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Abstract. Recent findings by Inglehart and Welzel indicate that emancipative mass attitudes show a significantly positive effect on subsequent democracy, controlling for previous democracy and a number of socio-structural and socioeconomic factors. However, on an important theoretical point these prior findings remain inconclusive: the causal mechanism of why and how emancipative mass attitudes favor democracy. This article specifies such a mechanism, arguing that emancipative attitudes motivate mass actions that demonstrate people's willingness to struggle for democratic achievements, be it to establish democracy when it is denied or to defend it when it is challenged. Based on World Values Surveys rounds two to four, the empirical analyses strongly confirm these hypotheses, supporting what has recently been introduced as an "emancipative theory of democracy."

Keywords: • Democratization • Mass attitudes • Mass action • Political culture

Introduction

The idea that mass attitudes affect a society's chances to attain and sustain democracy is the central premise of an entire school of thought in political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1966). Despite the centrality of this premise, studies testing directly whether variation in mass attitudes affects variation in democracy across nations are surprisingly rare (Inglehart, 1997: Ch. 6; Muller and Seligson, 1994; Seligson, 2002; Welzel et al., 2003). The most comprehensive study on this topic has been presented by Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 254–71). Their major finding is that, among a number of supposedly pro-democratic attitudes, a syndrome of "self-expression values" is most conducive to democracy. This syndrome combines attitudes that share an emancipative thrust in pursuing the

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freedom of ordinary people, involving an emphasis on people power, tolerance of nonconforming people, and trust in people.

The finding that a combination of emancipative attitudes affects democracy more than other factors could be seen as a central insight in democratization research. But in light of recent criticism by Teorell and Hadenius (2006), there is sufficient doubt to justify a further investigation of this claim. I see four starting points for such an investigation.

First, the evidence is based on only one out of several available indicators of democracy. It is thus possible that emancipative mass attitudes do not show a significant impact on democracy when a broader measure of democracy is used. Second, when testing the effect of emancipative mass attitudes against the influence of socioeconomic factors, Inglehart and Welzel do not use a broad modernization indicator such as the 10-item index introduced by Teorell and Hadenius (2006). Hence, emancipative mass attitudes might not show a significant effect on democracy when an encompassing measure of modernization is included. Testing these two possibilities touches upon the validity of an important claim.

The third point is of a theoretical nature. Inglehart and Welzel do not differentiate between the attainment and the sustainment of democracy as two distinct ways through which mass attitudes can be conducive to democracy. Thus, even if the pro-democratic effect of emancipative mass attitudes turns out to be valid, the nature of this effect remains dubious. Is it an attainment effect in that emancipative mass attitudes help to achieve democracy or is it a sustainment effect such that these attitudes help to preserve democracy? Is it both? Since the distinction between the attainment and the sustainment of democracy is central in democratization research (Doorenspleet, 2004; Shin, 1994), the existing evidence is inconclusive on a crucial point: the type of causality involved. Fourth, little has been done to specify the mechanism by which mass attitudes help to attain or sustain democracy. This is another relevant point relating to the theoretical plausibility of the empirical findings.

This article addresses these four problems. In particular, I test the validity of Inglehart and Welzel's analyses using broader measures of both democracy (the dependent variable) and modernization (a control variable). More importantly, I examine the theoretical nature of the pro-democratic effect of emancipative mass attitudes, examining whether these attitudes help to attain democracy or to sustain democracy, or both. Addressing the plausibility question, I outline at the beginning why and how mass attitudes might affect democracy, elaborating on the role of attitude-driven mass actions. This mechanism is tested in Section 4.

Theory

Why and How Mass Attitudes Should Affect Democracy

Implicitly, most scholars interested in the relation between mass attitudes and democracy assume that when pro-democratic attitudes are more widespread in a society, this society is more likely to attain and to sustain high levels of democracy. I can think of two scenarios in which this assumption is plausible.

First, consider two populations that both have little or no democracy, but differ greatly in the proportion of people who hold pro-democratic attitudes. Logically, the population with more widespread pro-democratic attitudes will lend broader support to activists and reformers who struggle to achieve more democracy. Activists

and reformers of this kind are also more likely to emerge from a population in which pro-democratic attitudes are more widespread. In addition, where pro-democratic activists and reformers can rely on broader mass support, they have greater power to succeed in their efforts to achieve more democracy. Thus, where there is little or no democracy, pro-democratic mass attitudes should operate as a support factor that helps to attain democracy.

Second, consider two populations that have high levels of democracy, but differ again in the proportion of the population that holds pro-democratic attitudes. Of these two societies, that with more widespread pro-democratic attitudes will lend less support to groups with antidemocratic goals. Weakened because of lacking support, such groups will find it difficult to challenge the regime seriously, making the survival of democracy more likely. Thus, in cases where there is a high level of democracy, pro-democratic attitudes should operate as a support factor helping to sustain democracy.

Either way, pro-democratic mass attitudes should be conducive to democracy because they increase public support for pro-democratic forces and distract support from antidemocratic forces. Mass support is a central element in the power balance between political forces. The emergence and survival of democracy depends critically on the power balance between antidemocratic and pro-democratic forces. More widespread pro-democratic attitudes shift this balance in favor of pro-democratic forces and thus make it more likely that these forces will win over antidemocratic forces, be it to attain democracy or to sustain it.

To be sure, pro-democratic mass attitudes become an effective support factor only to the extent to which they motivate powerful mass actions that demonstrate people's willingness to struggle for democratic goals. Still, mass actions that distinctively support pro-democratic goals are unlikely to emerge unless pro-democratic attitudes are widespread in the first place. Logically, pro-democratic mass *actions* should be more likely to emerge and to diffuse when pro-democratic *attitudes* are widespread. Of course, the forms of mass action in which widespread support for democracy manifests itself are variable, depending on concrete circumstances. What I suppose, however, is that widespread support for democracy manifests itself in at least some form of mass activity that is conducive to democracy.

In summary, I hypothesize that pro-democratic mass attitudes make pro-democratic mass actions more likely and that these mass actions help shift the power balance toward pro-democratic forces. Eventually, this makes it more likely for these forces to succeed, be it to attain democracy when it is denied or to sustain it when it is challenged.

Three Types of Mass Attitudes

The next question is which attitudes motivate people the most to support pro-democratic forces, be they social movements, reform groups among elites, or individual actors. In the political culture literature, one finds a number of attitudes to which authors attribute such motivational effects. I propose to group these attitudes into three major types.

To begin with, a widely shared assumption in the political culture school holds that in order to be motivated to support pro-democratic forces people must have a clear regime preference for democracy (Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Chanley et al., 2000; Diamond, 2003; Klingemann, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Seligson, 2002; Shin and Wells, 2005). Thus, many scholars believe that widespread regime

preferences for democracy constitute the support factor with the strongest pro-democratic regime effect.

Other scholars underline the importance of communal attitudes (Newton, 2001; Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2001). Communal attitudes tie people to each other and to their society at large. They provide social capital, helping people to join forces and build social movements. From this point of view, widespread communal attitudes are necessary to allow people to translate democratic preferences into active support for democratic goals.

Finally, in what we called an "emancipative theory of democracy," Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 299) have described democracy as an essentially emancipative achievement because it is designed to empower people. As a consequence, emancipative attitudes that emphasize people power should give people the most solid motivation to support democratic goals.

Summing up, three different types of attitude are considered relevant in activating the masses to support democratic forces, both to attain democracy when it is denied and to sustain it when it is challenged. First, widespread regime preferences for democracy are assumed to activate people to support democratic forces because people only support democracy when they actually prefer it. Second, widespread communal attitudes are expected to activate people in support of democratic forces because in order to become active as a group or a movement people need the social capital inherent in communal attitudes. Third, widespread emancipative attitudes are likely to activate people in favor of democracy because people are not willing to stand up for democracy unless they value the idea of people empowerment implicit in the concept of democracy. Which of these types of mass attitude has the most consistent attainment and sustainment effect on democracy is shown in the analysis section.

Data and Plan of the Analyses

Measures of Mass Attitudes

I measure attitudes using the World Values Surveys (WVS), which provide data for some 70 societies.[1] I use data from the earliest available surveys of the second to fourth WVS rounds,[2] covering the period from 1989 to 1999, with most of the data taken from the early 1990s (the mean year of measurement is 1993). Using these data I measure mass tendencies in individual attitudes. Only mass tendencies in individual attitudes can affect democracy, for democracy is a mass phenomenon by definition. I measure the mass tendencies of each attitude by calculating the national percentages of people holding the attitude in question. Percentage measures indicate the social radius that an attitude has in a society. The general assumption is that the more widespread an attitude is in a society, the stronger is its pro-democratic regime effect.[3]

Democratic Regime Preferences

In measuring people's preferences for a democratic system it is standard to ask them how good an idea it is "to have a democratic system" and how strongly they agree with the statement that "democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government." I measure the national percentages of

people expressing strong agreement with these statements. But insofar as explicit preferences for democracy are not expressed in conjunction with a rejection of authoritarian rule they are meaningless. For this reason, scholars interpret a public's preferences for a democratic system in connection with its rejection of authoritarian systems (Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Klingemann, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Shin and Wells, 2005). I include two items asking for people's response to the ideas of "having the army rule" and "having strong leaders who do not have to bother with parliaments and elections." I measure the national percentages of people expressing a strong rejection of these statements.[4]

Communal Attitudes

Following standard practice I measure the social radius of communal attitudes by the percentage of a population that is tied to the associations and institutions of its society, the percentage that adheres to norms of solidarity, and the percentage that trusts its fellow citizens (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Norris, 2002: Ch. 8; Rose-Ackerman, 2001). I differentiate ties to associations by measuring the national percentages of people reporting membership of any of three types of "sociotropic" association (charity, environmental, and cultural associations) and of any of three types of "utilitarian" association (professional associations, labor unions, and political parties). With respect to confidence in institutions, I measure national percentages of people expressing at least "quite a lot of confidence" in each of three types of "state" institution (army, police, and civil service) and in each of three types of "political" institution (government, parliament, and political parties). I measure adherence to norms of solidarity by the percentage of people expressing a strong rejection of each of the three following forms of non-solidary behavior: "accepting a bribe in the course of one's duties," "claiming government benefits for which one is not entitled," and "cheating on taxes." Insofar as people's trust in their fellow citizens is concerned, I measure the national percentage of people saying that "most people can be trusted."

Emancipative Attitudes

Inglehart and Welzel (2005) characterize a syndrome of "self-expression values" as an emancipative orientation because its components overlap in a common focus on human empowerment, pursuing an ideal of entitled, active, to-be-tolerated, and to-be-trusted people. The components overlapping in this emphasis on human empowerment include: (1) an emphasis on people power measured by priorities for people's self-governance (rank-ordered priorities for "giving people more say in important government decisions," "giving people more say in how things are done at their jobs and in their communities," and "protecting freedom of speech"); (2) taking part in civic mass actions, including petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes; (3) tolerance of nonconforming people measured by the acceptance of homosexuality; and (4) trust in people. For each of these attitudes, I calculate the percentage of people holding the respective attitude in a population.

To understand the emancipative focus intersecting these components, each component must be interpreted in conjunction with the others. By itself, taking part in civic mass actions might not be considered as reflecting an emancipative

attitude. It might actually not be considered an attitude at all, but a behavior. Yet, insofar as this behavior occurs in conjunction with an emphasis on people power, tolerance of nonconforming people, and trust in people, it is a behavioral manifestation of an emancipative attitude. The same argument applies to trust in people. By itself, trusting other people does not necessarily mean that one is inspired by an emancipative attitude that favors human empowerment. But to the extent to which trusting people occurs in conjunction with tolerating nonconforming people, taking part in mass actions, and emphasizing people power, it does constitute an emancipative attitude.

Apparently, trust in people has a contested status. On the one hand, it is seen as a communal attitude indicating a sense of reciprocity with other members of one's community. On the other hand, trust in people is seen as an emancipative attitude indicating a general belief in the reasonability of ordinary people. According to the latter view, trust in people is supposed to share with other emancipative attitudes what Lasswell (1951: 502) called a "fundamental belief in human potentialities." For Lasswell, this belief is the basis of what he saw as a "democratic character," that is, a character which integrates an emphasis on one's own freedom with respect for other people's freedom. Plausibly, one would hardly entrust people with freedom unless one trusts people in general. Indeed, it is conventional wisdom in the psychological literature that liberal, participatory, tolerant, and trustful attitudes go together in an "open belief system" (Rokeach, 1960; Schwartz, 1992). As this belief system emphasizes people's autonomy, liberty, and self-governance, it constitutes a fundamentally emancipative orientation.

There are reasons to consider trust as a communal attitude, an emancipative attitude, or as a bridging attitude that links both these types of attitude. Plausible reasons can be outlined for any of these possibilities, so what is true cannot be decided on mere theoretical grounds. In the end, it is an empirical question whether trust in people occurs in conjunction with emancipative attitudes or with communal attitudes, or both. The best tool to answer this question on empirical grounds is a dimensional analysis of the attitudes in question.

The factor analysis in Table 1 reveals a three-dimensional space confirming the previous typology. Support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian rule go together in a common dimension of democratic regime preferences. Confidence in state institutions, ties to "sociotropic" associations, and norms of solidarity go together in a dimension of communal attitudes. Emphasis on people power, participation in mass actions, and toleration of nonconforming people cluster in a dimension of emancipative attitudes. Trust in people, too, loads on this dimension. In fact, it loads only on the emancipative dimension; it does not even show minor loading on the communal dimension. In light of this finding, trust in people is neither a communal attitude nor a bridging attitude that links communal and emancipative attitudes. It is just an emancipative attitude. This finding is confirmed when conducting a factor analysis of the same attitudes at the individual level (as shown in Internet Appendix Table 1).[5] Consequently, I include trust in people with other emancipative attitudes in an overall measure of a society's emancipative orientation. This is done using the factor loadings in Table 1 in a weighted combination to extract the overlapping variation of the components. In the same way, I create summary indices for the other two dimensions, yielding measures of a society's overall democratic regime preference as well as its overall communal orientation.[6]

TABLE 1. *Dimensional Structure of Mass Attitudes*

	Dimensions		
	Democratic Regime Preferences	Communal Attitudes	Emancipative Attitudes
Support Idea of Democracy	.90		
Support Democratic System	.88		
Reject Strong Leader	.81		
Reject Army Rule	.58		.53
Trust State Institutions		.77	
Tied to Sociotropic Associations		.71	
Support Solidary Behavior		.67	
Emphasize People Power			.83
Partake in Mass Actions			.79
Tolerate Non-Conforms			.78
Trust People			.69
Explained Variance	16.2%	24.8%	27.3%

Notes: Principal Components Analysis with varimax rotation. Extraction of factors with Eigenvalues greater 1. Kaiyser-Meyer-Olkin measure is .70. Loadings smaller .40 not displayed. Listwise deletion (N=64 national populations). See Appendix-Table 1 in the Internet Appendix at http://www.jacobs-university.de/schools/shss/cwelzel for the same analysis at the individual level. Variable descriptions available in the Internet Appendix under "Variable List."

Measures of Democracy

Levels of democracy, the dependent variable, are measured after mass attitudes, that is, over the period 2000–04. This allows one to analyze democracy in longitudinal regressions with temporally ordered variables. I use indices measuring the absence or presence of democracy in degrees. This approach is based on the assumption that the elements defining democracy can be in place in combinations of differing completeness, covering various grades between the complete absence and presence of democracy.

A classical approach defines democracy by constitutional constraints on state power and by popular controls over state power. An index using information on power limitations and popular controls is the Polity IV index (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000), which yields a scale from –10 (pure autocracy) to +10 (perfect democracy). I label this index "limits and control of power." Another approach defines democracy by "free" popular elections to fill positions of power. For this definition, Vanhanen's (2003) index of electoral democracy is used. It combines measures of the "inclusiveness" and the "competitiveness" of national elections. This measure is labeled "electoral inclusion and competitiveness." A third perspective defines democracy by the rights it grants citizens. Two indices employ this definition. Cingranelli and Booth (2004) use information on human rights practices to assess what they call "physical integrity rights" (on a scale from zero to eight) and "empowerment rights" (on a scale from zero to ten). These indices are combined to measure "integrity and empowerment rights." Likewise, Freedom House (2005) ranks countries in terms of "civil liberties" and "political

rights" (both measured on a scale of one to seven). Again, a combined measure of "civil and political freedom" is used.

These indices measure democracy from different definitional perspectives. Yet one suspects that these are just facets of one underlying concept, democracy, the components of which might have one thing in common: they all tap an aspect of people empowerment. This is indeed the case. The factor analysis in Internet Appendix Table 2 shows that "limits and control of power," "electoral inclusion and competition," "integrity and empowerment," as well as "civil and political freedom" all represent just one underlying dimension, that is, democracy (with factor loadings of .89, .90, .90, and .96, respectively). This justifies summarizing these four indices into a factor-weighed combination that extracts their overlap to indicate a society's "summary democracy level." The resulting index is measured on a scale ranging from 0 percent (the complete absence of democracy) to 100 percent (the full presence of democracy).[7] This summary measure is more reliable than each of its components because it averages out the measurement errors specific to any single indicator. For this reason, the following analyses will focus on this broad measure of democracy.[8]

Plan of the Analyses

Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) most important finding is that emancipative mass attitudes impact more positively on subsequent levels of democracy than do other mass attitudes and more positively than do socioeconomic factors. My first step is to test whether this finding holds up when one uses the broad measure of democracy described above as the dependent variable and when one includes the broad modernization index introduced by Teorell and Hadenius as a control variable. Next, the nature of the alleged pro-democratic effect of emancipative mass attitudes will be examined, testing if this is an attainment effect, a sustainment effect, or both. Finally, I investigate why and how these attitudes might affect democracy, testing if this is the case because they motivate mass actions with a pro-democratic impetus.

Analyses

Attitudinal Effects on Democracy

The two diagrams in Figure 1 show T-ratios from separate regressions in which each mass attitude is entered as a predictor of subsequent democracy. Democracy as the dependent variable is consistently measured after its predictors, that is, after pro-democratic mass attitudes. This is crucial for a causal interpretation, as causes have to precede their effects. Yet, a proper temporal ordering of independent and dependent variables does not preclude that pro-democratic mass attitudes are endogenous to democracy, which they would be if it were the previous existence of democracy that makes such attitudes more widespread. For a causal interpretation, it is crucial to take this possibility into account and to eliminate endogeneity from the model to the extent such endogeneity actually exists. This is done by examining a given effect on subsequent democracy under the control of previous democracy. Doing so reduces a given effect on subsequent democracy on the part that is unaffected by previous democracy, partialing out reverse causality. This reduced effect then shows a mass attitude's truly exogenous

effect on subsequent democracy because this is the effect that remains after eliminating endogeneity.

To control for previous democracy, I use exactly the same measure of democracy, but now calculate it for the period 1984–88. This lagged version of the dependent variable is introduced as a control predictor into the various regressions. As this control is meant to partial out the effect of previous democracy on mass attitudes, previous democracy is measured over the period preceding the mass attitudes. Furthermore, because I measured the level of democracy subsequent to the mass attitudes over a five-year time span (that is, 2000–04), I do the same with the level of democracy prior to the mass attitudes. This temporal choice makes sense in light of what Doorenspleet (2000) characterized as the global "explosion" of democracy. Levels of democracy during 1984–88 are located before this "explosion" and levels of democracy during 2000–04 are located afterward (Welzel, 2006: 878).



Diagram 1.1 Notes: Each mass attitude entered into a separate OLS regression predicting *subsequent* democracy: version 1 (*light* gray bars) *before* controlling *prior* democracy: version 2 (*dark* gray bars) After controlling *prior* democracy. Number of nations (N) varying between 62 and 68.

(FIGURE 1 continued)



Diagram1.2 Notes: Emancipative orientation entered with each mass attitude into a separate OLS regression predicting *subsequent* democracy (*all* regressions under control of *prior* democracy: *light* gray bars show partial effect of emancipative orientation, dark gray bars show partial effect of the other mass attitude entered into the same regression. Number of nations (N) varying between 66 and 69.

FIGURE 1. *Pro-Democratic Effects of Various Mass Attitudes*

Diagram 1.1 in Figure 1 displays regression results for each mass attitude separately. The summary measures for each of the three groups of mass attitudes are shown in italics. The light-gray bars show the T-ratio of a mass attitude's democratic effect before controlling for previous democracy; the darker bars show the same attitude's effect after controlling for previous democracy, depicting the truly exogenous effect. The vertical bars represent the significance thresholds, with the lower boundary at T-ratios around –2 and +2 indicating the more lenient 5 percent level of significance and the upper boundary at around –3 and +3 indicating the more rigid 1 percent level.[9]

It is obvious from the T-ratios in Diagram 1.1 that a mass attitude's democratic effect is almost always considerably lower after controlling for previous democracy than before doing so. This tells us that pro-democratic attitudes depend partially on previous democracy and that for many of these attitudes this partial dependence is so large that when one controls for it, no more significant effect on

subsequent democracy is left. At least this is true when the 1 percent level of significance is taken as the reference line. Under this standard, most of the allegedly pro-democratic mass attitudes do not show a truly exogenous effect on subsequent democracy.

Looking separately at regime-preferential attitudes, only mass rejection of army rule survives the endogeneity test, showing a highly significant effect on subsequent democracy even after controlling for previous democracy. Directly positive statements for democracy itself clearly fail this test. Minus their dependence on previous democracy they have no exogenous effect on subsequent democracy. Merely outspoken preferences for democracy appear to be rather inconsequential.

Regarding communal attitudes, the first surprise is that these attitudes show predominantly *negative* effects on subsequent democracy, whether one controls for previous democracy or not. This means that more widespread communal attitudes favor lower, not higher, levels of democracy. Admittedly, in the case of people's ties to voluntary associations these negative effects are entirely insignificant, implying that more widespread ties to voluntary associations have neither antidemocratic nor pro-democratic effects. In the case of trust in institutions, however, the antidemocratic effect exceeds the 5 percent significance level, again after controlling for prior democracy. In the case of people's support for solidary behavior as well as in the case of people's overall communal orientation, the antidemocratic effects even pass the 1 percent significance hurdle.

Does the antidemocratic effect in the case of solidarity norms make sense? Remember that solidarity norms are measured inversely based on mass rejection of such non-solidary behavior as accepting bribes. Now, if many people strongly reject non-solidary behavior, this may mean that such behavior is so widespread in a society that people reject it for exactly this reason. If this is so, more widespread rejection of non-solidary behavior in fact indicates a more widespread violation of solidarity norms, not a more widespread practice of such norms. In this case, an antidemocratic effect is to be expected because lack of solidarity norms should prevent people from cooperating in pursuit of democratic achievements.

How about the antidemocratic effect of confidence in institutions? This effect makes sense if confidence in institutions involves a considerable portion of blind confidence, revealing a lack of criticality. In this case, more widespread confidence indicates a larger proportion of uncritical citizens. Societies with more uncritical citizens in turn should exert less democratizing mass pressure. Seen in this light, the antidemocratic effect of confidence in institutions makes sense.

All the components of emancipative attitudes show positive effects on subsequent democracy. Controlling for previous democracy, these effects remain significant at the 5 percent significance level in all cases. Furthermore, in all cases, except for trust in people, they remain significant even at the 1 percent level. Among these components, the highest loading (that is, emphasis on people power) represents most clearly the emancipative focus on people empowerment. Accordingly, it shows the strongest exogenous effect on subsequent democracy. The weakest component of emancipative attitudes (that is, trust in people) shows the weakest exogenous effect: after controlling for previous democracy, it passes the 5 percent significance level, but not the 1 percent level. Still, the overall indicator of emancipative attitudes has a stronger exogenous effect on subsequent democracy than each of its components.[10]

From the results in Diagram 1.1 of Figure 1 one would conclude that emancipative mass attitudes constitute the single most important type of attitude for

democracy. Diagram 1.2 strongly confirms this conclusion. It shows partial effects when pairing emancipative mass attitudes with each of the other mass attitudes in a separate regression. All partial effects are controlled for previous democracy so as to identify truly exogenous effects on subsequent democracy. Evidently, emancipative mass attitudes show a highly significant and positive exogenous effect on subsequent democracy, regardless with which other mass attitude they are paired. In all regressions, emancipative mass attitudes show by far the largest T-ratio, implying that these mass attitudes contribute most to the explained variance in subsequent democracy. Vice versa, paired with emancipative mass attitudes, no other mass attitude shows an effect that passes the 1 percent significance level. Even the 5 percent significance level is only passed by mass rejection of army rule, mass support for solidary behavior, and a population's communal orientation. In the case of the latter two attitudes, these effects remain negative, indicating antidemocratic rather than pro-democratic consequences. At any rate, emancipative mass attitudes constitute the type of attitude with by far the most profound pro-democratic effect. This result validates previous findings using a more encompassing and reliable democracy measure.[11] This outcome demands further investigation on the effect of emancipative mass attitudes.

Attitudinal and Non-Attitudinal Effects on Democracy

Most of the democratization literature neglects mass attitudes. In contrast, socio-economic and socio-structural factors loom large in the leading approaches toward democratization research, including modernization theory, world system theory, resource distribution theory, resource curse theory, and cultural fragmentation theory. Accordingly, variables indicating economic prosperity, world market position, resource dispersion, dependence on oil, and ethnic fractionalization have a long test record in democracy studies and have been repeatedly found to be among the best predictors of a society's level of democracy.[12]

The neglect of mass attitudes was understandable as long as the absence of survey data made it impossible to include mass attitudes in multi-country studies. But there is no substantive reason to ignore mass attitudes now that sufficient data are available. Indeed, focusing on mass attitudes permits us to link contemporary study with past insights. Consider, for instance, Lipset's original treatment of the modernization argument. When Lipset (1959: 84–5) explained why socioeconomic modernization favors democracy, he reasoned that this is so because modernization nurtures more libertarian, egalitarian, and participatory attitudes and by doing so makes democracy a more valuable goal in most people's eyes. Similar notions of the intervening role of mass attitudes can be found in the work of Dahl (1973: 124), Huntington (1991: 69), and other leading thinkers on democracy. Indeed, these notions are inherently plausible. Even if one admits that democracy is ultimately attained and sustained through pro-democratic actions, these actions must be motivated in some way by pro-democratic attitudes. Thus, objective socioeconomic and socio-structural factors should favor democracy largely because they nurture subjective orientations that make people willing to struggle for democracy, be it to attain democracy or to sustain it. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005) maintain, emancipative attitudes constitute the orientation that makes people most strongly willing to struggle for democracy.

If this is true, one should find that any objective factor's impact on democracy is greatly diminished once we control for a population's emancipative orientation.

The regressions displayed in Figure 2 test this assumption using those structural factors that have most often been found to exert a strong influence on democracy. These indicators include a society's economic prosperity measured by World Bank figures for per capita GDP, a society's world market position measured by World Bank figures for the per capita return on exports, the dispersion of socioeconomic resources as measured by Vanhanen's (1997) index of resource distribution, "asset specificity" as operationalized by Boix (2003) to indicate an economy's dependence on the yield of "fixed" assets (namely, land and oil), and a society's cultural fragmentation as measured by Alesina and Devleeschauwer's (2002) ethnic fractionalization index.[13] Measures of these indicators are taken from the first half of the 1990s to make them contemporaneous with our measure of emancipative attitudes, permitting us to compare indicators on an equal footing.



FIGURE 2. *Pro-Democratic Effects of Structural Societal Properties and Emancipative Attitudes*

Notes: OLS regressions predicting *subsequent* democracy: *dotted* bars show the effect of a structural societal characteristic *before* controlling emancipative orientations; *dark* gray bars show the effect of the same characteristic *after* controlling emancipative orientations *EO*; *light* gray bars show the partial effect of emancipative orientations. *All* effects under control of *prior* democracy. Number of nations (N) varying between 66 and 69.

In addition, I use a summary modernization index introduced by Teorell and Hadenius (2006) and covering a number of development measures that all constitute a single dimension, including indicators of urbanization, education, industrialization, communication, and longevity among others.[14] This collective indicator is included to test Teorell and Hadenius's claim that a broad enough measure of modernization renders emancipative mass attitudes insignificant while itself remaining unaffected by the inclusion of these attitudes.

All effects shown in Figure 2 are obtained while controlling for previous democracy so as to partial out endogeneity. Figure 2 arranges regression results in such a way that one sees each structural factor's effect on subsequent democracy before the inclusion of emancipative mass attitudes (dotted bars) and after their inclusion (darker bars). In addition, one sees the partial effect of emancipative mass attitudes (light-gray bars) when the respective structural factor and previous democracy are controlled for. As is obvious, all structural factors, except asset specificity, show a significant exogenous effect on subsequent democracy. Yet in all cases, this effect is reduced after including emancipative mass attitudes. In most cases, this reduction is massive, so massive indeed that it renders the respective structural factor entirely insignificant.

The only exception to this pattern is the broad modernization index. It continues to show a highly significant exogenous effect on subsequent democracy even after including emancipative mass attitudes. But also in the case of the modernization index, the effect loses much of its size when emancipative mass attitudes enter the picture. This finding disconfirms Teorell and Hadenius's assertion that the democratic effect of modernization remains unaffected by the inclusion of emancipative mass attitudes. Also, these authors' claim that, independent of modernization, emancipative mass attitudes show no effect of their own on subsequent democracy is disconfirmed. Emancipative mass attitudes do show as significant and strong an effect on democracy as the broad modernization index.[15]

The crucial point, however, is not whether modernization outperforms emancipative mass attitudes or whether these attitudes outperform modernization in what is anyway a close statistical horse race. What matters is that under mutual control both factors seriously reduce the other's effect. This reflects the fact that modernization and emancipative mass attitudes share a considerable proportion of common variance ($r = .79$ for 69 countries). This shared variance is not too large to identify the separate effects of both factors. But the overlap is large enough that once it is partialed out, the separate effects appear to be largely reduced even though they remain significant. This is nothing less than an empirical confirmation of the argument that modernization impacts on democracy largely insofar as it generates emancipative mass attitudes or, vice versa, that emancipative mass attitudes affect democracy largely insofar as they are nurtured by modernization.

A partitioning of the explained variance in democracy clarifies this point. Controlling for modernization, emancipative mass attitudes explain 16 percent of the variation in subsequent democracy while, controlling for emancipative attitudes, modernization explains another 15 percent of the variance. But the overlap connecting both factors explains still another 42 percent of the variance in subsequent democracy.[16] Thus, both modernization and emancipative mass attitudes show significant independent effects on subsequent democracy, yet the major effect emanates from their inseparable overlap.[17]

All this makes sense when one assumes that modernization increases people's economic, intellectual, and communicative resources and by doing so makes them more capable of struggling for democratic goals, whereas emancipative attitudes make people more willing to struggle for these goals. Thus, the strongest pro-democratic effect should be present when people are both capable and willing to struggle for democratic goals, which they are when the level of modernization is advanced and when emancipative attitudes are widespread. Confirming this assumption, the overlap between modernization and emancipative mass attitudes explains more variance in subsequent democracy than do these two factors taken separately. Still, both separate parts show a significant pro-democratic effect as well. On the one hand, this means that under equally widespread emancipative attitudes, a more advanced level of modernization favors a higher level of democracy. This is plausible because a public's willingness to struggle for democracy will translate into more effective mass pressures when people have more resources to make their will felt. On the other hand, given the same level of modernization, more widespread emancipative attitudes favor a higher level of democracy because given resources are used with greater determination when people are more willing to struggle for democratic goals.

These findings underline the relevance of emancipative mass attitudes for democracy. Apparently, these attitudes operate both as a separate force in favoring democracy and as a force through which modernization favors democracy. Hence, the nature of this favorable effect deserves further investigation.

The Nature of the Attitudinal Effect on Democracy

The previous findings point to the conclusion that emancipative attitudes are conducive to high levels of democracy. But how exactly are these attitudes conducive to high levels of democracy? There are three alternatives: more widespread emancipative attitudes help sustain democracy in more democratic societies or they help to attain democracy in less democratic societies or they do both.

To test these possibilities, I created two variables based on the summary democracy measure used so far. First, I calculated for each society the absolute value of its loss in democracy from the pre-survey period (1984–88) to the post-survey period (2000–04). The loss ranges from zero in the case of no decline to a maximum of +100 in the case of a society declining from the 100 percent democracy level to the zero level.[18] I analyzed democratic losses to see if more widespread emancipative attitudes help to sustain democracy in more democratic societies. For this to hold true, emancipative attitudes must show a negative effect on democratic losses among societies on an initially rather high level of democracy.

Analogously, I calculated the absolute value of a society's gain in democracy. The gain, too, ranged from zero in the case of no increase to a maximum of +100 in a case in which a society has climbed from the zero level to the 100 percent democracy level. I analyzed democratic gains to test if more widespread emancipative attitudes help to attain democracy in less democratic societies. To confirm this possibility, emancipative attitudes must show a positive effect on democratic gains among societies on an initially rather low level of democracy.

In analyzing democratic losses and gains, one must take into account that societies have greatly varying loss and gain potentials, depending on their starting levels of democracy. A society with a 20 percent level of democracy can only lose

20 percentage points, while a society at the 80 percent level can lose fully 80 percentage points. What a society can lose constitutes its loss potential and this is exactly equal to its initial democracy level. A society's gain potential, too, depends on its initial democracy level, though inversely: it is the difference between 100 and the initial democracy level. For instance, a society at the 60 percent level can gain another 40 percentage points to reach the 100 percent level. Actual losses and gains can only be influenced within the limits of a society's possible losses and gains. Hence, loss and gain effects must be considered under control of possible losses and gains. Otherwise, they are not comparable.

Since large democratic losses are only possible in initially rather democratic societies, I limited the analysis of losses to societies above an initial democracy level of 50 percent. Yet even these initially more democratic societies vary considerably in their loss potentials, namely, from something above 50 to fully 100 percentage points. This must be taken into account. For an absolute loss of 30 percentage points in a society with a loss potential of 60 percentage points is as sizeable as an absolute loss of 50 percentage points in a society with a loss potential of 100 percentage points. In both cases, a society would have lost half of what it could lose. To take variation in loss potentials into account, I included the loss potential as a control predictor among the explanatory variables. Doing so, one considers loss effects under constant loss potentials.

The same logic applies to democratic gains. They can only be large in initially less democratic societies, so I limited the analysis of democratic gains to societies below an initial democracy level of 50 percent. But since even these less democratic societies vary considerably in their possible gains, I included the gain potential as a control predictor among the explanatory variables, making gain effects comparable across societies with varying gain potentials.

As Table 2 shows, more widespread emancipative attitudes have a significantly negative effect on democratic losses among societies that have more to lose than to gain. This effect remains significant even controlling for modernization.[19] Obviously, emancipative mass attitudes help to sustain democracy in more democratic societies. At the same time, more widespread emancipative attitudes have a significantly positive effect on democratic gains in societies that have more to gain than to lose. Again, this effect holds even controlling for modernization. Accordingly, emancipative mass attitudes help to attain democracy in less democratic societies. Thus, a major puzzle is solved: a public's emancipative attitudes contribute both to sustaining and to attaining high levels of democracy.

The effect of emancipative attitudes has been analyzed separately for democratic losses and gains. This was necessary to check if these attitudes help both to sustain and to attain high levels of democracy or if only one of these two possibilities holds true. Because we have seen that both possibilities hold true, we can now summarize the two pro-democratic effects, attainment and sustainment, in just one model covering all societies at once.

To accomplish this end, I summarize losses and gains in a single variable measuring changing democracy levels in either direction. This variable ranges from a minimum of –100 (for societies that fall from the 100 percent level of democracy to the zero level) to a maximum of +100 (for societies that climb from the zero level to the 100 percent level). The midpoint of the change scale is zero, for societies whose level of democracy does not change. The two pro-democratic events (sustaining democracy and attaining democracy) both shift the change

TABLE 2. *The Effect of Emancipative Mass Attitudes on Losses and Gains in Democracy*

Predictors	Dependent Variable: *Loss* in Democracy Level (from 1984–88 to 2000–04), cases with loss potential greater 50 included[a]				Dependent Variable: *Gain* in Democracy Level (from 1984–88 to 2000–04), cases with gain potential greater 50 included[b]			
	Model 1–1	Model 1–2	Model 1–3	Model 1–4	Model 2–1	Model 2–2	Model 2–3	Model 2–4
Loss Potential 1984–88	–.23*	–.14	–.02	–.03	–	–	–	–
	(–2.11)	(–.99)	(–.13)	(–.18)	–	–	–	–
Gain Potential 1984–88	–	–	–	–	.93***	.75***	1.03***	.89***
	–	–	–	–	(3.4)	(3.71)	(5.27)	(4.91)
Modernization Index ca. 1993	–	–.09	–	.02	–	.83***	–	.49***
	–	(–.91)	–	(.21)	–	(5.81)	–	(3.16)
Emancipative Orientation ca. 1993	–	–	–.17**	–.18*	–	–	1.21***	.79***
	–	–	(–2.27)	(–2.01)	–	–	(6.14)	(3.54)
Constant	23.40*	22.89*	15.37	15.05	–45.33	–67.64***	–78.59***	–80.24***
	(2.48)	(2.41)	(1.64)	(9.73)	(–1.92)	(–3.81)	(–4.44)	(–5.05)
Adjusted R^2	.12	.12	.25	.22	.21	.58	.60	.68
N	26					40		

Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (b's) with T-ratios in parentheses. All variables standardized to vary between 0 and 100.Variable descriptions available in the Internet Appendix under "Variable List" at http://www.jacobs-university.de/schools/shss/cwelzel. [a]Cases included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Finland, France, Great Britain, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela. [b]Cases included: Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Croatia, Czech Rep., Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe.

Significance levels: * p<.10; ** p<.05; ***p<.005

score toward the positive. Sustaining democracy does this because it minimizes democratic losses, which involves a move from larger to smaller negative changes (from a minimum of –100 to a maximum of zero). Attaining democracy shifts the change score into the positive, because it maximizes democratic gains, which involves a move from smaller to larger positive changes (from a minimum of zero to a maximum of +100). Thus, sustaining and attaining democracy operate in different spheres of the change scale, but they still operate in the same direction: both influence things to the advantage of democracy. Hence, we can summarize the general pro-democratic tendency of both effects in just one model.

Changes in levels of democracy can only be influenced within the limits of the given potential for change. The change potential is defined as the balance between the gain and loss potentials. The change potential grows more positive, up to a maximum of +100, the more the gain potential exceeds the loss potential; it grows more negative, down to a minimum of –100, the more the loss potential exceeds the gain potential.[20] To make changes in democracy levels comparable across societies with greatly varying potentials for change, the analysis includes the change potential as an additional predictor of actual change. No society has to be excluded from this model on the grounds of a too small potential for change, for each society can change greatly in at least one direction: if it has little to lose, it has much to gain (a positive change potential); if it has little to gain, it has much to lose (a negative change potential). Covering the full set of countries gives us one degree of freedom more to include another control predictor besides the broad modernization index. I decided to include ethnic fractionalization as a noneconomic structural factor looming large in the literature.

According to the models shown in Table 3, emancipative mass attitudes show a highly significant and strongly positive effect on changes in democracy levels,

TABLE 3. *Explaining Changes in Levels of Democracy*

	Dependent Variable: *Change* in Democracy Levels (from 1984–88 to 2000–04)				
Predictors:	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Change Potential 1984–88	.25***	.28***	.41***	.50***	.50***
	(7.27)	(7.84)	(12.05)	(11.09)	(12.10)
Ethnic Fractionalization 1990s		–.26*			–.07
		(–2.33)			(–.77)
Modernization Index ca. 1993			.76***		.45***
			(7.17)		(3.27)
Emancipative Orientation ca. 1993				.88***	.52***
				(6.78)	(3.37)
Constant	15.86***	24.99***	–30.51***	–19.78***	–30.32***
	(6.01)	(5.39)	(–4.51)	(–3.51)	(–3.62)
Adjusted R^2	.44	.48	.68	.67	.73
N	66	65	66	66	65

Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (b's) with T-ratios in parentheses. Variable descriptions available in the Internet-Appendix under "Variable List" at http://www.jacobs-university.de/schools/shss/cwelzel.

Significance levels: * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .005

even controlling for the change potential, modernization, and ethnic fractionalization (see Model 5). To be sure, pairing emancipative mass attitudes with modernization reduces considerably the sole effect of emancipative mass attitudes shown in Model 4. Conversely, however, the sole effect of modernization shown in Model 3 is reduced even more when emancipative mass attitudes are included. Again, this tells us that the pro-democratic effect of emancipative mass attitudes is not fully independent of modernization. To a considerable extent, this effect exists insofar as modernization tends to nurture emancipative mass attitudes. By the same token, modernization has a pro-democratic effect largely because it helps to make emancipative attitudes more widespread.[21]

How does the emphasis of these findings on mass-level factors relate to the claim of elite theories that the autonomous choices of elites determine which level of democracy is attained and sustained in societies? It is undisputed that the level of democracy attained and sustained in a society is ultimately a choice made by elites. The extent to which these choices are autonomous from mass-level factors is debatable, however. Figure 3 gives some clarification of this question. It illustrates that emancipative mass attitudes channel changes in democracy levels from otherwise unexpected losses at the lower left-hand corner to otherwise



FIGURE 3. *The Effect of Emancipative Attitudes on Changes in Democracy Levels (Controlling for Change Potential)*

unexpected gains at the upper right-hand corner. This channeling effect demarcates a corridor, the width of which can be interpreted as the degree of freedom left to elites in changing a society's level of democracy, irrespective of the masses' emancipative attitudes. It is obvious that this degree of freedom is considerable, otherwise societies would have been distributed on a straight line. But it is also clear that elite choices of how to change democracy levels are bound within a limited interval that is significantly shaped by emancipative mass attitudes. These mass attitudes alone explain 42 percent of the subsequent changes in democracy levels. Elite choices are considerably constrained by mass-level factors.

The Causal Mechanism: The Role of Mass Actions

Addressing the mechanism by which emancipative mass attitudes operate in favor of democracy, I argued that these attitudes motivate people to mass actions that aim at attaining democracy in less democratic societies and at sustaining it in more democratic societies. Thus, the effect of emancipative attitudes on democracy should operate via these orientations' tendency to guide mass actions toward democratic achievements. Indirectly, this is evidenced by the fact that emancipative attitudes overlap with such mass actions as petitions, demonstrations, and boycotts, so that part of the democratic effect of these attitudes is carried by their manifestation in mass actions. But how much of the democratic effect of emancipative attitudes is due to the mass action part?

To answer this question, the path analysis in Figure 4 splits the variance in mass actions into one part that is tied to emancipative attitudes and another part that is detached from them. To do this, I first partial out mass actions from the syndrome of emancipative attitudes, preserving the syndrome in a reduced form that excludes mass actions. Then I split the variance in mass actions into one part that is predicted by the now reduced syndrome of emancipative attitudes and another part that is unpredicted by this syndrome. I interpret the unpredicted part as mass actions lacking an emancipative impetus. Likewise, I interpret the predicted part as mass actions having an emancipative impetus.[22] Because emancipative attitudes emphasize people power and because people power is what democracy is about, mass actions with an emancipative impetus should be aiming at democratic achievements. By the same token, mass actions without such an impetus might or might not be aiming at democratic achievements. Accordingly, I expect mass actions with an emancipative impetus to have a more highly significant and more strongly positive influence on subsequent democracy than mass actions without an emancipative impetus.

This is exactly what the path analysis shows: an increase in emancipative mass actions by 10 percentage points leads on average to an increase in democracy of 8.3 percentage points (significant at the .000 level), while an increase of 10 percentage points in non-emancipative mass actions leads on average to an increase of only 2.3 percentage points in democracy (significant at the .05 level). Thus, the relevance of mass actions to attaining and sustaining democracy does not so much lie in these actions as such, but in their motivational nature. It is not any kind of mass action, but mass actions motivated by emancipative orientations, that matter.[23]

The path analysis reveals several additional insights. Modernization[24] and democracy prior to mass actions have no significant effect of their own on democracy following these actions. They impact on subsequent democracy only indirectly, insofar as they contribute to generating mass actions, especially emancipative



FIGURE 4. *Path Diagram Summarizing the Causal Story*

Notes:
Variables:

- Modernization Index: Data from Teorell and Hadenius (2006) summarizing ten indicators of modernization. For 55 nations the measure is from 1988, for another 11 nations measures taken from 1991 (the first available data after national independence). Scale standardized to range from 0 to 100.
- Previous Democracy: Summary level of democracy over 1984–88 (scale standarized to range from 0 to 100).
- Emancipative Mass Actions: part of mass actions predicted by reduced version of emancipative attitudes (scale ranges from 0 to 100).
- Non-Emancipative Mass Actions: part of mass actions predicted by reduced version of emancipative attitudes (0 –100 scale).
- Subsequent Democracy: Summary level of democracy over 2000–04 (0–100 scale).

Entries, Number of cases:

Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients calculated with AMOS. Number of observations is N = 66 nations.

Model Fit:

Explained variance in subsequent democracy is 71%, in emancipative mass action 68%, and in non-emancipative mass actions 7%. General Fitness Index (GFI) of the entire model is .94.

mass actions. Finally, previous democracy does have a significant and positive influence on emancipative mass actions, yet these actions are neither solely nor dominantly shaped by previous democracy. Instead, they are more strongly influenced by modernization. This has two implications. First, the absence of democracy is no guarantee people will not engage in emancipative mass actions. In fact, emancipative mass actions can emerge in the absence of democracy when modernization raises living standards as well as education and information levels and by way of doing this makes people materially and intellectually autonomous enough to let them question uncontrolled authority, adopting a more emancipative world view that motivates actions for people power. Second, this finding helps us understand why modernization has been found in so many studies to impact strongly on democracy. It does so because it nurtures mass actions motivated by emancipative attitudes.

TABLE 4. *Multi-Level Model Analyzing Societal-level Variations in the Individual-level Effect of Emancipative Attitudes on Participation in Mass Actions*

	Dependent Variable: Participation in Mass Actions[a]			
Effects	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
– General Intercept (constant)	17.40***	–7.10***	–5.45***	–3.96***
	(27.67)	(–18.18)	(–6.79)	(–4.07)
Individual-level Effect (general slope):				
– Emancipative Orientation (reduced)[b]		.57***	.56***	.49***
		(59.90)	(61.02)	(12.39)
Societal-level Effects (intercept variation):				
– Level of Democracy[c]			–.02	–.04*
			(–1.29)	(–2.28)
– Modernization Level[d]			–.00	.01
			(–.00)	(.101)
Cross-level Interactions (slope variation):				
– Democracy * Emancipative Orientation				.01
				(1.63)
– Modernization * Emancipat. Orientation				–.00
				(–.23)
Unexplained Level-1 Variance	357.27	263.44	260.40	260.40
(% error reduction)				(27%)
Unexplained Level-2 Variance, intercepts		14.30	15.81	15.62
(% error reduction)				(0%)
Unexplained Level-2 Variance, slopes			.011	.011
(% error reduction)				(0%)

Notes: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with T-ratios in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<.05; **p<.01; *** p<.001.

Calculations with HLM 6.01.

Level-1 units (individuals) are 164,028 respondents from WVS I-IV. Level-2 units are 150 national samples.Variables (descriptions available in the Internet Appendix at http://www.jacobs-university.de/schools/shss/cwelzel):

a Scale indicating if respondent might or has taken part in a petition, boycott, demonstration, strike and occupation (scale has 25 grades between 0 and 5 with each "might do" adding .15 scale points and each "have done" adding 1.0 scale points). Resulting scale standardized to vary between 0 and 100.

b Individual-level emancipative orientations covering (individual-level factor loadings on common dimension in brackets): emphasis on people power (.75), tolerance of nonconformists (.77), and trust in people (.43). The individual-level factor loadings have been used to extract the overlap of these variables. Scale standardized to vary between 0 and 100.

c Combined and inversely coded Freedom House civil liberties and political rights scores averaged with Polity IV autocracy-democracy scores. Resulting scale standardized to vary between 0 and 100. For national samples from WVS I scores taken from 1980, for WVS II from 1989 for WVS III from 1994 and for WVS IV from 1998.

d Per capita GDP at constant US$ in 2000: for national samples from WVS I GDP figures from 1980 are used; for samples from WVS II figures from 1990, for WVS III from 1995, and for WVS IV from 2000.

To make sure that these results do not reflect an "ecological fallacy," Table 4 employs a multilevel model, testing whether there is a general individual-level effect of emancipative attitudes on mass actions. The interesting point is to what extent this effect is universal or varies with societal-level characteristics, namely, democracy and modernization.[25] From Models 2–4 in Table 4 one can see that people's emancipative attitudes influence their participation in mass actions in a strongly positive and highly significant way. The size of the coefficient (.49 in Model 4) tells us that on average an individual scores half as high on mass actions as he or she scores on emancipative attitudes. Thus, on average, emancipative attitudes can be said to take an individual halfway to participation in mass actions. Model 4 also tells us that there is no significant contextual variation of this effect. People's tendency to be active in proportion to their emancipative thinking does not vary consistently with a given society's level of democracy and modernization. Neither a more advanced level of modernization nor a higher level of democracy let people's emancipative attitudes translate more easily into mass actions. This underlines the relevance of emancipative attitudes. Once they are in place, they do translate into mass actions, irrespective of a society's level of modernization and democracy.

In summary, these findings confirm the emphasis that the recent literature places on the relevance of mass actions for the attainment and sustainment of democracy. But what I have found also goes beyond this literature, showing that it is not mass actions as such, but mass actions motivated by emancipative attitudes, that matter.

Conclusion

Emancipative orientations constitute a syndrome of attitudes that overlap in an emphasis on people empowerment. Confirming Inglehart and Welzel's previous results on a broader basis of measurement, I find that emancipative mass attitudes show a significant effect on levels of democracy measured subsequently, controlling for democracy measured previously. On a theoretically central point I go beyond our earlier work by specifying the nature of the pro-democratic effect of emancipative attitudes, showing that this effect is of a twofold nature: emancipative mass attitudes help both to sustain democracy in more democratic societies and to attain democracy in less democratic societies. Addressing the mechanism by which emancipative attitudes do this, the evidence suggests that these attitudes motivate mass actions aiming at democratic achievements.

As in every analysis, this analysis is conclusive within certain limits, two of which are noteworthy. First, the analysis focuses on "inner-societal" forces of democratization. This is a limitation because "inner-societal" forces can become effective only if external regime alliances do not block them. Just before the period of investigation two antidemocratic regime alliances had been dissolved: the USA gave up its support of right-wing authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Asia, while the Soviet Union abandoned its military guarantee of communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe. Only after this had happened, could emancipative mass attitudes become a major force for democratization in hitherto undemocratic societies. Without the existence of this force, however, the change of regime alliances alone could not have instigated a major democratic trend.

Second, emancipative orientations can operate as a force to attain democracy only in democratization cases of the "societal-led" type. This has been the dominant type of democratization in recent decades. But it is not the only type, as there also exists "externally induced" democratization. This type applies to postwar democracies such as Germany, Italy, and Japan after World War II. In the future, Afghanistan and Iraq might also fall into the category of externally induced democratization following wars (which is, however, in no way evident at present). Still, even in the externally induced type of democratization, emancipative attitudes become relevant: the extent to which these attitudes take hold in the population is a major factor of democratic consolidation. Thus, where emancipative attitudes do not operate as an attainment factor, they become relevant as a sustainment factor. In one or the other way, they are relevant to democracy, confirming the "emancipative theory of democracy" proposed by Inglehart and Welzel.

Notes

1. See Table 3 for the composition of the sample.
2. For information on the questionnaire, fieldwork, and datasets visit http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org. The Internet Appendix at http://www.jacobs-university.de/schools/shss/cwelzel describes which country measures are taken from which round of the World Values Surveys.
3. To determine the social radius of an attitude, I calculated national percentages of people holding this attitude. If one does this with an attitude measured on a multi-point scale, one has to define a cutoff point on which the percentage calculus is based. In such cases, I have also calculated national averages as a way to aggregate data, testing if this alters the results of the following analyses. In none of the analyses was this the case.
4. A detailed description of all variables is to be found under "Variable List" in the Internet Appendix at http://www.jacobs-university.de/schools/shss/cwelzel.
5. The Internet Appendix at http://www.jacobs-university.de/schools/shss/cwelzel contains a number of additional analyses, including robustness tests and various alternative model specifications.
6. Teorell and Hadenius (2006: 106) question whether emancipative attitudes constitute a coherent syndrome because their components are not strongly correlated among individuals *within* populations. This finding is not new (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 231–44). It merely shows that individuals scoring higher in one component (say, A) than the given population mean do not necessarily score higher in another component (say, B) than the given population mean. This finding misses the crucial point that populations having a high average score in A also have a high average score in B. The A and B scores of concrete individuals might appear inconsistently low and high as measured against the average of their *own* population. But measured against *other* populations they are most likely to be consistently high or consistently low. Thus, the syndrome character of emancipative attitudes is manifest at the level of entire populations, which is the level that matters when one studies democracy because democracy is an attribute of populations, not individuals. Internet Appendix Table 1 demonstrates the coherence of the emancipative attitudes syndrome at the individual level when the variation between populations is taken into account.
7. Another measure of democracy, the World Bank's "voice and accountability" index, is partly based on attitudinal data, which makes it unsuited to the analyzing of attitudinal effects on democracy.
8. Yet another measure of democracy is the index of "effective democracy" introduced by Welzel et al. (2003). This index devalues democracy measures from Freedom House to the extent that corruption (measured by the World Bank's "control of corruption

index") undermines democratic procedures. Using this index, all the results of the following analyses appear in still greater clarity, further underlining the importance of emancipative mass attitudes. Because of the unresolved dispute about the usefulness of measuring effective democracy (Teorell and Hadenius, 2006; Welzel and Inglehart, 2006), this index is not included in the analyses here. Results are, however, available under "Models with Effective Democracy" in the Internet Appendix at http://www.jacobs-university.de/schools/shss/cwelzel.

9. To be precise, for degrees of freedom between 64 and 69, the 5 percent significance level is passed at a T-ratio of 2.00, while the 1 percent significance level is passed at a T-ratio of 2.65.
10. Internet Appendix Table 2 documents the regression results displayed in Diagram 1.1. Internet Appendix Tables 3–6 document these results separately for each of the four democracy indicators included in the summary democracy measure. As is obvious, the results are very similar for each indicator of democracy.
11. Internet Appendix Table 7 documents the regression results displayed in Diagram 1.2. Internet Appendix Tables 8–11 document these results separately for each of the four democracy indicators included in the summary democracy measure. The results are very similar for each indicator of democracy.
12. The most recent studies in this tradition include Boix (2003), Doorenspleet (2004), and Vanhanen (2003).
13. Detailed descriptions of these variables are to be found under "Variable List" in the Internet Appendix at http://www.jacobs-university.de/schools/shss/cwelzel. It should be noted that I have investigated a great number of alternative indicators discussed in the literature. Instead of per capita GDP, I have used logged versions of per capita GDP and the Human Development Index. Instead of the per capita value of exports, I have used figures for trade openness and foreign direct investment. Instead of Vanhanen's index of resource distribution, I used Gini coefficients. Instead of Boix's measure of asset specificity, I used the percentage of fuel exports per traded exports. Instead of the ethnic fractionalization index, I used religious and linguistic fractionalization indices. Also, I have employed measures of the size of the working class, regional democratic diffusion, and the proportion of Muslims in a given population. None of these structural factors proved to have a more significant effect on subsequent democracy than emancipative mass attitudes. Moreover, against none of these factors did these attitudes themselves become insignificant. The Internet Appendix documents these findings.
14. I am very grateful to Jan Teorell, who generously put his dataset at my disposal. For replication purposes, the analysis in Figure 2 uses exactly the same version of the modernization index as Teorell and Hadenius (2006: 106), even though the temporal scope of this measure (which covers the time span from 1985 to 1995) is not of the appropriate specificity. Ideally, it should be centered on some time around 1993. A temporally specific measure of this sort will be used in subsequent models.
15. Teorell and Hadenius (2006: 106) claim that modernization has a fully significant and emancipative mass attitudes have an entirely insignificant effect on subsequent democracy based on a model that uses only one measure of democracy (Freedom House) measured in only one particular year (2002), and also controlling for previous democracy in only one particular year (1990). But the significance statistics of this model do not so straightforwardly disfavor emancipative mass attitudes as Teorell and Hadenius suggest. Replicating their model shows that the significance statistic is in fact a very close call: the modernization index only just passes the 10 percent significance level (at $p = .09$), while emancipative mass attitudes only just fail ($p = .11$). One can imagine that such a close result is highly sensitive to even slight changes in model specification. Indeed, with a more representative model that employs (1) a broader measure of democracy and (2) a measure of democracy that does not focus on just one particular year, I find emancipative mass attitudes to have as significant an effect on subsequent democracy as has the broad modernization index.

16. These results refer to the regression model depicted by the upper three bars in Figure 2. Internet Appendix Table 13 documents the variance partitioning of this model.
17. I can confirm that collinearity measures for this model are within acceptable limits. Variance inflation factors, for instance, are less than 5.0.
18. The Internet Appendix Table 14 displays these data.
19. Here I include a measure of the modernization index centered at a point in time around 1993. This is the appropriate temporal specification to make the modernization index contemporaneous with the measure of emancipative mass attitudes.
20. The change potential is a perfect inverse of the initial democracy level.
21. A series of robustness tests of Model 5 (Table 3) can be found in the Internet Appendix at http://www.jacobs-university.de/schools/shss/cwelzel under "Robustness Tests." All of these tests confirm the robustness of Model 5.
22. For the calculation of these two variables, see "Variable List" in the Internet Appendix at http://www.jacobs-university.de/schools/shss/cwelzel.
23. A similar result is obtained in a two-stage, least-squares regression when one uses emancipative mass attitudes as an instrument for mass actions.
24. I again employ Teorell and Hadenius's broad modernization index, but use a temporal specification located before the measure of emancipative mass attitudes. To do so, I use measures of the modernization index from 1988 whenever available (which applies to 55 nations) or from 1991 (the first available measure for another 11 nations, all of which gained independence only after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia).
25. Because the multilevel analyses cover data from the first round of the World Values Surveys in 1981–83 and because Teorell and Hadenius's broad modernization index is not available for this time, I use per capita GDP figures as a proxy for modernization. This is justified insofar as Teorell and Hadenius document per capita GDP as the strongest loading component in their modernization index.

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