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Abstract. Pressures from within (Islam) and without (globalization and European integration) have made Germans and the French feel apprehensive about their national identity and culture. Both countries are visibly struggling to defuse the potentially explosive mix of nationalism and fear of the Muslim "stranger," while defining citizenship for their marginalized and disenfranchised immigrants. The issue is no longer the building of "defensive citadels" of "Frenchness" or "Germanness," particularly since Germany has finally come to grips with the reality that the *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) are there to stay. The challenge for Germany and France today is to define what kinds of values are essential for their countries' secular model of society and what kinds are negotiable.

Keywords: • Islam • Jihadism • Depoliticization • Radicalization

A growing number of Europeans fear that Europe faces "a Muslim problem" (Bawer, 2006; Laïdi, 2002; Leiken, 2005). The 2006 global ravages of the cartoon crisis, triggered by offensive and disparaging cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed as a terrorist and lecher, coupled with the alleged plot to blow up US-bound airliners, have made more people fear not only Europe's homegrown radicals, but Islam itself, a religion increasingly seen as posing a direct threat to Western liberal democracy. Majorities in Europe believe that it is the tyranny of Islamic tradition and Muslims' anti-integration attitudes and innate hostility to democratic and civilized ideals that breed Muslims' anti-state orientations – not socioeconomic marginality, political exclusion, repressive tactics of the police, and lack of opportunity (Bertossi and Wihtol de Wenden, 2005; Joly, 2007; Leveau, 1997; Marchand, 2002). In every European country, public debate is focused on the dangers of Islamic dogma, the urgency of breaking the religious collective, and the necessity of taming and institutionalizing Islam within a much more securitized and secularized process. There is far less debate about whether the unsuccessful implementation of the equality specified in the European democratic model is what has led to today's acute crisis of citizenship and unity.

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Little attention is devoted to the fact that civil unrest results from serious problems of political representation rather than from the politicization of Islam, "communalism" of Muslims, or their "static collectivist" culture(s). Unfortunately, the 2005 riots in France and other political disturbances in several European countries have not prompted any meaningful revision of this fear-laden perspective of politicized Muslims, seen as imbued with the values of a hostile religious collective and group-identity politics that resist integration and promote separatist beliefs and radical tendencies. Notwithstanding the small number of radical Islamists, state officials in most European countries, for example, lump all Islamists together as quintessentially undemocratic, oppressive, and anti-Western. There is a tendency to conjure the worst case scenarios in which non-violent Islamists turn into terrorists or, at the very least, troublemakers who instigate civil unrest.

Throughout Europe, the public discourse has become more culturalist and policy responses are increasingly colored by ideology rather than much needed pragmatism. It is in this context that this article tries to debunk the widespread belief that Islam and the politicization of some Muslims are what contribute to their radicalization. Contrary to popular expectations, it is the depoliticization of Muslims and the failure of political Islamism in Europe that have sparked the rise of radical communal ideologies and antisystemic movements. By focusing on two different cases with two different types of Muslims, this article demonstrates how the failure of Muslims to organize politically and the exhaustion of political Islamism have heightened the potential for political and social disturbances.

The first part of this article analyzes how the vacuum created by the failure of political Islamism and the decline of the associative network of the movements of young Muslims in French suburbs paved the way for the emergence of disturbing phenomena, like the random violence of the 2005 November riots in France and the radicalization of a segment of indignant Islamic youths, angry at their social, political, and economic exclusion and outraged over the bloodshed in Iraq and Palestine. It also examines how political underrepresentation of Muslims and their loss of faith in political Islamists have given birth to a new form of salafi religiosity that is distinguished by its different shapes and tendencies. The second part focuses on Germany's Muslims and their differences with those of France. One objective of this second section is to illustrate how, despite the fact that the majority of Muslims—especially those of Turkish origin—have so far resisted embracing the antisystemic ideologies that penetrated France, there is no guarantee that most Turks will indefinitely shun violence as a means to protest against state discrimination or widespread Islamophobia. The recent arrest of two Turks implicated in a terrorist conspiracy and the growth of Turkish jihadi literature are frightening examples of the potential for radicalization within the Turkish community.

Cultural Anxiety in France

In France, fear of Islam and its extremist elements is not a new phenomenon. The 1995 bombings in the Paris Métro awakened the French to the threat of radical Islamism.[1] The French authorities' subsequent sweeps revealed the nexus between drugs, crime, and radical Islamism and the discrete patterns of terror networks like the "gang of Roubaix," a collection of militants of Algerian descent led by Christopher Caze, a 25-year-old convert who had traveled to Bosnia to work as a hospital medic only to return as a dangerous radical. The dreadful events of

September 11, 2001 heightened this fear of radical Islamism. In the eyes of the native French, the main culprits were of course the Muslim youth of the suburbs, suspected of sympathizing with the extremists.

The feeling that France is under Muslim siege has been propelled by a wave of xenophobia and populism washing over the European continent. The series of terrorist attacks on Madrid and London's underground and bus system, compounded by France's restive Muslim enclaves, have invoked troubling questions about the roles of race, Islam, and ethnicity and the challenges to European states' "integrationist" models. In the French context, ethnicity, culture, and Islam tend to be conflated and portrayed as the main causes of social and economic marginality (Cesari, 2005). The youth of the suburbs are often "equated with thieves" or described as "veilers" or even "scum that has to be simply scrubbed out" (Eric Macé in *Le Monde*, November 7 2005). This "symbolic ghettoization" of poorer neighborhoods, known as "cités" or "quartiers difficiles" in the political discourse and the media, has hyped the threat of illusory concepts such as "communatarization" or the communalism of ethnic ghettos living parallel lives to French uniqueness and the ideology of the republic.

But as the 2005 November riots in France demonstrated, the unrest was neither an Arab intifada against the republican ideals of "liberté, égalité, fraternité" nor a jihad of Muslims against France. In fact, neither Islam nor Islamism with its three different types (jihadi, missionary, and political) instigated the riots. There were no Palestinian or other Islamic green flags, nor were there any anti-Semitic arson attacks against Jewish synagogues, schools, or cemeteries. Arafat-style *keffyehs* were noticeably absent, as were the usual suspects: the Bearded Provocateurs (Roy, 2005). There were no shouts of "Allahu akbar!" (God is great) erupting from the rioters. Most importantly, the riots did not spread outside the suburbs, nor did they extend to the universities where students feel the same grievances and resentments against a system that in their view works against them (Roy, 2005). The spontaneity of the riots and the lack of bearded leaders contrast with the theories of self-segregating Islamic communities fueled by Islamic radicalism and other crude cultural arguments that abound in media commentaries and popular discourse.

Interestingly enough, neither the politically minded Islamist organizations, such as the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF), nor missionary Islamists like the Tabligh movement, nor the more peaceful predicative salafis (see below) managed to calm the rage of the young male rioters, aged between 12 and 25 years. Shortly after the outbreak of the spontaneous riots, leaders of UOIF rushed to defuse the crisis, hoping to prove their influence over second-generation migrants in the "cités" and hence score points with the authorities and the public at large. They failed to accomplish either objective. Appeals for calm in the mosques on November 4 fell on deaf ears, as did the "Anti Riot Fatwa" issued on November 6 by UOIF. The failure of one of France's largest Islamist groups to lower tensions and break the chain of violent events speaks volumes about the disconnect of political Islamist movements from the social base they claim to represent.

The Union of Islamic Organizations of France lost the right to represent the Muslim community in the French suburbs because of the leadership failure to develop a discourse attuned to the realities of the "quartiers difficiles," as the French like to call their Muslim enclaves. French-born Muslims denounce the structural weakness of the UOIF and their deliberate marginalization from decision making and leadership positions within the movement. The UOIF structure suffers from a concentration of power in too few foreign-born hands, as in the example of the 51-year-old Tunisian Muhammad Ateb, who is at the same time a representative of the UOIF in the Bourgogne region, the imam of the Dijon mosque, president of the regional administration council of the CRCM (Regional Council for the Muslim Faith), and editor in chief of a magazine (Amghar, 2005b). The defection in June 2005 of Farid Abdelkrim, the only member of the administration council born in France, is a direct result of this growing disenchantment with the leadership's political orientation (Ternissien, 2002).

The UOIF and other political Islamist organizations thought that by taking advantage of existing possibilities to participate in a political system usually fraught with politically motivated resistance, they would maximize their influence with the authorities and attenuate the fears of politically minded religious groups. But the groups' calculation, as well as that of the authorities who co-opted them, backfired. The UOIF image was severely tarnished in the suburbs because of the perception that the group had been co-opted by the Ministry of the Interior. The UOIF's low-profile critical posture vis-à-vis the French law banning the hijab (headscarf) in state schools (2004) and the disparaging Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed (2006) has given the impression that the organization's leadership has been co-opted by the French authorities. Some French-born Muslims also criticize the UOIF for its lack of robust involvement in the Palestinian issue.

This loss of faith in political Islamists, exacerbated by political underrepresentation and the disengagement of French Muslims from the institutional space, has created a dangerous void and an organizational vacuum where political and social demands are increasingly expressed through rioting and, to a lesser extent, through jihadism. And while it is true that there is little evidence of widespread religious radicalism, there are signs that salafi groups, a once insignificant presence in Europe, are on the rise (Amghar, 2005a).

There are three types of salafi groups in France: predicative, political, and jihadist. The first category represents by far the dominant stream of salafism in France (Amghar, 2006). In opposition to the jihadists, they are apolitical and nonviolent.[2] They take their cues from the Meccan period, when the Prophet Mohammed propagated "verses of peaceful persuasion" rather than revolt.

This period, which lasted from the start of the prophet's revelations to his emigration to Medina, was marked by the adoption of a nonconfrontational method of propagation by a rejected and persecuted prophet who judiciously avoided the application of violence, even in a bloody environment. The analogy with the Meccan period is purposefully used by this brand of salafism to denounce the jihadi activism of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and the political activism of the politicos (Wiktorowicz, 2006).[3] Predicative salafists resent what they see as the misappropriation of religious texts to justify clearly utilitarian strategies drawn from such non-Islamic sources as Third World anti-imperialism and Western social and political revolutionary models. It is for this reason that they have shunned, denounced, and boycotted the jihadists' and political salafists' publications. In their view, salafists should be the conscience of society, not the wielders of deviant religious innovations that contradict the prophetic model whereby *aqida* (creed) drives salafi *manhaj* (method). In other words, salafists must follow the Quran and replicate the model laid out by the Prophet Mohammed in both action and deed. Mohammed is seen as the Muslim exemplar who embodies the ultimate perfection of faith, character, and the will of God.

The politicos belong to the minority camp within the salafi movement in France. Their ideological underpinnings derive from a mixture of the political trend of the Muslim Brotherhood and the purist tradition of the apolitical Saudi salafism. This fusion started in the 1950s and 1960s, when Saudi Arabia became home to elements of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, and Syria. Fleeing political persecution at home, Muslim Brotherhood members found refuge in the Saudi educational system and large Saudi charities, like the Muslim World League, where they built strength, laying the groundwork for the development of a new hybrid form of political salafism (Amghar, 2006). The Muslim brothers, as Wiktorowicz aptly pointed out, "had a long history of political engagement and enjoyed a sophisticated understanding of political events, international affairs, and the world outside Saudi Arabia. Their arrival on the Saudi scene was an energizing force for young students eager to learn more about the modern world" (Wiktorowicz, 2006).

The jihadi brand of salafism is the most revolutionary of the three. Its goal is the projection of a privatized neo-salafist transnational order whose most distinctive feature finds expression not in the resurrection of a recidivist religious past, but in a virtual *umma* that is a byproduct of an odd mix of re-Islamization, de-culturation, and reactionary modernism. The construction of this imagined community functions as the spearhead of a revolutionary universal *umma* confident in its final armed victory against what it sees as the imperialist West.

Rise of Predicative Salafism

Predicative salafism today diffuses among a small segment of the uprooted and touches private aspirations with its disquieting "moralistic spirit" and fixation on rejuvenating the loss of the prophetic model and utopian Quranic possibilities that Muslim secularists "disavowed" and "defeatist" political Islamists "betrayed." Inspired and given direction by a handful of Saudi religious leaders, this form of salafism capitalizes on the travails of political Islam, a declining force that failed to translate its societal project into meaningful gains for its constituency. Members (referred to here as the "apoliticos") attribute the movement's loss of social and political relevance to the concessions political Islamists made to modernity and its secular majoritarian vision of politics. To this once enthusiastic but ultimately dismal vision of a political Islam working within established modes of Western thought and discourse to subvert the discriminatory dynamic present in French society, they claim to offer an opportunity to break the un-Islamic elements of political thinking and reconstruct a purely emancipatory transcendent counter-discourse that clings to simplistic but idealized notions of a more authentic global social order, guided by a pristine and simple prophetic model, full of life-affirming meaning.

The apoliticos posit themselves as the avant-garde of a Muslim community betrayed by the cultural and national forms of Islam and decomposed by opportunistic political Islamists and jihadists who have succumbed to the fickleness of human desire, political intrigue, and the attraction of non-Islamic models, resulting in deviations from the salafi *manhaj* and sectarianism that the prophet of Islam warned against. "I am leaving you two things and you will never go astray as long as you cling to them. They are the Book of Allah and my Sunna," Prophet Mohammed advised his followers (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 207). Another Hadith that the apoliticos use quite frequently as evidence of the righteousness of their creed and as vindication of their identity markers as *Ahl al-Hadith* (people of Hadith), *ta'ifat al-mansura* (the Aided Group), and *al-firqa al-najiyya* (the Saved Sect), is the one where the prophet predicted that the Muslim community "will divide into seventy-three sects all of which except one will go to Hell and they are those who are upon what I and my Companions are upon" (Wiktorowicz, 2006). The apoliticos constantly remind their followers of the traditions of the prophet and comfort them with his Hadiths and those of his companions.

Armed with arrogant but passionate religious conviction and delirious intensity, they strive to inject elements of certainty and determinacy into a Muslim minority community beset with a sense of aggravated vulnerability and identity confusion. Without necessarily challenging the fixed borderlines of the secular French culture, they try to set in motion their "civilizing" global mission of realizing the divine *raison d'être* of creation through potent but peaceful propagation of the epistemological promise of Tawhid (the doctrine of Oneness of God) and the true decontextualized teachings of the Quran and Sunna. Through purification (*tazkiyya*) and cultivation (*tarbiya*) they hope to actualize the divine will in the politically and socially marginalized and disempowered Muslim masses. The essence of their prophetic mission – in this case a revival of the lost teachings of the earlier *salaf* and deconstruction of traditional notions of established authority – impresses a segment of the Muslim population by its simplicity, anti-intellectualism, and confident projection of the possibility of reinventing an ahistorical transnational identity that trumps discredited traditional cultures of origin and shuns local European secularism.

Abdel-Hadi Dudi, the imam of the al-Sunna al-Kebira Mosque in Marseille, is the icon of the predicative brand of the salafi movement in France. A graduate of Al-Azhar University and a former mentor of Ali Benhadj, a former high-school teacher known for his militant views on the role of political Islam, Abdel-Hadi Dudi belonged to the Algerian salafist movement that helped create the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) in 1989. Condemned to death by the Algerian regime for his involvement in Mustapha Bouyali's Armed Islamic Movement (MIA), he took refuge in France with the tacit approval of the Algerian authorities. It is Abdel-Hadi Dudi's teachings that gave birth and life to the salafi movement in Marseille. His influence spread rapidly with the endorsement he received from Rabi al-Madkhali, the foremost authority on salafism in France. According to the Crisis Group, the conversion of Abdel-Hadi Dudi from salafi jihadism into predicative salafism is in line with the transformation that the salafi movement underwent in the second part of the 1990s. The first return of French students from Saudi Arabia in 1995 contributed to the development of a quietist salafism strongly influenced by Saudi theologians, namely those that belonged to the *madkhaliste* current. Abdelkader Bouziane is a case in point. Of Algerian origin, he studied for two years in the Islamic University of Medina. Upon his return to France, he became the imam of the mosque of Villefranche-sur-Saône, Duchère (Lyon), and Vénissieux, where he played a critical role in the spread of salafism in the region of Rhône-Alpes. The arrival at the end of the 1990s of Saudi preachers on French soil, especially in the Île-de-France at the mosques of Mureaux and in d'Argenteuil, strengthened this movement. Predicative salafists began aggressively to take over some mosques, where they encountered only feeble resistance from their weakened rivals (Smolar, 2005). Through the practice of *durûs* (study with salafi mentors and self-proclaimed imams) in the mosques, they managed to infiltrate places of worship, as Bouziane did in the grand mosque of Lyon. Contrary to Tabligh and other Islamist movements, salafism has no hierarchical structures and recognizes no form of leadership.

The rise of this ultra-strict but quietist salafism has laid the groundwork for a new re-Islamization that delinks Islam from ethnic cultures and disconnects the religious from the political in a way that reflects individualist concerns. The movement's relative success with a limited number of young Muslims can be attributed not only to the failures of political Islam in Algeria and France, but also to the emergence of a modern trend of the culture of the self in the suburbs, whereby cynical, disempowered, and alienated young French Muslims opt out of politics to become social, political, and moral isolationists, paralyzed by their disdain of society. Rather than organizing the Muslim community into a model of citizenship consecrated to fighting social exclusion and strengthening Muslim social cohesion, predicative salafists activate the depoliticization of the religious.

Salafists, as French scholar Olivier Roy has correctly pointed out, play on the deculturation and individualization of youth and provide a substitute cultural paradigm and a new tradition that is similar to the model of the "born again," in that it does not promote a return to traditional Islamic customs, but a (re-)Islamization of individuals within a de-territorialized *umma* disconnected from traditional cultures and societies (Roy, 2004). Unlike political Islamists who aspire to create a model of integration through citizenship, contemporary predicative salafists advocate the creation of a new and purely Islamic religiosity that focuses on salvation, moral values, and self-realization while maintaining a generally aloof attitude toward the social and political issues that triggered the riots in France (Cesari, 2004). This explains their noninvolvement in the protests against the ban on the headscarf and other religious apparel from public schools. The apoliticos also remained silent on the deportation of salafi imams from France, while nonreligious associations such as L'Aube and DiverCité mobilized protests in favor of the expelled imams. They did not even offer support to Abdelkader Bouziane, who is widely credited with spreading salafism to the Rhône-Alpes region, when he was deported to Algeria for defending wife-beating (Crisis Group, 2006).

The main rival of this form of salafism in the suburbs is the Tabligh movement, which is struggling jealously to guard its "holy" turf against the aggressive encroachment of a movement that is shrewdly capitalizing on its current high-water mark status and its arsenal of theological production that outpaces that of its main rival (Khedimellah, 2004). Tabligh is, of course, still a force to be reckoned with, but it is a force that is on the defensive. The movement has lost a number of its followers to salafism, including some of its preachers. There is no denying that Tabligh has lost some of its luster among the surburban youth, who regard its theological orientation as slowly decaying and unfit for their needs. The movement suffers from a serious image problem that is associated with the Islam of the grandfathers of the younger members and the Indian cultural context where it first originated, unlike salafism, which is regarded as an agency of both novelty and true belief. This is one reason why salafism's main recruits are aged from 15 to 35 years.

Predicative salafism becomes thus the conscience of a new globalized Islam, purified by the individualization of faith and the rejection of the un-Islamic accretions of traditional religious authorities and ethnic communities. The rejection of non-Islamic-produced innovations reflects a break with traditional and national cultures. Contrary to popular belief, the ascent of predicative salafism does not reflect a rebellion of a traditional culture, stuck to a narrative of the past. It is a mistake to place the underlying conflict between this form of salafism and Western cultures in a larger cultural and historical context. Salafism in France is not a reaction of the traditional and national cultures of ethnic immigrants. Rather, it reflects the loss of cultural tradition to a new individualized religiosity that smacks of self-learning and a disaffiliation from community ties and local space and traditions (Roy, 2004). Salafists encourage young people to rebel against their parents and press women to leave their "non-pious" husbands unless they repent and join *al-firqa al-najiyya* (the Saved Sect). Young salafists also forcefully challenge imams of the older generation in their understanding of Islam. In this sense, salafism becomes a youth-centered, comprehensive and individualized model that recruits less well where communal solidarities are strong. It does not fare well, for example, in Turkish communities permeated by communalism.

This expressive religious individualism is both a product of and a factor in globalization. There is a compound relationship between the formation of Muslim selves and the processes of the global forces of consumerism, best exemplified by the articulation of salafi practices vis-à-vis the consumption culture (Amghar, 2005c). The rise of "Halal fast-food," "Islamic" hamburgers, "Mecca Cola," and "Islamic rap" is clearly a result of this articulation process that is in line with the practices of consumerism (Boubeker, 2005). It is also a clear result of the break with the culinary cuisine of their ethnic communities. Salafists of North African origin are more interested in selling Greek sandwiches and pizzas than Moroccan couscous or Algerian traditional food (Roy, 2005). The same pattern applies when it comes to clothing. Salafists prefer trading in streetwear with Islamicized labels like MBN (Muslim by Nature) and Dawahwear than in hijabs and djellabas (Crisis Group, 2006).

Despite their rhetorical critique of the excesses of hypercommercialism, predicative salafists are not opposed to consumerism. Thus, contrary to expectations, consumerism is not connoted negatively in the salafist vision in France. Indeed, salafism is neither antimodern nor necessarily antimodernist. The movement works within and against globalization. It rejects philosophical rationalism and intellectualism but champions individualism and consumerism in the name of fundamentalism. It is this image of salafism as an anti-intellectual movement unbound by traditions and historical baggage that makes it most appealing to a segment of beleaguered minorities. Its revamped notion of globalized "Muslimship" is in line with the realities of unemployed and uneducated youth, enamored of the consumer culture they live in while at the same time resentful of French racism and the stigma of a terrorist culture.

Salafism's "emancipatory" alternatives to discriminatory existing societies, polluted ethnic cultures, and local Islams resonate not only with some segments of the youth of the enclave communities of the ghettos, but also with some disenchanted middle-class Muslims who are enthralled by the idea of emigrating to Muslim countries with great potential for economic growth. The Saudi godfathers of French predicative salafism have long advocated a *Hijrah* (migration) from the domain of Shirk (disbelief) and oppression to the secure lands of Islam. The Palestinians are reminded by Rabi al-Madkhali that the recovery of Palestine would not occur via jihad but through a "second *Hijrah*" to the countries of the Gulf. French Muslims are urged to leave France for the promised lands of the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Qatar, and other Gulf countries. As for those Muslims suffering authoritarian repression by Middle Eastern dictators, they are encouraged to leave their homelands and settle in the Gulf or even Western countries, known for their tradition of religious pluralism (Crisis Group, 2006). This new *Hijrah* plugs salafism into globalization and further into consumerism. Most salafists aspire to emigrate in order to realize their salafi dream of enriching themselves spiritually as well as financially. For salafists, *Hijrah*, an important principle in Islam, is made to seem like a panacea for most Muslim problems.

As for those who cannot afford to make the *Hijrah*, they are urged to disengage from society and develop an enclave mentality predicated on a transnational inerrant salafi creed. Ironically, this aspiration to emigrate to promising Muslim lands places this new Muslim generation in the same situation their parents were in when they hoped to return to their home countries. There are, of course, major differences between the two aspirations. The result is, however, the same in one key respect: Both generations have eschewed involvement in the affairs of the French state because of the belief that one day they would leave France.

In summary, this form of salafism has found a relative degree of success among a small segment of the Muslim population due to the vision it offers of a reconstructed transnational identity, a self-righteous citadel that is capable of transcending feelings of humiliation and alienation from the discriminating institutions of power. But despite this appeal, predicative salafism has failed to garner the support of all those Muslims who are hungry for social justice and immediate political empowerment.

As neither pietistic movements, like predicative salafism or Tabligh, nor politically minded salafists or Islamist groups, like UOIF, are capable of, or interested in, organizing a Muslim youth underclass, the suburbs slid into a dangerous confusion and organizational vacuum where political and social demands have been increasingly expressed through rioting and, to a lesser extent, jihadism.

Who Are the Jihadi-Salafis?

Jihadi salafism is a revolutionary movement that is increasingly domestically grown, a marked shift from the past when violent salafism was strictly linked to foreign Islamist militants who internationalized and externalized their grievances into France with a wave of terrorist bombings. The 1986 bombings perpetrated by Fouad Ali Saleh, a close associate of Hizbollah, bore a strong terrorist warning from Tehran to Paris to stop supporting Saddam Hussein's war against Iran, to crack down on Iranian exiles in France, and to leave Lebanon. Through its leading surrogate, Hizbollah, Iran recruited Fouad Ali Saleh, who spent three years studying in Qom, Iran, under Ayatollah Khomeini and other Tunisian-born expatriates converted to Shiism, seeking to intimidate the French government into changing its foreign policy. The result was a terror campaign between December 1985 and September 1986 that killed 13 and injured hundreds. The point of connection between the Beirut-based Party of God and the twenty person terrorist network came via Iran.

In the early 1990s a different connection developed between Maghrebi youth in the destitute *banlieues* of France and foreign-sponsored terrorist organizations. This time, however, Iran was not the source or patron of the terror. Jihadism came via Algeria, where the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) "recruited young thugs, exploiting their larcenous talents to raise money and build an infrastructure to attack France for its support of the Algerian government" (Crumley, 2001).

Since the mid-1990s, however, a high percentage of French jihadists have been born in France, detached from any given culture and stimulated by a "deterritorialized" Islam that offers the uprooted Islamic diaspora a transnational Islamic identity, forged in anti-imperialist discourse. This transnational jihad obsesses no longer about the creation of particular Muslim states, but focuses instead on the belief in a mythical final battle between the *umma* and the forces of Western "evil." "We are at war and I am a soldier," proclaims Muhammad Sidique Khan in a videotape that rails against what he calls the atrocities committed by Europe's "democratically elected governments" against Muslims. "Now you too will taste the reality of this situation," he warns (BBC, 2005). Most jihadists are captivated by this anti-imperialist dimension of transnational jihadism, as is clearly shown by the converts to Islam (though small in number) who came to find solace in an anti-system Islamist supportive milieu that promises a way out of alienation and delinquency into a new life of jihadi brotherhood capable of challenging what they believe is a hegemonic Western system perceived as racist and discriminatory. "Converts will be used for striking more and more by jihadist circles," warns Jean-Luc Marret, a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations and a terrorism expert at the Strategic Research Foundation in Paris. "They have been used in the past for proselytism, logistics or support, and they are operationally useful now" (Smith, 2004). What is troublesome about the transition to jihadism is the fact that it occurs in relatively short time frames. In over 50 percent of cases, the transition to radicalism was short (Khosrokhavar, 2006). Contrary to expectations, terror is not bound to Islamic extremism, nor is it the product of long-term indoctrination (Pape, 2005).

It is increasingly evident that the jihadist enterprise draws strength in part from its development out of, and alongside, strong opposition to perceived Western expansionist policies that tend to favor militarism and empire. This strong rejection of the West's perceived politico-ideological hegemony and its "predatory" free-market globalization is what enables and drives jihadi madness. It is, therefore, a mistake to view the jihadists' terrorist madness as emanating from a crude moral absolutism. There is little doubt that it is the perception of America's politico-ideological pursuit of imposing its hegemony on the Muslim world that fuels the angry and exclusivist outlook of jihadists' visions of vengeance. Karim Hassoun's sentiment that the "more body bags of Americans we see coming back from Iraq, the happier we are," echoes with disturbing frequency those of a small segment of young French Muslims who come from atypical backgrounds and are convinced that the US and its European allies are conspiring to destroy Islam (Powell, 2005).

Thus, contrary to expectations, the jihadists' enterprise is not fueled by a blind obsession with a chauvinist version of Islamic morals and the strict dictates of dogma. Unlike the customary jihadists' violent assault on liquor stores, clubs, and cinemas, the target of the new transnational jihadists is not Muslim or French "depravity," but Western imperialism, as is clearly shown by the dismantled Beghal network that was planning to attack the American embassy in Paris, and the neutralization of a Chechen network, suspected of involvement in a planned attack on Russian targets in Paris in the suburbs of Lyon and Paris in 2002, and the January 2005 dismantlement of the Farid Benyettou cell widely credited with influencing a number of local young Muslims to fight the Americans in Iraq. This indignation at perceived Western imperial policies at the global level is compounded and exacerbated by local economic, social, and political exclusion.

The latter constitutes a key element in the radicalization process. In other words, Muslim radicalization in France, and throughout Europe, is not caused by a long process of religious indoctrination or maturation, but by political marginalization at home and perceived Western injustices against Muslims abroad.

In summary, the rise of salafism in France results from serious problems of political representation rather than from the "communatarization" of the suburbs or Muslims' static collectivist culture(s) that threaten the symbols of a jittery nation and deepen Muslims' "chosen" status of extraterritoriality and "voluntary" apartheid. Despite their differences and marginal success in mobilizing Muslims, all three tendencies of salafism distinguish themselves by their defiance of a political order that is incapable of accommodating, or unwilling to accommodate, the concerns and grievances of French Muslims.

Germany's Discomfort with Its Muslim Minority

As in France, there is a noticeable increase in the radicalization of a small segment of the Muslim community in Germany that is a direct result of social marginalization and the West's perceived politico-ideological hegemony over the Muslim world. The fear of Islamist terrorism in Germany has reached new heights. A recent survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, a research center in Turin, Italy, documented a sharp increase in the number of Germans who are becoming nervous about their vulnerability to terrorism. Majorities are resigned to the fact that living with terrorist threats might become part of their daily lives. Some 70 percent feel that they are likely to suffer a terrorist attack, which is a 32 percent increase since 2005.

Ever since the discovery of the Hamburg-based terrorist cell at the heart of the September 11 attacks, there has been a growing fear about a perceived Islamist wave sweeping across Germany, seeking to re-Islamize its Muslim minorities, deepening their presumed status of "extraterritoriality" and expanding their "culture-based crime." Warnings about the transformation of Germany and the rest of Europe into an anti-Christian, anti-Western "Eurabia" (Ye'or, 2005), and the emerging "darkness of a new barbarism" that threatens to overtake the symbols of the nation and subjugate a destructively passive and self-doubting population, are rampant in political and media rhetoric. The fear of the "unwanted Germans" living fraudulently and infiltrating the citadels of Germanness prompted a bishop emeritus of Germany's Independent Lutherans to express his anxiety in striking terms: "I fear that we are approaching a situation resembling the tragic fate of Christianity in northern Africa in Islam's early days" (Mulrine, 2005).

This perception of Muslim communities as knowingly nursing a fifth column of sleeper cells, secret sympathizers, and potential insurgents is creeping to the center of public debate to the point of becoming "just one step short of conspiracy theories like the all-too familiar anti-Semitic stereotype that world Judaism is capable of committing virtually any wicked deed to achieve its ends" (Seidel, 2005). Even egregious acts like female genital mutilation, which have nothing to do with Islam, are viewed by large segments of the public as Islamic atrocities prescribed by the Quran. This ancient African tradition, which is still practiced in some Muslim and non-Muslim countries, is sometimes deliberately depicted by the media as religiously sanctioned. *Frau im Leben* magazine wrote: "In order to launch a campaign in Egypt against female circumcision, the religious leaders there would first have to be convinced of its pointlessness. Islam is the state religion. 93 percent of the population is of the Muslim faith" (Schiffer, 2004). This is a clear example where the magazine associates genital mutilation of girls in Egypt with Islam. These misleading and false statements are rampant in the media. For example, one study found that while announcements of raids on mosques were always featured on the front pages of most papers, raid findings were buried inside the papers or went unreported owing to the failure of most raids to uncover any evidence of terror crimes. It is, therefore, not surprising that Muslim places of worship are increasingly seen as incubators of terror.

The Threat of Islamist Terrorism to Germany

Such views of Muslims and their religion have hardened in the last few years. Al-Qaeda threats to Germany over its forces in Afghanistan, coupled with the arrest of four Arab men accused of supporting al-Tawhid – a terrorist organization believed to have links to al-Qaeda – have alarmed the German authorities, who fear a rising jihadi threat in their country. Three Jordanian terror plotters – Mohamed Abu Dhees, Ismail Shalabi, and Ashraf al-Dagma – and an Algerian – Djamel Moustfa – were charged with planning terrorist attacks on the Berlin Jewish Museum and a Jewish-owned bar in Düsseldorf. Germany is also still haunted by the last aborted terrorist plot to bomb trains in Dortmund and Koblenz. The devices planted by two Lebanese men were hidden in large suitcases and fitted with alarm-clock timers set to go off ten minutes before the trains arrived.

The fact that converts to Islam were also implicated in other terrorist activities frightened many Germans. Deputy CDU floor leader Wolfgang Bosbach went as far as to declare that conversion to Islam contributes to radicalization and to ultimate recruitment by a terrorist organization. "We know that some who convert become radicalized," Bosbach argued (Spiegel Online, 12 September). Of course, this is not the first time that converts have been involved in terrorist networks. In 2005 a Belgian female convert stunned the country and the world when she blew herself up in Baghdad in a failed suicide attack against US forces. In Britain, people are still perplexed by the fact that one of the suspects arrested in the foiled bomb attack on a transatlantic airline was the son "of a Conservative Party activist." This growing trend of converts embracing radical Islamism has raised several questions about the role of Islam in radicalization.

Nevertheless, it is not the conversion to Islam that is the prime factor in the new converts becoming terrorists. It is the group they associate with once they embrace Islam that creates the conditions conducive for radicalization. As Stefan Reichmuth, a professor of Islamic studies at the Ruhr University in Bochum, has pointed out, radicalization occurs "in the context of acquaintances, the environment or the networks that one encounters after converting" (*Deutsche Welle*, September 11 2007). Gudrun Ensslin, one of the leaders of the left-wing rebels of Germany's Red Army Faction, became radicalized only after she joined a group of disgruntled and angry middle-class youths who saw themselves as fighting the "arch capitalists." This daughter of a protestant pastor did not veer into extremism because of her religious background. She did so when she "fell in with a group of far-leftists unhappy with German society" (*Deutsche Welle*, September 11 2007).

Clearly, young converts are more susceptible to the "anti-imperialist" dimension of transnational salafi jihadism, as is shown by the disaffected German nationals who came to find solace in jiahdism and its revolutionary promise to exact vengeance on what it sees as a hegemonic and discriminatory Western system. It is, therefore, a mistake to view the jihadis' terrorist enterprise as emanating exclusively from religious absolutism. After all, the targets of the German suspects were not Christian landmarks but the US military air facility at Ramstein, an important transport hub for the US war command and its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and US and Uzbek consular facilities in Germany. The goal was to put pressure on both the German and Uzbek governments to close the Termez base in southern Uzbekistan. Germany uses the base for logistical support for its 3,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. A communiqué posted online on September 11, 2007 by the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), a group affiliated with al-Qaeda that splintered from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, claimed that the IJU had intended to attack the United States and Uzbekistan because of their "injustice and brutal policies toward Muslims and Islam" (Spiegel Online, September 12 2007).

These foiled plots and other incidents clearly show that, unlike the 9/11 suicide pilots who used the country as a base to plan their terrorist missions, Germany is now "no longer only a retreat, but also an operations area," according to Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. In his presentation of the government's report on extremism for 2006, Schäuble made it clear that: "The biggest threat for the stability and security of Germany comes again from Islamic terrorism."[4] Even though the terror threat level in the country remains less critical than in other European countries involved in Iraq, law enforcement officials warn that, in the eyes of the jihadists, "Germany is classed as one of the so-called crusaders, the helpers of the United States and of Israel."[5] The 2005 annual report on the protection of the constitution warns that Germany's involvement in Afghanistan, the deployment of its marines in Somalia, and its training of Iraqi officers make it part "of the Islamist terrorists' theater of operations."

Yet, while Germany is by no means immune to home-grown terrorism, like that which occurred in Great Britain on July 7, 2005, it is still a fact that the ideologies that spawn terrorism or radicalism in France and elsewhere in Europe have not found fertile ground among the country's Turkish immigrants, who make up three-quarters of the Muslim population.[6] The few terror suspects apprehended so far are of Arab origin or were German converts (Crisis Group, 2007). Unlike most of their Muslim counterparts in France, Britain, and other European countries, Turkish laborers in Germany were not imported as former colonial subjects. Also, the background of the majority of Muslims in Germany differs significantly from that of Muslims in France, Britain, Spain, and some other European countries. Whereas in France Muslims come predominantly from a North African background, especially from Algeria, an incubator of radicals, those in Germany come mostly from Turkey, a predominantly secular nation and one of the few modern and democratic countries of the Arab and Muslim world. "We are rather lucky with our Turks who live here, who have known about the separation of religion and state since Ataturk. There is fundamentalism in Turkey, but Turks do not generally feel that Saudis or Osama bin Laden are addressing them in particular," according to North Rhine-Westphalia's integration minister (Crisis Group, 2007).

To be sure, Turkish Muslims are a diverse group, divided in their practice and interpretation of Islam and their political orientations. The relationships among the different subcategories are not always smooth, as demonstrated by the sporadic clashes between Kurds and Turks. There are also major differences between groups that are accommodationists and those that are exclusivists (Warner and Wenner, 2006). When in 2007 the DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union for the Institution of Religion), the largest such organization in Germany, joined forces with its rivals, the Islamic Council (IR), the Central Council of Muslims (ZMD), and the Association of Islamic Culture Centres (VIKZ), to institute a unified umbrella group, the Alevites and others refused to join the initiative. "We have a completely different religious understanding," said Ali Ertan Toprak, the General Secretary of the Alevite Community in Germany (Buck, 2007). Mr Toprak also justified his group's position on political grounds. "For us the DITIB is a state-run Turkish organization and the Islamic Council represents Millî Görüs." The latter is greatly suspected by the German authorities for its fundamentalist affiliations and alleged anti-European tendencies. The IR, ZMD and VIKZ have also been investigated by the German authorities for their Islamist ties and alleged opposition to democratic pluralism and integration within German society.

But despite the rivalry among the different Turkish groups and the religious radicalization of some, the Turkish community has remained by far the least prone to violence or terrorism. Salafist ideologies have had difficulty penetrating the Turkish community. Movements like the Tabligh and the Muslim brotherhoods, for example, have had some success proselytizing among European Muslims, but their influence on the Turkish population within Germany remains insignificant. This, of course, does not mean that Turks are not affected by their second-class social status or by the anti-imperialist propaganda of the salafi-jihadis. Since 2007 there has been a disturbing increase in jihadi literature written in Turkish and distributed over the Internet (The Economist Online, 2008). The recent arrest of two Turks implicated in a terrorist conspiracy heightened the level of concern about the potential radicalization of a population hitherto thought to be largely immune to armed activism. However, despite these incidents, "the border between religion and politics, policed until very recently by the Turkish state, has been largely respected in Germany" (The Economist Online, 2008).

According to the international Crisis Group, Islamic activism, with the exclusion of the Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs (Islamic Community of the National Vision, IGMG), appeals far less to the Turkish Muslim element than it does to the rest of the Muslim minority. Despite the concern about Islamist ideologues exporting their creed to a marginalized Muslim minority, the federal Verfassungsschutz (Office for the Protection of the Constitution), the equivalent of Britain's MI5 and the US FBI, put the number of supporters of the 28 Islamist organizations that operate in Germany at 32,150 in 2006. The number of supporters of Turkish Islamist groups stands at 27,250. The Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs gets the largest share of support with around 26,500. Arab Islamist groups claim 3,350 supporters. The Muslim Brotherhood tops the list of such groups with around 1,300 supporters; the Lebanese Hezbollah comes second after the MB with 900. As for Jama'at Tabligh, it has about 500 members, and Hamas 300 members.[7]

Yet despite the fact that intelligence agencies have found little evidence of the association of Islamists with social unrest or jihadism, local and federal authorities are highly distrustful of Islamism in both its moderate and its radical forms. "The number of Islamists is not the same thing as the number of potential terrorists, but Islamists have a vision of state order that we do not share ... We do not want terrorists, but we also do not want Islamists," said Interior Minister Schäuble (Crisis Group, 2007). The Verfassungsschutz keeps a close eye on all Islamist groups, including nonviolent ones, whom it accuses of fostering radicalization. This radicalization, however, failed to manifest itself during the French riots of 2005 and the 2006 Mohammed caricatures affair. Civil unrest or a spillover of violence did not occur.

There is no doubt that there are radical Islamists who warrant close surveillance. It is estimated that the Hilafet Devleti movement, the biggest of the radical groups operating in Germany, has 750 members. The banned Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) has about 300 members. Hezbollah and Hamas can count no more than a few hundred members. German officials put the number of supporters of the Iraqi Ansar al-Islam/Ansar al-Sunna and a handful of "non-aligned mujahideen" in the low hundreds. Just 1 or 2 percent of Islamists (400–600) are believed to be "ready to commit violence," but so are foreign leftist extremists, who are estimated to number 17,290 in Bavaria alone, and foreign extreme nationalists (8,430 members). All are described as potentially violent.

Notwithstanding the small number of radical Islamists, state officials frequently lump all Islamists together as quintessentially undemocratic, oppressive, and anti-Western. Many Germans believe that any accommodation with the Islamists would constitute a dangerous betrayal of the values of the Enlightenment and an appeasement of an Islamist foe whose rise is said to resemble the rise of the Third Reich.[8] "This mass of devout people wants to take possession of its deadly infidel enemies; it wants to slaughter them and burn them." (Wolfgang Sofsky, quoted in Misik, 2006). This hard-line exclusionary rhetoric, which begins with getting the Islamist monolith in line with the universalist and static secular culture of the superior "real Germans," leads inevitably to cultural fundamentalism. There is a disturbing belief that good Muslims are the ones who do not practice their religion and suppress their Muslim identity.

As in France and the rest of Europe, even Muslim female headgear, for example, is seen as an Islamist threat that needs to be combated. Many Germans view the headscarf as an inflammatory symbol of religious fanaticism that poses a mortal threat to the values of society. Calls are increasingly being made to free headscarf-wearing females from their "oppression" and "manipulation" by the Islamists. Those women who have challenged this perception are ridiculed for their backwardness and submission to the extremists. They are also branded as enemies of the social order who must be banished from civil service and ultimately from public view.

There is a tendency to conjure up worst case scenarios in which nonviolent Islamists, who are believed to deceptively project themselves as victims of state paranoia and Islamophobia, turn into terrorists or at the very least troublemakers who instigate civil unrest. Much is made of the importance of dialogue and consultation with the Muslim community, but the crucial thing, as Rita Süssmuth states, "is that we stop going on about how essential dialogue is, and that we actually get down to doing it in practice" (Sey, 2005). This former president of the Bundestag, the German parliament, is very critical of the policy of exclusion that the German authorities have embraced for decades with regard to organizations they suspect of promoting a "legalistic Islamism."

Islamist groups deny the state's accusations. The Islamic Association Millî Görüs rejects the authorities' claim that the organization is an extremist Islamist movement. "What activities among the wide range found within our infrastructure are directed against the German constitutional order?" asks Oguz Ücüncü, the Secretary General of the IGMG. For Ücüncü, the latest report by the Bundesverfassungsschutz fails to document in any way how IGMG violates the constitution and threatens the internal cohesion of society. "What have we been concretely accused of in order to have our association named in the intelligence agency report? There is a need for hard facts! And, just as in the past, I don't see them" (Sollich, 2006).

Indeed, IGMG has in one instance, in November 2005, successfully challenged in court the security agency of the largest German federal state, North Rhine-Westphalia, to retract its accusations that the organization has not distanced itself from antidemocratic and anti-Semitic comments made by people associated with the IGMG's sister organizations in Turkey.

The security agency also had to admit that it made errors in translating and transcribing comments from Turkish into German. Some experts have already criticized the depiction of Islamist movements like the IGMG in the report as "tendentious and unbalanced." "Facts which fit the picture of an anti-constitutional, rigidly hierarchical organization are included, facts which don't are simply ignored," writes Werner Schiffauer (Schiffauer, 2004). To be sure, experts have been at odds over whether the organization is radical or not. But stigmatizing nonviolent Islamists through exclusionary policies will unfortunately do nothing to isolate radical Islamists and eliminate the threats they make. While it is true that nonviolent Islamists can become radicalized, this radicalization is not automatic. It is indiscriminate crackdowns and arbitrary humiliations that are likely to drive nonviolent Islamists into the hands of the radicals.

Conclusion

The rhetoric about the rising tide of fundamentalism overtaking Germany engenders only more fear and paranoia of the young, alienated Muslims who are poor, ill educated and tempted by crime and radical Islam. As demonstrated above, the majority of Muslims, especially those of Turkish origin, have so far resisted embracing the antisystemic ideologies that have penetrated France, Britain, Spain, and other European countries. But it would be a mistake to think that most Turks will indefinitely shun violence as a means of protest against state discrimination or widespread Islamophobia. As the French case has taught us, the failure of political Islamism, aggravated by political underrepresentation and the disengagement of Muslims from the institutional space, can create a dangerous void and an organizational vacuum that can be exploited by violent jihadists. The arrest of two Turks implicated in a terrorist conspiracy and the growth of Turkish jihadi literature are examples of the potential for radicalization within the Turkish community.

The demonization of Islam and Islamism only deepens the level of distrust between the Muslim communities and German nationals. A number of surveys have shown that a substantial number of Germans admit to being preoccupied with anything Muslim and acknowledge that they would feel uncomfortable living in districts populated by Muslims. To assuage people's fears and concerns, the German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg introduced in 2006 a new citizenship test for Muslims to make sure that they share German principles. The irony of the test is that many Germans would fail to pass it. Given that a large number of Muslims in Germany were denied easy access to citizenship until very recently, their existence in Germany is increasingly becoming conditional upon the espousal of particular beliefs and fidelity to values that even the most patriotic Germans might not know or agree with. This emphasis on Muslims' loyalty to Germany's "fundamental principles and values" is the right of every country, but requirements for ideological conformity (are you truly with us or against us?) with moral dilemmas are difficult to comprehend and even violate the German Grundgesetz (constitution), which upholds "freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom of creed, religious or ideological." It is counterproductive to threaten potential ostracism through naturalization and a foreigners' law as punishment for the "sin" of refusing to adopt an imposed ideological uniformity on moral dilemmas that looks more like absolute assimilationism than integration.

Calls for cultural homogeneity and linking Muslims' acceptance in Germany to forced assimilation have overshadowed far more important and relevant issues that deal with economic, social, and educational marginalization. Germany's three-tier educational system, for example, as Vernor Muñoz Villalobos, the Special Rapporteur on education issues for the Commission on Human Rights, has reported, promotes "social inequalities" and has relegated immigrant children to "third-rate, dead-end schools."[9]

The Path Ahead

Pressures from within (Islam) and without (globalization and European integration) have made Germans and the French feel apprehensive about their national identity and culture. Both countries are visibly struggling to defuse the potentially explosive mix of nationalism and fear of the Muslim "stranger," while defining citizenship for their marginalized and disenfranchised immigrants. The issue is no longer the building of "defensive citadels" of "Frenchness" or "Germanness," particularly since Germany has finally come to grips with the reality that the Gastarbeiter (guest workers) are there to stay. The challenge for Germany and France today is to define what kinds of values are essential for their countries' secular model of society and what kinds are negotiable.

French and German politicians have until now been preoccupied by what they consider to be the urgent necessity of taming and institutionalizing Islam within a much more securitized and secularized process. But it is becoming increasingly clear that the development of such a strictly controlled Islam will not stymie the growth of radical tendencies within the Muslim community. Government-sponsored religious organizations will do little to isolate radical Muslims and address the main problems of disenfranchisement and lack of opportunity that second and third generation immigrants suffer from. It is the promotion of Muslim involvement in politics and their meaningful involvement in political activities at the local level that can lessen political disturbances and restore some credibility to the European democratic model. This, in addition to a sincere focus on education and job creation, would be an important step toward empowering neglected minorities and helping them climb the ladder of success. Major efforts need to be made to tackle socioeconomic problems and put an end to state toleration of Islamophobia and discrimination against Muslims in the same way that the scourge of anti-Semitism is combated.[10] A sincere and impartial effort to resolve the Palestinian predicament and end foreign adventures in Muslim lands would certainly decrease support among immigrant youths for antisystem groups, violent or otherwise.

Notes

1. The attacks carried out between July and November 1995 killed 8 and injured around 150.
2. Predicative salafism stands for an apolitical and nonviolent version of Islam that draws heavily from the fatwas of Saudi theologians. It is fundamentalist in its doctrinal outlook, eschews politics, and is primarily concerned with the preservation of the Islamic faith and moral order in society.

3. "The politicos" is the term used by Wiktorowicz (2006) to describe the type of salafists who subscribe to a politicized form of salafism.
4. "German Minister Outlines Risks from Terrorism," Associated Press, May 15 2007, URL (consulted August 24 2007): http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/15/news/berlin.php.
5. "2005 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution." For the full report, see URL (consulted August 24 2007): http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/SHOW/vsbericht_2005_engl.pdf.
6. According to the German Ministry of the Interior, there are 1.8 million Muslims who are Turkish, in addition to the roughly 1 million former Turkish nationals who are naturalized German citizens. Germany is also home to 160,000 Bosnians, 70,000 Moroccans, 60,000 Iranians, and 55,000 Afghans. Sunni Islam is by far the largest denomination (2.5 million), followed by Alevites (500,000) and Shiites (200,000). URL: http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_012/nn_1026710/Internet/Content/Themen/Deutsche__Islam__Konferenz/DatenUndFakten/Islamkonferenz__Kurzinfo__en.html.
7. "2005 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution."
8. See, for example, Josef Joffe, "The Offensive of Islamo-Fascism," *Die Zeit*, March 18 2004. See also "We Have Enemies! And They Want to Subjugate or Kill Us," *Welt am Sonntag*, July 24 2006.
9. See Stefan Theil, "Where the Future Is a Dead End," Newsweek International, June 12 2006, URL (consulted August 25 2007): http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13124097/site/newsweek/. See also David Gordon Smith, "Germany's School System Is an Anachronism," Spiegel Online, March 22 2007, URL (consulted August 24 2007): http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,473337,00.html.
10. A number of studies have demonstrated the deep-rooted discrimination against Muslims. See Barbara Franz (2007), "Europe's Muslim Youth: An Inquiry into the Politics of Discrimination, Relative Deprivation, and Identity Formation," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 18(1): 89–112; Dominique Maillard (2005), "The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 16(1): 62–78.

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