's West. *New Perspectives Quarterly* 16(3): 14–17.

Koehn, Peter H. and James N. Rosenau (2002) Transnational competence in an emergent epoch. *International Studies Perspectives* 3: 105–27.

Landolt, Patricia and Luin Goldring (2010) Political cultures and transnational social fields: Chileans, Colombians, and Canadian activists in Toronto. *Global Networks* 10(4): 443–66.

Lewis, Mark E. (2009) *China's Cosmopolitan Empire: The Tang Dynasty*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001) *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McGrath, Cam (2011) Sectarian strife threatens Egypt's new epoch. *The Middle East*: 22–5.

Mandaville, Peter (2011) Transnational Muslim solidarities and everyday life. *Nations and Nationalism* 17(1): 7–24.

Markoff, John (1996) *Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change*. London: Sage Publications.

Markoff, John (1999) Globalisation and the future of democracy. *Journal of World-Systems Research* 5(2): 277–309.

Moravcsik, Andrew (2004) Is there a 'democratic deficit' in world politics? A framework for analysis. *Government and Opposition* 39(2): 336–63.

Muravchik, Joshua (2011) Neoconservatives and the Arab Spring. *Commentary*, September.

Nisbet, Erik C. and Teresa A. Myers (2010) Challenging the state: Transnational TV and political identity in the Middle East. *Political Communication* 27(4): 1–20.

Nussbaum, Martha C. (1996) Patriotism and cosmopolitanism. In: Cohen, J. (ed.) *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, pp. 2–20.

Olesen, Thomas (2005a) World politics and social movements: The Janus face of the global democratic structure. *Global Society* 19(2): 109–29.

Olesen, Thomas (2005b) The uses and misuses of globalisation in the study of social movements. *Social Movement Studies* 4(1): 49–63.

Olesen, Thomas (2005c) Transnational publics: New spaces of social movement activism and the problem of global long-sightedness. *Current Sociology* 53(3): 419–40.

Peffley, Mark and Robert Rohrschneider (2003) Democratisation and political tolerance in seventeen countries: A multi-level model of democratic learning. *Political Research Quarterly* 56(3): 243–57.

Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue (1997) *Interreligious Dialogue: The Official Teaching of the Catholic Church, 1963–1995*. Rome: Pontifical Council.

Rizvi, Saiyid Athar Abbas (1975) *Religious and Intellectual History of the Muslims in Akbar's Reign, with Special Reference to Abu'l Fazl*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.

Rodio, Emily B. and Hans Peter Schmitz (2010) Beyond norms and interests: Understanding the evolution of transnational human rights activism. *International Journal of Human Rights* 14(3): 442–59.

Roy, Olivier (2012) The Islamic counter-revolt. *New Statesman* 151, 23 January.

Saif, Ibrahim and Muhammad Abu Rumman (2012) The economic agenda of the Islamist parties. Report, Carnegie Middle East Centre, May.

Santosuosso, Antonio (2001) *Storming the Heavens: Soldiers, Emperors, and Civilians in the Roman Empire*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Sawhney, Neil K. (2008) A democratic brotherhood? An analysis of the democratic reorientation of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. Unpublished thesis, Harvard University.

Schumpeter, Joseph (1950) *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. New York: Harper and Brothers.

Schwedler, Jillian (2007) Democratisation, inclusion, and the moderation of Islamic parties. *Development* 50(1): 56–61.

Spence, Jonathan D. (1984) *The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci*. New York: Penguin Books.

Stilt, Kristen (2010) 'Islam is the solution': Constitutional visions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. *Texas International Law Journal* 46(1): 73–108.

Tarn, William Woodthorpe (1933) *Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind*. London: British Academy.

Tarrow, Sidney (2001) Transnational politics: Contention and institutions in international politics. *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 1–20.

Tarrow, Sidney (2005) *The New Transnational Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Telhami, Shibley (2013) *The World Through Arab Eyes*. New York: Basic Books.

Tessler, Mark A. and Eleanor Gao (2008) Democracy and the political culture orientations of ordinary citizens: A typology for the Arab world and beyond. *International Social Science Journal* 59(192): 197–207.

Trager, Eric (2011) The unbreakable Muslim Brotherhood: Grim prospects for a liberal Egypt. *Foreign Affairs* 90(5): 138–48.

Usher, Graham (2011) That other Tunisia. *The Nation*, 12 September.

Van Dyke, Nella (2003) Crossing movement boundaries: Factors that facilitate coalition protest by American college students, 1930–1990. *Social Problems* 50(2): 226–50.

Vidino, Lorenzo (2011) Post-Mubarak developments within the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. *Public Policy Series, 2*. Swindon: Arts and Humanities Research Council.

Voll, John O. (1991) Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab world: Egypt and the Sudan. In: Marty, M.E. and R.S. Appleby (eds) *Fundamentalisms Observed*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 345–402.

Waltz, Susan (1986) Islamist appeal in Tunisia. *Middle East Journal* 40(4): 651–70.

Webb, Adam K. (2006a) *Beyond the Global Culture War*. London: Routledge.

Webb, Adam K. (2006b) The calm before the storm? Revolutionary pressures and global governance. *International Political Science Review* 27(1): 73–92.

Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky (2004) The path to moderation: Strategy and learning in the formation of Egypt's Wasat Party. *Comparative Politics* 36(2): 205–28.

Author biography

Adam K Webb has been Resident Professor of Political Science at the Hopkins-Nanjing Centre since 2008. He previously taught at Harvard University and Princeton University and was a Visiting Scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the author of *Beyond the Global Culture War* (2006) and *A Path of Our Own: An Andean Village and Tomorrow's Economy of Values* (2009).