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Books Reviewed

Adams, James F., Merrill, Samuel, III and Grofman, Bernard (2005). *A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bartolini, Stefano (2000). *The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860–1980: The Class Cleavage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Van Biezen, Ingrid (2003). *Political Parties in New Democracies: Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chhibber, Pradeep K. and Kollman, Ken (2004). *The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hale, Henry E. (2006). *Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Katz, Richard S. and Crotty, William, eds (2006). *Handbook of Party Politics*. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Levitsky, Steven (2003). *Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott (1999). *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Ware, Alan (2002). *The American Direct Primary: Party Institutionalization and Transformation in the North*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Transitions to democracy provided parties specialists with a cornucopia of parties and party systems to be studied. The windfall came at a time when students of parties had neither completed investigations of parties in older democracies nor developed categories and frameworks to accommodate the broader array. This review considers what is new and different and how we are coping.

A word about inclusion: I sought monographs which were cutting edge or bridged gaps. Finding them was not easy: the study of parties is a mature field. Most research elaborates existing paradigms rather than developing new ones. Nor is it different from other fields: the American and comparative literatures are separate and scholars argue about rational choice analysis. Books describing parties or party systems in their national context were excluded unless they advanced new perspectives or addressed divisions in the literature. I omitted studies of electoral laws; these constitute a separate, but complementary, literature. With one exception, Katz and Crotty's *Handbook of Party Politics*, the books considered are monographs. Including it violates another rule, excluding books in which you have had a hand, but doing so would have omitted a volume likely to be important to everyone in the field.

Older Democracies

We begin with Stefano Bartolini, *The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860–1980*, and Alan Ware, *The American Direct Primary. The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860–1980* examines the mobilization of class cleavages in 13 Western European party systems. Bartolini wants to know why class cleavages are more prominent in some countries than in others. His approach is empirical and quantitative: he investigates the macro-historical constellations which led to cleavage mobilization. Rather than relying on participants' accounts or imposing expectations from Marxism, he allows the data to speak for itself. Bartolini begins by examining the impact of urbanization and industrialization on left voting. Next, he considers religious and linguistic heterogeneity, the timing of enfranchisement, organizational structuring and the impact of trade unions, cross-class alliances, and the socialist–communist split. He concludes that the mobilization of the left depends on macro-historical processes and choices made at different junctures. Socialism was "more a movement for the national political emancipation of conscious segments of the lower classes than a movement of socioeconomic protest and revolution" (Bartolini: 562). The forms which it takes are diverse. Only if class cleavages were linked to hostility to the state was communism likely to thrive. The book is a tour de force. Presenting sophisticated data in easily digestible forms, Bartolini advances an agenda which Stein Rokkan mapped, but could not complete. This is an excellent example of the results that quantitative historical analysis can produce.

The American Direct Primary is a refreshing book which anyone studying American parties should read. Ware challenges prevailing knowledge about the circumstances which led to ballot reform and the introduction of primaries. In the late 19th century, states replaced ballots printed by parties with state-supplied ballots, cast privately rather than in public. In the early 20th century, many states introduced direct primaries. Political scientists attribute both to the onslaught of progressives, determined to weaken entrenched political machines. Ploughing through newspapers and historical records, Ware shows that neither

was the case: ballot reform was promoted by parties. Then, as now, Americans voted for multiple offices and parties faced challenges from insurgents. Dissidents sometimes printed nearly identical ballots, substituting candidates for one or two offices. Because ballots looked alike, few voters noticed the difference. State-supplied ballots helped parties fend off dissidents. Ballot reform was promoted by politicians who knew a good thing when they saw it.

Ware's explanation for direct primaries is similar. The standard explanation attributes primaries to the demands of progressives and the realignment of 1896. Two-party competition had given way to one-party dominance in many states. V.O. Key (1949, 1964) argued that primaries were introduced to ensure competition. However, his conclusions were based primarily on his work on the South. *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (Key, 1949) continues to be one of the finest comparative studies of American state politics, but conditions in the North and South were different. In the South, voting Democratic was a device to maintain racial segregation. The upheavals of 1896 were less pronounced in the North: many states continued to be competitive. Ware shows that primaries were promoted by entrepreneurial politicians (often state governors) seeking to advance their standing. Primaries spread in the same way as ballot reform: states imitating each other, often for the same reasons. Ware not only stands prevailing wisdom on its head, but also resolves a paradox – how progressives defeated political machines said to be invincible. Similar factors could explain why electoral reform is occurring in some countries but not others.

Neither Bartolini's nor Ware's books are typical of research on Western Europe or the United States. Both provide us with a deeper understanding of why party systems took the shape that they did. However, neither brings the American and Western European literatures closer together or helps us understand parties and party systems in other settings.

Parties in New Democracies

Transitions to democracies in the later third of the 20th century took many of us by surprise. Nevertheless, students of political parties are not without tools to study the windfall of parties and party systems. The comparative literature provided categories and hypotheses and Western European experience provided not only a backdrop, but also frames of reference. Using that experience has not been easy because conditions have rarely been the same. Ingrid van Biezen's *Political Parties in New Democracies*, Steven Levitsky's *Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America*, Scott Mainwaring's *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization*, and Henry Hale's *Why Not Parties in Russia?* draw on the comparative literature, but they do so differently.

Van Biezen wants to know what parties' organizations in new democracies are like and how they differ from parties in older democracies. *Political Parties in New Democracies* examines party organization in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal, and Spain. She uses formal rules and procedures to chart the ways in which parties are organized. According to Van Biezen, the transitions literature has paid scant attention to parties, treating them at high levels of generality. Nor has there been much attention paid to parties as membership organizations. Models of parties in the Western European literature are "transformational," positing change from one type to another. Emerging in different circumstances,

with different resources available to them, parties in new democracies are unlikely to pass through identical stages. Parties in Western Europe mobilized to demand the vote. Parties in Southern and Eastern Europe faced different problems – getting already enfranchised citizens to participate. Nor were there well-defined cleavages around which parties could mobilize. Parties in new democracies had few incentives to build membership organizations beyond the minimal structures required for candidate recruitment. Nor did they have to develop their own media; the latter were already available to them.

Parties in Southern and Eastern Europe started out entrenched in the state. Dependent on public funds, parties have weak roots in society and barely function as membership organizations. Parties have difficulty attracting members, and those who join have minimal influence. Symptomatic of the low regard which parties have for members, parties sometimes nominate independents. Although Panebianco's (1988) arguments about the formative impact of genetic types suggest the predominance of parties in public office over party central offices, Van Biezen finds parties in new democracies less tightly embedded in the state than their Western European counterparts: reflecting the fractious nature of politics in these countries, party rules vest substantial authority in national executives. Even so, such parties are not all that different from those in older democracies. Office-holders are well represented on national executives and parties are top-heavy, with minimal activity on the ground. However, parties in older and newer democracies arrived at similar points via different paths.

Unwilling to content herself with description, Van Biezen examines how parties respond to the environment in which they operate. If there is a criticism to be leveled it is that the book does not go far enough. Following Katz and Mair (1994), Van Biezen concentrates on "the official story." Official stories are important data in countries where rules and procedures are respected, but they are never the entire story. Some parties may be more than the official story, others less. We need to know more about how their parts mesh and what politicians who populate them actually do.

Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America goes well beyond the official story. Steven Levitsky examines the transformation of Argentina's Justicialist Party (PJ) from a union-based party to a patronage-based party in the 1980s. Following the demise of the military government, the Peronistas abandoned import substitution, embraced liberal economic policies, and returned to power after 1989. Labor-based parties often find adaptation difficult, but the PJ managed to embrace marketization with minimal resistance. Levitsky wants to know why this was possible. To find out, he interviewed national legislators, members of the national council, congressional staff members, leaders of national and local unions, and municipal and neighborhood party leaders in three urban areas, and surveyed local party branches and party activists.

The key to Peronista adaptation is low routinization. Relying on informal arrangements, the Justicialists ignore rules and procedures. This is reflected in party structure. At the bottom are base units of 20–25 people, led by *punteros* or point persons. Base units are clustered into *agrupaciones*. Two or three might coexist in a mid-sized city. Unions had considerable say. Unwritten rules gave them a third of the nominations. However, because formal structures had little real power, outcomes depended on alliances among unions and politicians.

In the 1980s, new base units formed and insurgent politicians and unions displaced an older dominant coalition. Change proceeded rapidly because informal structures offered few opportunities for resistance. Federalism provided footholds. State governors and local mayors supplied patronage to the new *agrupaciones* and base units. Historically based on unions and the urban poor, the Peronistas ended up based on political machines.

Levitsky examines PJ organization at several levels. Doing so, he addresses multiple literatures. Points of reference include populist parties in Latin America, how labor-based parties adapt, and the parties literature. His primary focus is adaptation, but Levitsky also considers parties and how we classify them: existing typologies fail to get much purchase on parties like the Peronistas. Theories of institutionalization focus on formal organization. Routinization of internal practices is a better term. Parties vary on the strength of mass linkages and their degree of routinization. Together, these produce a four-cell table (see Table 1). Parties with strong mass linkages, but low routinization, like the JP, are mass populist parties; those with high routinization are mass bureaucratic parties. Examples of the latter include European social-democratic and communist parties. Parties with weak mass linkages are personalistic electoral parties if routinization is low, or electoral-professional parties if it is high.

Levitsky's typology overcomes the transformational bias Van Biezen finds in standard schemes. However, his book is a case study. We do not know if other weakly routinized parties adapt with equivalent flexibility. If different elements come forward, adaptation might proceed more slowly, as in many mass bureaucratic parties. Few weakly routinized parties have been studied or, if they have, so identified. This is not Levitsky's fault. He has provided a readable portrait and a superb piece of comparative analysis.

Scott Mainwaring put the concept of party system institutionalization on the map.[1] In *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization*, he argues that the degree to which party systems are institutionalized in societies affects the quality of democracy and the prospects of consolidating it. In institutionalized party systems, voters face fixed choices and parties relate to each other in a regular and predictable fashion, forming stable alliances. Over time, voters develop allegiances to parties. This restricts opportunities for new parties.

Party systems in newer democracies are different: parties come and go, appearing in one election and disappearing in the next. Because voters have little to which they can become attached, levels of volatility are high. Once elected, parties lack control. Discipline is lax, defections common. Unsure of support, governments find it difficult to implement policies. Confronted with shifting menus, voters cannot hold elected officials to account. Regimes are vulnerable to challenges from populism and personalism.

TABLE 1. *Levitsky's Typology Based on the Dimensions of Routinization and Mass Organization*

Mass Linkages	Low Routinization	High Routinization
Strong	Mass Populist Party	Mass Bureaucratic Party
Weak	Personalistic Electoral Party	Electoral-Professional Party

Source: Levitsky (p. 23).

Mainwaring examines party system institutionalization in Brazil. Chapters 1 and 2 ground the book in party system theory, the new institutionalism, and rational choice theory. Institutionalization is a process through which parties become known and actors develop expectations about their behavior. The institutionalization of party systems is "under-theorized." Mainwaring criticizes Sartori's (1976) assertion that party systems are either institutionalized or inchoate and not worthy of study as systems. Institutionalization varies across systems and over time. Dimensions include patterns of party competition (stable and predictable versus fluid and erratic), the degree to which parties are rooted in society, the degree to which citizens and political actors accord legitimacy to parties, and the impact of parties as organizations. Highly institutionalized party systems function differently than weakly institutionalized systems. In the latter, party discipline is weaker, levels of accountability lower, and relationships among parties less predictable.

Brazilian party systems have rarely been as strongly institutionalized as those in Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, or Western Europe. Parties enter and exit and vote shares fluctuate from election to election. Only the Workers Party (PT) has a mass following. Neither voters nor politicians are strongly attached to parties. The latter defect regularly. Relations among parties are neither stable nor predictable. Coalitions supporting presidential candidates come and go, and state parties form alliances different from those of national parties.

Low levels of institutionalization reflect incentive structures. Individual legislators, local politicians, and state governors have substantial opportunities for patronage. Few need well-organized parties: candidates for election raise their own funds and campaign through the media. Combining open-list proportional representation for legislative elections with winner-take-all presidential elections, Brazil's electoral systems discourage institutionalization. Open-list PR facilitates factionalism and encourages defection. Winner-take-all presidential elections require candidates to forge cross-party alliances in order to win.

Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization is important but problematic. Although Mainwaring demonstrates that Brazil's party system is less institutionalized than others, there are problems with the concept and its measurement. Parties are important and often enduring, but they are not formal institutions. Mainwaring is referring not to the institutionalization of party systems, but rather their regularization or entrenchment or, in Levitsky's terms, routinization. Of the four dimensions, only one, the ways in which parties interact, taps the systemic qualities of a party system. A second, the impact of parties as organizations, taps characteristics of individual parties rather than characteristics of the system itself. However, there may be reasons to consider the collective characteristics of parties populating a system. Less clear is the systemic relevance of either the degree to which voters and political actors regard parties as legitimate or the extent to which voters develop strong attachments to parties. The former is a characteristic of political culture, the latter a characteristic of voters and the electorate. Neither are characteristics of the system, but rather products of parties and how they behave.

Electoral volatility is one of several measures of party system institutionalization, but it is one to which Mainwaring and others readily resort. However, electoral volatility is not a characteristic of party systems per se, but rather a dependent variable influenced by them. There is nothing wrong with this if it can be shown

that (1) levels of volatility are a reliable surrogate for institutionalization, and (2) there are no other factors which bear heavily on volatility. The former has neither been confirmed nor disconfirmed, but the latter is anything but certain: levels of volatility in Western European party systems have increased in recent elections, but parties remain central to election campaigns and government formation. The same is true in Canada, where high volatility has been the norm.

At issue is the level of attachment which we should expect. Drawing on the European experience, Mainwaring argues that voters should become attached to parties. This was the case in Western Europe, but circumstances are different today: parties have become remote from voters (Katz and Mair, 1995), and the proportion who are members or active members has declined (Mair and Van Biezen, 2001). Voters have other channels to express opinions. Unable to rely on members, parties use public funds for capital-intensive campaigns. Parties also find it difficult to disassociate themselves from policies for which they have been responsible. Parties in newer democracies operate under similar conditions, but lack the reservoirs of support on which parties in older democracies still draw. There are reasons to expect lower levels of attachment in newer and older party systems, but this does not mean that either are less institutionalized.

Mainwaring's argument would be more persuasive if he had produced more evidence of the presence or absence of durable relationships among Brazilian political parties. However, continuity in alliances supporting presidential candidates was not investigated. Nor does he consider whether some of the effects which he discovers (loose links between federal, state, and local politics) are products of federalism. Nor does he attempt to measure durable relationships beneath the flux. All are important. The French party system is known for its fluidity: labels change and political formations regroup from time to time, but competition between left and right defines the system. Mainwaring's research suggests that even if Brazil's party system is not deeply entrenched, patterns of politics are (Ames, 2001). The problem is that informal patterns are more difficult to characterize, measure, and compare.

Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization is a case study of Brazil and an exercise in comparative analysis. The comparative literature provides benchmarks against which Mainwaring assesses Brazil, but comparative referents are the book's strength and its Achilles heel. There is a tendency to extrapolate without considering whether conditions are indeed the same. Nevertheless, Mainwaring has forced us to consider variations in party systems and their impact. This is no mean achievement.

Why Not Parties in Russia? takes a different approach to party system institutionalization. Henry Hale wants to know why parties in Russia are weakly rooted. He argues that we should consider not only the supply of political parties, but also demand for them. With new parties appearing at each election, the supply of parties is adequate. More problematic is the demand for parties: Hale uses survey data to show that voters align parties on a left–right spectrum and use party labels as a guide to electoral choice. However, politicians can rely not only on parties, but also on party substitutes, to provide the resources needed to contest elections. The privatization of state resources in post-communist Russia concentrated the ownership of economic resources in large financial-industrial groups. Controlled by a handful of oligarchs or in some instances municipal or regional politicians, politicized financial-industrial groups can supply candidates

with the funds required to hire campaign professionals and mount capital-intensive election campaigns.

The availability of party substitutes is only one reason for the failure of parties to take root. Presidentialism and federalism have also played a role. Neither Boris Yeltsin nor Vladimir Putin concentrated on party-building. Instead, both contested elections either as nonpartisan candidates or on party labels cobbled together for single elections. A strong executive presidency provided more than adequate resources to contest elections. Only when faced with strong opposition did Putin invest in party-building. Hale argues that this was a deliberate choice intended to enhance rather than share power with well-organized parties which might, in turn, want control over nominations, policy, and their own governance. Russian presidents were not the only political actors hesitant about building political parties. Provincial governors, previously elected but now appointed by the federal president, were able to rely on resources at their disposal as substitutes for the capabilities which parties might otherwise have provided.

Why Not Parties in Russia? is an important book. Examining party competition in a system whose transition is stalled, if not terminated, Hale provides tools which enable us to understand why some party systems are more institutionalized than others.

Rational Choice and Quantitative Approaches

Rational choice analyses of parties and party systems are not new, but if there is any genre which has forced us to take notice, this is it. We consider Adams, Merrill, and Grofman, *A Unified Theory of Party Competition* and Chhibber and Kollman, *The Formation of National Party Systems*. The former attempts to blend spatial modeling with the behavioral characteristics of voters and parties. The latter is not rational choice analysis per se, but quantitative comparison which draws on it.

A Unified Theory of Party Competition incorporates behavioral factors into models of party positioning. Adams, Merrill, and Grofman argue that the predictive capability of spatial models can be improved by considering how voters decide and the ways in which parties formulate strategies. They argue that voters discount what parties have to say and that parties compensate by adopting positions more sharply defined than those which would appeal to the median voter. As a result, vote-seeking parties not only take account of policies, but also differentiate themselves from each other, although not to the extent that distance models predict (Rabinowitz et al., 1991). The authors test hypotheses against survey data and expert judgments about party positioning in France, Norway, the United States, and Britain, four countries for which adequate data is available and which include parliamentary, presidential, and mixed systems with diverse electoral laws. They demonstrate that building in voters' response to party positioning (discounting) and parties' responses to voter discounting improves the predictive capacity of spatial models.

Those who have found previous attempts at spatial modeling divorced from actual political behavior will applaud Adams, Merrill, and Grofman's efforts. Their models are not only more complex, but also more realistic, than earlier ones. Also laudable is their effort to test their models in diverse settings. Less certain is whether these models tell us all that we might want to know about party

positioning or party competition. Spatial models treat parties as single actors. Sometimes they are. In other instances, party positioning, and *inter alia* party competition, depends on who is in control and the extent to which they are able to speak for factions within the party. As a result, party positioning may vary over time. Elements like these can be built into future models, but the more this is done, the less elegant they become.

The Formation of National Party Systems examines the number of parties in the United States, Britain, Canada, and India. Of the four, only the United States has a two-party system. Duverger predicts that single member plurality (SMP) electoral systems result in two-party competition. However, Duverger's law applies only to district-level competition. If it is to operate nationally, then entities competing in individual districts must be aggregated into broader political parties. Third or fourth parties can thrive if they draw on regional support. Chhibber and Kollman want to know why aggregation has occurred more thoroughly in the USA and less thoroughly in the other three countries. To find out, they compare the extent to which patterns of competition have become nationalized in the four countries.

Differences and similarities allow scope for comparison. All have long histories of democratic elections and all use SMP for legislative elections, but three are federations and one is a presidential system. The authors start with single member districts. Candidates could compete individually, but they solve collective action problems by forming parties. However, this varies over time and across countries. Chhibber and Kollman examine party aggregation from 1789 in the United States, 1867 in Canada, 1885 in Britain, and 1957 in India. Treating elections in each district as individual cases allows the authors to examine factors leading to greater or lesser aggregation in 58,534 cases. Chhibber and Kollman discover that the effective number of parties contesting elections depends on the centralization of government policy: the greater the centralization of economic policy, the lower the effective number of electoral parties. The lower the centralization of economic policy, the more likely (1) that policy-making will be decentralized and (2) the higher the effective number of electoral parties.

Explicitly comparative, *The Formation of National Party Systems* investigates the impact of federalism on party systems. Chhibber and Kollman use longitudinal and cross-national comparison to address an old question: what determines the number of parties? Rational choice analysis frames macro-historical comparisons. Their presentation is lucid, but descriptions of politics in each country are truncated and somewhat wooden. Nor do the authors investigate the impact of federalism as thoroughly as they might. Chhibber and Kollman examine competition in national elections in the three federations. Doing so, they bring together important data on the extent to which the same parties compete across all districts in each country. However, they do not consider whether the parties competing in subnational elections are the same as parties in national elections. Canadian experience suggests that they need not be: in some provinces, federal or provincial parties contest elections under distinct labels. In others, the labels are the same, but provincial and federal counterparts are organizationally separate and often at odds with each other.

Questions can also be raised about the choice of variables. The degree of economic centralization is important both in its own right and as a surrogate for the extent to which there is a national community with national issues, but it

is only one of several variables which affect party competition. Not considered are the ways in which parties are organized. Parties can have greater or lesser tolerance for divergent opinions. Comparing the United States and Canada, Leon Epstein (1964) argued that the presence of more than two parties in Canada reflected the exigencies of parliamentary discipline. However, stricter discipline is not the only factor which should be considered. Confederations of state and local parties, American national parties allow considerable scope for divergence. The extent of aggregation depends not only on the centralization of economic policy, but also on parties' ability to accommodate divergent tendencies.

Suggesting that more proximate variables matter does not detract from what Chhibber and Kollman have accomplished. *The Formation of National Party Systems* is a well-formulated longitudinal cross-national study. We need more of these.

Handbook of Party Politics

Richard Katz and William Crotty's *Handbook of Party Politics* is a monumental work, comprehensive in its coverage and the authors included. The aim is "to provide a reliable and thorough summary of the major theories and approaches ... prominent in the development of the field," by offering "a concise 'road map' to the core literatures in the various subfields of party-related research," while identifying "the theories, approaches, and the research efforts that define the current 'cutting edge' of the field" (Katz and Crotty: 3).

Some 45 chapters are grouped into six sections treating definitions of party, the functions of party, party organization, links between party and society, parties in the state, and the future of parties. The editors regard these divisions as arbitrary:

> Given the complexity of the subject, there is no unproblematic way to organize the literature on parties, and hence no straightforward way to organize and order the chapters that follow. (Katz and Crotty: 4)

Part 1, definitions of party, contains chapters not only on definitions and origins, but also on party systems and party system change. Part 2, functions of party, considers not only standard functions of parties such as candidate selection and campaigning, but also American exceptionalism and party system institutionalization. Other sections are more homogeneous. The assertion that there is no single way in which to organize the literature is correct. Engaged in linkage, parties cut across different domains of political activity. Nevertheless, chapters might have been grouped in ways which confronted issues or problems. Chapters on American exceptionalism are separate from each other and there is no section on party systems. However, these are minor complaints. It is difficult to think of a single volume which brings together an equivalent cornucopia.

Like any edited volume, the final product is not as even as it might be. Many authors fulfill their mandates, but some do not. Chapters which succeed include Scarrow, "The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Modern Political Parties"; Katz, "Party in Democratic Theory"; Mair, "Party System Change"; Hazan and Rahat, "Candidate Selection: Methods and Consequences"; Enyedi, "Party Politics in Post-Communist Transition"; Webb and Kolodny, "Professional Staff in Political Parties"; and Siavelis, "Party and Social Structure." Each guides readers through the literature, juxtaposing points of view and highlighting problems. In the

"Unwanted Emergence of Party-Based Politics," Scarrow takes us through familiar and unfamiliar terrain. We believe that suffrage and parliamentary politics stimulated party formation. Scarrow reminds us that parties sometimes formed without these factors or failed to jell despite their presence. Siavelis' "Party and Social Structure" summarizes ways in which parties translated social and economic cleavages into political divisions. There is insufficient treatment of interparty processes and parties as "autonomous actors" and no literature on links between party and society in developing countries. In "Party Membership and Participation," Heidar weaves together arguments about whether and why parties need members, who they are, what they do, and what difference this makes.

Other chapters fulfill their mandates differently. Some contain less comprehensive overviews because the subject is new (Margetts, "Cyber Parties") or narrowly defined (Müller and Sieberer, "Party Law"). In others, authors reach too narrowly or produce journal articles instead of literature reviews. In "Party Origins and Evolution in the United States," Crotty neither considers whether American parties are different, nor mentions critical elections or realignment. Realignment theory is treated in his concluding chapter, "Party Transformations: The United States and Western Europe," but Crotty omits criticisms leveled against it.[2] He notes that students of European party systems use different theories of change, but neglects their preoccupation with freezing and thawing. Nor is it easy to consider post-industrialism the principal source of change in Europe when new right populist parties (barely mentioned) are sometimes stronger than left-libertarian parties. Similarly, Green, "On the Cusp of Change, Party Finance in the United States," focuses on the likely impact of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), ignoring questions about how public finance is changing parties. The detail is admirable, but the article is speculative and will become dated the next time Americans tinker with election finance.

Other authors develop new syntheses rather than commenting on the literature or indicating what is cutting edge. In "Party Models," Krouwel uses genetic origins, the social bases of elite recruitment, and ideological and organizational dimensions to classify parties into five types: elite, mass, catch-all/electoralist, cartel, and business firm, ending up with five dimensions on which parties might be distinguished. However, he is too busy integrating Hopkin and Paolucci's (1999) business firm type into earlier frameworks to consider other new types (for example, new right populist parties, left-libertarian parties, and franchise parties) or where they might fit. Nor does he escape the European bias which he criticizes. Missing are reviews of the literature which the chapter was to contain. Similarly, Lowenstein's "Legal Regulation and Protection of American Parties" provides a detailed examination of court intervention in the United States and how it has changed over time. This is interesting, but it is not an examination of the literature.

These criticisms should not detract from the substantial contribution which the *Handbook* makes. The *Handbook*'s coverage is sufficiently comprehensive that it is difficult to think of literatures or debates not represented. If there is a shortcoming, it is that the chapters, individually and collectively, do not do enough to unite disparate strands or suggest new directions. Only a few chapters treat parties outside Europe or North America. The gulf between studies of American parties and parties elsewhere is amply represented, but only a few

chapters place American parties in comparative context. The most successful is Ware's "American Exceptionalism." Ware argues that differences between American and non-American parties are overstated; the problem is not that parties and party systems are different, but rather that scholars fail to consider the environments in which parties operate. Features such as presidentialism, legal regulation, internal contests for nominations, and reliance on informal structures exist outside the United States. However, pinpointing the problem is not the same as solving it.

The *Handbook* brings differences between rational choice and empirical approaches into sharp relief. Hershey's "Political Parties as Mechanisms of Social Choice" combines an effective summary of the premises of rational choice analysis with critiques and commentaries of proponents and opponents. De Winter and Dumont's "Parties into Government: Still Many Puzzles" explores advances in the literature on coalition formation. These improve the accuracy of prediction. However, models and theories continue to be built around available data rather than the data needed to explain the phenomena in which we are most interested.

Detailing everything in the *Handbook* is neither possible nor desirable. The *Handbook* is a significant addition to the literature. No volume provides a comparable barometer of what we have or have not accomplished. The *Handbook* will help us go forward. Although it might be used in graduate courses, the *Handbook* is neither a textbook nor a book likely to be read from cover to cover, but it could provide a basis for one to be written. This is a book with which parties specialists will grapple. At a cost of US$130.00, that is more likely to be done in libraries than homes or offices.

Where Now?

Our tour suggests that the literature is anything but static. New books continue to appear. However, students of parties and party systems need to do more than plough wider or deeper. If we are to achieve a more encompassing comparative study of parties, then gaps between the American and Western European literatures must be bridged and parties in other parts of the world (re)incorporated into the literature.

How this can be accomplished is an open question. Proponents of rational choice analysis argue that we need better models, empiricists that we need better and more datasets or that we need to study more parties and party systems. However, one does not preclude the others: we need all three. Done well, rational choice analyses can distill important facets of parties and how they behave. For example, John Aldrich's *Why Parties?* (1995) poses questions which we need to think about. However, propositions derived from formal models must be tested against the real world, and neither sophisticated models nor quantitative analyses are possible unless we know and understand what real parties do and how real party systems operate. Much of what we do know, we would not know if someone had not studied specific cases, or known and understood the history. Today, fewer people go into the field and case studies (in today's jargon, "thick description") are few and far between, but it is difficult to imagine how comparison can be done without first understanding the cases.

Transitions to democracy have provided a much wider range of parties and party systems which we can study. American exceptionalism is more galling to

comparativists than to Americanists, but there should be less of it today; the United States is only one of several large federal presidential systems. Nevertheless, we have no such subfield, and books like Levitsky's *Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America*, describing and analyzing parties in such systems, are rare.

Taking to the field will make little difference if we lack categories around which to organize our findings. Classifications from the European literature have done yeoman service, but have never enabled us to compare European and North American parties. Something different is needed – not typologies, but rather categories and dimensions which would allow them to be built. Exploring the horizontal (that is, decisions and compromises about ideological or geographic breadth, or both) and vertical bargains (whether and how to connect different levels of party organization) needed to construct and maintain parties is a place to start. Even so, some caution is in order: we need to examine not only formal structures, but also the informal structures which supplement them. This is not easy. When parties follow rules and operate within formal structures, we know what to investigate and how to do it. That is less true if internal relations are fluid or clientelism prevails. Different methods may be needed. We have our work cut out for us.

Notes

1. Derived from Huntington (1968) and advanced in Mainwaring and Scully (1995), the concept has been used in the study of party systems throughout the world.
2. See, for example, Clubb et al. (1980).

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