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International Political Science Review 2008 29: 133
DOI: 10.1177/0192512107085609

International Political Science Review (2008), Vol. 29, No. 2, 133–156

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Abstract. Postmaterialists argue that citizens' values change when economic development expands educational opportunities. In modernized societies, people embrace postmaterialist values such as self-expression and the quality of life, including support for gender equality. We argue that the political processes that accompany modernization influence value formation. Since all societies do not modernize in the same way, citizens in different regions do not share an identical set of values at a particular stage in modernization. We compare East Asia with other regions, arguing that in East Asia, state-driven modernization processes incorporated gender inequality, and citizens' values reflect the norms disseminated by their governments. We use the underutilized Gallup International Millennium Survey, conducted in more than 60 countries in 2000.

Keywords: • Gender equality • Cross-national comparisons

Introduction

Why is it that East Asia is highly developed economically while citizens' values in the region are not "postmaterialist"? In the original statement of his postmaterialist values theory, Inglehart famously argues that economic development and growing affluence tend to expand literacy and educational opportunities, which in turn influence values and attitudes. As societies modernize and people become increasingly secure, their emphasis turns from economic and physical security toward embracing postmaterialist values such as self-expression and the quality of life, including support for gender equality (see, for example, Inglehart, 1977, 1997). Implicit in this line of reasoning is that if other nations are as wealthy as the USA, or Western Europe, they will share similar values, including pro-feminist attitudes.

Some nations in East Asia *are* as wealthy as western nations, but East Asians are much less supportive of gender egalitarianism. Although previous research demonstrates that modernization does not produce uniform attitudes, the reasons why citizens' values in societies with similar levels of development can

DOI: 10.1177/0192512107085609
Sage Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, and Singapore)

be dramatically different are not clearly understood. To explain disparities, some researchers, including those within the postmaterialist tradition, rely on vague notions such as "cultural heritage" (see, for example, Inglehart and Baker, 2000: 22), while others argue that non-western democracies are simply playing economic and political "catch-up" (Brzezinski, 1997: 5). In the future, they argue, citizens' values will be similar to those of westerners. These arguments have been criticized for "western centrism," that is, implying that West European or North American attitudes toward gender are the normative standard to which other nations will eventually conform.

We argue that since all societies do not modernize in the same way, citizens do not all share an identical set of values at a particular stage in modernization: the state-driven modernization processes in East Asia explicitly incorporated gender inequality and citizens' values in the region tend to reflect, but are not wholly explained by, the norms disseminated by their governments.[1] A component of attitudes toward gender roles stems from Confucian values (what William Kelly [1993: 202] succinctly refers to as a "Confucian idiom of relational hierarchy and performative obligation") and some leaders used Confucianism to legitimize their discourse on modernization, but using the Confucian heritage to explain the varying values within the region does not explain the intra-regional variance. Nor does it explain the ways in which values have changed, have been differently emphasized by state discourses at different times, or the variation in attitudes that exist among different groups within a single nation. We need to examine in more detail what exactly influences values and the ways in which these influences are different in the region.

Much of the existing research analyzes attitudes toward gender equality either in a single nation or in a limited number of nations, usually either the USA or Western European nations. These studies contribute much to our understanding, and using a small sample of countries or a single case study increases our in-depth understanding of those nations, but do little to help us understand the rest of the world, particularly when processes of modernization differ so greatly.

In this article, we examine citizens' attitudes toward gender equality in 60 nations, using data from the Gallup International Millennium Survey, an under-utilized, large-scale, cross-national, public-opinion survey.[2] We particularly focus on explaining attitudes toward gender equality in Japan and compare these with the rest of East Asia (specifically, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore). The wealth and educational levels in East Asia lead us to expect high levels of gender-egalitarian values (as Inglehart and Norris [2003: 2] argue, "the most egalitarian attitudes toward the division of sex roles should be found in the most affluent societies"), but, in fact, East Asians are less egalitarian than postmaterialist theories predict.

We argue that the modernization processes in this region differ markedly from those in many of the countries that experienced early industrialization and in currently industrializing nations, resulting in lower levels of support for gender egalitarianism. The national ideologies that supported modernization promoted gender segregation in policy and practice. These national ideologies, and the policies that they generated, still influence contemporary values.

In most analyses of egalitarian attitudes, researchers pool all regions together in a single regression analysis, using one dummy variable for each region (see, for example, Inglehart and Norris, 2003). The implicit assumption is that the

causal mechanisms are exactly the same for all regions; citizens' attitudes toward gender equality are different cross-regionally, but the extent to which education, marital status, and so forth influence attitudes is the same in each region. A more detailed regional comparison of the individual-level influences on gender attitudes is necessary. We expect the effects of socioeconomic conditions to vary by region and by nation, and we examine the circumstances under which wealth and political freedom produce egalitarian attitudes.

We begin by discussing why the explanations of Western European and US attitudes do not hold in East Asia. We then turn to the social and economic bases that predict attitudes, analyzing the causes of attitudinal differences among regions and then looking in more detail at differences between nations. Analyzing the regions separately allows us to understand the causal mechanisms between attitudes and their socioeconomic and demographic bases in different regions.

The Social and Postmaterial Bases of Egalitarian Attitudes

Much previous research that explores attitudes toward gender equality in the USA and Western Europe finds that people employed outside the home, singles, the less religious, and people with more education are more egalitarian than are others.[3] But these attributes may not have the same effect on attitudes in East Asia. The ideologies that accompany the processes of modernization influence egalitarian beliefs cross-nationally; the employment patterns that predominate in a particular country, for example, and the type of education reflect these processes. We expect the effects of employment or education to influence opinions across nations differently.[4]

We focus on the nations in East Asia that were included in the survey, but we expect variation to exist among the East Asian nations in our sample. We do so because previous research on attitude formation emphasizes attitudinal similarity among citizens in regional blocs with similar historical legacies, and also the importance of modernization in influencing attitudes. All of these nations share in common broadly similar processes of modernization within which public discourses and practice concerning the appropriate roles for women and men were emphasized. These late, rapid industrializers generally had strong, centralized states that managed their processes of industrialization and economic growth. Economic transformation went hand in hand with processes of democratic consolidation in Japan, where industrialization substantially preceded that of other Asian nations. In the other nations, democratic institutions and political freedom did not emerge until after their periods of high economic growth. In Singapore and Hong Kong, the political rights and civil liberties of citizens remain severely curtailed. Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea introduced elections before they had established the basic institutions of the modern state such as the rule of law and a strong civil society. None had a strong civil society, without which government-espoused values may permeate society more readily.

In East Asia, states enacted policies to promote economic growth and disseminated national ideologies that underpinned the growth policies, stressing hard work and the sacrifice of individualism for the greater good of society. Gendered employment practices met the state's perceived need for a compliant, cheap labor supply during industrialization and during the postwar period of high economic growth. The processes of industrialization incorporated large numbers of women

into the labor force, but did so in ways that did not contribute to women's social and economic empowerment by incorporating women into the poorly paid, low-value chains of global production networks. Research demonstrates that export-led economic growth creates false opportunities for women; they join the labor market in low-paying jobs, recreating the patriarchal gender relations of households (Brinton, 2001; Lantican et al., 1996; Ward, 1984).

The policies to promote high growth fundamentally altered the structure and rates of women's employment in the postwar era. In Japan, for example, until the early 1970s women were more likely to be in paid employment than were women in other advanced industrial nations because women worked on farms and in family businesses (Bernstein, 1991; Takahashi, 1998). As part of the process of incorporating women into the newly emerging industrial labor force, national ideologies (that differed slightly across these countries) emphasized women's primary role within the household as wives and mothers, and they were expected to leave paid employment on marriage. The two large subgroups of female workers (young, single women and older women whose children were grown up) were channeled into semiskilled or unskilled work, and since their tenure was short and labor not specialized, they comprised a supply of disposable, cheap labor. The effects of this ideology are still strong: currently, around two-thirds of Japanese and Korean women leave the labor market at the time of their marriage and Taiwanese women leave either at marriage or in their early thirties (Brinton et al., 2001; Lee and Hirata, 2001).

In Japan, not only did the state's policies constrain gender relations, but the "official discourse" on women's proper role was explicitly (and increasingly) disseminated by the Ministry of Education, the school system, and the mass media from the end of the 19th century to the end of the Second World War (see Uno, 1993). But as Uno notes, this discourse did not evaporate in the postwar era: she shows how the state's "vision of women ... as homebound wives and mothers continued to influence state policies toward welfare, education, employment, sexuality and reproduction at least until the late 1980s" (1993: 295). These policies also shaped the employment practices of corporations (see Buckley, 1993).[5] In Japan, structural conditions such as formal and informal labor market regulations, tax laws, and limited access to childcare encouraged married women not to work fulltime outside the home.

Political leaders in Singapore went further, explicitly contrasting Singapore's own approach and Asian values with those of western nations, emphasizing that its "traditional value systems" emphasized hard work, a Confucian legacy of respect, and a high regard for the family, and the state actively promoted its approach to development as a model, particularly for other Asian countries (Pyle, 1997).[6] As Pyle notes, Singaporean family and fertility policies were carefully tailored to facilitate economic development, and women provided the labor in the early years of export-oriented industrialization. From the 1980s, in response to demographic change, policies placed an increased emphasis on simultaneously increasing female labor force participation and augmenting fertility rates among the educated, higher-income, largely Chinese population (Pyle, 1997). However, the rhetoric regarding the importance of family values continued, meaning that the additional burdens fell on women.

Labor force participation in East Asia is not a radicalizing experience for women; implicit in government and company policies (and to some extent social expectations) is the shared sense of interest between women and men as a family unit

that transcends any social consciousness based on gender ideals. In this context, it is less pertinent to describe gender values as traditional or progressive. Attitudes that are labeled "conservative" may actually be a pragmatic assessment of the nature of women's employment or of the difficulties of combining work and family roles, assessments that are contextually specific.

In sum, these values were constructed to underpin perceived economic needs; bearing in mind East Asia's developmental path helps draw hypotheses from the literature on the USA and Western Europe, particularly on the effects of labor force participation, marital status, religiosity, age, and education on gender-role attitudes.[7]

Labor Force Participation

Cross-national research finds that women employed outside the home express more support for gender-role combination (see, for example, Goot and Reid, 1975). Yet other research demonstrates that this relationship varies cross-nationally (Panayotova and Brayfield, 1997).

The types of jobs that women typically do and women's expectations about work in a particular country or region probably influence their attitudes toward gender roles, rather than their participation in the labor market. Researchers tend to assume that since "the majority of jobs that women occupy offer little fulfillment or autonomy in the workplace," work heightens feminist attitudes (Scott and Duncombe, 1992, 43; see also Klein, 1984). Banaszak and Leighley (1991) argue that in the USA employment brings women into networks with fundamentally different values than they otherwise would encounter, and is a potentially consciousness-raising experience.

But these effects may be context-specific. All women do not critique their position in the labor market from a feminist standpoint; we cannot expect employment per se to heighten feminist attitudes. The radicalizing effects of employment on women may not apply to East Asian countries in which women tend to leave the labor force on marriage or childbirth, leading them to view employment as a stopgap measure, and not as a source of identity or fulfillment. (Taiwan is an exception: women's lifetime employment patterns are more similar to those in the West, with fewer women leaving the labor market on marriage.)

For some women, particularly when a national ideology stresses women's primary role within the family, the experience of low employment status may cause them to leave the labor market, preferring to become homemakers, rather than to work in low-autonomy, poorly paid jobs. In post-socialist Eastern Europe, too, although the state-disseminated ideology is not the same as in East Asia, evidence suggests that women who are currently faced with the double burden of housework and paid employment are choosing to leave the workforce (Gal and Kligman, 2000).

Marital Status

Analysts debate the effects of marital status on US women's attitudes. On the one hand, some analysts suggest that married women are more conservative than are single or divorced women (see, for example, Davis and Robinson, 1991; Gerson, 1987), while, on the other hand, some studies find that married women are *more* likely than unmarried women to be feminists (Plutzer, 1988).

More married than single women experience the difficulty of combining home and work – the so-called "two job syndrome." But this need not encourage feminist values. On the contrary, women may be more likely to support role segregation: doing only housework or being employed may be preferable to doing both. Although support for role segregation is classified as conservative or traditional thinking, this may instead be a pragmatic assessment of the difficulties women encounter when attempting to combine family responsibilities with employment outside the home.

The experience of marriage is different for women and men; in general, regardless of their employment status, women usually take primary responsibility for the household and childrearing. Single women may be more egalitarian than are single men, since single women have a vested interest in broadening the options available to them, whether or not they later choose to work. Yet this is probably more important to women outside East Asia, where, as we discussed earlier, norms still emphasize the primacy of the family and women's role as wives and mothers.

Religiosity

Studies on western nations find that religiosity and religious affiliation, particularly affiliation with the Catholic Church, predict conservative attitudes toward gender roles (see, for example, Banaszak and Plutzer, 1993; Mayer and Smith, 1985). Studies claim that Christian religious ideology supports gender-role segregation and a subordinate role for women, both in the religious institutional hierarchy and within the home, stressing women's roles as wives and mothers, but the prevailing attitudes within religious institutions may vary cross-nationally. Inglehart and Norris (2003), in their large-scale, cross-national study, find that frequent church attendees are less supportive of gender equality than are others. They do not, however, include religions other than Christianity in their analyses: this may be a serious weakness that risks missing much information; religious denominations that are not anti-feminist may be "cancelled out" by those that are. Similarly, we would expect that religious variance within Buddhism would differently influence attitudes. Unfortunately, the single question on Buddhist affiliation included on the survey does not allow us to probe such differences.

Age

Studies find that older women and men are less supportive of gender equality than are younger people (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Plutzer, 1988). It is beyond the scope of this article (and data set) to decide exactly why this is so. Proponents of the life-cycle model (also known as the age/senescence effects model) argue that people become more conservative as they age. On the other hand, proponents of the cohort model (or generation model), argue that opinions are acquired fairly early in life, and are relatively stable (Butler and Stokes, 1974). Thus, older people are less supportive of gender equality, not because they became more conservative as they aged, but because of their experiences in early adulthood, when their values and attitude structures were forming. Other analysts have found a combination of these two effects (Jennings and Niemi, 1981).

In Japan, we expect the effect of cohort to be particularly strong since the older cohorts came of age in the prewar era when state power was at its height, and was most strongly promoting gender segregation.

Education

Cross-national studies find more support for gender equality among people with higher levels of education (see, for example, Butts, 1998; Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Davis and Robinson (1991) propose two theses that may explain this relationship. The "enlightenment thesis" posits that education increases awareness of inequality, which in turn leads the educated to favor measures to redress the balance. In contrast, the "reproduction thesis" posits that although education increases awareness, this awareness does not lead to enlightenment, but to acceptance of what are deemed to be "meritocratic" practices. The effects of education on values may also be context-specific: education per se need not influence values at all, for example, technical or scientific education, rather than the broad liberal-arts type of education, may not increase social awareness.

Some researchers suggest that educated women more strongly support equality than do others (Banaszak and Plutzer, 1993; Klein, 1984). If educated women do more strongly support gender equality, rational self-interest may drive their beliefs. Since fulfilling employment is more likely to be available to educated women, they may be less willing to give up such employment. They may also be more likely than others to see women as capable of participating equally with men in the public sphere.

In East Asia, education may not influence gender-egalitarian values. Although women increasingly graduate from universities, the type of education they receive may not encourage gender egalitarianism, since the connection between women's education and their labor force participation is not strong (Taiwan is the exception) (Lee and Hirata, 2001). In Japan, a university education, rather than a means to equality, has become a life stage, and does not guarantee better career opportunities for women (Brinton and Lee, 2001); and in South Korea, women do not accrue all the benefits of a high level of education.

In sum, previous case studies provide insights into the probable influences on attitudes toward gender equality cross-nationally. However, we expect fairly systematic differences between nations: the experiences of a university education or being single, for example, probably do not influence attitudes in the same way cross-nationally because those experiences are not the same cross-nationally. Large-scale studies of many nations also identify crucial predictors and broad attitudinal patterns, but these studies frequently analyze all nations in one model, implicitly assuming that influences are the same cross-regionally, when this is unlikely to be the case. Postmaterialist studies, for example, stress similarities between countries within a given region and between groups of countries at similar stages in their economic development (see Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Analyzing all nations in a single model helps us understand broad patterns and reduces huge amounts of data, but doing so may mask important differences. We thus first analyze basic attitudinal differences, to understand the role that wealth, civil liberties, and socioeconomic differences play.

Data and Methodology

The data we use in this analysis are from the Gallup International Millennium Survey, conducted in more than 60 countries at the turn of the 21st century.[8] To measure attitudes toward gender egalitarianism, the survey first asks respondents:

"Would you say that in [your country] women have equal rights with men or not?" It then asks:

> I'm going to read out some statements and I'd like you to tell me for each one whether you agree or disagree.
>
> - Education is more important for boys than for girls.
> - Both the husband and the wife should contribute to the household income.
> - On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.
> - When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women.
> - A woman needs to have children in order to be really fulfilled.
> - Women in advanced countries must insist more for the rights of women in the developing world.

The response categories were "agree," "disagree," and "don't know."[9] We recoded responses so that an egalitarian response is coded as one, and otherwise as zero.

While these questions by no means capture all dimensions or nuances of attitudes toward gender egalitarianism, they do include key public and private aspects such as the importance of education for girls, whether the role of income provider is gender-specific, women's capacity to lead, the desirability of women working, the constituents of a fulfilling life for women, and, lastly, a question that is somewhat difficult to interpret clearly, that is, whether women in advanced countries should promote the rights of women cross-nationally. We first examine responses to these questions in different regions and then explore the influence on attitudes cross-regionally in multivariate models that we describe in more detail below.

Bivariate Results

First, we divide the countries into geographical regions (Africa, East Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, North America, South Asia, and Western Europe) and present the percentage of respondents in each region who agreed with each statement in Figure 1. We divide Eastern and Western Europe because the political differences suggest that values may be dissimilar in the two regions[10] and we begin with broad regional comparisons.

More than 70 percent of citizens in all regions support various measures of gender egalitarianism that are included in the survey. Most people think that women in advanced countries should insist more on the rights of women in developing countries; that education is not more important for boys; and that the husband and wife should contribute to the household income. Our research suggests that the averages and scales that analysts typically use tend to mask an overall similarity in attitudes that exist cross-nationally. North Americans are the strongest supporters of gender equality on average – on four of the six questions, they are most egalitarian, but on the other two questions, they are not.

On whether men make better political leaders than do women, whether men have more rights to jobs than do women, and whether women need to have children to be fulfilled, East Asian attitudes (and those of Eastern Europeans) were around the middle (except that most East Asians felt, as did their African and South Asian counterparts, that women need children for fulfillment), North Americans were most supportive of egalitarianism, and Africans and South Asians



FIGURE 1. *Regional Attitudes Toward Gender Equality*

Note: The original question wording was recoded so that agreement reflects support for gender-egalitarian attitudes.
Source: Gallup International (2000).

the least supportive. Citizens in only two regions (East Asia and Africa) think that women and men have equal rights.

Inglehart and Norris (2003) suggest that in developing nations women and men support the division of sex roles in the family and in the workplace, and that the egalitarian beliefs of North Americans are much less widely shared than is commonly recognized. Our research indicates that this is generally the case, but regional differences in attitudes are highly issue-dependent. Of all groups, East Asians are least likely to think women and men should contribute to household incomes, lending support to our hypothesis that East Asian ideologies promote "separate spheres" for women and men. Citizens in low-income regions think that both spouses should contribute to the household income, perhaps reflecting the economic necessity of double incomes, which contradicts the assumption that in undeveloped nations citizens favor complete role segregation, with women in the household and men in the public sphere. This may not reflect feminist notions of a double-income household, but still indicates a desire for women to contribute economically. This probably reflects the unremunerated and undervalued nature of women's work in the home: arguing that women ought to work in the paid labor market renders women's work in the home invisible, but the "wages for housework" campaign is less well known outside North America, and is clearly a much more difficult demand. However, the reality is that if women work outside the home, most are condemning themselves to a double burden of homemaking and paid employment. Preferring a single to a double burden may not necessarily be anti-egalitarian in nature, but has the effect of gender segregation. Citizens in low-income regions are also egalitarian on the importance of education for girls and boys, perhaps indicating a desire for greater equality of opportunity in future generations.

The Bases of Egalitarian Attitudes

Our central focus is explaining attitudes in Japan, but we use other countries, particularly those in East Asia, as points of comparison. To analyze the bases of attitudes, we used factor analysis to create a general measure of citizens' attitudes toward gender equality that we then used as the dependent variable (we present the component matrix in Appendix C).

We used principal components analysis to uncover whether there exist underlying attitudes that lead people to respond to the gender-equality questions as they do. Of the questions included in the survey, we excluded the question on whether equal rights for women exist in the respondents' countries, since this may capture policy knowledge rather than subjective opinions. The correlations among the survey items reveal a significant overlap among two subgroups of items. Attitudes toward women and men in positions of political leadership, work (in times of high unemployment), the education of girls, and fulfillment through children load heavily on the first factor. Whereas, attitudes concerning women in advanced countries insisting on the rights of women in the developing world and both husband and wife contributing to the household income cluster on the second factor (see Appendix C). Conceptually, these two dimensions seem to denote a more specific attitude toward women's and men's roles in the family, workplace, and home, and a generalized gender egalitarianism in the household and in the outside world. Our analysis used the first dimension, since it captures general

attitudes toward egalitarianism. In addition, the question on women in developed countries insisting on the rights of women in less developed countries loads onto the second factor (that we do not include in the analysis). This question probably incorporates other political opinions, rather than only gender-role attitudes, so using the first factor leaves us more confident that our measure reflects attitudes toward gender roles.

Our measure of gender-egalitarian beliefs (Factor 1 from the component matrix in Appendix C) is measured on a scale that ranges from –2.21 to 1.21, where higher values are gender egalitarian.[11] We present the means and standard deviations for this variable in the left-hand column in Table 1. Note also that the standard deviations show that intra-regional differences are marked.

The bivariate relationships between support for gender equality and GDP confirm broad patterns noted in previous research, that is, that people who live in wealthier regions are more likely to support gender egalitarianism (see Figure 2). The correlation between the wealth of the region in which citizens reside and their support for gender equality is by no means perfect, but even a glance at Figure 2 shows that East Asian and, in particular, Japanese attitudes are less egalitarian than their income levels would predict. On average, citizens in the wealthiest regions (North America and Western Europe) are most egalitarian, and citizens in low-income regions are less so. Inglehart argues that people who live in low-income societies prioritize survival; the basic sense of insecurity makes people more mistrustful of change, tending to rely on values such as authority, tradition, inherited social status, and so forth. In richer nations, where citizens' basic needs are secure, and policies provide a safety net, values such as innovation, individualism, and self-actualization, which includes gender equality, flourish. But in East Asia, these values have not flourished to the extent that postmaterialist theories imply.

Inglehart and Norris readily admit that peoples' values differ cross-nationally, even among nations that are at the same level of development, citing cultural differences as the determining factor: "While it is widely assumed that culture matters, it remains unclear how much it matters in comparison with levels of societal development ... cultural traditions are remarkably enduring in shaping men and women's worldviews" (2003: 4). But grouping nations according to historical legacy, as they do, subsumes these national differences and implicitly assumes (in the absence of interaction terms) that the effects of the independent variables are the same worldwide, which, as we argued earlier, is unlikely to be the case.

Multivariate Results: Explaining Regional Variation in Attitudes

We now analyze how the social and material influences on attitudes toward gender roles differ in each region. Rather than introducing a mass of unwieldy interaction terms measuring the difference between the socioeconomic attributes and regions, we estimate separate regression models for each region, using attitudes toward gender equality as the dependent variable (Factor 1 from the factor analysis that we describe earlier) and the following independent variables:

1. GDP (purchasing power parity per capita).
2. Civil liberties (1–7, with 7 being the highest level of civil liberties).
3. Religiosity (1–7, with the highest value indicating the most religious).

TABLE 1. *Attitudes Toward Gender Equality and Selected Regional Characteristics*

Region	Attitudes toward Gender Roles	Real GDP	Civil Liberties	Political Rights	Literacy Rate	Life Expectancy	Infant Death	Rate of Freedom
East Asia	–0.274	13150	5.14	5.30	95.24	74.09	9.11	2.56
	0.977	6797	1.54	2.02	5.86	3.99	7.02	0.69
Africa	–0.703	2016	4.00	2.66	61.62	54.10	76.74	1.67
	0.864	346	0.81	1.69	3.41	2.65	9.65	0.47
West Europe	0.468	16311	6.14	6.62	96.97	75.33	10.72	2.87
	0.844	4792	1.28	0.99	6.23	3.47	13.41	0.33
East Europe	–0.331	4953	4.75	5.18	97.55	70.16	16.20	2.38
	0.960	1642	1.22	1.55	3.04	1.39	6.28	0.65
Latin America	0.237	5630	4.89	5.31	90.51	68.38	40.23	2.67
	0.861	2633	0.63	1.27	5.09	4.91	21.38	0.47
North America	0.667	19105	6.40	6.60	95.04	75.34	9.28	2.80
	0.702	6166	1.20	0.80	2.54	2.80	4.45	0.40
South Asia	–0.626	4963	4.01	4.67	82.10	67.55	34.49	2.51
	0.970	2345	1.00	1.38	19.53	3.18	21.99	0.50

Note: Cells are regional means with standard deviations beneath.
Source: Gallup International Millennium Survey (2000); Freedom House (1999–2000).



FIGURE 2. *Real GDP and Attitudes Toward Gender Equality*

Note: The data for East Asia are not strictly comparable. The data for Hong Kong and Taiwan were missing from the Gallup dataset, so we included real GDP chain per worker from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).
Sources: Gallup International (2002) and Heston et al. (2002).

4. Religion (dichotomous [dummy] variables, 0 if otherwise, that is, Protestant and other Christian = 1, 0 if otherwise; Muslim = 1, 0 if otherwise; Hindu = 1, 0 if otherwise; Buddhist = 1, 0 if otherwise; and other, none, and refused = 1, 0 if otherwise [as compared with Roman Catholics]).[12]
5. Gender (female = 1 and male = 0).
6. Age (under 18 = 1; 18–24 = 2; 25–34 = 3; 35–44 = 4; 45–54 = 5; 55–64 = 6; and 65 and over = 7).
7. Education (1 if educated to university degree level, 0 if otherwise).
8. Labor force participation (1 = housewife, 0 if otherwise).
9. Marital status (1 if single, 0 if otherwise).

To these usual suspects, as we discussed earlier, we also added two interaction terms: one between *gender and marital status* and the other between *gender and education*. As we discussed above, we do not expect marital status and education to influence women's and men's values differently in East Asia.[13] The type of education and the values stressed in education, as well as the opportunities that education affords women vary across regions. See Appendix A and Table 1 for further details of the variable recoding and the survey question wording.

TABLE 2. *Explaining Regional Attitudes Toward Gender Equality*

	East Asia	Africa	Eastern Europe	Latin America	North America	South Asia	Western Europe
Real GDP (log)	0.568*	0.678*	0.261*	0.117*	–0.452	0.368*	–0.297*
	(0.095)	(0.101)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.274)	(0.055)	(0.044)
Civil liberties	0.076*	0.120*	0.111*	–0.153*	0.176	0.166*	0.186*
	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.103)	(0.030)	(0.014)
Female	–0.033	0.428*	0.351*	0.076*	0.194*	0.189*	0.165*
	(0.067)	(0.048)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.019)
Single	–0.014	0.059	–0.131*	0.011	–0.008	0.036	–0.015
	(0.082)	(0.053)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.024)
Single female	0.368*	–0.132*	0.240*	0.051	–0.011	0.231*	0.065*
	(0.108)	(0.064)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.032)
University	0.083	0.236*	0.178*	0.346*	0.191*	0.195*	0.192*
	(0.072)	(0.054)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.024)
University female	0.089	0.091	–0.070	–0.022	–0.047	0.214*	0.028
	(0.108)	(0.085)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.085)	(0.033)
Age	–0.213*	0.011	–0.090*	–0.068*	–0.064*	–0.043*	–0.083*
	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.005)
Housewife	0.111	–0.186*	–0.061	0.077*	–0.163*	–0.150*	–0.083*
	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.029)
Religiosity	0.002	0.026*	–0.022*	–0.008	–0.043*	–0.011	–0.053*
	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.004)

Buddhist	–0.122	–0.252	0.453*	0.168	–0.320	0.207*	0.046
	(0.097)	(0.361)	(0.220)	(0.313)	(0.208)	(0.069)	(0.175)
Hindu	0.129	0.442	0.187	–0.753	0.043	0.042	–0.117
	(0.213)	(0.571)	(0.404)	(0.478)	(0.244)	(0.118)	(0.199)
Muslim	–0.458*	–0.378*	–0.298*	–1.228*	–0.564*	–0.238*	–0.340*
	(0.167)	(0.048)	(0.060)	(0.370)	(0.231)	(0.072)	(0.053)
Protestant/other	0.125	–0.008	0.041	–0.027	0.011	0.073	0.190*
Christian	(0.099)	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.095)	(0.018)
Other/no	0.009	0.001	–0.024	0.106*	–0.019	0.060	0.180*
religion/refused	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.089)	(0.024)
Constant	–5.337*	–6.671*	–2.908*	0.086	4.255*	–4.317*	2.514*
	(0.959)	(0.819)	(0.241)	(0.266)	(2.010)	(0.512)	(0.397)
Std. Error of the Regression	.9068	.8030	.9029	.8262	.6837	.8797	.7421
R^2	.15	.14	.10	.08	.07	.18	.23

*p ≤.05

Note: Cells are OLS unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors beneath in parentheses.

Source: Gallup International Survey (2000).

We present our findings in Table 2. Other things being equal, most regions conform to the pattern noted in previous research: the wealthier the country, the more egalitarian the attitudes of citizens.[14] Our findings imply that Wilcox's (1991) assertion is accurate: "objective" equality, such as is more apparent in Scandinavia, raises the social acceptability of feminist views (a counterargument suggests that objective egalitarianism may undermine the raison d'être of the feminist movement).

East Asians' relative anti-gender-equality stance is partly explained by the attitudes of three subgroups: women, the more educated, and housewives. In regions other than East Asia, these subgroups tend to be more likely than others to support egalitarianism, but in East Asia they are no more egalitarian than are others. The greater support of these groups seems to make sense for at least three reasons. First, since women have more to gain than men from gender equality, it is in their rational self-interest to be egalitarians: higher levels of education open a broader range of careers for women, and egalitarian attitudes allow women to enter these careers. Second, educated women and men may be more likely to interact with other educated women and female professionals, thus undermining ideas that women are not as capable as men at functioning in the public sphere. Third, education may have an "enlightening" effect on men: education produces a greater awareness of inequality, and this awareness increases support for measures to redress inequality (see Davis and Robinson, 1991).

However, these reasons are not applicable to East Asia. There, consistent with our hypothesis on contemporary norms in East Asia, the values of women, the educated, and housewives are no different from the values of others. As we discussed earlier, national ideologies in the postwar period emphasized economic growth and hard work to benefit society, rather than the fulfillment of individual needs. Public discourse still to some extent stresses women's primary role in the family and women and men share a common sense of what is good for them as family members, subsuming support for gender equality among women.

Housewives in East Asia are no less progressive than are others. Although the lifestyle of housewives is rooted in gender-segregated roles, women typically expect to leave the labor force upon marriage and childrearing, so homemakers are no less egalitarian than are others. In Japan, for example, researchers note that the low occupational status of most women reduces their self-directedness and autonomy (Naoi and Schooler, 1990). For most Japanese women, full-time employment has become a temporary life-phase, and not an identity-defining issue; routine employment coupled with limited access to childcare and a state-disseminated national ideology on women's proper role in the family bolster support for gender-role segregation.

Inglehart (1990) notes Japan's overall lower levels of "postmaterialist" values and suggests that Japan's late industrialization explains its lack of postmaterialist values. He argues that ecological replacement will change the overall value structure in Japan: a large proportion of the older generation has "traditional" values, but as the younger, more educated generations replace the older generation postmaterialist values will come to predominate, implying that, in time, Japan will "catch up" with western values.

The hypothesized relationship between the values of the older generation being replaced by the values of the younger, educated generation is only partially accurate in Asia: older people are less egalitarian, but education does not contribute

to egalitarian values. Not all university educations produce postmaterialist values; education in East Asia, until very recently, has tended to focus on the skills needed for economic growth.

The role of religious affiliation and religiosity tends to be regionally specific. Once we take into account religious affiliation, religiosity has no influence on attitudes in East Asia (or in Latin America or South Asia). In Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and in North America higher levels of religiosity are associated with less egalitarian values (only in Africa is religiosity associated with more egalitarian attitudes). Pooling Western European nations into "Historically Protestant" and "Historically Catholic" blocs does not explain the differences in gender-role attitudes between all of the nations in Western Europe. A conservative Roman Catholic heritage explains Spanish and Irish lack of support for gender equality, but as we have seen in the previous analysis, Catholicism is not necessarily associated with anti-gender-egalitarian attitudes. Neither does it explain the relative lack of support for equality in Germany and Switzerland – historically Protestant nations currently among the wealthiest, but whose citizens' attitudes are not as egalitarian as hypotheses based on a country's level of development would predict.

In general, the more civil liberties citizens enjoy, the more likely they are to be egalitarians. Higher levels of civil liberties may also raise the acceptability of values in support of gender equality or may produce an "enlightening" effect: since citizens enjoy general civil liberties, they also support rights for women. Women's equality may be seen as part of the whole package of civil liberties.

Concluding Remarks

In general, our findings confirm previous research that citizens in wealthier regions are, on average, more egalitarian than are citizens in low-income regions. But differences are context-specific: on some topics, citizens in low-income regions are not less egalitarian than are citizens in wealthier regions. Overall, we find high levels of support for egalitarian beliefs, but the responses are sometimes ambiguous, and clearly far from supporting total equality. For example, most people feel that women should contribute to the household income, while at the same time believing that women cannot be fulfilled without having children.

East Asians are less likely to support gender equality than other regions with similar levels of wealth. Rather than view this as a "time-lag" problem (that is, a difference caused by late industrialization), we suggest that the processes of economic development that shape values are not uniform. In the East Asian region, context-specific factors are crucial: ideologies that have been disseminated by strong central states and bolstered by the education system stress gender segregation in employment and put in place institutional constraints to women's employment. These factors could be described as "cultural values," but they are not diffuse and permanent values, rather, these values were derived from ideologies intended to promote high economic growth. The states' discourses and policies pertaining to women have played a major role in shaping practices and attitudes.

Our findings imply that support for gender equality is widespread, but we should be cautious in interpreting exactly what this means cross-nationally. Gender equality takes on different meanings in different countries. Citizens in different countries, and during different time periods, may focus on different aspects of the "rights of women."

Appendix A

Survey Questions and Coding

Religiosity

Q8. Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?

More than once a week; Once a week; Once a month; Only on special holy days; Once a year; Less often; Never, practically never; Not answered

Recoded 1–7, so that high values represent higher degrees of religiosity don't know excluded.

Religion

Q9. What is your religious denomination?

Roman Catholic; Protestant; Other Christian; Jew; Muslim; Hindu; Buddhist; Other; None; Refused to answer

Recoded into dichotomous (dummy) variables: 1 if Roman Catholic, 0 if otherwise; Protestant/Other Christian 1, 0 if otherwise; Muslim 1, 0 if otherwise; Hindu 1, 0 if otherwise; Buddhist 1, 0 if otherwise; Other, none, refused 1, 0 if otherwise.

Attitudes on Gender Equality

Q14. Would you say that in [your country] women have equal rights with men or not?

Yes, women have equal rights; No, women do not have equal rights; Don't know

Q15. I'm going to read out some statements and I'd like you to tell me for each one whether you agree or disagree:

- Education is more important for boys than for girls
- Both the husband and the wife should contribute to the household income
- On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do
- When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women
- A woman needs to have children in order to be really fulfilled
- Women in advanced countries must insist more for the rights of women in the developing world

Agree Disagree Don't know

Gender

(Classified by respondent) 1 = female; 0 = male

Age

May I have your age please:

Under 18; 18-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 55-64; 65+

Education

What is your current education?

No education; Primary education; Secondary education (High School); University degree; Don't know/no response

Recoded 1 if university degree, 0 if otherwise.

Occupation (Housewife)

What is your current occupation?

Recoded 1 if housewife, 0 if otherwise.

Marital Status

Could you please tell me what is your marital status?

Single; Married/Living together; Separated/Divorced/Widowed; Don't know/no response

Recoded 1 if single, 0 if otherwise.

PPP

GDP per capita, as included on the survey. Hong Kong, Taiwan, Bosnia Croatia, Macedonia, and Indonesia (Heston et al., 2002).

Civil Liberties

Coded 1–7, 7 = highest level of civil liberties (Freedom House 2000).

Appendix B

Characteristics of the Gallup International Millennium Survey

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Standard deviation	Percent of total sample (dummy variables)	Minimum	Maximum
Female	0.52	0.50	52.1	.00	1.00
Age	4.07	1.66	–	1.00	7.00
Single	0.27	0.45	27.3	.00	1.00
University degree	0.23	0.42	22.6	.00	1.00
Religiosity	4.26	2.11	–	1.00	7.00
Housewife	0.11	0.31	10.6	.00	1.00
Buddhist	0.05	0.21	4.8	.00	1.00
Protestant/ other Christian	0.23	0.42	23.4	.00	1.00
Muslim	0.08	0.28	8.5	.00	1.00

(APPENDIX B continued)

(Appendix B continued)

	Mean	Standard deviation	Percent of total sample (dummy variables)	Minimum	Maximum
Hindu	0.00	0.06	0.4	.00	1.00
Catholic	0.36	0.48	36.5	.00	1.00
Other, no religion, refused	0.27	0.44	26.5	.00	1.00
Civil liberties	5.21	1.39	–	2.00	7.00
Literacy rate	93.15	10.90	–	38.00	100.00
Freedom rate	2.57	.599	–	1.00	3.00
Purchasing Power Parity	9816.31	6921.55	–	1560.00	23760.00
Life expectancy	70.96	5.98	–	50.40	79.50
Infant death rate	21.55	21.58	–	3.20	84.00

The following countries were included in our analysis:

Country	Sample size	Country	Sample size	Country	Sample size
Argentina	1513	France	1006	Norway	552
Armenia	800	Fyr Macedonia	820	Pakistan	462
Austria	780	Georgia	1013	Paraguay	500
Belarus	1009	Germany	1004	Peru	1001
Belgium	1001	Ghana	1002	Philippines	1000
Bolivia	1326	Hong Kong	509	Poland	968
Bosnia	500	Hungary	1000	Romania	1350
Bulgaria	1104	Iceland	619	Russia	2000
Cameroon	1001	Ireland	1395	Singapore	506
Canada	1038	Italy	1001	Slovakia	1000
Chile	605	Japan	1321	Spain	602
China	578	Kazakhstan	500	Sweden	1000
Colombia	1000	Korea	1509	Switzerland	502
Croatia	998	Latvia	504	Taiwan	526
Czech Republic	500	Lithuania	1003	Thailand	510
Denmark	1001	Luxembourg	500	Turkey	2001
Dominican Republic	500	Malaysia	1014	UK	1022
Ecuador	660	Mexico	515	Ukraine	1200
Estonia	487	Netherlands	902	Uruguay	527
Finland	1049	Nigeria	1030	US	1005
				Total sample size	53851

We excluded other countries from our analysis since they contained incomplete data. The surveys were conducted by Gallup International, member offices in each nation being responsible for sampling and conducting the survey. The preferred method of sampling was from the general population, but in some nations, majorities etc. were accepted. The interviews were conducted face-to-face, and in some countries over the telephone.

Appendix C

Component Matrix for Gender Egalitarian Beliefs

	Component:	
	1	2
On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do	.732	.020
When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women	.747	.010
A woman needs to have children in order to be really fulfilled	.651	–.186
Education is more important for boys than for girls	.601	.192
Women in advanced countries must insist more for the rights of women in the developing world	–.089	.694
Both the husband and the wife should contribute to the household income	.062	.741

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Source: Gallup International (2000).

Notes

1. For a short discussion of the tension in the postwar discourse, see Kelly (1993: 193–4).
2. For further details of the survey and question wording, see Appendices A and B and Table 1.
3. See Banaszak and Plutzer (1993) for a review of this literature.
4. We include Hong Kong in the East Asian region, but its current political status, recent history, and employment structure set it apart from its neighbors.
5. Such policies were resisted by some groups of women, and these policies did not define the reality of all working women's lives.
6. Taiwan's development was also export-led, but, in contrast, was dominated by small family enterprises, generating employment opportunities for women that allowed them to balance their home role with work (Lu, 2001).
7. More recently, economic slowdown and falling birthrates have forced states to rethink policies toward women's employment.
8. We provide the exact question wording for the English language version, details of the survey, and descriptives in Appendices A and B.
9. We have excluded "don't knows" from our analysis.
10. Clearly, equal cases could be made to divide parts of Africa or Asia; we do not claim that other regions are all similar. We are not suggesting that regional classifications denote uniform experiences or values.
11. Due to the limitations of the questions, we are unable to distinguish between what Banaszak and Plutzer (1993: 36) label "social feminism" and "equity feminism." *Social* feminism is the belief that women have unique characteristics that should be incorporated into public life, whereas *equity* feminism holds that women and men are not different.
12. We do not expect all adherents of a particular religion to share similar opinions: in the USA, we would expect evangelical Christians to differ from Unitarians. Unfortunately, the survey does not ask denominational questions.
13. We expect a number of other factors to predict attitudes toward gender equality, such as spousal employment (for men) and income. Unfortunately, since questions on these issues are not included in the surveys, we are unable to determine their influence.
14. However, the attitudes of citizens in North America and Western Europe are exceptions. In North America, wealth makes no difference, whereas in Western Europe, the inverse to the general pattern holds true. In Western Europe, this is due partly to the

attitudes of citizens in Switzerland, Germany, Luxembourg, and France – nations that are slightly more wealthy than Scandinavia and the rest of Western Europe, but whose citizens have slightly less egalitarian attitudes than do their Scandinavian and British counterparts (excluding Ireland, Spain, and Turkey).

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Acknowledgment: We would like to thank Sean Richey for helpful comments on an earlier draft.