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# Bases of Support for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: Gender, Attitudes toward Economic Integration, and Attachment to Europe

Cigdem Kentmen

## Abstract

The present study examines the determinants of individual support for the European Union's (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Using data from the 2005 *Eurobarometer* survey, I specified models that test whether gender, subjective economic evaluations of the European integration, and attachment to Europe affect how EU citizens view the CFSP and a possible rapid European military force. My findings show that there is no gender gap in EU foreign policy attitudes: women are not less pacific than men. Individuals base their evaluations of the EU on their experience of the economic integration and their feelings for Europe.

## Keywords

Foreign policy opinion, European Union, Gender gap, Economic calculations, European identity

The extensive past literature on foreign policy found that citizens lack information on foreign issues, and that elites therefore do not take their foreign policy preferences into account during the policy-making process (Almond, 1950; Converse, 1964; Lippmann, 1922). Thus, there has been little scholarly interest in understanding which factors affect individual perceptions of national foreign policies. However, recent foreign policy issues, such as the war in Iraq, the global war on terrorism, and foreign interventions in ethnic conflicts, have attracted a great deal of public attention in contemporary politics. Growing public criticism in the United States and Europe of governments' foreign policies has increased the scholarly interest in the dynamics and nature of popular attitudes toward national foreign policies (Eichenberg, 2000; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987, 1990; Isernia, 2000; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004; La Balme, 2000). Recent studies observe that individuals can make rational calculations about foreign issues. For example, voting behavior literature showed that "the electorate can use the

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## Corresponding author:

Cigdem Kentmen, Izmir University of Economics, Department of International Relations and the EU,  
Sakarya Cad. No. 156, Balçova, 35330, Izmir, Turkey  
[email: [cigdem.kentmen@ieu.edu.tr](mailto:cigdem.kentmen@ieu.edu.tr)]

outcomes from the cases of international intervention to estimate the foreign policy competence of the government” (Smith, 1996: 136). Since individuals’ utilitarian calculations regarding foreign policy issues are a significant indicator of governmental support, it is important to understand the factors that shape individual foreign policy attitudes.

An important determinant of public attitudes toward foreign policies “to which the ruling elite must be attentive” is gender (Regan and Paskeviciute, 2003: 291). This is because, through electoral participation, mass demonstrations, or connections with parties and candidates, women have influenced governmental policies in a different way than men. For example, Caprioli (2000) showed that the inclusion of women in political, social, and economic spheres decreases the likelihood of militarized disputes. Similarly, Regan and Paskeviciute (2003) found that the higher the percentage of women in the lower houses of parliaments, the lower the likelihood of dyadic militarized disputes.

The underlying argument rests on the claim that women and men may have different opinions, especially on national interests abroad and the use of military and non-military force. It is claimed that the roles and values prescribed for women, whether by society, feminist thought, or women’s nature, make women more cooperative and less belligerent in foreign affairs than men (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Togeby, 1994; Wilcox et al., 1996).

Most previous studies providing empirical evidence for a gender gap in foreign policy attitudes come from the United States (Frankovic, 1982; Gilens, 1988), with little research from other countries. Thus, it is not possible to generalize the findings of the current gender literature on foreign policy attitudes for other parts of the world. This study provides the first evidence of whether a gender gap exists in the EU. Given the unique tasks, structure, and purposes of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, several questions come to mind about gender attitudes. Do women, who are assumed to be more supportive of cooperative behavior in the international arena than men, favor the CFSP? Do European women support a common foreign policy or a common security policy, or both? Are women more likely to oppose the development of a common military force in Europe, given their presumed tendency to oppose the use of national military forces in foreign affairs? The existing literature does not provide answers to these questions; this study is the first close examination of whether European women and men think differently about the foreign and security policies of the EU.

This article also explores two other alternative explanations of support for the CFSP. One focuses on whether individuals base their evaluation of the CFSP on their attitudes toward the economic success of European integration. The CFSP is a newly established policy area compared to that of economic integration, and its intergovernmental character, which leaves decision-making responsibilities to the member states rather than EU institutions, makes it less visible to European citizens. Therefore, while evaluating the CFSP, citizens might rely on their experience with what they are more familiar with, and so their attitudes toward economic integration might have a significant influence on their preferences for the CFSP.

This study also analyzes another explanation of support for the CFSP that links attachment to Europe to foreign policy attitudes. Previous literature on public support for European integration suggested that the strength of social identity has a significant effect on individual opinion even in the presence of demographic factors. Using *Eurobarometer* data, earlier literature showed that individuals who said that they had a stronger attachment to their national identity than to Europe were more likely to be Euroskeptics (Christin and Trechsel, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2005). There is no previous study testing whether identity affects attitudes toward the CFSP, which includes plans for establishing a common European army. National military force represents the sovereignty of nation states; thus the CFSP might pose a threat to individuals who lack a strong attachment to Europe.

At the outset it might be questioned why, since EU member states still maintain sovereignty in foreign policy, it is fruitful to focus on attitudes toward the EU’s CFSP. Our response: although

individual states are still the most important actors in global politics, scholars claim that the dynamics of international politics have changed dramatically, especially after the Cold War. For example, as Ruggie (1993: 140) argues, the EU has emerged as a “postmodern international political form” that might be an alternative to the nation state as a major player in contemporary international politics. EU member states agreed to create the CFSP in response to divergent national approaches during the first Gulf War and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The CFSP was therefore created to guarantee stability, security, and peace in Europe, and this may include developing a permanent European military force. Thus, given the emergence of the EU as an actor in the international arena, questions about the nature of individual attitudes toward the CFSP have become relevant.

Questions about the nature of individual attitudes toward the CFSP are also prompted by voters’ rejection of the draft EU Constitution in 2005, which had important articles regarding the CFSP. This rejection highlights the need to develop a better understanding of public opinion on the CFSP, since the ratification of EU treaties requires the support of citizens in some member states. Even if a member state requires parliamentary ratification rather than a public referendum on international treaties, public preferences will still be taken into consideration. Members of the parliament who wish to be re-elected in subsequent elections might be reluctant to support an unpopular issue. Thus, decision-makers may need to develop policies and draft treaties that are responsive to the demands of individuals. Therefore, the findings presented here will not merely broaden our understanding of the nature and context of foreign policy attitudes in general. They will also offer an insight into citizen support for the deepening of the European unification process.

## The Sources of the Gender Gap

The literature on foreign policy attitudes suggests that women and men might think differently about foreign policy. Studies claim that the two groups are likely to have a different distribution of opinions on international affairs, actors, issues, and foreign policy goals. The general argument is that women tend to be more liberal and cooperative than men. For example, by analyzing survey data, Smith (1984) found that men were more favorable toward the use of military force and involvement in wars. Using data from five surveys conducted in 1990 and 1991 in the US, Bendyna and Finucane et al. (1996) found that women were more likely to have negative feelings toward the Persian Gulf War. Using individual level data gathered from the 1960s to 1990s in the US, Shapiro and Mahajan (1986) found that men were more likely to support violent policy options.<sup>1</sup>

Three arguments have been advanced to explain the gender gap in foreign policy attitudes. The “greater distance argument” claims that the levels of women’s political efficacy and interest in politics are usually lower than men’s. This lower level of involvement in politics means that women will be less well informed about foreign policy issues (Delli-Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Verba et al., 1997). Addressing this argument, Togeby (1994) found that Danish women, who showed less interest in politics and low efficacy, are more likely to give “don’t know” responses to questions on foreign policy than Danish men. Togeby (1994) also found a positive and significant correlation between political interest and opposition to an aggressive foreign policy among Danish women.

The second “women’s values argument” draws attention to the roles and values prescribed for women by society, family, and occupation. Both traditional and modern societal structures entrust women with responsibility for care giving, particularly parenting (Hare-Mustin, 1988). Labor markets reflect this in, for example, the tendency for women to be hired preferentially for positions such as nursing. Such responsibilities identify women with cooperative behavior, maternal values, and sense of care-taking in contrast to “masculine goals of competition and individuation” (Mills et al., 1992; Wilcox et al., 1993: 69). Regarding foreign policy, this would lead women to worry about the casualties of possible wars. Married women with children would be more likely to oppose

the use of military force, instead supporting peaceful solutions, negotiations, and cooperation among international actors (Ruddick, 1983; Wilcox et al., 1993).

The relevant empirical findings, however, are mixed. Togeby (1994) found that, contrary to expectations, the number of children in the house is positively correlated with support for militaristic foreign policies. The effect of marital status is also controversial. Among women, single women are the least critical of militaristic foreign policies and have attitudes very similar to those of men, whereas divorced men and women are the most critical of foreign policy compared with other marital status groups. In contrast to family status, the findings for professions show the expected effect on attitudes: both women and men who have trained for care-giving professions such as healthcare and teaching, and who have jobs in these fields, are more likely to be critical toward militaristic foreign policies.

The third “feminist mobilization argument” basically claims that feminist women will have more gender-conscious values (Cook and Wilcox, 1991). Many feminists have examined why women and men have different values. They claim that having a “woman-centered perspective focusing on the female experience as a unique source of values” leads women to be more open to the influence of those values (Conover, 1988: 987). They are more likely to treat female values, which include “caring and responsibility toward others,” “as a matter of pride, confidence, hope, and superiority” (Conover, 1988: 987). The feminist mobilization argument claims that feminists’ internalization of these values would lead to “a challenge to the use of force and violence as a means of conflict resolution” (O’Neill, 2001: 280). Conover (1988) found that there is a gender gap between feminist women and men regarding foreign policy issues. However, there is no gender gap between non-feminist women and men on foreign issues.

This article makes several predictions. Consistent with many claims in the gender-oriented literature, it expects women to be more supportive of cooperation among EU member states in foreign and security policy areas. Women would support closer relations that not only promise stability and peace in Europe, and other parts of the world, but also decrease the military burden on member states. The gender literature also claims that men are more aggressive and less liberal regarding foreign policy. In accordance with this logic, this article claims that men should be less supportive of cooperation in a common foreign and security policy. This study also expects women to be less supportive than men of the creation of a rapid military force within the EU because their nurturing and care-taking role discourages them from supporting the use of violence. A European army would enhance cooperation among the member states, but it would not eliminate national armies. It would be an additional force in Europe, and thus women might perceive this as increasing the possibility of engaging in military conflict.

## **Support for Economic Integration**

The CFSP has recently become an item of public discussion. In the early 1990s several EU member states began to question the role of the EU in international politics and invest more deeply in the idea of a common foreign policy. Consequently, the Treaty of Maastricht introduced the CFSP in 1993 as the second pillar of the EU. The treaty allowed member states of the EU to take joint actions and to develop systematic cooperation in the agreed areas of foreign policy.<sup>2</sup> However, the proposed security and military capabilities of the CFSP (which would make it more noticeable to the public eye) were weak, and neither the Treaty of Maastricht nor subsequent treaties created a common European military force.<sup>3</sup> In this sense, the CFSP was a much less developed area of EU policy than economic integration.

Studies of public support suggest that individuals evaluate low-profile institutions, such as the CFSP, on the basis of their assessment of more visible institutions. Thus, EU citizens, having limited knowledge about the CFSP, rely on their experience with something less obscure, such as European economic integration (Blondel et al., 1998). Since the late 1950s European leaders have been working toward the Single Market, the European Monetary System, and the coordination of macroeconomic policies. Their efforts have altered the cost–benefit calculations, interests, and identities of both the member states and their citizens (Dyson, 2002). This study expects that individuals who support more visible economic integration will have similar attitudes toward the CFSP.

## Attachment to Europe

Many studies have argued that attachment to a European identity affects how individuals view the EU (Carey, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Smith, 1993). Theories of social identity suggest that those who have strong ties to Europe see themselves as part of this larger group – here, the EU. This self-identification with Europe has three consequences. First, it encourages individuals to differentiate themselves from the out-group. They have a “we identity,” while they view non-member states and their citizens as “others.” Second, “the fortunes and misfortunes of the group as a whole are incorporated into the self and responded to as personal outcomes” (Brewer, 2001: 119), so they become protective of European interests. Third, those who have a strong attachment to Europe are more supportive of unification. As Kentmen (2008: 494) suggests, since European identity becomes the new reference point for individuals, “they will not be too bothered by the weakening of national identity that may come with the deepening of European integration.”

Several studies suggest that individuals who feel closer to Europe rather than the nation or the region will be more supportive of European unification. In contrast, those who have a strong national identity will oppose deeper European unification. Hooghe and Marks (2004) found that those who value their national identity over European attachments are less supportive of European unification, while Carey (2002), using *Eurobarometer* data, found that attachment to national identity has as much impact on how an individual views European integration as utilitarian explanations. Following this logic, I expect individuals who have strong ties to Europe to be more supportive of EU unification, and, since the CFSP constitutes the second pillar of EU unification, I expect those who have strong ties to Europe also to be supportive of the CFSP.

## Data Analysis

In this analysis, I rely on data from *Eurobarometer 63.4* (European Commission, 2005). The *Eurobarometer* survey series was first developed by the European Commission in 1973 and since then surveys have been held twice a year in all member and candidate states. The purpose of the *Eurobarometers* is to examine cross-national and cross-temporal changes in public opinion on European integration. All *Eurobarometer* surveys share a common set of questions, including questions on perceived quality of life, interest in politics, attitudes toward unification, knowledge on the EU, and satisfaction with democracy and the national economy. Other than those common questions, each survey asks about an additional topic such as agriculture, energy, or the environment.

*Eurobarometer 63.4* (European Commission, 2005) was conducted in 25 EU member states. I excluded Romania and Bulgaria from the data since they had not joined the EU at the time of the survey.<sup>4</sup> My aim is to understand the determinants of foreign policy behavior in member states; I do not expect citizens in candidate countries to have stable attitudes toward the CFSP since they do

not have any experiences with this pillar yet. I used the *Eurobarometer 63.4* survey because it includes a battery of questions regarding common foreign, defense and security policy, economic unification, and attachment to Europe. The survey sample consists of 24,801 individuals aged 15 and older. I employ the sample weighting recommended by the *Eurobarometer* series. To evaluate the gender gap hypotheses, the following section analyzes attitudes toward the EU's common foreign and security policy using logit regression models. Logit regression is an appropriate method because the analysis involves categorical dependent variables (McCullagh, 1980).

### *Dependent Variables*

In the analyses, I examine opinions about the EU's common foreign and security policy using three survey questions. The first question asks respondents whether they are for or against "one common foreign policy among the Member States of the European Union, towards other countries." Respondents who support the common policy are coded 1, and those against 0. I coded "don't know" answers as missing.

The second measure of attitudes toward the common security policy of the EU asks respondents whether they are for or against "a common defense and security policy among European Union Member States." Once again, those who support the policy are coded 1, and those against 0, with "don't know" responses coded as missing data.

The third measure of attitudes toward the common security policy of the EU asks respondents: "The European Union already has a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a European Security and Defense Policy. There is now a debate about how much further these should be developed. Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree that [...] the European Union should have a rapid military reaction force that can be sent quickly to trouble spots when an international crisis occurs?" I coded those agreeing with this statement as 1 and disagreement as 0. "Don't know" responses are coded as missing data.

### *Independent Variables*

This study employs gender as the key independent variable, together with three other independent variables. Gender is coded 1 for female respondents and 0 for male respondents. Previous studies have shown that individual evaluations of economic unification can affect support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel and Whitten, 1997). Therefore, I add a measure of EU economic performance to the models. This variable is measured by asking respondents whether they feel more stable economically because their country is a member of the EU. "Tend to agree" is coded 1 and "tend to disagree" as 0. "Don't know" responses are coded as missing data.

Previous research has revealed that attachment to Europe affects how individuals view European integration. Those who have close attachments are expected to favor the integration process. Following this argument, I suggest that individuals with strong European attachments would also support the CFSP and defense pillar of European integration. I measure attachment to Europe using the following survey question: "People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country, or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to Europe." Responses range from "very attached" (1) to "not at all attached" (4). For ease of interpretation, answers are recoded so that (1) is "not at all attached" and (4) is "very attached." Responses of "don't know" are coded as missing.

## Control Variables

The logit regression models also include five control variables. The first control variable is political efficacy. Level of political efficacy affects women's and men's attitudes toward politics. The related survey question asks respondents whether or not they agree with the statement that "my voice counts in the European Union." Those who agree with this statement are coded 1 and those who do not are coded 0. "Don't know" responses are coded as missing data.

Second, research suggests that level of knowledge also affects one's opinion about foreign policy. For a measure of level of knowledge, I relied on four *Eurobarometer* questions. The survey asks respondents to indicate whether the following statements are true or false: "(1) The European Union currently consists of fifteen Member States," "(2) The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of the European Union," "(3) The European Union has its own anthem," "(4) The last European elections took place in June 2002." Those who know the correct answer are coded 1 and all others 0. Then I summed the four question scores to obtain a total ranging from 4 ("perfect knowledge") to 0 ("no knowledge about the EU").

Third, I added marital status to the models. I recoded the marital status variable with "married," "remarried," and "unmarried but currently living with partner" as 1, and all of "unmarried" and "having never lived with a partner," "having lived previously with a partner but now on her own," "divorced," "separated," and "widowed" as 0. "Others" are coded as missing data. Previous studies suggest that women living with a partner are more likely to be more cooperative and less belligerent in foreign affairs because of the care-taking role that cohabitation prescribes to them. The fourth control variable is age, ranging from 15 to 97. I added age to the models since earlier studies claim that it negatively affects attitudes toward European integration.

Fifth, I created two dummy variables for occupational groups. "Employed" includes those who are self-employed or an employed professional, business proprietor, general manager, working at a desk, director, top manager, or middle manager, farmer, fisherman, craftsman, skilled or unskilled manual worker, traveling employee, working in a service job, or supervisor. The second dummy variable is unemployed, including housewives responsible for housework, the unemployed, and those who are retired or unable to work due to illness. This is the base category. Previous studies claim that women who are not occupied with housework are less likely to have the whole responsibility for family care. Thus, they will care less about nurturing and think more like men regarding policy issues.

Sixth, I created three dummy variables to control for the effect of nation.<sup>5</sup> Germany is the base category. The final control variable is religiosity, which is measured using a survey question that asks: "Apart from weddings or funerals, about how often do you attend religious services?" The responses range between "(1) about once a year" and "(8) more than once a week."

## Results for the Logit Regression Models

Table 1 reports the results of the logit regressions of support for the CFSP. I tested three basic models for each of the three main dependent variables: support for common foreign policy, common military policy, and common military force. I ran each model three times for three groups: whole sample, men, and women.

Table 1 shows that all models yield statistically significant chi-squares, which suggests that the models are robust. Table 1 also presents the proportional reductions in errors (PRE). The models reduce errors in the prediction of the dependent variables by at least 1 percent. Finally, multicollinearity is not a problem in these models: the rule of thumb for multicollinearity is a



**Table 1.** Logit Results for Support for EU's Common Foreign Policy, Common Defense and Security Policy, and Rapid Military Force

Predictors	Coefficient (robust standard error)											
	Common foreign policy			Common defense and security policy			Rapid military force					
	All (Model I)	Women (Model II)	Men (Model III)	All (Model IV)	Women (Model V)	Men (Model VI)	All (Model VII)	Women (Model VIII)	Men (Model IX)	All (Model X)	Women (Model XI)	Men (Model XII)
Intercept	-.951*** (.213)	-.533 (.286)	-1.45*** (.299)	.251 (.247)	.321 (.346)	.157 (.348)	-.232 (.207)	-.040 (.286)	-.499 (.285)			
Gender	.003 (.081)	—	—	-.027 (.093)	—	—	-.046 (.077)	—	—	—	—	—
EU's economic benefit	.862*** (.091)	.853*** (.126)	.879*** (.081)	1.10*** (.117)	.974*** (.177)	1.19*** (.152)	.519*** (.087)	.473*** (.127)	.559*** (.116)			
Attachment to Europe	.641*** (.056)	.528*** (.078)	.757*** (.081)	.571*** (.062)	.502*** (.101)	.636*** (.078)	.312*** (.049)	.283*** (.073)	.336*** (.065)			
EU knowledge	.112** (.04)	.127* (.054)	.093 (.059)	.064 (.044)	.099 (.066)	.032 (.059)	.057 (.035)	.071 (.049)	.042 (.049)			
Political efficacy	.548*** (.091)	.579*** (.124)	.514*** (.131)	.657*** (.11)	.700*** (.158)	.610*** (.156)	.423*** (.085)	.346** (.123)	.480*** (.119)			
Marital status	-.063 (.063)	.184 (.118)	-.339** (.131)	.002 (.106)	.062 (.140)	-.052 (.156)	-.038 (.084)	.091 (.114)	-.209 (.125)			
Age	.007** (.003)	.001 (.004)	.016*** (.004)	.002 (.003)	-.002 (.005)	.005 (.004)	-.005* (.003)	-.009** (.004)	.001 (.003)			
Employed	.07 (.088)	-.023 (.120)	.237 (.127)	-.155 (.104)	-.093 (.146)	-.189 (.145)	-.308*** (.085)	-.442*** (.119)	-.145 (.119)			
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.177	.154	.211	.184	.162	.210	.071	.071	.079			
Log likelihood	-4804.5	-2460.48	-2315.92	-3706.7	-1890.32	-1807.28	-5674.28	-2813.53	-2842.67			
Wald chi-square	863.28***	460.76***	456.99***	844.43***	478.38***	424.47***	459.60***	247.30***	246.58***			
(Df)	(32)	(31)	(31)	(32)	(31)	(31)	(32)	(31)	(31)			
PRE	.107	.110	.091	.067	.089	.061	.012	.007	.011			
N	11047	5448	9307	11136	5492	5644	11058	5439	5619			

Notes: I used STATA 9.2 in this research.

\* Significant at .05 level; \*\* significant at .01 level; \*\*\* significant at .001 level in two-tailed test of significance.

variance inflation factor (VIF) greater than two, and the largest VIF value for these models is 1.8 (Fox, 1991).

My findings do not support the gender gap arguments of the foreign policy opinion literature. In Models I, IV, and VII, which include the gender variable, gender does not have a statistically significant effect on support for common foreign policy, common defense and security policy, or rapid military force. These results differ from previous studies, which found that there are gender differences regarding support for national foreign policies and tools across countries (Fite et al., 1990; Wilcox et al., 1993). My results suggest that women might have different views on *national* foreign policy than men, but when it comes to the *common* policy of the EU member states, gender does not appear to matter.

Instead, my findings provide empirical evidence that support for the EU's foreign and security policy depends on support for the EU's impact on member state economies. In all models, the EU's perceived economic benefit is a statistically significant variable,  $p < .001$ . That is, individuals who think that the country's economy is more stable because of the EU are more likely to support the CFSP. I calculated the discrete change in the predicted probability of the dependent variables when the EU's economic benefit variable changes from 0 to 1 to assess the impact of the economic benefit variable on the dependent variables, while holding other independent and control variables constant. The results are presented in Table 2. Individuals who agree that the EU contributes to the stability of their country's economy are more likely to support common EU policies than those who disagree: the probability of support is 13 percent higher for a common EU foreign policy; 10 percent higher for a common defense and security policy; and 9 percent higher for an EU rapid reaction military force.

The coefficients in Table 1 further reveal that, as expected, the level of individual attachment to Europe explains a citizen's support for common foreign policy, common defense and security policy, or rapid military force. Table 2 shows that a change in the attachment to Europe variable from one half standard deviation below the mean to one half standard deviation above the mean had the following effects: an 8 percent increase in the probability of supporting common foreign policy; a 4 percent increase in the probability of supporting common defense and security policy; and an almost 5 percent increase in the probability of supporting rapid military force in the whole sample.

The coefficient of attachment to Europe variable in Model III is also noteworthy. Table 2 reveals that a standard deviation change in the attachment to Europe variable led to a 10.4 percent change in the probability of men's support for the common foreign policy, compared with merely a 5.3 percent change in the probability of men's support for a common defense and security policy and a 4.8 percent change in the probability of their support for a rapid military force. There is almost a 5 percent difference between how European identity affects men's view of the common foreign security policy and common defense and rapid reaction military force. This finding suggests that men, who are often claimed to be more belligerent on military issues, base their evaluations of common defense, security, and rapid military force on how close they feel to Europe. Utilitarian calculations play a more significant role in attitudes toward military-related issues.

Turning to the effect of the control variables on the dependent variables, Table 1 reveals that men are more likely to oppose a common foreign policy if they are cohabiting, whereas cohabiting women do not have a statistically different view of this policy than single women. Age is also an important determinant of support for a common foreign policy for men, but not for women. Older men are more likely to support a common EU foreign policy than younger men. However, the impact of marital status and age disappears in models for the other two foreign policies for men. Older women, however, are less likely to support a rapid reaction military force. In contrast to the earlier findings reported above, this finding confirms the expectations of the literature on the gender

**Table 2.** Predicted Probabilities of Support for EU's Common Foreign Policy, Common Defense and Security Policy, and Rapid Military Force

Variable	Common foreign policy			Common defense and security policy			Rapid military force		
	All (Model I)	Women (Model II)	Men (Model III)	All (Model IV)	Women (Model V)	Men (Model VI)	All (Model VII)	Women (Model VIII)	Men (Model IX)
EU's economic benefit	.131	.137	.122	.102	.095	.103	.091	.085	.095
Attachment to Europe	.082	.072	.104	.044	.040	.053	.046	.043	.048
EU knowledge	.082	.022	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Political efficacy	.083	.093	.071	.060	.066	.051	.074	.062	.081
Married	—	—	-.047	—	—	—	—	—	—
Age	.019	—	.039	—	—	—	-.015	-.027	—
Employed	—	—	—	—	—	—	-.054	-.080	—

Note: The probability changes are reported only for the significant variables.

gap. As women get older, they tend to take on societal roles which expect them to be more caring and protective. Thus, older women will be more likely to have a negative view of a European military force that might lead to more war casualties. However, it must be noted that the impact of the age variables reported in Table 2 is small. A standard deviation change in the age variables led to less than a 3 percent decrease in the probability of supporting a rapid reaction military force. Women with a job are also more likely to oppose a rapid reaction military force. If a woman is in the paid labor force, the probability of her supporting rapid military force decreases by 8 percent.

Table 1 further reveals that those women and men with greater political knowledge are more likely to support a common foreign policy. However, we do not see the same significant relationship in the models for the other two foreign policies. Political efficacy, in contrast, has a positive and significant effect on men's and women's attitudes in all models. Both women and men who think that their voice counts in the EU are more likely to support common foreign, defense, and security policies and a rapid reaction military force. The effect of political efficacy on foreign policy support is higher than the effect of European attachment for women but not for men. This finding is compatible with the greater distance argument, which suggests that level of political efficacy will affect women's opinion on foreign policy issues more than men's. It is also compatible with the Togeby (1994) findings, which similarly demonstrated that Danish women who had low political efficacy would be more disengaged from foreign policy.

## Discussion and Conclusion

This study examined the determinants of individual support for the CFSP. By doing so, the article aimed to fill at least three gaps within the public opinion literature on foreign policy. First, the foreign policy opinion literature has focused on attitudes toward the external actions of nation states and ignored the policies of new international actors such as the EU. However, recent literature on the EU claims that the CFSP's joint actions make the EU a capable international actor, especially in the areas of peacekeeping, democratization, and environmental protection (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; Kagan, 2003). For example, the EU provided technical assistance for Bosnia-Herzegovina's general election in 1996 and municipal elections in 1997. To promote peace and limit North Korea's nuclear capability, the EU also joined the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization in 1997 and worked with founding members Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States. Yet, despite this increased visibility as an international actor after the Cold War, the previous literature on foreign policy opinion has ignored how individuals view the EU. This study provides empirical evidence on whether gender, economic calculations, and European identity have any effect on how EU citizens view the CFSP and the creation of a rapid military force among the EU member states.

Second, much of the previous literature on the gender gap in foreign policy opinion has provided empirical evidence mostly from the United States (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Smith, 1984), which makes it difficult to generalize the findings of gender gap analyses. This study provides the first evidence that European women and men do not think very differently about the EU's CFSP. Moreover, previous research demonstrated that there is a gender gap in attitudes toward military and defense policies in the United States, whereas my research showed that women and men do not think differently about a European defense policy and rapid military force.

Third, previous research predicted that there would be a gender gap in foreign policy attitudes. However, my findings show that individuals' evaluations of the economic benefits of the EU play a more important role in determining their attitudes toward the CFSP than gender. If individuals think that the EU has succeeded in bringing economic stability to their country, they are more

likely to support the CFSP and a rapid reaction EU military force. As with individuals' economic evaluations of the EU, attachment to Europe is also a determinant of foreign policy attitudes, both for women and for men. However, its impact is relatively small. This indicates that utilitarian calculations play a more important role than the effect of social identities in an individual's formation of foreign policy attitudes. Moreover, it means that individuals rely on cues received from other policy areas, rather than relying on their identities, when they are evaluating a policy area that is not so visible.

Given the lack of a clear EU foreign policy, it is understandable that individual attitudes toward the EU's common foreign policy are mostly shaped by attitudes toward economic union and attachment to Europe rather than gender. As scholars emphasize, "the CFSP cannot be regarded as a common policy in a sense analogous to the Common Commercial Policy; rather it is a highly institutionalized and complex process of consultation and cooperation between member state governments" (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 169). The member states still preserve their sovereignty in the foreign policy area and the EU's status as an identifiable actor in the international arena has not yet been firmly established. Whereas earlier studies suggested women might be more pacific about national foreign policy than men, when it comes to the common policy of the EU, my study showed that gender does not have a significant impact on attitudes. Future research might study whether a gender gap exists in attitudes toward national foreign policies in the EU member states and compare the dynamics of attitudes toward national foreign policies and the CFSP.

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### Notes

1. See also Caprioli (2000), McGlen and Sarkees (2001), Nincic and Nincic (2002), and Regan and Paskeviciute (2003).
2. This did not mean that member states would not have the right to conduct independent foreign policies. On the contrary, the CFSP was intergovernmental in character and, among the supranational EU institutions, the Commission and Parliament would have only a limited role in the decision-making process of the CFSP, while the Court of Justice would have none.
3. Article 13 (ex J.3) and Article 17 of the Treaty of Amsterdam stated merely that the European Council was responsible for developing a common defense framework and that it could make use of Western European Union action. The Treaty of Amsterdam also incorporated Petersberg tasks into the CFSP; that is, humanitarian, rescue, and peacekeeping tasks, and the use of combat forces in crisis management. At the Helsinki Conference of 1999, member states decided to further strengthen the security and defense arm of the CFSP by creating a joint military force of 50,000 to 60,000 personnel, deployable within 60 days, to take on the Petersberg tasks.
4. This study includes Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
5. Country dummies are not reported in Table 1 to make the interpretation of the table easier. However, these data are available on request to the author.

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**Biographical Note**

Cigdem Kentmen is Assistant Professor at Izmir University of Economics, Department of International Relations and the EU, Turkey. She has published on public opinion regarding Turkey's prospective membership of the EU and voting behavior in European Parliament elections. Her current research is about Turkish Cypriots' attitudes toward the application of EU legislation. ADDRESS: Izmir University of Economics, Department of International Relations and the EU, Sakarya Cad. No. 156, Balçova, 35330, Izmir, Turkey [email: [cigdem.kentmen@ieu.edu.tr](mailto:cigdem.kentmen@ieu.edu.tr)].