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Abstract. In the new EU member states, the European Parliament elections in June 2004 were anticipated with particular anxiety because of the role of anti-EU, nationalist, and extreme right-wing parties, which in some countries had scored significant electoral successes in the recent past. But also in some of the old member states, the radical right was watched closely, in particular, after the French Front National's historic performance in the 2002 presidential election. Since the radical right feeds on the economic and social crisis and feelings of anxiety raised by EU integration, by globalization, and by anti-establishment feelings, many observers expected a general rise in support for these parties, especially in light of the growing complexity of the expanded EU. This article analyzes the electoral outcome for the radical right in the 2004 elections and discusses country-specific characteristics as well as regional patterns. It also looks at the role the radical right played, if any, in the votes on the new EU constitution in various member states. The article shows that, regarding the radical right, the European elections proved to be surprisingly unsurprising. Clearly, EU membership was not the only issue involved. Rather, larger issues of national identity, the strength of nationalist traditions, and some particular features superseded narrow foreign policy concerns and explain, more or less, the electoral success achieved by the radical right. Compared to the EU elections, the referenda on the EU constitution in several member states provided little to no opportunities for the radical right.

Keywords: • Anti-EU protest • EU enlargement • Extreme right • Nationalism • Radical right

1. Introduction

In the new European Union (EU) member states, the European Parliament (EP) elections in June 2004 were anticipated with particular anxiety because of the role of anti-EU, nationalist, and extreme right-wing parties, which in some countries had scored significant electoral successes in the recent past. In this regard, however, the European elections proved to be surprisingly unsurprising.

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In the older member states, the level of anxiety was rather varied, as in some countries the radical right's influence had recently decreased (Austria and the Netherlands), in some it had increased (Belgium), and in others it had remained stable at a high level (France). This article traces the fate of what is here called the "radical right" in the elections, outlining some general trends and some country-specific characteristics. More specifically, it raises the issue of the extent to which the radical right, at the EU level, reflects a European-wide cleavage which replicates national cleavages along a dimension of the openness or closure of modern western societies (see Kitschelt, 1995; Loch, 2001; Perrineau, 2001a). Our argument is that as the old, mainly class-based, left–right cleavage gives way to a pluralization of cleavages, the radical right, as the anti-pluralist force par excellence, posits itself as the opponent of both the processes of pluralization and the perceived carriers of these processes.

2. The Radical Right, its Political Space, and Changing Cleavage Structures in the EU

The radical right is seen here as a collection of nationalist, authoritarian, xenophobic, and extremist parties that are defined by the common characteristic of populist ultranationalism (see Minkenberg, 2000a; Perrineau, 2001a). In light of theories which define modernization as processes of societal and functional differentiation and the growing status mobility of individuals, right-wing radicalism can be defined as the radical effort to undo such processes and fight their (alleged) negative impacts, the counter-concept to social differentiation being the nationally defined community. It has an overemphasis on, or is a radicalization of, images of social homogeneity within the national framework, which often characterize radical right-wing thinking. At the core lies a myth of a homogeneous national body which puts the nation before the individual and his or her civil rights, and which therefore is directed against liberal and pluralist democracy (though is not necessarily in favor of a fascist state), its underlying values of freedom and equality, and the related categories of individualism and universalism (Minkenberg, 1998: 33–47).

Some authors insist on including anti-system attitudes or opposition to democracy as essential definitional criteria (Backes and Jesse, 1989; Ignazi, 2003). According to the definition used here, right-wing radicalism is not the antithesis of democracy per se. Instead, by focusing on ultranationalism instead of antidemocratic attitudes, the question of the right-wing radicals' relationship toward democracy remains open for empirical testing. To put it differently, right-wing radicals are not necessarily in favor of doing away with democracy, but they want government by the people in terms of "ethnocracy" (Griffin, 1997). This focus on ultranationalism instead of fascism or racism makes it possible to account for a wider range of varieties of right-wing radicalism, and then to distinguish between them according to the way ethnic, religious, cultural, and other criteria of exclusion are used. We therefore propose here to distinguish at least two ideological types which are derived from the concept of nation and the exclusionary criteria: the autocratic fascist or extreme right wing (which unlike the new right-wing radicals directly challenges democratic principles or the entire order)[1] and the populist nationalist.[2] In the European context, these groups are usually characterized by an EU-critical or anti-EU stand and by some strands

of ethnocentrism. Special cases are specifically racist or religious fundamentalist (see Minkenberg, 1998: Chs 1, 7). All versions also have in common a strong, anti-pluralistic desire for an internal homogeneity of the nation and a populist, anti-establishment political style.

This anti-pluralist and ultranationalist drive of the radical right must be interpreted in the light of the changing cleavage patterns of European societies. There are numerous accounts of this phenomenon (see Kitschelt, 1995; Loch, 2001; Minkenberg, 1998, 2002; Perrineau, 1998, 2001a). Usually, these analyses focus on either western or eastern Europe, and rarely do they employ a combined look at national and transnational developments across Europe and their interplay at the level of the EU. However, studying the radical right in Europe, and in particular in EU elections, needs to take into account various overlapping developments, which, as far-reaching social and cultural processes, provide the context for the radical right. There are at least three such macro-processes. In the West, they are captured by various terms, such as "postindustrialism," "value change," "late capitalism," "the third modernity," and so on. Among these, prominent arguments are provided by Ulrich Beck (1986), who talks about "the other modernity," and Ronald Inglehart (1997), who relates his research into "post-material value change" to the concept of "postmodernity." These terms refer to an increasingly reflexive process of modernization and a new, self-critical posture toward modernity. Within this posture, the following factors dominate: cultural orientation (in particular, in light of the growing cultural pluralization resulting from migration processes all over the continent), a sharpened sense of crisis due to the exhaustion of the welfare state, the primacy of the "life world" (*Lebenswelt* in Habermas's reading), and the central role of education, language, and communication. Overall, the process can be read as a new phase of individualization and pluralization, following the above definition of modernization, and as the de-emphasizing of authority, both religious and rational-legal in the Weberian sense.

As a result of these processes, new cleavages have emerged in western democracies which cut across the older, mainly class-based, cleavages. Various studies have demonstrated the weakening of the old cleavage structures and emergence of a new plurality of cleavages which operate according to different logics. Inglehart and others use the concept of value change to identify the new polarity between post-materialists and their opponents, the more extreme version of which can be located among the radical right (Dalton, 1996; Inglehart, 1997; Minkenberg, 1993). Kitschelt (1995) uses a more fundamental conceptualization of political space and argues that the radical right occupies the area in which the far-right ends of a capitalist–socialist axis and a libertarian–authoritarian axis overlap, that is, the capitalist-authoritarian sector. Perrineau (2001b) argues similarly that economic liberalism and cultural liberalism constitute two different dimensions which must be distinguished, but adds a third dimension, that of universalism and anti-universalism, on which the radical right occupies the anti-universalist pole. Regardless of the different conceptualizations of the new cleavage structures, these various approaches point in the same direction, that is, that the radical right occupies the pole of a "closed society" by positing itself against a universal and cosmopolitan, or libertarian, concept of society and the individual therein (see Chiche et al., 2000). Adherents of the radical right are primarily those who see themselves as losers in these processes – "modernization losers" in a more subjective rather than objective sense (see Minkenberg, 2000a).

In eastern Europe, some of these developments have also set in after 1989, but the more dominant paradigm here is that of regime change. In various ways, the transformation process in eastern Europe is more far-reaching, deeper, and complex than the current modernization process in the West (Von Beyme, 1994: 12–14). First, it includes the collapse not only of political regimes, but also of their legitimating ideologies. Thus, a simple return to left-wing or socialist ideas as a recourse by the "losers" in this modernization process is not a viable option. Right-wing groups or those who combine socialist with nationalist ideas can benefit from this conjuncture. Second, the democratization of regimes is accompanied by an economic and social transformation which touches all aspects of life (thus making it different from earlier waves of democratization and from "redemocratization" such as the German and Italian cases after World War II). The complexity of the transformation process generates large "transformation costs" which can benefit the radical right. Third, the exchange of entire social systems creates high levels of social disorientation and ambivalence toward the new order. Again, political entrepreneurs who offer simple solutions and appeal to the "people" or nation rather than a particular social class or universalist vision of progress have a competitive advantage. In sum, these opportunity structures which lie behind the institutional settings of liberal democracy as they are put into place in most central and eastern European countries must be seen as generally favorable to the radical right. It is also clear that these processes are fundamentally different from the western transition from an industrial to a postindustrial society, one of the key contextual factors for the emergence of a new or postindustrial radical right (see above). However, the transformation process is further complicated by the fact that it is a dual modernization process, that is, the transition to a liberal democracy and market capitalism along with elements of a change from industrialism to postindustrialism, which often involves aspects of simultaneous nation and state building as well. As a result, the radical right combines postindustrial aspects, such as the use of a modern mass media and the decreasing role of mass (party) organizations, with the ideologies of a particular past, that is, the mix of traditional nationalism in the East and the legacy of state socialism (see Minkenberg, 2002).

At the EU level, the political space of party competition and related cleavage patterns are structured by the project of ongoing European integration, which affects western and eastern European member states alike. In addition to national "outgroups," as identified by the radical right in national contexts (mostly immigrants, national minorities, or neighboring countries), the EU provides an overarching scapegoat which adds to the new pattern of cleavages (Perrineau, 2001b: 297–9). Since the dynamic of European integration was set in motion in the 1950s, a cleavage has emerged which juxtaposes one pole favorable to increasing European integration with one opposed to it. For a long time, this division only affected the political class. Since the 1980s, however, with the increasing engagement of the electorate in European affairs, the people have appropriated this division.

The integrationist faction advocates a veritable political federation, with political sovereignty being exercised directly by the European peoples instead of passing through the representation of their states. The idea is to establish finally a legislative power constituted by the European Parliament and an executive responsible vis-a-vis that parliament, to which could be added a president elected

by the citizens of such a "federal Europe." The integrationist group ranges, roughly speaking, from the socialists to the Christian Democrats and liberals of the center, including the Greens. It is characterized by graduation rather than by separation, from the most federalist (such as the Greens in Germany or the federalist Christian Democrats of the Union pour la Démocratie Française in France) to those who have most recently converted, are appalled already by the word "federalism," but who, at any rate, have pronounced themselves in favor of Maastricht or the European constitutional treaty (the liberal Gaullists such as Alain Juppé in France, to name but one example).

In opposition to this group, there is the euro-skeptic faction, which opposes this development and promotes a "union" of states, which does not rule out strong cooperation between these states, but which seeks to prevent any loss in their sovereignty. This group is divided by a severe split between the autonomists and the antiliberals. For the first group, which exhibits strong nationalist leanings, the sovereign and autonomous nation-state must not be touched: Jean-Marie Le Pen, Philippe de Villiers, and Charles Pasqua in France; in Great Britain, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and certain conservatives; and, in Poland, the ultra-Catholic and nationalist League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin or LPR). From the antiliberals' point of view, such European construction must be impeded because it follows an economic logic which they describe as ultraliberal, and of which they do not approve. Hence, they argue that it would be easier to build what they call a "social" or a "solidary Europe" based on the various nations (France, Great Britain, and Poland) rather than fighting in a federal and liberal Europe. The Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus) in Germany, political heir of eastern German communism, the French Communist Party (Parti communiste de France or PCF), the Communist Party (Kommounistiko Komma Elladas or KKE) and extreme left (Synaspismos tis Aristeras ton Kinimaton kai tis Oikologias or SYN) in Greece, the Partido Comunista Português and the extreme Trotskyist left (Bloco de Esquerda) in Portugal, and the formerly Maoist Socialistische Partij in the Netherlands are all archetypical examples of this position. All these diverse euro-skeptic currents are united by the wish to slow down the European construction as far as possible.

While the 1980s was a decade of regular increase in EU affiliation (as shown by the Eurobarometers regularly conducted by the European Commission in Brussels and measuring EU affiliation through public opinion surveys), there was a drop in affiliation during the 1990s and in the years from 2000 to 2005. At the end of 2003, only 48 percent thought that EU membership was "a good thing," thus they were in the minority and almost on a par with those thinking that the membership was either "a bad thing" (15 percent) or "neither good nor bad" (31 percent) (Eurobarometer, 2005: 9). The growth in euro-skepticism can be traced back to a variety of anxieties: the prospect of EU enlargement by 10 new member states bringing with it fear of the displacement of companies and of immigration, with both factors seen as leading to increasing unemployment in a Europe where the economic upswing is a long time in coming. The difficulties (or the lack of determination) of the member states, but also of parties and electoral alliances, even the pro-European ones, in putting Europe at the center of public debate and in informing and organizing extensive discussion on the important issues (such as the constitution, enlargement, and European identity) have paved the way for protest votes and, by avoiding the issue of European integration,

opened up opportunities for often very strongly euro-skeptic populist groups. These groups find an ideal scapegoat in the European institutions, which can be held responsible for all national troubles (for example, unemployment, corruption, or weak economic performance). This euro-skepticism reaches its highest level among lower social strata (52 percent of workers and craftsmen do not have confidence in the European institutions) and in rural milieus.

Accordingly, European questions brought about a new cleavage along cultural and social dimensions which has greatly disturbed the cleavages that had hitherto existed in political life. Wealthy and cultivated voters often pronounce themselves in favor of Europe, for different, but convergent, reasons. This process mirrors the emerging national polarities of the postmodern cleavage (see above). As the geographer Jacques Lévy (1993: 6) wrote with reference to the French referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992: "Market and culture, finance and communication have in common that they are to be thought of and organized on different levels, ranging from local to global, without attributing exclusive prevalence to either level. Exactly the opposite unites the 'losing France': ethnic, geopolitical and socio-economic constriction on a single level."

This constriction on the nation-state has paved the way for the development of a radical right that has always been at the cutting edge of exclusive nation-state confinement and of a closed nationalism (see Winock, 1990). The nationalist protest of the radical right is facilitated by new opportunity structures offered on the European political stage. Since the end of the 1970s, the European Parliament has been elected by direct universal suffrage. These European elections comply entirely with the model of "second-order elections," and were formalized some few months after the first European elections took place in June 1979 (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). In general, these elections are characterized by low turnout, sanction voting vis-a-vis the parties in power, and a fragmentation of the political spectrum, which means that there is an advantage for extremist parties. The Vlaams Blok, for instance, accomplished its first electoral triumph in the European elections of 1994, just like the Front National (FN), which experienced its first breakthrough 10 years earlier in the European elections of 1984, or the Republikaner, which scored its first (and only) national success in the 1989 elections. In 2004, this phenomenon of second-order elections once again helped the radical right in various countries, such as Belgium, France, Poland, and Great Britain.

3. The Radical Right in the Old EU Member Countries: Contrasted Results

As usual, most parties of the radical right took the European elections as an opportunity to denounce the negative effects that, according to these parties, are linked to the process of building a multinational Europe. They denounce federalist Europe as the last step before a "worldwide government" which would ensure the definite disappearance of the countries involved. For example, in its program, the Front National (2005) writes: "The governments never revealed the true final result: the creation of a super-national entity, postulating the end of France as defined as a human community able to manage itself ... The Europe of Maastricht and Amsterdam is clearly the end of political sovereignty." The same type of argument is presented by the British National Party (2005), which calls for the "return of Great Britain's independence," and the Danish People's Party (2005),

which wants "to give privilege to the independence of Denmark and grant freedom to the Danish people in their own country." This condemnation of an "antinational" Europe leads certain parties of the radical right to demand an exit from the European Union: "Our country must exit the Brussels Europe as quickly as possible. This Europe definitely cannot be reformed" (Front National, 2005); "We are for the withdrawal of Great Britain from the European Union. Instead of belonging to the European Union, we want to move towards a greater national self-sufficiency, and work towards restoring the Great Britain family and our lines of exchange with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand" (British National Party, 2005). This denunciation of Europe, this plea for the reassertion of the entire sovereignty of nations, is connected to the denunciation of US influence:

> Europe is the catalyst of globalism ... European countries, including France, will voluntarily become satellites of the United States ... The Europe of Maastricht and Amsterdam is the end of economic independence ... The result is an ultra-liberalist, globalized economy under the influence of the United States, an economy which only caters to the profit of anonymous financial powers ... Europe is the result of submission to the Hollywood culture. (Front National, 2005)

This anti-European critique is a general characteristic of the radical right, even if certain groups take a more moderate tone; for example, the Vlaams Blok (2005) does not call for an exit from the EU and the Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore (MS-FT, 2005) is even in favor of enlarging the EU to include all eastern European countries, as well as Russia. But the somewhat generally shared hostility toward the European Union can turn into a "witchcraft trial," with Europe being considered the origin of all that is bad: "Europe is the end of economic prosperity ... it is the end of independent food markets ... it is financial failure ... it is the end of social protections ... it is a foolish and totalitarian juridical order," claims the Front National (2005).

It is on this basis of a Europe which, most of the time, is singled out as a virtual "diabolical causality" that the radical right enjoyed several electoral successes (see Table 1).

On the territory of the former 15 EU member states, the best electoral performances by the radical right were recorded in Belgium, where the Vlaams Blok received 14.34 percent of the vote and the Front National and Front Nouveau de Belgique (FNB) 3.20 percent (thus, in Belgium a total of 17.54 percent of the vote went to the radical right); followed by France (10.12 percent, with the Front National as a strong hegemon receiving 9.81 percent, which represents 97.00 percent of the radical right's electorate); then by Italy (7.00 percent, but divided among four different lists); then by Denmark (6.80 percent for the Dansk Folkeparti); then by Austria, where the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs saw a strong decline (6.33 percent, a loss of 17.15 percentage points from the previous European elections in 1999). Similarly, the Pim Fortuyn list in the Netherlands also saw a large drop, which lowered its electoral power to a marginal level (2.55 percent); whereas this list had won 17.00 percent of the vote in the legislative elections in 2002, it only won 5.70 percent in those of 2003. Also notable is the strong upward drive of the British National Party (BNP) in the United Kingdom (from 0.96 percent in 1999 to 4.91 percent in 2004) as well as the appearance of a strong, orthodox extreme right in Greece, the Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos (LAOS),

TABLE 1. *The Evolution of the Radical Right in the European Elections (1999–2004)*

Country	Party	1999 (%)	Elected	Group	2004 (%)	Group	Elected	Variation (%)	Variation
Germany	Die Republikaner (Rep)	1.70	–		1.88		–	+0.18	
	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)	0.40	–		0.94		–	+0.54	
	PBC	0.30	–						
Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)/Die Freiheitlichen	23.48	5	NI	6.33	NI	1	–17.15	–4
Belgium	Vlaams Blok (VB)	9.40	2	NI	14.34	NI	3	+4.94	+1
	Front National (FN)	1.50	–		2.79			+1.29	
	Front Nouveau de Belgique (FNB)	0.40	–		0.41			+0.01	
Denmark	Fremskridtpartiet (FRP)	0.70	–						
	Dansk Folkeparti (DFP)	5.80	1	UEN	6.80	UEN	1	+1.00	=
Spain	Falange Española de las JONS				0.03		–		
	Falange Española Independiente (FEI)	0.07	–						
	Democracia Nacional (DN)	0.04	–		0.04		–	0.00	
	Alianza por la Unidad Nacional (AUN)	0.06	–						
	La Falange (FE)	0.05	–		0.09		–	+0.03	
	La Falange Autentica (FA)				0.01		–		
Finland	Perussuomalaiset	0.80			0.50		–	–0.30	
	Suomen Kasan				0.20		–		
	Suomi Isanmaa				0.10		–		
France	Front National (FN)	5.69	5	NI	9.81	NI	7	+4.12	+2
	Mouvement National (MN), renamed MNR	3.28	–		0.31		–	–2.97	
	Ligue nationaliste (LN)	0.01	–						
	Alliance Royale				0.01		–		
Greece	Proti Grammi	0.76	–						
	Komma Ellinismou	0.26	–						

	Elliniko Metopo	0.12	–		0.25		–	+0.13	
	Ethniki Patriotiki Topiki Agonistiki Kinisi Ellinon (EPTAKE)	0.00	–						
	Ethniko Patriotiko Komma (EpaK)	0.00	–						
	Ethnikon Agoniston	0.00	–						
	Laikos Orthodoxos				4.11	IND.DEM.	1		+1
	Patriotiki Symmaxia				0.17		–		
Ireland									
Italy	Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore (MS-FT)	1.60	1	NI	0.7	NI	1	–0.90	=
	Mussolini				1.20	NI	1		+1
	Lega Nord	4.50	4	NI+ELDR	4.96	IND.DEM.	4	+0.46	=
	Rauti				0.1		–		
Luxemburg									
Netherlands	Centrumdemocraten (CD)	0.50	–						
	Pim Fortuyn				2.55		–		
	Leefbar Nederland				0.19		–		
	Niew Rechts				0.33		–		
	De Europese Partij	0.70	–						
Portugal	Partido Nacional Renovador	–	–		0.24		–		
United Kingdom	Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)	1.80	1	NI	1	NI	1	–0.80	=
	British National Party (BNP)	0.96	–		4.91		–	+3.95	–
Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna (SD)	0.33	–		1.13			+0.80	
	Europeiska Arbetarpartiet (EAP)	0.00	–						
Total			*19*				*20*		

with 4.11 percent of the vote and one deputy. Everywhere else (Germany, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Sweden), the radical right was either absent or its numbers were undisclosed.

Belgium and France are the only countries from the former European Union 15 where votes for the radical right passed the 10-percent mark. In Belgium, the increase was vigorous: +4.94 percent for the Vlaams Blok at the national level and +1.30 percent for the FN and FNB. In the only Dutch-speaking electoral region of Belgium, the Vlaams Blok attained 22.87 percent of the vote (8.05 percent higher than in 1999); similarly, in the only French-speaking electoral region, the FN and FNB received 8.55 percent (+3.38 percent). The levels of support and the appeal of the Vlaams Blok are particularly elevated in the provinces of Anvers (27.48 percent, 8.09 percent more than in 1999) and Limbourg (21.90 percent, up 9.36 percent on 1999). The FN's and FNB's performances were more modest in the Walloon area, except in the province of Hainaut, where the vote for these two totaled 12.01 percent (+6.10 percent). It is clear how the effects of the critical debate on the unitary status of Belgium and of the social malaise in the old industrial regions (Limbourg and Hainaut) come together to make the Belgian radical right one of the most powerful in Europe. In France, the radical right, with 10.12 percent of votes, has risen out of the crisis of 1999 (8.99 percent for the concurrent lists of the FN and the Mouvement National), but remains below the level it reached in the 2002 presidential election (19.20 percent, of which Jean-Marie Le Pen polled 16.86 percent and Bruno Mégret 2.34 percent) and in the regional elections in March 2004 (16.1 percent, comprised of 14.7 percent for the FN lists and 1.4 percent for the Mouvement National lists and other extreme rightists). With an increase of 1.15 percent from 1999 to 2004, the French radical right is still a significant force in Europe, although it struggles with mobilizing all of its electorate. According to the postelection investigation by the Institut Français d'Opinion Publique (French Institute of Public Opinion or IFOP),[3] voters who aligned themselves with the FN and those who aligned themselves with the Greens were most absent in the June 13, 2004 election. The Front National saw a poor mobilization of its electorate (particularly in the working-class segments) at the European elections. Despite this weak voter turnout, however, the radical right reached higher polling levels among the youth (17 percent of those under the age of 35), the ill-educated (18 percent), unskilled service workers (19 percent), and industrial workers (15 percent), as well as among lower-income households (16 percent of those who earn less than €762 per month). This capability of the radical right to capture a significant part of the "protest vote" makes sense given the geography of the vote. Beyond the traditional bastion of Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur (15.85 percent of voters), there are a number of regions in the east and the north where problems of unemployment, relocation of jobs, and deindustrialization are prominent: 14.46 percent polled for the radical right in Picardie, 13.85 percent in Nord Pas de Calais, 13.60 percent in Champagne Ardennes, and 12.89 percent in Lorraine. Outside of Belgium and France, the radical right made a significant showing in five other western European countries: Italy, Denmark, Austria, Great Britain, and Greece.

Italy possesses a sort of neo-fascist extreme right, and like the extremist regional populism practiced by the Northern League, it is extremely fragmented. Alongside the Northern League and the Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore (MS-FT) lists, which campaigned in all five Italian regions, was another group,

the Social Alternative lists. Headed by Alessandra Mussolini, granddaughter of the Duce and dissident of the Alleanza Nationale, the Social Alternative lists were also on the ballot throughout Italy. The Social Idea Movement with Rauti lists, however, provided stiff competition in three of the regions. The Social Alternative lists collected 1.22 percent of the vote, and a deputy seat in the central electoral district, where this list recorded its best numbers (1.6 percent and as much as 2.2 percent in the Latium region around Rome). The MS-FT lists only received 0.72 percent (but still gained a deputy in the southern electoral district) and the Social Idea Movement with Rauti lists earned a meager 0.14 percent of votes. The Northern League lists had very different results in each region: 11.2 percent and three deputies in the northwest electoral district (Piedmont, Aosta Valley, Lombardy, and Liguria), 8.4 percent and one deputy in the northeast electoral district (Trentino-South Tyrol, Veneto, Friuli, and Emilia-Romagna), 0.6 percent in the central electoral district, 0.3 percent in the southern electoral district, and 0.2 percent in the Italia Insulare electoral district (Sardinia and Sicily). Since the MSI dissolved and became Alleanza Nazionale at the Congress of January 1995, the Italian radical right has been disjointed and politically rather marginal.

In Denmark, the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti or DFP) received 6.8 percent of the vote (one deputy in the European Parliament) and increased its percentage by a full point from 1999. In a country of very homogeneous ethnicity, the DFP, product of the 1995 split of the extreme-right party, the Party of Progress, took its turn by developing its anti-immigration and anti-European Union themes. The party's program specifies that "Denmark is not a country of immigration and never has been" and that it "cannot accept that Denmark lose its sovereignty" (Danish People's Party, 2005).

In Austria, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) continues its electoral decline that began just after its integration into the governmental coalition in 2000. This integration was fatal for the protesting and populist party of Jörg Haider. After receiving 23.48 percent of the suffrage (and five deputies) in the European elections of June 1999, the FPÖ slipped to 6.33 percent (and one deputy) in June 2004. More recently, the FPÖ passed the 10-percent mark only in its lone bastion of Carinthia (19.29 percent). In all the other regions, its numbers oscillated between 3.84 percent (in the Burgenland) and 8.23 percent (in Vorarlberg). This decline has progressed quickly since the legislative elections of 2002 (the FPÖ's vote had already fallen from 26.9 percent in the legislative elections of October 1999 to a level of 10.2 percent by November 2002). During the 2004 European elections, the appearance of a list highly critical of the function of the European Union accentuated the decline of the FPÖ. This new group, the Hans Peter Martin list, received 13.98 percent of the vote.

Unlike the Austrian radical right (triumphant in the past, but today in disarray), the radical right in Great Britain and Greece gained more support and notoriety. In Great Britain, the BNP, which barely gained 1.00 percent of the vote in 1999, collected 4.91 percent in June 2004. Its performance in the election was particularly strong in the declining, old industrial regions: Yorkshire and Humberside (8.0 percent), the West Midlands (7.5 percent), and the North West (6.4 percent). In Greece, the extreme right resurged under Georgios Karatzaferis, former right-wing deputy for the party Nea Demokratia (from which he was expelled in 2000), proprietor of a television channel, and founder of a populist orthodox group (Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos) that favors strong anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant sentiments, especially toward those from Muslim countries and Albania.

With 4.1 percent of the vote, LAOS had the best electoral performance of any extreme-right party in Greece since the demise of the "authoritarian (military) regime" in 1974. It was in several regions near the northern border of Greece that LAOS fared best (7.68 percent of the vote in Thessalonica A, 6.71 percent in Kilkis, 6.49 percent in Thessalonica B, and 6.12 percent in Imathias) as well as in the region of Athens-Le Pirée, where the leader of LAOS had previously been elected as a deputy.

In the other western European countries (Germany, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Sweden), the radical right remained divided into several small groups, and was not a real presence on the electoral scene.

After looking at these different occurrences in western Europe, we can begin to paint a sociological and political portrait of the radical right's electorate. As the post-electoral studies found in "European Electoral Studies" of 2004 are not available for the whole of Europe, we have preferred to use 2003's "The European Social Survey," which measures the vote in favor of the radical right beginning with the most recent legislative elections in each of the countries being studied. We selected eight countries where the levels attained by the radical right in legislative elections were such that a cross-section of those interviewed would contain a sufficient number of radical-right voters. A comparative analysis of the socio-demographic and attitudinal profiles of the radical right's electorates (see Table 2) in eight countries (of which Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, and the Netherlands are EU members, while Norway and Switzerland are not) confirms several major conclusions already reached by some of the best analyses of this subject (see Betz, 2004: 173–93).

Often the electorate of the radical right is quite noticeably masculine (except in the Netherlands). It is clear how the machismo of extreme right-wing parties "speaks" to a number of men who have lost their footing in a society rarely capable of creating jobs and generating meaningful identities for all its members. A second characteristic which confirms previous analysis is that the radical right's electorate, with one exception (Switzerland), is profoundly proletarian. The weight of workers and employees in the electorate varies between 62 percent and 81 percent. As Hans-Georg Betz (2004: 193) has written: "It is hardly surprising, given the circumstances, that the political parties who establish themselves as defenders of national integrity and economic security in the face of mass immigration and the perils of globalization are able to gain significant support, in particular from those who feel the most threatened by these structural changes." The third characteristic, which is less salient, is that the youth of the electorate varies from one country to another: in Switzerland, only 8.3 percent of electors of the Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People's Party or SVP) are between the ages of 18 and 34, while in Germany, 41.2 percent of voters for the Republikaner belong to this age group. In Italy, Denmark, and Switzerland, voters over the age of 55 are overrepresented. In Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, elderly voters are very much a minority in the radical right's electorate. As such, the ability of the radical right to win votes from the young, or the relatively young, is not the same in every country; yet in most cases, the electorate of the radical right is younger than the electorate as a whole. Voters born between the two world wars, during World War II, or just thereafter make up only a small part of the radical right's electorate. Nostalgia for the 1930s and 1940s is not a strong leverage point for the radical right in terms of attracting voters.

TABLE 2. *Socio-Demographic and Attitudinal Profiles of the Radical Right's Electorate in Western Europe*

		Gender		Age			Occupational group			Xenophobia		Feeling of insecurity	Performance of democracy
		Male	Female	18–34	35–55	55+	Upper management	Middle management	Manual workers/ employees	+	–	+	–
Germany	Rep	82.4	17.6	41.2	52.9	5.9	0.0	23.5	76.5	47.1	52.9	17.6	56.4
	average	48.4	51.6	18.4	43.1	38.5	15.4	24.2	60.4	40.4	59.6	23.1	22.2
Belgium	VB FN	60.5	39.5	27.8	47.2	25.0	5.6	16.7	77.8	75.7	24.3	29.7	47.2
	average	52.0	48.0	26.0	41.7	32.3	15.0	26.2	58.8	42.4	57.6	20.5	15.7
Denmark	DFP	66.7	33.3	26.7	30.0	43.3	3.6	21.4	75.0	70.0	30.0	16.7	4.3
	average	51.8	48.2	24.4	39.8	35.9	17.5	25.9	56.6	36.4	63.6	10.6	3.4
France	FN MNR	60.3	39.7	10.6	57.1	32.3	12.1	11.5	76.4	73.7	26.3	34.7	56.7
	average	50.3	49.7	19.0	43.5	37.5	26.5	22.0	51.5	34.8	65.2	24.6	26.4
Italy	Lega Nord												
	Fiamma Triolore	52.2	47.8	15.2	41.3	43.5	9.5	21.4	69.0	41.3	58.7	34.8	8.7
	average	48.0	52.0	24.2	43.8	32.1	9.4	22.5	68.1	24.9	75.1	22.6	21.5
Norway	Fremskrittspartiet	65.9	34.1	28.6	35.7	35.7	8.3	11.1	80.6	46.3	53.7	17.1	18.0
	average	54.9	45.1	26.7	37.9	35.3	14.8	22.9	62.3	29.3	70.7	9.2	9.4
Netherlands	Lijst Pim Fortuyn												
	Leefbar Nederland	45.8	54.2	25.9	46.4	27.7	20.2	17.8	62.0	51.8	48.2	27.1	23.4
	average	46.3	53.7	21.7	44.6	33.8	24.0	26.4	49.6	33.8	66.3	17.9	10.0
Switzerland	SVP	57.1	42.9	8.3	41.7	50.0	25.0	22.7	52.3	49.0	51.0	12.2	6.0
	average	49.6	50.4	23.9	43.0	33.2	20.9	25.5	53.6	29.0	71.0	12.0	7.3

Notes: Republikaner (Rep), Vlaams Blok (VB), Front National (FN), Dansk Folkeparti (DFP), Mouvement National (MNR), FRP (Norway).
Source: European Social Survey (2003).

This electorate of the radical right always favors a strong rejection of immigration,[4] which is considered a bearer of economic, social, cultural, and security problems. By putting the question of immigration at the core of its political agenda, the radical right offers a "scapegoat" to a number of populations worried about economic and social changes in our societies. While still fairly high, the level of xenophobia and anti-immigrant feelings is nevertheless weaker in Italy, Germany, and Switzerland. It reaches extremely high levels, however, among the radical right's electorate in Belgium, France, and Denmark. The second important issue for this sort of electorate is the feeling of insecurity.[5] Except in Germany (where the radical right's electorate is rather young), this feeling is stronger among those who vote for the radical right than among the electorate as a whole. Independent of this pair of preoccupations, which have long connected extreme right-wing voters, in certain countries (France, Germany, and, to a lesser degree, the Netherlands and Norway) a strong dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy can feed the extreme vote.[6] But in Denmark, Italy, and Switzerland, alienation related to the democratic system is rarer. We must say that, in these countries, the radical right is more or less directly associated with the system: in Denmark, the DFP supports the liberal-conservative coalition in power; in Switzerland, the SVP is associated with power; and, finally, in Italy, the Northern League was part of the government with Forza Italia and the National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale).

In contrast, wherever the radical right is removed from power, it launches a challenge to the political establishment by affirming "that in Western Europe, the political power has been usurped by a clique of professional politicians who pretend to represent and serve common citizens, but in reality only serve their own narrow interests" (Betz, 2004: 89–90). As we are going to see, this "antipolitical" sentiment is equally salient in the young democracies of central and eastern Europe.

4. The Radical Right in the New EU Member Countries: Pathetic Extremism or Catching Up with the West?

In those countries which had undergone a profound process of transformation toward democracy and capitalism prior to EU membership, the radical right has established itself as a rather visible force. This is quite contrary to the post-authoritarian countries of Greece, Spain, and Portugal which joined the EU in the first half of the 1980s and where, due to the collapse of neo-fascism, little or no signs of such parties can be seen at the national and EU level (see Perrineau and Ignazi, 2000). In most central and eastern European transformation countries, a radical right springing from populist and antidemocratic ultranationalism has emerged, and the socioeconomic and political conditions for its appearance seem rather favorable (see above and Minkenberg, 2002). However, with some notable exceptions discussed below, even under these conditions the radical right's electoral success seems limited, and it is no threat to the democratization processes in the region. As one expert on the radical right in central and eastern Europe (CEE), Cas Mudde, observes: these parties "are not really a major political force in CEE. Indeed, if compared to their 'brethren' in Western Europe, they look somewhat pathetic: (far) more extremist, but (far) less successful" (2005: 165). With EU membership in 2004 and the upcoming elections for the European Parliament, many observers expected a resurgence of the radical right in these countries, first, because of the growing significance of the issue of EU accession which seemed

to feed into nationalistic and ethnocentric sentiments and, second, because of the nature of the European elections as second-order elections, which usually benefits smaller or more radical parties. But surprisingly, the EP elections, roughly one month after these countries' accession, proved rather "normal" and in line with the trends in the old member states. Table 3 summarizes the results for the extreme-right variant of the radical right and shows that, with the exception of the League of Polish Families, none of the parties, which in some countries had played a considerable role in national politics, acquired any seats in the European Parliament. Moreover, again with the exception of the LPR in Poland, and to a much lesser extent the Slovenian extreme right, these parties declined in electoral support compared to their fate in the last national parliamentary elections.

In general, then, what we observe in these countries is a rapid decline of the extreme right to levels below those in the old member states. The extreme right in the new member states was unable to profit from the EP elections and to capitalize on anti-EU sentiments. Its failure to do so indicates a lack of willingness among voters to obstruct newly acquired EU membership. However, a few points need to be stressed when looking at these results. First, since EU membership came almost simultaneously with the elections, it would be premature to interpret the mediocre performance of the extreme right as an absence of EU-skepticism in general and as a favorable sanctioning of the EU. It remains to be seen whether in these countries the phenomenon of EU-critical ultranationalism, so familiar in a variety of the old member states, will launch a comeback. Second, there are country-specific variations in the strength and fate of the extreme right, with Poland at one end of the spectrum and the Baltic States and Malta at the other. This will be discussed in more detail below. Finally, when considering the results for the less extreme, but nonetheless EU-critical, nationalist right, the picture looks quite different. Table 4 provides a summary of these parties for all new member states, again with the results of the last parliamentary elections in which they ran and for which data were available.

When comparing the nationalist right to the extreme right, the situation seems almost the reverse. In most countries where the extreme right fared poorly (the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia), the nationalist right gained seats in the European Parliament. Moreover, in some countries their share of the vote went up from the previous national elections, although this increase should not be overinterpreted because some parties either did not run in the national elections or joined an alliance with other parties. The exceptions here are Hungary and, again, Poland. In the light of the overall results, Malta and Cyprus are the most striking exceptions because, both at the national and the EU level, neither nationalists nor the extreme right left any impression on the electoral map. Overall, the election results of the radical right in the new EU member states of central and eastern Europe seemed to follow the pattern of the western European radical right, where neo-fascists are withering away while a less extreme, postindustrial radical right establishes itself (see Perrineau and Ignazi, 2000). But such an interpretation of their "catching up" overlooks a few particularities among the new EU members, most notably Poland. Therefore, a closer look at some of these countries and the electoral role of the radical right follows.

In Hungary, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja or MIÉP) clearly continued a downward trend which had begun in the 2002 national parliamentary elections, in which it failed to re-enter the parliament in

TABLE 3. *The Extreme Right in the European Elections of 2004 and in the Last Parliamentary Elections: The 10 New EU Member States*

Country	Party	EP 2004 (%)	Group	Seats in EP	National (year) (%)	Seats national
Czech Republic	Republikani Miloslav Sladek	0.67			1.0 (2002)	–
	NS–CSNS Coalition	0.12			–	
Cyprus	Neo Orizontes (NEO)	1.65			3.0 (2001)	1
Estonia		–				
Hungary	Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (MIÉP)	2.35			4.4 (2002)	–
	Magyar Nemzeti Szoveteg	0.66			–	
Latvia		–				
Lithuania		–				
Malta	Imperium Europa	0.65				
Poland	Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR)	15.74		9	7.9 (2001)	38
	Polska Partia Narodowa (PPN)	0.04			–	
	Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski (NOP)	0.04			–	
Slovakia	Slovenska Narodna Strana–Prava				3.3 (2002)	–
	Slovenska Narodna Strana (allied in 2004)	2.01			3.7 (2002)	–
	Slovenska Ludova Strana	0.17			–	
Slovenia	Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka	5.04			4.4 (2000)	4
Total				*9*		

TABLE 4. *The Nationalist Right in the European Elections of 2004 and in the Last Parliamentary Elections: The 10 New EU Member States*

Country	Party	EP 2004 (%)	Group	Seats in EP	national (year) %	Seats national
Czech Republic	List Sdruzeni Nezavislych a Europsti Demokrate	11.02		3	2.8 (2002)	–
	List Nezavisli	8.18		2		
Cyprus	–					
Estonia	List ERL Eestimaa Rahvaalliit	8		–	13.0 (2003)	13
Hungary	–					
Latvia	List TB-LNNK	29.82		4	5.4 (2002)	7
Lithuania	List Lietuvos Lenku Rinkimu Akcijos (LLRA) and Lietuvos Ruso Sajungos Koalicija "Kartu mes jega!" (LRS) List DP Darbo Partija	5.71		–	3.8 (2004)	2
		30.18		5	28.4 (2004)	39
Malta	–					
Poland	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)	11.82		7	9.5 (2001)	44
	Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (SO)	10.09		6	10.2 (2001)	53
Slovakia	List LZ-HZDS (Hnutie Za Demokraticke Slovensko)	16.73		3	19.5 (2002)	36
	List Ludovia Unia	1.69		–	–	
Slovenia	–					
Total				*30*		

Budapest. This party, led by István Csurka, dominates the radical right spectrum in Hungary (see Bock, 2004: 280–92; Minkenberg, 2002). In 1993, it split off from the conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum or MDF), one of the major players in the 1989/90 "Velvet Revolution." The MIÉP espouses anti-Semitic and biological-nativist views, and advocates a recovery of the formerly Hungarian territory which now belongs to Romania, Ukraine, and Slovakia. It thus refuses to accept the Treaty of Trianon of 1919, which settled the current borders between Hungary and its neighboring states. Precisely for this reason, the MIÉP is much less euro-skeptic than its eastern European counterparts. Because of the national "status law" which grants special relationships between the Hungarian state and Hungarians living in neighboring countries (such as Romania) and because a large group of Hungarians living in Slovakia joined the EU as well, the MIÉP has softened its criticism of the EU to the point at which, on the eve of Hungary's accession to the EU, it issued an official statement endorsing the EU accession (Bock, 2004: 65). Although Csurka claims not to be anti-Semitic, he shares with openly anti-Jewish neo-Nazis the goal of exposing what he sees as a worldwide Judeo-liberal-cosmopolitan conspiracy including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and George Soros (see Karsai, 1999: 143). The MIÉP's downward trend began at the end of the 1990s and continued in 2004 when the party received less than 3 percent of the vote (the vote was only 0.66 percent for the more extremist Hungarian National Federation or Magyar Nemzeti Szoveteg) (see Table 3). As in 2002, the national election campaign by the major parties hurt the radical right. In 2002, the center-right Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Young Democrats or FIDESZ) took over some of the issues of the MIÉP (such as the special responsibility of the Hungarian state for Hungarians living outside Hungary in neighboring countries and the related "status law"). Moreover, the election campaign in 2004 was highly polarized between FIDESZ and the socialists. FIDESZ's top candidate, Pál Schmidt, declared the EU elections a referendum on the socialist government's work toward Hungary's EU accession, and few Hungarians seemed willing to spoil it by giving the MIÉP their vote.

The European elections proved even more devastating for the Czech extreme right, which had two party lists: the successor of the "Republicans," Sdruzení pro republiku-Republikánská strana Československa (SPR-RNC) and the NS–CSNS coalition, which consisted of a very old radical right-wing party, the Narodni Strana, and Česká Strana Narodne Socialni. The larger of the two, the "Republican List of Miroslav Sladek," received only 0.67 percent of the vote. The most important party on the radical right, it was founded in 1989 by Miroslav Sladek and is still under his leadership today. The party was modeled after the Russian Liberal-Democratic Party and the German "Republikaner," is openly xenophobic, and is the only Czech party which does not accept the secession of Slovakia. Its dreams of an "ethnically pure" greater Czechoslovakia (comprising only Slavic people) are combined with visions of a paternalistic and corporatist (that is, authoritarian) state. During the 1990s, the party had about 25,000 members, thus making it the third-largest party in the Czech Republic and, compared with the German Republikaner and Deutsche Volksunion (German People's Union or DVU), an unusually strong radical right-wing party (Brendgens, 1998: 60). Nevertheless, in the 1998 parliamentary elections, the SPR-RNC lost all its seats, and in 2002 received only 1 percent of the vote. On the other hand, two more moderate nationalist parties, the List Sdruzeni Nezavislych a Europsti Demokrate and the List

Nezavisli, received 11 percent and 8 percent, respectively. In neighboring Slovakia, the alliance of the Slovenska Narodna Strana (SNS) and the Prava Slovenska Narodna Strana (PSNS) made less of an impression in the EP elections than either of them did separately in the 2002 national elections (see Table 4). The SNS began in 1989 as a fascist party advocating violence, but turned more moderate over the years. It was the only party which in 1990 favored the separation of the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia, and in 1992 it was the only one of the extreme right-wing parties under consideration here which participated in government. After one year of supporting Meciar's government, the SNS officially entered a coalition with Meciar's Hnutie Za Demokraticke Slovensko (HZDS) and provided three ministers. The party's platform comprises populism, corporatism, and xenophobia (in particular directed against national minorities such as the Hungarians in the south and the Roma) and is both anti-EU and anti-NATO (see Bayer, 2002: 265–80; Cibulka, 1999: 126). In the late 1990s, the party suffered from various changes in its leadership and a growing conflict between its top politicians, which hampered its successes in various elections and put the party on a path of decline similar to that of its Czech counterpart. After its failure to enter parliament in 2002, the SNS formed an alliance for the European elections with the PSNS, with the SNS's Peter Sulovsky as their prime candidate, but this group received only 2 percent of the vote in June 2004. In contrast, the nationalist HZDS fared much better than the SNS, but also lost votes in comparison to the 2002 elections (see Table 4).

Trends in the Baltic States were similar to those in the Czech and Slovak cases. Nationalist parties were successful, particularly in Lithuania, where the Darbo Partija received 30 percent of the vote in 2004, similar to its showing in the same year's national elections. In neighboring Latvia, the nationalist list TB-LNNK was equally successful, with almost 30 percent of the vote and having a much better showing than in the 2002 national elections (5.4 percent). Here, the issue of the Russian minority (30 percent of the resident population) and the pressure by the EU on the Latvian governments to implement minority rights seem to have helped the nationalists, in particular the TB-LNNK, which has repeatedly obstructed improvements in the status and citizenship of the Russian minority (see Bayer, 2002; Schmidt, 2002; Van de Grift, 2002). Only in Estonia did the nationalists fare more modestly, scoring 8 percent, somewhat below their national showing in 2003 (see Table 4). To the right of these more moderate parties, several anti-Semitic and xenophobic extreme-right groups exist in the region, for example, the Estonian Independence Party (Estonian Eesti Iseseisvuspartei), the Latvian Thundercross (Perkonkrusts), and the Lithuanian Freedom Union (Lietuvos laisves sajunga), but none of them ran in the European elections (see Bayer, 2002; Huang, 2000; Kasekamp, 2003: 401–14). Pronounced anti-Russian sentiments are widespread in the region and, because they permeate even the mainstream parties, they do not help the extreme right in elections.

The big exception to these developments, however, is Poland, where there were two surprises. First, among the top four parties yielding more than 10 percent of the vote, three were right-wing radical or populist parties. After the winner, Citizens' Platform (Platforma Obywatelska or PO), a conservative party, the parties of the radical or populist right received the second, third, and fourth largest share of the vote. Second, Andrzej Lepper's fiercely anti-EU and populist Self-Defense (Samoobrona), which was second in the opinion polls preceding the elections, received only 10.8 percent of votes and took fourth place. Self-Defense

was surpassed by the more extreme and ideological LPR, a strongly anti-EU, yet ethnocentric and orthodox Catholic, party, which took second place after the PO. The third right-wing party was Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość or PiS), a nationalist law-and-order party, also with an EU-skeptic platform. All together, these three parties received 38.7 percent of the vote, an impressive result for this type of party in Europe.

It seems, then, that the radical right in Poland flourishes, despite the high volatility in the Polish party system since the end of state socialism. The election results show that Poland deviates from other new EU member states both in terms of levels of support for the radical right and the nature of the phenomenon itself – it lies between the cases of consolidated democracies and fellow EU joiners, such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, and non-consolidated regimes and non-EU countries, such as Romania and Russia. As shown elsewhere (Minkenberg, 2002), the Polish situation is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation and variation. This often leads to a restructuring of the party system and to a reorganization and renaming of individual parties.[7] To some extent, this can be attributed to a lively right-wing sector in Polish society, one which is largely understudied (see Grün and Stankiewicz, 2006). One of the most important nonparty groups of the Polish radical right since the mid-1990s has been the ultra-Catholic radio station Radio Maryja, which has attracted millions of listeners and followers with its mix of religious, antimodernist, nationalist, xenophobic, and, at times, anti-Semitic messages. Although far from being a political party, Radio Maryja nonetheless scored a significant political success in the late 1990s by finding parliamentary allies among several representatives of the Solidarność group AWS (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność or Solidarity Electoral Action) in the Polish Sejm[8] and entertaining close ties to the new LPR. The fluidity and limited success of the Polish radical right during the 1990s was attributed to the fact "that it lacked a persuasive target against which to mobilize constituents" (Ost, 2003: 88).

With the growing importance of EU accession, however, the Polish radical right seems to have found just such a persuasive target. This was suggested by the results of the most recent parliamentary election in September 2001, which combined the elements of fluidity in the party system, on the one hand, and of stability and even some growth in support for the far right, on the other. While older radical right-wing parties, such as the KPN (Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej or Confederation for an Independent Poland) and ROP (Ruch Odbudowy Polski or Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland), virtually disappeared, three new parties appeared on the far right. First, the right-wing populist Samoobrona of Andzrej Lepper gained 10.2 percent of the vote. Second, the fundamentalist LPR, which is allied to Radio Maryja and oriented toward the anti-western ideas of interwar political icon Roman Dmowski, scored 7.9 percent of the vote. Third, the nationalist, Catholic-oriented, and law-and-order PiS received 9.5 percent of votes (see Tables 3 and 4). All three mobilized their electorates around the issue of opposition to Poland's accession to the EU, although the PiS's criticism of the EU and Polish accession was rather soft, compared to that of the other two parties.

Samoobrona is a rather special case in this picture. Founded and led by Andrzej Lepper as both a political party and a farmers' lobby group in 1992, it led an obscure life until its breakthrough in the 2001 parliamentary elections. Up to the present, it has evaded easy programmatic classification, advocating a "third

way" which combines appeals to Polish nationalism, cultural traditionalism, and economic protectionism. The two organizations are truly only one, held together by Lepper's charisma and skillful leadership (see Grün, 2004). Its fierce anti-EU rhetoric turned out to be more a tactical tool than an ideological cornerstone: both Lepper's public statements on the eve of the referendum in June 2003 on Poland's EU accession and interviews with Samoobrona leaders show that the party does not oppose Polish membership of the EU, but criticizes the mode of accession. In the campaign that led to the referendum, Samoobrona decided not to persuade its followers to vote against EU accession, but instead steered a neutral course (see Klemenska, 2003: 65–72; Mudde and Kopecky, 2002).

This rather pragmatic attitude is also found in the other two Polish parties considered here. While the LPR represented EU-phobic and EU-rejectionist opinions, this image changed dramatically after the 2003 referendum. Before then, the EU was seen by LPR leaders and followers in classical, radical right-wing ways: as an effort to subordinate Poland to western and, in particular, German interests (the slogan was "Akcesja, Aneksna, Anschluss"[9]), as run by freemasons and by the USA, and too secular to accommodate Polish religious traditions and interests. Even the Pope's support of Polish accession to the EU was criticized in the ranks of the LPR as a mistake because he allegedly did not understand the EU. Only five days after the referendum, however, LPR leader Roman Giertych argued in favor of transforming the LPR's anti-EU profile into a nationalist and EU-compatible profile: "LPR for Poland *within* the EU."[10] This pragmatism is even more pronounced with PiS, which also advocated the rejection of Polish integration into the EU before the referendum, but interpreted the result of the referendum and EU membership as a "destiny" that was to be accepted once it had happened (Klemenska, 2003: 83–90).

Overall, it seems that despite a deep-seated distrust of the EU (with even some racist undertones) among the three Polish parties discussed here, opposition to Polish EU membership is not a central programmatic feature or defining element of these parties. Rather, these parties, especially Samoobrona and the LPR, used the campaign for the referendum and its outcome in order to position themselves favorably in the electoral arena and to attract new supporters. This strategy seems to have paid off in the European elections of 2004, although it proved more successful for the PiS and LPR than for Samoobrona.

5. The Radical Right and the Vote on the Treaty for the EU Constitution

In the two countries where the treaty for the EU constitution was rejected in a referendum, the radical right was next to invisible. In both France and the Netherlands, the radical right mobilized against the treaty, but the cleavage (and the narrow results) cut across the entire society and produced the usual political bedfellows. The Dutch radical right had miniscule results in the June elections (see Table 1) and, accordingly, their campaign against the treaty was hardly noticeable. In the French case, FN voters, just like PCF voters, rejected the constitution by more than 90 percent, thus mirroring the U-shaped distribution of the political spectrum vis-a-vis the process of European integration, with the extreme right and left at the poles having the highest level of rejection (see Minkenberg, 2000b; Perrineau, 2005). Between the Maastricht referendum in 1992 and the vote on the constitution in 2005, rejection grew mostly in regions where

the FN has not had traditional strongholds – with the notable exception of Alsace (see Perrineau, 2005: Table 1). On the other hand, the evolution of the vote for Le Pen in presidential elections from 1995 to 2002 corresponds in quite a number of departments with the evolution of the rejection of European integration, for example, in the South and the North East. One can argue that the consolidation of the FN electorate outside its traditional strongholds also resulted in a growing EU-skepticism and that the FN succeeded in mobilizing part of the "no vote" in 2005. On the other hand, the profound level of nationalization of the EU issue in the 2005 referendum by all parties outweighs the specific effort by the FN.

In some of the new member states, such as Poland, EU-skeptics on the far right, such as Samoobrona and the LPR, are in the process of adjusting to a changing political climate after the Polish EU referendum in 2003 and membership in 2004. Today, support for Polish EU membership is rather high and membership is also seen as a benefit among those who, prior to EU accession, had been targeted by the radical right's anti-EU rhetoric (see above). At present, Samoobrona, LPR, and PiS steer an ambiguous course. On the one hand, they have, especially after the EU referendum in 2003, toned down their criticism of the EU and become more pragmatic than principled in their position on the EU. On the other hand, all three belong to the fiercest opponents of the EU constitution in the Polish party system. So far, however, their opposition has not proven effective. In a recent opinion poll on this issue in February 2005, 64 percent of Poles supported ratification of the EU constitution and only 7 percent opposed it – opposition having fallen from 21 percent in July 2004 and 11 percent in November 2004 (Klotzle, 2005).

In general, the radical right in various EU countries may contribute to growing EU-skepticism among voters, but they hardly benefit from it.

6. Conclusion

In the EU of 25, the radical right has not gained significant strength. Just prior to the enlargement, the European Parliament included 19 deputies of the radical right (making up 3 percent of the 626 deputies). The deputies of the radical right (whether they are from the extreme right or the nationalist right) were incapable of uniting at the Strasbourg Parliament; the various parties failed to find common ground and to come together just as their predecessors had failed in the parliament in 1994 and 1999. It was only in 1984 and 1989 that Jean-Marie Le Pen succeeded in creating a partial union of radical right parties. In 1984, he integrated the French Front National, the Greek EPEN (Ethniki Politiki Enosis or National Political Union), the Italian MSI, and the Ulster Unionist Party in a "group of European rights," then in 1989 he formed a new group by expelling the Italian MSI, and associating the FN with the German Republikaner and the Vlaams Blok. The divergent nationalistic agendas (characteristic of the radical right) make it very difficult, if not impossible, for a unified nationalist and euro-skeptic pole to emerge in the European Parliament. The anti-EU groups (the Union for a Europe of Nations [UEN] and Independence/Democracy, which succeeded the Europe of Democrats and Differences) attract a good part of this pole. Certain parties in the East had already joined these two main anti-EU groups as observers before the June 2004 elections. As for the specifically extreme-right movement, nine parties of this persuasion produced at least one winning candidate. This group

represents a total of 28 deputies from six countries, with the League of Polish Families (9 seats) and the Front National (7 seats) being the largest participants. In practice, these numbers satisfied the European Parliament's rule that a group may form if it has at least 16 deputies from at least five different countries. Some of these parties, however, are in alliance with anti-EU groups (the DFP with the UEN and the LPR and the Northern League with Independence/Democracy); others, such as the FPÖ, had never wanted to return to a group directed by Le Pen and some newer groups did not want to collaborate with Jean-Marie Le Pen upon their arrival as observers in the European Parliament (the LPR and Samoobrona). Overall, there is nothing more difficult to establish than an "international group of nationalists."

As has been argued above, this radical right feeds on growing complexities at different levels: the economic and social crises and ensuing differentiation of society, the pluralization of cultures and lifestyles, and sentiments of anxiety raised by EU integration and by globalization, to which may be added widespread anti-establishment feelings. Our analysis of the 2004 European elections shows that, in western European EU member states, the proletarianization of the radical right's electorate continues into the new millennium, as does the focus on immigration and security issues. Hence, the social and ideological profile of the "crusaders for a closed society" (Perrineau, 2001a) underlines the stability of the new "postmodern" cleavage in western societies. In central and eastern Europe, multiple modernization processes have opened up new opportunities for the radical right, but the closure of the regime-change cleavage by 2000 (the most salient cleavage in these countries in the first decade after 1989) has limited the outright anti-system appeal of radical right actors in a majority of the new EU member states. Moreover, unlike in the West, the immigration issue has not (yet) emerged as a new rallying point for the radical right, and the cleavage patterns are rather unstable and undefined. What remained in the East was a widespread anti-establishment and anti-EU sentiment which, however, benefited the less extreme parties, not least because EU accession occurred shortly before the EU elections. But with a few exceptions, electoral support for the radical right in the new central and eastern European member states of the European Union follows the pattern of the western European radical right, where fascists, old and new, are retreating while a less extreme, postmodern radical right establishes itself. The EU-wide cleavage of integrationists versus euro-skeptics which exists in both the West and East merges with national cleavages of closure versus openness, hence reinforcing the political camp of closed nationalism in individual countries. But, as has been shown, this merger does not automatically lead to a larger electoral fallout for the radical right – it may only result in more cohesiveness in the radical-right camp.

On a European scale, the radical right is not able to integrate itself into a powerful group capable of passing from global discontent to an articulated discourse that can weigh on the course of European construction. In other words, the radical right is still unable to achieve its goals: to re-establish full and entire national sovereignty, to reclaim possession of national currencies, to repeal the right to vote for nationals of other EU countries, or even to be finished with the notion of European citizenship. Once again, this political family is limited to the role of a spoiler, without ever achieving the ability to represent a veritable alternative for the people of Europe. Moreover, compared to the EU elections, the campaigns,

parliamentary votes, and referenda on the EU constitution in member states provide little or no opportunities for the radical right. Clearly, the new European order can help in understanding the divergent trajectories of the radical right by opening up new opportunities and bringing back old issues of relations with neighboring countries. But EU membership is not the only issue involved. Rather, larger issues of national identity, the strength of nationalist traditions, and some particular features may supersede narrow foreign policy concerns and explain the variations in the electoral success achieved by the radical right.

Notes

1. This is very close to the definition of the extreme right given by Pierre Milza (2002: 20): "The accent is on the system of values (or of counter-values) of the extreme right, on its long-term project of transforming the social order, on its aspiration to see a strong power establish itself, on its fundamental opposition to the founding principles of liberal democracy, on its attitude of exclusion regarding foreigners and enemies of the state."
2. The category of populism is hard to define and rather controversial, since many experts see it as a matter of style rather than substance, embodying a protest rather than a programmatic quality. Here, it will be used for those parties of the radical right which exhibit internal authoritarian structures built around some charismatic leader and which are hard to pin down programmatically beyond their populist rhetoric, except for some vision of exclusionary politics. See, for example, Hans-Georg Betz (2003: 74–93), who recently has reconceptualized his previous catch-all category of radical right-wing populism into "radical right" with two variants: exclusionary populism and fascism. For authoritarian populism, see also Mudde and Kopecky (2002: 297–325).
3. This postelection investigation was conducted by IFOP for the Center for Political Research at Sciences Po (CEVIPOF), the Center for Information on Sociopolitical Data (Centre d'Informatisation des Données Socio-Politiques or CIDSP), and the Center for the Study and Knowledge of Opinion (Centre d'Etudes et de Connaissances de l'Opinion or CECOP) between June 14 and June 19, 2004, using a nationwide sampling of the French population aged 18 or more and registered on electoral lists.
4. Such strong xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiments are measured by responses to a group of five questions which touch upon different dimensions of immigration. They are designed to indicate whether respondents think immigration is good or bad for the national economy, impoverishes or enriches the national culture, increases criminality or not, is good or bad for employment, and whether immigrants use more tax revenue (and social services) than they contribute. These five questions correlate strongly with each other (Cronbach alpha of 0.7), and hence can be used to construct an anti-immigration index. For the index and its construction, see Rouban (2005).
5. This feeling of insecurity is measured here by the following question: "Do you feel safe walking alone in your neighborhood at night?" The available responses are "very safe," "safe," "a little safe," and "not at all safe." The strong feeling of insecurity comprises the last two response choices.
6. Dissatisfaction with democracy is measured according to the responses given to the following question: "Are you satisfied with the way democracy functions in your country?" Responses took the form of a 10-level scale, with level 1 corresponding to "extremely unsatisfied" and level 10 to "extremely satisfied." Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4 define what we call here "strong dissatisfaction" with democracy.
7. For a detailed, but very descriptive, overview of all post-1989 national, nationalist, and right-wing radical parties, see Grott (1994: 13–34); Kalina (2000); Prazmowska (2000: 198–214); Strzykala (2004).
8. Letter to the author (Michael Minkenberg) from Dr Karol Kostrzebski, Institute of Political Science, Warsaw University, June 12, 2000.

9. "Accession, Annexation, Anschluss" is a play on words with Austria's *Anschluss* to Nazi Germany in 1938, as suggested by LPR representative Andrzej Chranowski in the journal *Nasz Dziennik*, June 5, 2003.
10. Stated by Roman Giertych in an interview with *Gazeta Wyborcza*, June 13, 2003 (emphasis added). See Klemenska (2003: 57–8).

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