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Abstract

Since the 1970s, military policies in liberal democracies have been potentially affected by the gap of legitimacies syndrome, that is, the widening of the gap between high levels of political legitimacy for using force and low levels of social legitimacy for making the attendant sacrifices. Military policies are stretched between the poles of these values. While a high level of legitimation for using force encourages bellicosity, the attenuated legitimacy of sacrifice permits only low-cost military build-ups, both in economic and human terms. Deviations from this approach may re-create legitimacy problems. EU countries, as well as Canada and Australia, have managed to adopt a policy without a legitimacy gap by limiting their use of force, but, as countries that often activate their armed forces, the US and Israel have remained very much affected by this syndrome.

Keywords

Legitimacy, Casualty-aversion, War costs, War goals, Militarism, Conscription

Introduction

The war in Iraq has enriched the academic discourse about the social costs of war, one implication of which is the societal distribution of the military burden. Communitarian proponents often highlight the inequitable burden brought about by the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) system by using new representative terms. For example, the term *spectatorial citizenship* has been coined to describe the premise that good citizens need not be active but can watch others doing the public's work on their behalf, in this case, war (Galston, 2003). *NIMBY* (Not in My Back Yard) *politics* describes the claim that the powerful in society shift the burden of war onto the marginalized by their very participation in anti-war movements, their apathy, and through the privatization of military-related work (Tannock, 2005).

Underlying these concepts is the argument that the current war in Iraq reveals a paradox: a high level of political legitimacy for using force coexists with a low level of social legitimacy for sacrificing through the use of force. However, scholars have refrained from addressing this gap.

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Much of the existing literature on the influence of domestic politics on foreign, and especially military, policies consists of assertions that recognize this gap, albeit not explicitly, with special attention paid to the US. Sociologists have traced the social processes leading to declining levels of motivation to sacrifice that made the use of force more socially and, hence, more politically costly. These scholars have cited the rise of individualism, the growth of the market society, and the divorcing of citizenship from soldiering as some of the factors contributing to this trend.

IR picks up where sociology leaves off and examines how this change affects military policies, especially war management, an overlooked agenda for sociologists. Recent empirical work by IR scholars demonstrates the new syndrome. Democracies are more sensitive to the costs of fighting than are other types of regimes, so they are more cautious when considering the use of force and tend to fight short, low-cost wars (e.g. Feaver and Gelpi, 2003; Filson and Werner, 2007; Reiter and Stam, 2002). However, like their sociological colleagues, IR scholars have not explained how that sensitivity corresponds to the propensity to use force and the domestic legitimation of using force, especially in the US.

A partial explanation is found in other theoretical streams that focus on the inherent proclivity of liberal democracy to act aggressively. In his "two-level game theory," Putnam (1988: 434) argued that liberal democracies act in two arenas simultaneously:

> At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.

Therefore, the manner in which the actors' concerns are satisfied should overlap in the two arenas; otherwise, interstate stability is at risk. It follows that the complexity of domestic coalition-building in liberal democracies in ratifying agreements reached by negotiators at the international level may create conditions that drive democratic states to interstate clashes. Indeed, Agha and Malley (2002) illustrated how Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak missed the opportunity to make peace agreements with both the Palestinian Authority and Syria in the years 1999–2000 because he believed that Israeli public opinion had affected his ability to make agreements. Difficulties in constructing a peace coalition at home led to the need to satisfy the hawkish opposition through the international negotiation effort but failed to minimize the adverse consequences of it, thus paving the way for two more rounds of hostilities.

A similar propensity is evident in the tradition of "peace democracy," which links the distribution of arms and the costs of bearing arms among the citizenry with the mechanism of self-restraint that it entails, as Kant predicted (Scarry, 1991). This prevents a democratic society from fighting with another democracy (Lake, 1992; Maoz and Russett, 1993). At the same time, liberal states, argued Doyle (1986), have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression because they see themselves as threatened by aggression from non-democratic states that are not constrained by representation. Even though wars often cost more than the economic returns they generate, liberal republics are prepared to protect their values. In other words, the same values that restrain belligerency also encourage belligerency when these values seem to be at risk.

The liberal rationale for aggression also seems to underlie the militarization of American political culture. Bacevich (2005) has analyzed the new American militarism since the Vietnam War mainly as an evolution of ideas. His discussion moves from the recovery of the military after

Vietnam to the role played by soldiering in embodying America's new national ideals, and, most importantly, the role of neoconservatism in redefining America's mission in the world vis-à-vis the perceived forces of evil. In an attempt to move from ideas to interests and to explain how liberal democracy invests for war, Harvey (2006: 58) tied neoconservatism to the powerful military-industrial complex, which has a vested interest in permanent militarization. Furthermore, he even partly traced the occupation of Iraq to the US's project of imposing a full-fledged neoliberal state apparatus on Iraq whose fundamental mission would be to facilitate conditions for profitable capital accumulation (Harvey, 2006: 10–11).

In sum, "peace democracy," the "two-level game" theory, and the school of militarism illustrate how the apparently contradictory values of liberal democracy and belligerency are harmonized in the sense that liberal democracy may become war-prone. Nonetheless, this harmonization still embodies the underlying gap in attitudes. After all, the same liberal values that may drive a nation to violence still dominate and affect policies even during a war by displaying sensitivity to the costs. While sociological and IR students focus on the low level of social legitimacy for sacrificing, the proponents of "peace democracy," the "two-level game," and militarism focus on the other side, namely the political legitimacy for using force. How do states deal with these contradictory approaches?

This article offers an integrative interpretation of these different studies, rather than an attempt to counter them, by focusing on one major aspect that will be termed the "gap of legitimacies." It is argued that military policies in liberal democracies, mainly the US and Israel, are affected by the *gap of legitimacies syndrome*, that is, the widening of the gap that has emerged since the 1970s between high levels of political legitimacy for using force and low levels of social legitimacy for making the attendant sacrifices. Military policies are stretched between the poles of these values in a manner that during the 1980s and 1990s gave rise to strategies that reduced the level of sacrifice by reducing military participation, an approach that extended the state's autonomy. While the combination of extended state autonomy and a high level of legitimation for using force encourages bellicosity, the attenuated legitimacy of sacrifice permits only low-cost military build-ups, both in economic and human terms. Deviations from this approach may re-create legitimacy problems. EU countries, as well as Canada and Australia, have managed to adopt a policy without a legitimacy gap by limiting their use of force. They could, however, be affected by the gap syndrome if the propensity to use force intermittently increases (such as in the intervention in Iraq) and requires human resources that exceed the low level of social legitimacy for sacrifice. In a different manner, the US, as a country that often activates its armed forces, has remained very affected by this syndrome. In the Second Lebanon War (2006), Israel exemplified a similar pattern.

The first section of this article conceptualizes the "gap," while the second deals with the implications of the gap for the state's military policies.

Conceptualizing the Gap of Legitimacies

This article differentiates between two levels of legitimacy regarding the use of force: political legitimacy to use force and social legitimacy to sacrifice for it. In general, legitimacy encompasses normative, legal, and cultural values that determine society's acceptance of regimes and institutions, as Weber long ago suggested (1947). Legitimacy is not a circumstantial view (in the form of public opinion) but reflects deeper values.

The political legitimacy to use force is indicated by supportive or defiant public and elite opinion regarding the necessity to deploy the armed forces and the targets against which they will be

directed. The monitoring of public opinion and political debates indicates the level of this legitimacy. The external environment largely affects the level of legitimation inasmuch as democracies are status-quo prone. Still, public and elite opinion can be analyzed as a multi-layered structure in which opinions and rhetoric rest on deeper cultural constructs that are less easily detectable and can be measured along the militarization–pacifism continuum. Here the distinction between the public and the elite matters. As Aldrich et al. (2006: 494–5) recently summed up the scholarly literature regarding the US, the public acts as a constraint on elites who would otherwise be more willing to use force, a conclusion that may lead to a multi-layered analysis.

Herein lies the relevance of the social legitimacy to sacrifice. It is evident through indirect indications, among which are the motivation for military service, the public's attitude toward sacrifice (especially the willingness to incur casualties), and the market-oriented attitude toward military resources (see Levy, 2009). While the former is *political legitimacy* that is manifested in the political discourse, the latter is *social legitimacy* that embraces both attitudes and practices. It embodies political and culturally guided social institutions, particularly symbols, myths, interests, and other cultural determinants of social legitimacy.

Support for war should therefore be analyzed more thoroughly to determine the more hidden, but also more critical, component of the willingness to launch an offensive regardless of the costs. On the surface, there are cases, most typically in the US, where the public and the political elites share the same ideas about force, such as the US invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11. Nonetheless, this commonality of attitude testifies to the level of political legitimacy, not the social one. To the extent that the two levels do not correspond, political legitimacy may be negatively impacted by the declining level of the social legitimacy of sacrifice, ultimately bringing about the shortening of a war or imposing other constraints to reduce its costs.

Throughout the history of military–society relations, there have been changes in the match between the two levels of legitimacy, which have ultimately led to the development of the gap syndrome. The matrix depicted in Figure 1 illustrates the main historical crossroads.

Protection is the main public good that the state provides its citizens. However, protection is not supplied for free. It is paid for through military participation, either in the form of military service or taxation for funding the army. The state is inclined to demand an exaggerated price for its services as a means of retaining "surplus value" in the form of increased internal control, while its citizens prefer to purchase protection at the lowest possible price (Lake, 1992). Thus, the state and organized groups bargain over the cost of state-provided protection.

From the 1800s onward, war was democratized: the great political-technological revolution brought about a mass recruitment of citizens for war with the creation of mass armies. Concurrently, the civilian population was exposed to increasing levels of military violence as a victim of foreign military aggression or the supplier of mass mobilization. In turn, the more the army relied on mass foundations, the more responsive the state was to bargaining with the groups that controlled the human and material resources needed for waging war. Military contribution was exchanged for rights allocation: civilian control over the military via the establishment of representative institutions, which prompted democratization with the expansion of suffrage and other rights, along with the creation of the welfare state. The citizen-soldier thus embodied the republican model of transferring sovereignty from the ruler to the community of citizens that staffed and politically controlled the military (Burk, 1995; Skocpol, 1992; Tilly, 1997: 193–215).

As military build-up fostered an increasing ratio of military participation, political discourse was inevitably militarized in the sense that war and preparation for war became normal (Mann, 1987: 71). Only militarization could legitimize the elevating levels of sacrifice for war in monetary



Figure 1. Legitimacy Matrix

and human terms. Militarism thus took the form of *popular* rather than *elite militarism*. New bases of legitimacy for sacrifice facilitated war making and war preparation in a manner that embraced an increasingly large proportion of the population, who could sustain a prolonged war effort.

With this link between military and political participation, the decision to go to war was conditional on the support of the local community, namely, those directly shouldering the burden of war and the social groups yielding their children to military service. In other words, the army became indirectly monitored by the social networks of the very youngsters who staffed its ranks. Still, until the 1970s Western democracies enjoyed a high level of autonomy in administering their military policies, largely due to the balance between military sacrifice and rights allocation.

In sum, a transition occurred from low levels of legitimacy for both the use of force and sacrifice that typified the pre-modern era to high levels of legitimacy for both values (a transition from Point C to Point B on the matrix). At the peak of this transition during World War II, even the US enacted a peacetime draft (in 1946), despite a previous reluctance to do so that had been embedded in the country's political culture. Over the long term, this level of sacrifice was legitimized by means of the 1944 GI Bill of Rights, which entitled veterans to subsidized benefits. The provision of these benefits was not justified as monetary compensation, but rather as a means by which society recognized and honored those who had fulfilled their military obligation and as a way of helping people serve the community (Burk, 2001). European societies embarked on a similar track.

It follows that if the military burden rose without a concomitant increase in rights (whether in reality or in the relevant groups' perception), middle-class groups might undertake collective action aimed at either increasing their rewards in return for their sacrifice or decreasing their level of sacrifice.

Indeed, from the end of World War II, and especially from the 1970s onward, the ethos of the market economy that dominated Western political culture took this republican principle of bargaining a step further. At the center of this trend was a decline in the legitimacy of sacrificing for war, with the empowerment of the market society. According to the existing scholarship, three main factors were at work.

First, the costs of security became heavier as the Cold War cooled down during the 1970s. Although not necessarily in absolute terms, these costs became heavier in relative terms insofar as economic and physical security continued to be valued positively, but their relative priority declined over time (Inglehart, 1990). In the 1990s, global conflicts simply did not threaten the interests of the US and European NATO members strongly enough to justify putting large numbers of soldiers at risk. Concurrently, the rise of individualism came at the expense of dedication to serving one's country and actually contradicted the values of military service such as sacrifice and discipline (see Smith, 2005).

Second, compulsory recruitment was delegitimized in most liberal democracies partly because citizenship was gradually divorced from soldiering when the middle class was able to realize considerable achievements that were no longer dependent on military service (Burk, 1995).

The crisis in the draft's legitimacy was accompanied as much as triggered by the attenuated social acceptance of casualties. With the demise of the Cold War, military death has been gradually stripped of its meaning (Smith, 2005), and a post-heroic mentality emerged, resting upon a capitalist vision of the economy with the peaceful spirit of commerce at the center (Münkler, 2005: 71–2). In this spirit, and with the shrinking size of the family, individualization has increased (Smith, 2005: 500–1). Moreover, when casualty counts are low, each soldier can be highlighted by the media to the public and to decision-makers as people with names and faces or even as body bags (Ben-Ari, 2005).

Third, military consumption was portrayed as a burden. The citizen-soldier was replaced by the citizen-taxpayer and particularly by the citizen-consumer, both of whom favored "purchasing" low-cost security as part of the neoliberal ethos of "small government." Economists have often debated whether military expenditure plays a crucial role in maintaining low levels of unemployment and contributing to growth, or whether it is a burden on growth. The intensification of this debate since the 1970s has signaled the new ethos of endeavoring to rein in defense budgets (Davoodi et al., 2001; Pivetti, 1992).

As a result of these factors, democracies had to bargain with leading groups through multiple patterns of collective action. Middle-class groups placed conditions on their military participation and bargained over those conditions with the state or the military. In other words, the democratization of war was at work. These conditions were in part political and were framed as forms of selective conscientious objection. This is a form of exchange by which the political character of military missions may affect the soldiers' agreement to carry them out and vice versa. Monetary bargaining over the terms of military service, however, also became more common, in a process described by Moskos (1977) as the transition "from institution to occupation" in the US armed forces. Most important, moreover, is the heightened sensitivity to military losses that has made "casualty aversion" a central cornerstone in military and political thought since the 1970s (Smith, 2005).

Evidence of this tendency was reflected in the American experience in Vietnam, as much as in the Israeli experience in the Lebanon wars. Accordingly, public opinion has played a restraining role when democracies have to decide on war and peace (Everts, 2002).

In short, the ability of liberal democracies to raise large numbers of resources for the military effort was impeded, thus eroding the legitimacy of deploying force. Simply put, the idea that it is legitimate to sacrifice for war has lost much of its value. The reduction in the size of armies and the demise of the nuclear deterrent in Western Europe in the 1980s and 1990s attest to the new limitations set on the state's autonomy.

The transition from Point B on the matrix took two main routes: back toward a point somewhere between C and D (in the case of most EU countries, Canada, and Australia) and to Point A (in the US and Israel).

Particularly in post-World War II West European societies, and especially following the demise of the Cold War, a transition toward low levels of legitimacy of the two values took place. Since the 1980s, the legitimacy of sacrifice in EU countries has plummeted. We can point to three signs that support this contention:

1. The delegitimization of compulsory military service in the form of conscientious objection increased the volunteer component in the majority of Western European armies, gradually leading them to phase out the draft (Ajangiz, 2002). Militaries that remained faithful to the draft system, Germany for example, did so out of considerations other than the motivation to, or need for, sacrifice, such as domestic political concerns.
2. Spending cuts played a major role in the increased reliance on the US in campaigns outside of Europe, and even in contingencies for war within Europe (Hillen, 2002: 33–6).
3. Antinuclear concerns rose dramatically, although they remained too weak to galvanize a mass-based revolt. The calming moderation in the international discourse of the mid-1980s tempered these concerns (Joffe, 1987).

Politically, this declining legitimacy to sacrifice was reflected in policies that led the European armies to keep their distance from areas of military friction while taking part in NATO. In other words, the use of force was poorly legitimized, as a comparative survey in the 15 countries of the EU conducted in 2000 indicates. Only 18 percent of Europeans believed that it should be a European army's role to intervene in conflicts in regions of the world outside the EU. In addition, although the majority of Europeans favored the idea of a European (volunteer) army, about half of them believed that it was up to the governments prepared to send troops to decide whether or not to deploy them, not a majority vote forcing each state to send troops (Manigart, 2001). Such a sentiment indicates that Europeans want a high level of political control over this crucial issue.

Thus, in societies that have largely abolished the draft and cut defense spending we see a low level of legitimacy to use force and sacrifice for it except in cases of direct missions in defense of the country's territory. Minor involvement in interventionist missions (Iraq – of course minor relative to the US forces) and a focus on peacekeeping missions (East Timor, Lebanon, and Kosovo where the peacekeepers are exposed to relatively minor risk) attest to the acceptance of belligerency but only on a limited scale. Surely, in the case of a real threat to those societies, the attitude may change.

A more interesting case, and the focus of this article, is that of the US, namely, the erosion in the legitimacy of sacrifice while the legitimacy of using force has remained fairly strong (Point A in the matrix in Figure 1). Public opinion in the US has been stable in regard to the use of force following the collapse of the Soviet Union (and even before 9/11): about 70–90 percent support the use of force, whereas about 10–30 percent oppose virtually any use of force. Among the "hawks," 30–35 percent are considered "solid hawks" who appear to be remarkably indifferent to the stakes, costs, or prospects for victory. About half of the public – 40–45 percent – is "casualty phobic" or "defeat phobic" in the sense that they support military missions provided that the missions have low costs or are successful (Feaver and Gelpi, 2003: 145–6).

Viewed from a political-cultural perspective, Bacevich (2005) has portrayed the new militarism that has flourished in the US of the post-Cold War era as one that values military power for its own sake, with an increased propensity to use force, resulting in the normalization of war. Much of the new militarization is attributed to the empowerment of neoconservative thinkers, bearers of a purely civilian culture, who viewed the Vietnam War as an impetus for restoring American power. Later, pouring more oil on the fire, the events of 9/11 were portrayed as a sickness in the Muslim world that should be addressed by using military force.

As Jervis (2003) explained, the US and its European allies held very different beliefs in this regard. The US believed strongly in its role of spreading democracy, in the existence of significant threats that could be defeated only by new and vigorous policies, and in an overriding sense that peace and stability required the US to assert its primacy in world politics. It is no wonder that most Europeans, particularly the elite, oppose American foreign policy in Iraq (Risse, 2004).

Nonetheless, the case of the US displays an incongruity between the public's positive views about the legitimacy of using force and the more skeptical attitudes that form the social legitimacy of sacrifice. Such contradictory desires to undertake overseas military missions but at the same time minimize losses have been anchored in American political culture since the 1980s (Mandel, 2004). Jeffrey Record (2002) confirmed the strong elite belief that the American public will not support casualties. Still, the administration was effective in mobilizing the support necessary to go to war. During the war in Iraq, moreover, the same respondents indicated that they supported the war but refused to participate in it (Galston, 2003). Growing losses have spurred pressures to bring the soldiers back home.

It follows that the distinction between the level of political legitimacy regarding the use of force and the level of social legitimacy to sacrifice is very significant. As the Iraq War attests, the initial supportive *political* legitimacy was eroded by the declining level of the *social* legitimacy of sacrifice.

Since the 1980s, Israel has increasingly mirrored the patterns of other liberal democracies regarding the declining legitimation to sacrifice in war. However, like the US, as a democratic state coping with a protracted war, Israel's military policies have been held captive by the gap syndrome (Levy, 2007). For example, a public opinion survey conducted just a few months after the Second Lebanon War had ended can provide a suitable indication of the extent to which the social legitimation of sacrifice has declined (Arian et al., 2007). Only 27 percent thought that the interests of the country were more important than the individual's personal ones, while in 1981 the figure was 69 percent. Of course, demanding military sacrifice does not accord with these sentiments. A similar drop was indicated in the readiness to pay more taxes in order to allocate money to defense matters: 29 percent of the Jews who responded were ready to pay more taxes for the sake of the defense budget, while in 1986 the number was 48 percent. Only about 35 percent of the respondents indicated that they would want themselves or their sons to serve in combat units. Similarly, 44 percent gave some legitimacy to draft dodging. Clearly, the legitimation for sacrifice has declined. At the same time, the legitimation for using force remained high: 62 percent of respondents expressed objections to territorial concessions, and 52 percent identified with the right wing compared with 22 percent who identified with the left wing. How do the US and Israel cope with this gap?

Coping with the Gap

To balance its inborn propensity to use military force and the domestic limitations imposed by the low level of legitimacy for sacrifice, the US reduced the level of sacrifice. Hence, the level of political participation that sacrificing for war may stimulate was reduced as well. The reduction took two forms: structural changes and changes in policy-related practices.

At the structural level, several changes have been made:

1. Phasing out the draft in favor of a volunteer, professional army. Abolition of the draft helped defuse the antiwar movement. Draft resisters played a crucial role in shifting antiwar sentiments from the margins of society to the center of American politics, with a particular impact on college students (Foley, 2003).

2. Employing technology in place of human combatants (the "Revolution in Military Affairs," hereinafter RMA). Although internal military logic generated the development of precision warfare and high-tech weaponry, the ethos of casualty aversion advanced this trend. RMA has responded to the need for waging swift campaigns with minimal casualties (Erdmann, 2002: 49–54). Indeed, casualty aversion became an important argument in the advertisements of Western industrial defense companies (Schörnig and Lembcke, 2006). Politically, moreover, a technological war with reduced military participation creates the ability to wage a war that no longer requires mass enlistment or popular mobilization that may generate pressure to expand rights or benefits (Starr, 2007). Viewed from another perspective, because of the political costs of recruiting the middle class and the change in its values, democracies build more capital-intensive militaries than non-democracies, and wealthy democracies use capital more intensively than poor ones. In other words, the burden is shifted to the wealthiest groups, the heaviest taxpayers (Caverley, 2007). It follows that the military-industrial complex may not only trigger wars but also shape public opinion with regard to how war is perceived. With the new form of science-intensive warfare that removed the citizenry from war and decreased the level of its sacrifice, it is far more likely, Hooks (1999: 495) argued,

> that citizens will cheer on technological marvels as they kill thousands of people and destroy cities and less likely that the citizenry will empathize with the suffering caused by this highly scientific and distant form of slaughter.

3. Supplementing the use of technology with "risk-transfer war," by which states achieve their aim of keeping casualty numbers low by transferring risks away from their own militaries. This goal is achieved primarily by activating local allies such as the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and the Southern Lebanon Army (used by Israel in the years 1985–2000) to assume the risks of war as "subcontractors" (Shaw, 2002). A similar function has been performed by the Awakening Councils in Iraq.
4. Privatizing military missions. This allows the state to utilize market mechanisms in a manner that might weaken political control over the use of violence, thereby lessening antiwar sentiments (Avant, 2005).
5. Realigning the army's social composition. Not only has the mechanism of recruitment, the draft, been altered, but the demographic composition of the recruits has also changed. As military service lost much of its significance in the eyes of middle-class groups, it gradually attracted relatively low-status groups: women, the lower-middle class, and ethnic minorities, for whom military service remained a valuable avenue for social mobility (Krebs, 2006).

Consequently, as Vasquez (2005) has argued, the relatively low level of selectivity entailed by conscription directly touches more powerful actors than voluntary service. These actors may utilize their political power to constrain policy-makers by means of collective action. Likewise, a broad distribution of the costs of war throughout society, as is the case with conscription, drives politicians to pursue casualty-averse policies so as to avoid the political costs entailed by military hostilities. With the shift to AVF, these rules work in the opposite direction. It is therefore easier to deploy volunteer forces for disputed political goals. Furthermore, the ability to wage a technologized war with so little call for personal sacrifice from the public may reduce the high threshold for starting wars (Starr, 2007). Bacevich (2007) has summed up this trend by claiming that

> [w]hen it came to invading Iraq, President Bush paid little attention to what voters of the First District of Massachusetts or the Fiftieth District of California thought. The people had long-since forfeited any ownership of the army. Even today, although a clear majority of Americans want the Iraq war shut down, their opposition counts for next to nothing.

Israel followed the US's restructuring path with one major exception – the draft remained in force, although the ranks have been increasingly staffed by religious groups, immigrants, and lower-middle class groups who have replaced many of the secular middle class. Many of these newer recruits have a hawkish agenda, so antiwar protests are less likely to emerge from the social networks of such groups. This situation contrasts sharply with the protests that arose among the ranks during the 1980s and 1990s when middle-class groups dominated the military. State autonomy was thus partly restored by other means (Levy, 2007: 117–45).

Still, restructuring is partly effective. While EU countries restructured their armed forces in a similar fashion but at the same time limited their use of them to achieve congruence between the two levels of legitimacy, the US, which frequently deploys its troops, needed more tools to narrow the gap. Otherwise, military policies would remain hostage to this gap of legitimacies in that increasing costs may delegitimize the war effort. Policy-related practices have therefore also played their part in a manner that leveraged and perfected the tools that the restructuring policies made available. Three mechanisms in particular merit examination: disorderly decision-making, shortening the length of war, and setting ambitious war goals.

Disorderly Decision-Making

When states act within an environment that is skeptical about the costs of waging war, an orderly decision-making process is not really workable. For example, the decision to attack Iraq involved a campaign to manipulate intelligence, as intelligence was used to build the case for war by speculating on the unproven link between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (Freedman, 2004). A lengthy but transparent process of decision-making might have eroded the legitimacy of the war. Against this background, Huysmans (2004) has suggested that the relative slowness of decision-making is a virtue in a liberal democracy. Decision-making should be made through argumentation, in which everyone's opinion is in principle equally fallible in the court of public opinion, and deliberation takes time and is always open to reassessment. After a dramatic event, such as that of 9/11, security responses often articulate a need for swift and decisive countermeasures that challenge the institutionalized guarantees of the equal fallibility of truths and suppress dissent. In other words, disorderly decision-making is instrumental in overcoming internal opposition and therefore is more likely to be employed when leaders expect effective opposition, especially opposition that is based on cultural tenets, in this case a skeptical attitude toward sacrifice. Moreover, disorderly decision-making is not only crucial for overcoming opposition, but is also workable when used in conjunction with technologized, vocational militaries that reduce the threshold for going to war, as noted above.

Israel exemplified a similar pattern in the Second Lebanon War. A few hours after two soldiers had been abducted by Hezbollah on the border between Israel and Lebanon, Israel launched the war with a broad range of goals. In the history of the relationship between the political and military leaderships of Israel, the government has never made the significant decision to go to war so quickly, just a few hours after the crisis had broken. One possible explanation for this abrupt decision is that the militarily inexperienced government (headed by PM Ehud Olmert) found it difficult

to display hesitancy in a crisis situation within a political-cultural environment that strongly supported the use of force. However, the government was caught in another trap in that the reduced legitimacy for military sacrifice that had typified Israel since the 1980s gave rise to a rapid decision-making process. An orderly decision-making process might have encouraged a public debate on the benefits versus the costs of the war and restrained the military's forceful response (Levy, 2007: 220–3).

Shortening the Length of War

"In-between wars" are medium-sized wars, somewhere between "big wars" in which mass mobilization encompasses the home front and "small wars" that are fought by professionals away from the public eye (Kaplan, 2007). An "in-between" war, claims Kaplan, creates the worst combination for a non-warrior democracy: one in which the public is keenly aware of the worst details, yet has no context in which to assimilate them and is otherwise unaffected. Hence, this type of war is most likely to suffer from public delegitimization with fluctuating levels of legitimation and acceptance of casualties and sacrifice. Fluctuating sensitivity to casualties is affected by the level of the perceived risk (Everts, 2002; Jentleson, 1992), the likelihood of the war's success (Feaver and Gelpi, 2003), and the log of casualties (Mueller, 2005). This sensitivity can be partly assuaged by shifting to a vocational army (Vasquez, 2005).

Recognizing this problematic situation, the US has further leveraged the advantages of RMA to answer the double need for a short and costless war. RMA was reflected in the moves in Operation Desert Storm, namely, the concern to keep the war brief and casualties few by employing several mechanisms: encouraging an extremely intense phase of aerial bombing before the launching of the ground campaign, a massive flanking ground operation that would maximize Iraqi casualties, and a swift end to the war itself (Reiter and Stam, 2002: 176–8). The air strikes of Kosovo (1999) are another example of this approach. Conversely, criticism of the Pentagon during the Iraq War has focused on the accusation that it failed to send enough troops to Iraq to get the job done (Eichenberg, 2005). The implied lesson here is that a more forceful strike should have been employed to avoid the crisis in legitimacy that a lengthy war of attrition brought about. Such a crisis can be exacerbated in light of the advances in technology that have changed the public's expectations of how many casualties are realistically needed to achieve victory and thus further increased the sensitivity to casualties (Gelpi, 2006).

To a large extent, the concept of "overwhelming force from the outset" has replaced the doctrine of "graduated escalation" that allegedly failed in Vietnam (Freedman, 1998: 767–8). Graduated escalation is deemed instrumental for mobilizing domestic support when a military policy would be publicly rejected if it were introduced all at once (George, 1965: 19). Nonetheless, the more war management is democratized, the more likely it is that gradualism will lose its grip, because it prolongs war and hence expands the political space for debates over the costs versus the potential gains of warfare. Decisive force that may end wars quickly becomes preferable for the sake of domestic legitimation.

Israel attempted to apply this concept in the Second Lebanon War, a typical "in-between war." Israel relied on the Air Force during the war's first days. Problems of legitimacy dictated the deployment of a massive military force with the strategy of damaging civilian infrastructures in the area of Beirut. This strategy was designed to ensure a swift conclusion to the fighting by creating pressure on Hezbollah via the Lebanese government to disarm, or at least to retreat from the border with Israel. In light of the sensitivity to losses, which was demonstrated after small-scale intrusions

resulted in a relatively high number of casualties (Inbar, 2007), the government refrained from calling up more than a limited number of reservists and restricted the ground operations. Only the inability to achieve the declared military goals increased the role played by reservist ground forces. Ultimately, however, this oversensitivity caused Israel's failure to secure a clear victory in the war, as a committee of investigation appointed by the Israeli cabinet in January 2008 following the war concluded (see Merom, 2008).

Setting Ambitious War Goals

Setting expansive goals serves the political leadership's need for legitimacy. Politicians use such goals to galvanize support among middle-class groups for making military sacrifices in an environment that has been less inclined to legitimize such sacrifices. Under similar conditions, democratic leaders have tended to rally their citizens for war by portraying it as a battle of "good versus evil" (Everts, 2002). As the US policy under President Bush demonstrated, demonizing the enemy within the framework of the "war on terror" helped to cripple democratic processes (Krebs and Lobasz, 2007), and thus proved effective in quelling opposition that was grounded in the low level of legitimacy to sacrifice. A less ambitious goal is also less appealing and may provoke defiance. Finally, under the guise of "securitizing" the coverage of the war, the state co-opted liberalized, broadened access to information about the war to promote support for it (Walsh and Barbara, 2006).

Going one step further, setting ambitious goals not only serves the political mobilization for war but also limits the government's ability to exit the war. As Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004) contend, democratic leaders (more so than autocratic ones) are inclined to produce public goods from war that they can allocate to the domestic war coalition in return for its sacrifice. Therefore, democratic leaders are more likely to make an extra effort to win by increasing the resources devoted to the war effort. A victory that produces public goods is crucial. Democracies are torn between concerns about casualties and concerns about losing, as the desire to limit casualties may shorten the war, while the desire to avoid losing may encourage a leader to fight on (Filson and Werner, 2007).

As the war in Iraq has demonstrated, portraying the war as an experiment in imposing democracy transformed the task from foreign policy restraint to occupation and "nation building," culminating in a legitimacy crisis brought about by a lengthy war of attrition (Eichenberg, 2005). Ambitious goals, however, impede exit. A similar scenario repeated itself in the case of Israel's battle in Lebanon. The government set the goal of disarming or eliminating Hezbollah by means of a military assault, a goal that the military command recognized it could not actually achieve without occupying large areas of Lebanon, to which it was opposed (Schiff, 2006). Again, unrealistic objectives dragged Israel into a longer war than had originally been anticipated and required a costly, but also flawed, ground thrust.

Democratic imperatives of this sort complicate the relationship between politicians and generals (see Desch, 1998). The pursuit of legitimation reinforced the US Army's tendency to avoid being dragged into situations in which the use of force had little legitimacy, as the tension that had appeared during the Vietnam War between politicians and generals attested. Following the Weinberger Doctrine, the Powell Doctrine suggested that, in order for the country to be prepared to commit sufficient resources to ensure victory, the massive use of force should be reserved for military disputes that threaten national security, while avoiding the unrestricted use of force in less critical arenas (Powell, 1992/3).

In sum, disorderly decision-making, shortening the length of war and reducing its costs, and setting ambitious goals that ensnare the government – all originate from a disharmony between the

levels of legitimacy, namely, the effort to wage war in a reluctant social environment. Nevertheless, part of the complexity that states face in waging war originates from the very contradictions innate in the manner in which states cope with the legitimacy gap. In particular, the goal of achieving a swift and low-cost victory does not necessarily correspond to the inherent inclination to set ambitious goals. Ambitious goals tie the state's hands and limit its exit strategy. The Powell Doctrine, indeed, strove to harmonize the resources that can be devoted to achieving war goals, starting with the very decision to wage war.

Conclusions

This article is about a contradiction between two levels of legitimation that has plagued liberal democracies since the 1970s. Congruity between the two values of legitimacy for war and legitimacy for sacrifice existed in the pre-modern era and continued with the militarization of Western societies through much of the Cold War. While EU countries, Canada, Australia, and other liberal democracies seemed to escape the emergence of this contradiction by harmonizing de-militarized sentiments and a low level of willingness to sacrifice with the limited use of force, the US and Israel are grappling with this gap of legitimacies.

Paradoxically, the gap was born out of the state's success during the 1980s and 1990s in restoring part of its autonomy in administering military policies. With the insulation of the military from citizens' demands that resulted from the restructuring steps detailed above, privileged and hence more organized groups distanced themselves from the sites of sacrifice and consequently made fewer demands. In other words, as fewer people participated in the military, states faced less political opposition to preparing for and even initiating war autonomously (see Silver, 2004). Within a hawkish environment, autonomy may breed the temptation to use force. However, the "sacrifice phobia" tempered the legitimacy of using force. Only a low-cost military build-up in both economic and human terms can command a high level of legitimation. The restructuring of the armed forces indeed provided a large substratum for effective, short-lived military efforts, but the prolonging of war or an increase in its costs reignited the legitimacy problem. Cracks in the legitimacy for waging war thus partly nullified the previous "gains" of states like the US, as the eroded support for its presence on Iraqi soil demonstrates.

Adjustments to the limitations that the democratization of war produced resulted in two consequences that are inconsistent with democratic values. First, a low level of legitimacy at home generates the use of excessive force. Proponents of RMA justified the investment involved by claiming that the use of precision weapons and improved target selection can minimize fatalities among non-combatants (Lambeth, 2000: 29, 176). However, critics of RMA claim that these new high-tech weapons have reformulated the laws of war by justifying the erosion of the distinction between soldiers and civilians and legitimizing collateral damage (Smith, 2002). The weaker the willingness to sacrifice at home, the greater the tolerance for the adversary's sacrifice (up to a point at least). Israel's 2009 offensive in Gaza exemplified how the erosion of the legitimacy of incurring military casualties reduced the level of risk to which the soldiers were subjected by increasing the level of lethality, which raised the number of non-combatant casualties.

Second, the mechanisms analyzed in this article suggest that states cope with the imperatives of democracy by undermining democracy. Disorderly processes of decision-making, the demonization of the enemy in a manner that sets up cultural barriers to democratic political discourse, and the lowering of the threshold for waging war due to the reliance on technologized armies are cases in point. Furthermore, the state has greater autonomy to initiate a war but also may make bad

decisions that extensive bargaining between the state and its citizens prior to the launching of the war could have averted. Bad decisions are translated into intolerable costs, the very costs governments initially strove to avoid by utilizing the abovementioned mechanisms.

Underlying this article is the effort to integrate different studies dealing with the declining legitimacy to sacrifice versus militarization and the manner in which this mixture impacts policies. As theories about peace democracy, the two-level game, and militarism demonstrate, liberal democracy can harmonize its inherent market-oriented and materialist values with a proclivity for waging war despite the tension between militarization and the reluctance to sacrifice. This article has examined the manner in which this tension, or the gap between these two values, is managed. By coining the term "gap of legitimacies," the article does not refute other cited arguments explaining how Western democracies manage their military policies in a new political-cultural environment, but goes one analytical step further.

What does this concept of the "gap of legitimacies" add to our understanding?

Support for war entails two different levels of legitimation. Polls or surveys of elites indicate the political legitimation for using force, but a more thorough analysis is required to map society's willingness to sacrifice for war. In the absence of a match between the two levels, political legitimacy may be negatively impacted by the declining level of the social legitimacy of sacrifice, a situation that ultimately leads to an inability to wage a prolonged, costly war. Scholars can then assess the extent to which the original support for war was embedded in a social infrastructure that legitimized enduring sacrifice or, conversely, led to attitudes such as casualty phobia. Terms like "casualty phobia" and "defeat phobia" gain more credence when we analyze their social origins and then assess their impact on policy-making.

Likewise, if we factor in the level of militarism in society, we can contextualize the support for war by scrutinizing how deep the pro-war sentiments are, as well as evaluate the impact of militarized sentiments on the level of sacrifice legitimacy. For example, the level of militarization contextualizes the real connotation of what Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004) term the "public goods" from war. Public goods are not detached from the meaning ascribed to them through the lens of various groups' interests and values.

IR scholars have nicely mapped the countervailing pressures exerted on states' leaders but not the source of them, nor their level of operation – political legitimacy for using force or social legitimacy for sacrifice. The concept of the "gap of legitimacies" addresses this issue. The concept is not offered here just to study support for war in terms of militarism and its effect on war legitimacy or to study "casualty phobia" in terms of sacrifice legitimacy. The goal is to look at each variable that affects military policies through the two levels at the same time and then weigh their respective influences. Therefore, what needs to be considered is not simply domestic pressures (as IR students do) but also the precise location of those domestic pressures in the matrix of legitimation. For example, the material consequences of trade may have an impact on the foreign policy attitudes of individuals affected by those consequences (Aldrich et al., 2006: 483–4). Here, social interests should be taken into account to understand the political legitimacy of specific policies and the readiness to pay for promoting these interests. This approach is but one way in which this study offers a conceptual framework that can guide an empirical study.

By adding the sociological dimension, moreover, one can look at different levels of legitimation among various social groups. It is essential to study how alterations in the makeup of the army affect the willingness of its soldiers and the social networks in which they are embedded to sacrifice, beyond the impact of vocationalization. Different groups are motivated by different sets of values derived from their social status, their expectations from military service, the alternative

mobility tracks available to them outside the military, their cultural values, and other factors. Furthermore, public opinion as such is less crucial than the groups' ability to initiate collective action, which may leverage as much as shape public opinion and convert it into political power (see Vasquez [2005] in the context of war costs).

Finally, a note of warning: the "gap of legitimacies" is not an exclusive explanation for any pattern of war management. Furthermore, it is not an argument for a causal relationship between the appearance of the "gap" and the resulting policies. Rather, the matrix (Figure 1) demonstrates the variety of combinations that yield different policies, as the distinction between the US and the EU, or post-World War II and the 1990s, shows. The interplay between the two "legitimacies" largely creates the space within which a mixture of policies is constructed. Still, it is likely that other variables may have an important effect on how wars are fought. For example, strategic culture, namely, the cultural context influencing strategic preferences, affects the choice of the recruitment model (see, for example, Kier, 1995). Strategic culture that determines such issues as the symbolic status of military service can partly be embedded within the cluster of social legitimacy for sacrifice.

This article, therefore, is a call for further research that elaborates on the underlying gap of legitimacies, the consequences of which impact the way democracies fight, or hopefully avoid fighting.

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