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Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously

ANDREJ TUSICISNY

ABSTRACT. This article analyzes political and social values held by people in security communities (regions in which large-scale use of violence is very unlikely). Inhabitants of four security communities (in Europe, North America, South America, and South-East Asia) are generally more tolerant to out-groups than the rest of the world's population. In addition, comprehensive security communities (that is zones where not only interstate war, but also civil war, has become unthinkable) are characterized by higher interpersonal trust. The hypothesized effect of democracy, economic liberalism, and social participation was not confirmed. Going back to Deutsch's conceptualization of the security community, the article challenges assumptions frequent in the constructivist literature.

Keywords: • Security community • Liberal values • Public opinion • Interpersonal trust • World values survey

Introduction

The promising concept of security communities, introduced by Deutsch et al. (1957), successfully re-emerged in the mainstream of the international relations literature after the end of the Cold War. A considerable effort has been made in order to redefine the theoretical framework (for example, see Adler and Barnett, 1998a) and the number of case studies has been expanding in recent years.[1] However, most analyses do nothing more than map how interstate war, as a viable foreign policy alternative, did or did not disappear from the discourse in a given region. Focusing on elites, they do not take the general public into account. Quantitative studies are virtually absent in this area of research.

Attempting to overcome the limits of the usual approach, this article broadens the definition of the security community beyond its present meaning of an area without interstate war. Building upon Deutsch's original concept, it also turns attention to common values held by societies. First, I am interested in whether

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the development of security communities is also reflected in people's support for political and social values. Second, the article identifies the societal conditions differentiating interstate security communities (zones without interstate war) from areas where the use of large-scale violence became unthinkable not only between, but also within, states. The main aim is to examine whether the values ascribed to security communities by scholars are really supported by those communities.

Security Communities in Theory

Basic Concepts and Classifications

The concept of the security community was created by Deutsch et al. (1957: 3) "as a contribution to the study of possible ways in which men some day might abolish war." Their seminal work defined a security community as "a group of people" integrated by a "sense of community," that is, "a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change'" (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5). Peaceful change was in turn defined as "the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force" (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5).

Deutsch et al. (1957) also distinguished between two basic types of security community. An amalgamated security community (such as the USA) emerges when two or more previously independent political units form one larger unit with one common government. A pluralistic security community (such as the USA with Canada) consists of formally independent states.

Deutsch and his colleagues called for an extensive research program in order to clarify the conditions of security community formation and how these conditions "might be extended over larger and larger areas of the globe" (Deutsch et al., 1957: 4). But the theory remained more or less dormant until its resurrection after the end of the Cold War, when it was summoned by students of constructivism. The research program was redefined, accordingly, and a new framework for study was proposed.

Since regional integration has not led to a formal unification of sovereign states, as early postwar federalists often hoped, contemporary researchers deal almost exclusively with pluralistic and not amalgamated security communities. Pluralistic security communities have proved themselves to be astonishingly vigorous. The European example in particular has inspired many (less successful or ambitious) imitators throughout the globe. Moreover, as Deutsch et al. (1957: 29) observed, "pluralistic security-communities turned out to be somewhat easier to attain and easier to preserve than their amalgamated counterparts." For these reasons, I focus on existing pluralistic security communities, although some of the results might be applicable to amalgamated security communities as well.

Adler and Barnett (1998b) described three phases of security community development: security communities can be empirically identified as nascent, ascendant, and mature, and the mature ones can be categorized as either loosely or tightly coupled. In a nascent security community, one observes "the minimal definitional properties and no more: a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change" (Adler and Barnett, 1998b: 30). A mature security community includes a "mutual aid" aspect and "a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional, centralized ... government; that is, it is something of a post-sovereign system, endowed with common supranational, transnational, and national institutions and some form of a collective security system" (Adler and Barnett, 1998b: 30).

However, the constructivist reconceptualization went much deeper than merely describing these three stages in the development of security communities. Now a security community has "shared identities, values, and meanings" (Adler and Barnett, 1998b: 31). It is a "socially constructed," "imagined," or "cognitive" region, whose borders may or may not coincide with traditional geographical borders (Bellamy, 2004). Australia, as a remote member of a wider "Western security community," has been used as an example (Adler and Barnett, 1998b: 33). The term "imagined community," raised by Anderson (1990), means that even though members of a community can hardly meet most of the other members, they still retain the mental image of their communion. A more traditional example of an imagined community is a nation-state, whose size generally prevents citizens from knowing each other in person. For this type of community, common identities and values are essential because ties between members cannot be based on face-to-face interactions.

In addition, Deutsch's meaning of "peaceful change" was more narrowly specified. According to Adler and Barnett (1998b: 34), this concept excludes not only "expectations," but also "preparation for organized violence." At the same time, however, the whole theory was somewhat distorted: now it focuses on interstate relations and the (non-)use of organized violence "as a means to settle interstate disputes." The depth of the change is only rarely acknowledged. For example, Waever (1998) argued that Deutsch himself dealt with "non-war" communities and was predominantly interested in states' behavior.

Deutsch's concern about interstate war becomes more than understandable if we consider the historical context of his research program. It was conducted a few years after the disastrous World War II and interstate conflicts generally overshadowed civil wars both in frequency and magnitude. Nevertheless, Deutsch's conceptualization goes far beyond his experience. Security communities are formed around the expectation that "social problems" can and must be resolved "without resort to large-scale physical force." If large-scale violence is still seen as a possible means of regime change, national liberation, or oppression of political opponents, such a region simply does not meet the criteria of a security community, regardless of the likelihood of interstate war.

Instead of taking the extreme positions that domestic instability precludes successful formation of security communities in general (Nathan, 2004) or that the theory is limited to interstate peace (Adler and Barnett, 1998a), I decided to analyze both the interstate and intrastate aspects of security communities. Therefore, I adopted Väyrynen's (2000) differentiation between comprehensive security communities, defined in Deutsch's broad terms of "peaceful change," and interstate security communities, referring to those regions where interstate war has become unthinkable while organized large-scale violence is still perceived as a possible (though not necessarily legitimate) means of solving social conflicts within the state.

Role of Values and Trust

Deutsch et al. (1957) developed an extensive list of conditions that were essential for a successful amalgamation of the historical security communities examined. But only two prerequisites seemed to be relevant in the case of pluralistic security communities. The first one is “the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 66). This responsiveness should be assured particularly by “established political habits” and political institutions “favoring mutual communication and consultation” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 66). In this context, Barnett and Adler (1998) underlined the importance of international organizations and institutions, which encourage interactions between states, discover new areas of mutual interest, shape norms of state behavior, and help to construct the common identity of the participating states and societies. Since international organizations are now burgeoning in all corners of the world, Deutsch’s institutional prerequisite seems to be satisfied in most regions. However, security community building has not proven to be equally successful in all regions.

Therefore, variation in Deutsch’s second criterion gains crucial importance. This second condition is the “compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 66). Deutsch was interested mainly in the political and social values “incorporated in political institutions and in habits of political behavior” and “held by the politically relevant strata of all participating units” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 46–7). Analytically, they can be identified based upon their importance in “the domestic politics of the units concerned” and “in their common relations” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 123). A typical example of such a value is the “basic political ideology,” for example “democracy” in the North Atlantic area (Deutsch et al., 1957: 124).

Nevertheless, it is important to note that Deutsch et al. did not consider compatibility of values to be necessary for the creation of security communities. Without “mutual needs and mutual concessions, even a high degree of similarity in institutions and of like-mindedness in outlook would not produce any particular progress toward either integration or amalgamation” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 91). The crucial issue leading to the emergence of a pluralistic security community is not cultural similarity, but simply “the increasing unattractiveness and improbability of war among the political units concerned” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 115). For instance, a pluralistic security community between the USA and Mexico was founded in anticipation of World War II, when military intervention in the Americas ceased to be attractive for Washington; and it has survived despite significant differences in the core political values of the two countries (Gonzalez and Haggard, 1998).

Compatibility of values becomes essential in later stages of integration – in the transition from loosely to tightly coupled security communities if we use Adler and Barnett’s terminology. Furthermore, as I discuss below, it may be important for differentiating security communities as comprehensive or interstate.

Although Deutsch distinguished analytically relevant values basically by their political importance for the actors concerned, more recent studies focus on a particular set of liberal values. These are often claimed to provide a solid basis for security community building (Adler, 1997; Hurrell, 1998), while communities built around other values (for example, in South-East Asia) sometimes fail to prevent internal, large-scale violence (Acharya, 2001; Väyrynen, 2000). Adler (1992: 293) even argued that "members of pluralistic security communities hold dependable expectations of peaceful change not merely because they share just any kind of values, but because they share liberal democratic values." However, this move from Deutsch's original conception is not always appreciated (Kivimäki, 2001).

Deutsch et al. (1957: 36) also warned that "The populations of different territories might easily profess verbal attachment to the same set of values without having a sense of community that leads to political integration." The sense of community is "rather a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of 'we-feeling,' trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests" (Deutsch et al., 1957: 36). Adler and Barnett (1998b: 31) built upon this observation, defining a community by (1) shared identities, values, and meanings, (2) many-sided direct interactions, and (3) reciprocal long-term interest. In the framework proposed by Adler and Barnett, compatibility of values becomes part of a broader scheme, topped by mutual trust as the ultimate state of security community building.

An important question concerns whose values and trust matter. This article goes back to Deutsch's definition of the security community as a "group of people." In other words, it analyzes the values of societies, not only the attitudes of their elites. Cronin (1999: 3) explicitly declared that the goal of most studies of security communities is to explain "how political elites construct transnational communities by developing common social identities." The single most popular method is discourse analysis. On the other hand, mass values and attitudes are generally overlooked.[2]

It is my belief that evaluation of the theory of security communities should use the basic concepts in the same form as defined by Deutsch 50 years ago. Previous case studies of security communities, especially those included in Adler and Barnett (1998a), identified the key values "incorporated in political institutions and in habits of political behavior" (Deutsch et al., 1957: 46) of contemporary security communities, but they largely failed to prove that these values were "held by the politically relevant strata of all participating units" (Deutsch et al., 1957: 47).

However, foreign policy is rarely formed independently from public opinion. Empirical findings indicate that "policymakers in liberal democracies do not decide against overwhelming public consensus" (Risse-Kappen, 1991: 510). Public opinion, having its own dynamics and inertia, sets constraints on policymaking (Hinckley, 1992; Page and Shapiro, 1992). The interplay between policymakers and the public can be modeled as a two-level game, in which leaders play not only an international game, but also a domestic one, with the ultimate goal being to stay in power (Putnam, 1988). Consequently, they provide public or private goods to the winning coalition, formed by their supporters within the "selectorate" (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999). But, as Gelpi and Grieco (2003: 47) observed, "the winning coalitions within democratic states generally have to be quite broad and tend toward the inclusion of the median member of the selectorate." Since the support of such a large winning coalition cannot be maintained by scarce private goods, it is rather the congruence between the median voter's preferences and the leader's decisions that normally keeps the incumbent in office. Therefore, we should examine the values of the median voter (at least in states with democratic elections) if we want seriously to analyze Deutsch's condition of the compatibility of major values "held by the politically relevant strata of all participating units." In democracies, the median voter has certainly become politically relevant.[3]

Theoretical Expectations and Research Design

Hypotheses

Political elites in many regions claim to build security communities, but the prospects of those initiatives are rarely analyzed.[4] Basically, development of a security community may end in failure or with the formation of a comprehensive or interstate security community in the given region. The key factor, as hypothesized by Deutsch et al. (1957), is the compatibility of politically relevant values. This article aims to analyze whether and how this condition is met in existing security communities. Analyzing values held by the public, my research complements previous studies focused on the discourse among elites.

Although the nature of this research project is rather exploratory, it attempts principally to address three issues. The first question concerns to what extent members of existing security communities share compatible values, as was proposed by Deutsch and as is often assumed by his followers. The second, related issue is the difference between the values held by societies inside and outside security communities. Third, an effort is made to examine variation in the public support for politically relevant values between comprehensive and interstate security communities.

My analysis uses the European and World Values Surveys Integrated Data File (henceforth, referred to as the WVS) released by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).[5] Both surveys were conducted in the period 1999–2001.[6] The WVS is the most comprehensive cross-national survey dealing with a wide range of social, political, and other values.

Since the respondent's support for each value can be indicated by several different questions, I constructed six composite variables measuring attitude toward those values which, according to various theories, should facilitate peaceful change.[7]

The first variable indicates the level of interpersonal trust in the given society. Social scientists often emphasize the role of trust in sustaining social groups. As Fukuyama (1995: 25) briefly put it, "communities depend on mutual trust." It is thus not surprising that trust is also a key element in what Deutsch et al. (1957) identified as "we-feeling" in successfully integrated communities. Adler and Barnett (1998b: 45) developed this idea, proclaiming trust and collective identity to be "the proximate necessary conditions for the development of dependable expectations of peaceful change." If interpersonal trust within a community (defined by Deutsch as a "group of people") fosters dependable expectations of peaceful change, its level should be higher in the most successful security communities. In more formal language:

H1a: Interpersonal trust is higher in security communities than outside them.
H1b: Interpersonal trust is higher in comprehensive security communities than outside them.

The concept of "we-feeling" seems to imply that members of a community share a collective in-group identity. However, Deutsch defined security communities by the expected peaceful resolution of conflicts between groups, not by the absence of any intergroup conflict. For instance, the French can still perceive the Germans as an out-group, but this in-group–out-group difference may not be seen as a reason for organized violence. In other words, the peaceful relations within a security community may arise not only from in-group trust, but also from mere tolerance of out-groups. Furthermore, a higher tolerance of ethnic, religious, and political minorities also indicates a lower (or nonexistent) tension between different societal groups living within states. Therefore, attitudes toward various out-groups predict to some extent the propensity for civil strife, the factor crucial for characterizing a security community as comprehensive or only interstate:

H2a: Tolerance of out-groups is higher in security communities than outside them.
H2b: Tolerance of out-groups is higher in comprehensive security communities than outside them.

The role of values is not unknown in democratic peace theory. The normative basis of democracy is assumed to "emphasize regulated political competition through political means" (Maoz and Russett, 1993: 625). In other words, political conflicts are normally expected to be resolved by institutional means (for example, voting) and not by violence. Based on this assumption, the normative (or cultural) argument for democratic peace claims that democratic societies have not only internalized democratic norms, but they also externalize these norms in their mutual relations. As a result, they perceive each other as similar in their basic values (Doyle, 1997; Russett, 1993). Belonging to the same in-group, democracies are consequently supposed to treat each other with more respect and trust. In addition to the interstate dimension of democratic peace theory, several studies show that democratic regimes lead to durable intrastate peace (Hegre et al., 2001; Muller and Weede, 1990), though the responsibility of the normative mechanism has not been addressed adequately in this case. In the context of the security community theory, Deutsch et al. (1957) considered democracy to be one of the core values of the North Atlantic security community and some more recent studies of other cases have also connected security community building to democratization (Hurrell, 1998; Shore, 1998). Following the logic of the normative argument for democratic peace, Hypotheses 3a and 3b can be formed:

H3a: Democracy is supported more in security communities than outside them.
H3b: Democracy is supported more in comprehensive security communities than outside them.

In addition to liberal democracy, some scholars have also emphasized the role of contractual forms of exchange in promoting peaceful change. For instance, Deutsch et al. (1957: 124) listed the "free-enterprise" economic model among the key values of the security community that emerged in the North Atlantic area after World War II. Proposing some sort of causal mechanism, Mousseau (2003: 489) argued that "liberal political values deeply embedded within the norms of market-oriented economic development" contribute to a universal extension of trust in a community because in a market economy most people must be engaged in mutual nonviolent interactions. Although Mousseau was attempting to explain international cooperation, this theory can be easily applied to social relations within a state and two hypotheses may be made:

H4a: Economic liberalism is supported more in security communities than outside them.
H4b: Economic liberalism is supported more in comprehensive security communities than outside them.

Furthermore, students of security communities (Adler and Barnett, 1998a; Deutsch et al., 1957) also underlined the role of civil society as a force that creates ties between different social groups and strengthens common identity in the community. Brehm and Rahn (1997) found evidence that civic engagement builds interpersonal trust – an attitude lying at the core of the security community theory. Voluntary associations, fostering what Almond and Verba (1963) called "civic culture," are also supposed to strengthen democratic institutions (Putnam, 1993). Therefore, the effect of social participation on the viability of security communities can be both direct and indirect. On the one hand, it can reduce the propensity for conflict by forming overlapping networks of individuals and social groups; on the other hand, it can contribute to durable peace through the development of democracy:

H5a: Civic engagement in voluntary organizations is higher in security communities than outside them.

H5b: Civic engagement in voluntary organizations is higher in comprehensive security communities than outside them.

Security Communities Analyzed

In this article, I compare support for the five values described above in four security communities that have received the most attention. The first of these is the European security community (henceforth, referred to as the ESC). Although it is perhaps the most prominent example of a security community, its borders are not clearly defined (Bellamy, 2004). Some scholars merge it into a wider Euro-Atlantic security community (Adler, 1998); some reduce it more or less to Western Europe (Wæver, 1998). Usually, membership of the European Union, NATO, or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is seen as a criterion of membership of the ESC. However, the OSCE comprises several countries that have not developed expectations of peaceful change (for example, Georgia) and NATO includes Turkey with its unresolved security problems at both the intrastate (Kurdistan) and international (Cyprus and the Aegean) levels. On the other hand, a relatively safe operationalization of the ESC may be based on EU membership. In this article, the ESC is operationalized as consisting of the members of the EU (minus Cyprus) plus Norway and Switzerland. Greece is included because of the recent changes in the dynamics of its relationship with Turkey and the UK is included because the peace process has made any large-scale use of violence in Northern Ireland much less likely.

Bellamy (2004) characterizes the ESC as a mature, tightly coupled security community. It can also be described as a comprehensive security community due to the general expectation that political conflicts within the community (that is, both between and within the member states) will be resolved in a peaceful way. The PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) recorded only one armed conflict opposing groups from the ESC during the post-Cold War period (1990–2002): a clash between the UK and Real IRA in 1998.

Many institutions of the European security community proclaim political liberalism to be their core value. For example, the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) stated that the European Community's policy "shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms." Similarly, the

Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) declared that the EU is founded "on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States." Liberal values are also endorsed by the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and NATO.

The second security community included in my analysis is situated in North America. It involves two distinct security communities, the USA–Canada and USA–Mexico dyads, but it is more convenient for cross-sectional analysis to simplify it by using the label "NAFTA" (formally, the North American Free Trade Agreement). Both dyads are defined as loosely coupled security communities, mainly because of the lack of formal institutions and the absence of trust and common identity in the US–Mexican relationship (see Gonzalez and Haggard, 1998; Shore, 1998). However, the community has proven itself stable and can be described as a comprehensive security community. There have been only two minor intrastate conflict years recorded within NAFTA after the end of the Cold War: between Mexico and leftist insurgents in 1994 and 1996 (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

Liberal values are seen as politically relevant by both Canada and the USA, while Mexico's somewhat ambivalent attitude to democracy and democratization has changed only recently. In contrast to Western Europe, common values played little role in the development of the Northern American security community and cooperation between the USA and Mexico is still shaped primarily by security and economic interests (Gonzalez and Haggard, 1998).

Another security community is formed by the members of MERCOSUR in South America. The community has been primarily created by confidence-building measures in military affairs and economic cooperation between two main actors, Brazil and Argentina. Since there are no data for Paraguay in the WVS dataset, this security community is operationalized as containing only Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Hurrell (1998) described MERCOSUR as a loosely coupled security community. Its member states were not involved in any armed conflict between 1990 and 2002 (Gleditsch et al., 2002). On the other hand, the level of violence between non-state actors remains high and even produced a full-scale armed conflict between a powerful organized crime group and the Brazilian government in May 2006.[8] Because of this type of organized violence as well as enduring political instability, MERCOSUR can hardly be characterized as a comprehensive security community and it appears to lie somewhere between the two ideal types.

Democratization of Latin America in the 1980s led to increased cooperation between new civilian governments and new market-oriented policies promoted economic integration (Parish and Peceny, 2002). The changes contributed to the building of a security community in the Southern Cone (Hurrell, 1998). Thus in this case liberal political values have had a positive impact at the institutional level.

The fourth case is the security community in South-East Asia which emerged around the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Acharya (2001) described ASEAN as a nascent security community, while Emmerson (2005) countered that ASEAN might cease to be any kind of pluralistic security community in the near future. Since five members of ASEAN were involved in serious intrastate conflicts during the post-Cold War period (Gleditsch et al., 2002), South-East Asia has certainly not reached the threshold of a comprehensive security community (Väyrynen, 2000), although it has an impressive record of successful interstate dispute settlement (Acharya, 2001). Unfortunately, only four members of ASEAN (Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam) are included in the survey. This under-representation means the results for ASEAN should be interpreted carefully.

ASEAN, as Acharya (2001) summed it up, "has no comparable aspirations to become a 'democratic security community.'" The common values of the elites maintaining interstate peace in the region are mostly illiberal (Kivimäki, 2001).

Among 44 territories not belonging to any security community yet included in the survey, 26 have recently experienced organized violence, in several cases including interstate war (Gleditsch et al., 2002). It may be possible that certain values supported in security communities are in fact not exclusive to these zones, but are equally appreciated in all peaceful societies. For example, the normative mechanism of democratic peace may work in all democratic countries, regardless of whether they belong to a regional security community. That is why I created two separate control groups (see Appendix 2), differentiated by whether the country has been involved in armed conflict during the post-Cold War period.[9]

Methods

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to show any significant difference in public support for values between the examined security communities and the rest of the world, as well as across the security communities themselves. The unit of analysis is the group of countries: the ESC, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, and two control groups drawn from nonmembers of security communities and consisting of countries recently involved in an armed conflict and countries without any armed conflict recorded after the Cold War. I compare the mean values and distribution of our five variables in order to reject the null hypothesis that the groups of countries are just random samples from the same population. Post hoc tests then identify between which groups the difference is significant. For example, support for democracy may be significantly stronger in the European security community than in those countries not belonging to any security community, but the difference between Europe and North America may not be significant. Because of a very large N, all results are likely to be statistically significant and the difference in mean values is analytically more interesting than the p-value.

Results

Trust

A test of the homogeneity of variances (Levene statistics) showed that the assumption of equal variances is violated. Thus, I used Welch and Brown-Forsythe tests of equality of means rather than a standard one-way ANOVA.[10] Both tests showed a significant (p-value < 0.01) difference in the mean values (and distributions) of interpersonal trust between the groups of countries examined. Tamhane's T2 post hoc test identified in which security communities the level of trust significantly differs from the same attitude in those countries that are not members of security communities (two control groups). But as I mentioned above, the statistical significance of the results is not surprising in light of a very large N (114,170 cases) and the difference in mean values is more informative.

Hypothesis 1a can be rejected because (1) the mean value of interpersonal trust in ASEAN is not significantly different from the mean value in the "no conflict" control group (those societies not belonging to any security community yet living in peace) and (2) the level of trust in MERCOSUR is even lower than in those countries recently involved in armed conflict. On the other hand, Table 1 provides evidence for Hypothesis 1b. Interpersonal trust within two comprehensive security communities is significantly higher than elsewhere. It is interesting that the difference between the ESC and NAFTA is statistically insignificant; they form a coherent group in this regard.

Tolerance of Out-Groups

Hypothesis 2a received mixed support. People in all the security communities except ASEAN are significantly more tolerant of out-groups than people in the rest of the world (see Table 2). It is not clear whether ASEAN's deviation from the trend is systematic or results from the under-representation of this community in the survey. Hypothesis 2b can be rejected because the highest mean value of tolerance was observed in the South American security community, which is not entirely comprehensive.

Support for Democracy

Hypothesis 3a was not confirmed by the empirical evidence since people from ASEAN and MERCOSUR are not more supportive toward democracy than people from the two control groups (see Table 3). Although the perception of democracy in two comprehensive security communities is more favorable, the mean value of this attitude in NAFTA does not exceed the mean value in other countries

TABLE 1. *Mean Values of Interpersonal Trust*

Group	Mean	Std. Deviation
ESC	0.33	0.47
NAFTA	0.32	0.47
MERCOSUR	0.13	0.34
ASEAN	0.27	0.44
No Conflict Control Group	0.27	0.45
Conflict Control Group	0.23	0.42

Notes: N = 114,170; range from 0 to 1.

TABLE 2. *Mean Values of Tolerance of Out Groups*

Group	Mean	Std. Deviation
ESC	0.46	0.50
NAFTA	0.61	0.49
MERCOSUR	0.63	0.48
ASEAN	0.25	0.43
No Conflict Control Group	0.24	0.43
Conflict Control Group	0.26	0.44

Notes: N = 111,704; range from 0 to 1.

TABLE 3. *Mean Values of Support for Democracy*

Group	Mean	Std. Deviation
ESC	1.79	1.02
NAFTA	1.39	1.12
MERCOSUR	1.18	1.16
ASEAN	0.57	1.06
No Conflict Control Group	1.45	1.17
Conflict Control Group	1.17	1.16

Notes: N = 106,755; range from –3 to 3.

TABLE 4. *Mean Values of Support for Economic Liberalism*

Group	Mean	Std. Deviation
ESC	6.27	1.78
NAFTA	6.34	1.69
MERCOSUR	5.56	1.83
ASEAN	6.20	1.52
No Conflict Control Group	6.02	1.82
Conflict Control Group	5.64	1.93

Notes: N = 113,304; range from 1 to 10.

without armed conflict. High public support for democracy is thus not specific to comprehensive security communities, as was suggested by Hypothesis 3b.

Economic Liberalism

According to Table 4, three of the four security communities support economic liberalism more than the rest of the world. On the other hand, the lowest mean value of this variable is recorded in the fourth community: MERCOSUR. Therefore, Hypothesis 4a should be rejected. As for Hypothesis 4b, people from two comprehensive security communities are more market oriented than the rest of the world, so the hypothesis seems to be confirmed. However, it is important to note that the statistical significance of the difference between the ESC and ASEAN is slightly above the usual threshold (p-value of 0.051).

Social Participation

Surprisingly, both Hypotheses 5a and 5b can be rejected in the case of social participation. Contrary to theoretical expectations, citizens' engagement in civil society discriminates neither security communities from the rest of the world nor comprehensive communities from interstate ones (see Table 5). On a scale ranging from zero (no engagement) to one (volunteer work of all the types included in the WVS), the level of social participation is higher only in ASEAN and NAFTA (compared to the control groups). In the ESC and MERCOSUR, it is even lower than the average world value (0.05).

One can argue that defining social participation by unpaid work has a bias toward the Anglo-American meaning of civic engagement. Social participation in continental Europe, for instance, can be manifested more by membership in local

TABLE 5. *Mean Values of Social Participation*

Group	Mean	Std. Deviation
ESC	0.04	0.08
NAFTA	0.08	0.12
MERCOSUR	0.02	0.06
ASEAN	0.09	0.13
No Conflict Control Group	0.07	0.13
Conflict Control Group	0.06	0.13

Notes: N = 76,451; range from 0 to 1.

clubs or trade unions. Therefore, I also constructed a less restrictive indicator of social participation, based on whether the respondent belongs to any voluntary organization or activity (see Appendix 1). However, the above-mentioned results are still valid: 69 percent of respondents in NAFTA and 59 percent in ASEAN belong to some voluntary organization, while the values for the ESC (51 percent), the "conflict" control group (49 percent), and MERCOSUR (42 percent) are below both the average world value (51 percent) and the average value in those countries without organized violence that do not belong to any security community (54 percent).

With few exceptions (most notably MERCOSUR), liberal values are supported more by those societies living in peace than by those that have recently experienced armed conflict. But within the group of non-war countries, ANOVA in most cases failed to distinguish members of security communities from nonmembers. People in MERCOSUR are quite tolerant of out-groups, but at the same time general interpersonal trust is extremely low. Moreover, neither political nor economic liberalism is particularly valued by the general public in South America. ASEAN is characterized by high social participation and support of economic liberalism, while democracy is not prized. The level of interpersonal trust and intergroup tolerance also remains low. On the other hand, people in Europe and North America seem to be much more trustful, tolerant, and market oriented than people elsewhere. The ESC is also characterized by higher support for democracy, while NAFTA is stronger in social participation.

Which Values Are Relevant?

The analysis presented in this article disconfirms many of the most frequent assumptions about the allegedly shared values of security communities. Despite the expectations of academics (for example, Adler, 1992, 1997), values held by people from security communities are not generally more liberal than those values held by citizens of other peaceful countries.

Some 50 years ago Deutsch et al. (1957) highlighted democracy as one of the core values of the security community emerging at that time in the North Atlantic area. However, data from the most recent waves of the WVS show a significant difference between Europe and North America in this regard. Support for democratic principles in NAFTA is in fact lower than in many other countries without armed conflict. Attitudes toward democracy in two interstate communities (MERCOSUR and ASEAN) are even less favorable.

Public support for democracy is generally higher in most peaceful societies. This result is in line with the normative argument for democratic peace, which sees shared democratic norms as a cause of interstate (and perhaps also intrastate) peace. However, the effect of democracy is evidently not restricted to pluralistic security communities and it would be unwise to attribute the development of security communities to democratic values shared at the societal level.

In addition to stressing the role of democracy, Deutsch et al. (1957) argued that what they called the "free-enterprise" economic model could be another relevant value in the North Atlantic security community. Greater support for economic liberalism in Europe and North America can be observed in the WVS data. In addition, ANOVA showed that many other societies living in peace are pro-market oriented. This result evokes the theory that democratic peace is facilitated by the market economy. For example, Mousseau (2000: 478), assuming "that economic norms translate into social values and worldviews," argued that "Individuals in developed market economies tend to share the social and political values of exchange-based cooperation, individual choice and free will, negotiation and compromise, universal equity among individuals, and universal trust in the sanctity of contract." If the values of economic liberalism prevail, out-groups are no longer perceived as a threat, but rather as potential partners in mutually beneficial transactions. Consequently, since the values held by the median voter are crucial for democratically elected leaders, market democracies are supposed to behave in a less bellicose way than any other type of state.

But a closer look at the data reveals that this effect is not universal. For instance, citizens of the member states of MERCOSUR overwhelmingly oppose economic liberalism. Furthermore, ANOVA showed that higher support for economic liberalism is not exclusive to security communities, but can be observed in most peaceful societies. Due to the high variation between member states of the ESC and NAFTA, economic liberalism also cannot be described as the common value of comprehensive security communities. For example, there is a huge difference between the USA (with a mean value of support for economic liberalism of 6.87) and Canada (6.55) on the one hand, and Mexico (5.61) on the other. Support for economic liberalism in two nonmembers from the region, El Salvador (6.34) and the Dominican Republic (6.39), exceeds the average value in NAFTA (6.34). The range within the ESC is similarly wide (from 5.41 to 7.14) and the results for several societies in neighboring regions (for example, Albania, Algeria, and Russia) are close or even superior to the average value recorded in the ESC (6.27). In other words, support for economic liberalism is neither a common value of comprehensive security communities nor is it supported significantly more in comparison to neighboring territories.

Among the most surprising findings presented in this article are those challenging the traditional view on the role of civil society. For example, Adler and Barnett (1998b: 41) stressed the importance of "a shared transnational civic culture," which "may shape the transnational identity of individuals of the community." According to their theory, security communities should arise (though not exclusively) from strong civil societies and "the networks of organized processes between them." The results of my analysis, however, show that individuals' engagement in civil society is not consistently stronger in the existent security communities. Moreover, its level is even lower in the mature, tightly coupled

European security community than in ASEAN, a supposedly nascent "horizontal community between elites" (Bellamy, 2004: 117). Although the relationship between social participation, the emerging sense of community, and the development of the actual security communities is often simply assumed, I found no empirical evidence of even a correlation between the two variables.

Finally, the quantitative analysis of survey data presented in this article identified no more than two values whose support is in line with the expectations of the theorists. This means that although security communities are not exactly zones of strong liberal values in general, they are still qualitatively different compared to the rest of the world, as far as the values of citizens are concerned.

First, the citizens of three security communities are characterized by significantly greater tolerance of out-groups. What is striking is that this difference remains significant even if security communities are compared with other peaceful countries. The only exception is the security community existing in South-East Asia, which was somewhat under-represented in the survey. It is not clear whether the low tolerance of out-groups in ASEAN is a systematic feature of this illiberal community.

In MERCOSUR, tolerance of out-groups seems to be widely accepted by all participating units (the range is between 0.57 and 0.72, with a mean of 0.61), so it meets Deutsch's criterion for a compatible value. It also distinguishes the member states of MERCOSUR from their neighboring territories. Tolerance of out-groups in other South American countries is lower (0.27 in Venezuela, 0.38 in Peru, and 0.54 in Chile), with the mysterious exception of Colombia (0.77).

The vast majority of European and North American countries are characterized by greater tolerance of out-groups in comparison to both societies not belonging to any security community in general and societies in neighboring regions in particular. For example, the average tolerance of out-groups in NAFTA (0.61) is greater than in Central America (0.17 in San Salvador) and the societies in the ESC are generally more tolerant (a range from 0.10 to 0.72, with the mean equal to 0.46) than the societies in the neighboring Commonwealth of Independent States and Mediterranean regions (with an average value for tolerance always less than 0.46 and in many cases less than 0.10).

But tolerance still varies considerably across member states. In the asymmetric North American community (see Gonzalez and Haggard, 1998), people in the core state (the USA) seem to perceive out-groups more positively (a mean value of 0.65) than citizens in Mexico (0.39). The same pattern can be observed in Europe, where people from the original core of the community (Western Europe) appear to be, in most cases, more tolerant than people from the new member states (Central and Eastern Europe). Deutsch et al. (1957) underlined the role of "core states" in the creation of historical security communities, though they did not predict that values would differ between the core and the periphery of a community.

Contrary to the theoretical propositions of Adler and Barnett (1998a), citizens of all security communities do not appear to be particularly trustful. In fact, people in the frequently studied South American zone of peace are less trustful than people in many war-prone countries. Nevertheless, the societies in the comprehensive security communities are clearly distinguished by a higher average level of interpersonal trust when compared to other parts of the world.

When disaggregated to the country level, interpersonal trust varies greatly across European states, with the mean value ranging from 0.10 (Portugal) to 0.66 (Sweden). But the level of trust in the neighboring regions (the former Soviet Union and the Mediterranean) is considerably lower than the ESC's average value (0.33) in all cases except Egypt and Montenegro. NAFTA is slightly more homogeneous, but US citizens (0.36) and Canadians (0.39) are still more trustful than Mexicans (0.21). The average value in NAFTA (0.32) is higher than the average value in the rest of Central America (0.15 in El Salvador and 0.27 in the Dominican Republic), although this difference results mainly from the high level of trust in Canada and the USA.

Anthropologists often see the socialization of distrust as a good predictor of the overall level of aggressiveness in a society, both against members of that society and against outsiders (Snyder, 2002). The results presented in this article indicate that the effect of trust (or, at least, of simple tolerance) may be equally important in more developed modern societies. Trust is also the central concept of the security community theory. It is considered to be an indicator of the "we-feeling" within security communities (Deutsch et al., 1957). However, my research findings contradict the assertion made by Adler and Barnett (1998a) that trust is a necessary condition for the development of any dependable expectations of peaceful change.

High interpersonal trust is shared by the existing comprehensive security communities, but interstate security communities can hardly be understood in terms of a theoretical framework based on trust. There is no empirical evidence for the claim that trust is higher within MERCOSUR and ASEAN, for instance. If we broaden the usual constructivist focus on elites, we see that trust is actually relevant only in two cases: Europe and North America. This conclusion challenges the tendency of scholars to apply the Deutschian approach to any region with some degree of integration at the institutional level, such as South Africa in the work of Ngoma (2005). It is also important to point out that Europe and North America (two comprehensive security communities) have many cultural commonalities. If the most prominent theoretical approach, in which trust fulfills the crucial role, is applicable only to these two cases, it could call the utility of the concept outside the western cultural zone into question. Another caveat is that the public values analyzed in this article are relevant only in polities in which public preferences can be translated into political decisions. The impact of voters' preferences is logically stronger in democratic polities.

Moreover, as Emmerson (2005) has pointed out, security in security communities is intramural – their members maintain peaceful relations among themselves, yet they do not necessarily project the same attitudes toward other countries. War between the USA and Canada or between the USA and Mexico is quite unthinkable, even though the USA was less reluctant to send its forces to Iraq in 2003, for example. Lewis and Wigert (1985: 968) suggested that trust "must be conceived as a property of collective units (ongoing dyads, groups, and collectivities)." It would thus be interesting to examine how general tolerance and trust are translated into the perception of concrete groups. The WVS measured tolerance of domestic out-groups (such as various minorities). But it did not report public attitudes toward foreign countries.

Eurobarometer 46.0, organized in 1996, measured how much Europeans trusted different nations from both inside and outside their security community.

Although all out-groups in general are tolerated more in security communities, and comprehensive security communities are also characterized by a higher level of interpersonal trust, the most favorable view is reserved for fellow members of the community. As of 1996, 21.6 percent of surveyed citizens of EU member countries trusted other EU member countries, while only 9.4 percent on average extended their trust to candidate countries. Perception of non-European countries is similar: Turkey was trusted by 6 percent of Europeans, Russia by 8 percent, China by 9 percent, the USA by 11 percent, and Japan by 19 percent.

Conclusion

Some 50 years ago Karl Deutsch concluded that compatibility of values was a precondition of successful security community building. Despite Deutsch's clear conceptualization, most students of security communities restrict their analyses only to the level of elites and mostly to liberal values. Taking the masses into account has produced some interesting findings. With few exceptions, liberal values are supported more by those societies living in peace than by societies that have recently experienced armed conflict. But within the group of non-war countries, it is fairly difficult to distinguish members of regional security communities from more isolated peaceful countries. For instance, the prominent role of democracy and civil society, usually just assumed by most of the literature about security communities, was not confirmed by my empirical analysis. Contrary to Adler's (1992) theoretical claim, liberal values are not a necessary condition of security community building, at least not at the societal level.

Two factors highlighted by my analysis are trust and tolerance of out-groups. Tolerance of out-groups is significantly greater in all the security communities except ASEAN. The only truly comprehensive security communities, Western Europe and North America, are also characterized by strong interpersonal trust. It is perhaps not a coincidence that ASEAN, whose population is neither exceptionally tolerant nor trustful, faces outbursts of internal violence and a preponderant arms race despite the ongoing development of a security community. In this light, one can question the prospects of security communities created entirely by the will of elites despite the prevailing mistrust between various societal groups and little peaceful interaction between them (for example, in Africa).

As Deutsch et al. (1957) concluded, security communities can emerge because of purely materialist reasons (such as a common external threat), while many societies appreciating the same values may not also share a sense of community. Security concerns played an essential role in the formation of the security communities involving the USA and Canada (Shore, 1998), the USA and Mexico (Gonzalez and Haggard, 1998), and in Western Europe (Miller, 2005; Ripsman, 2005).

But peaceful interactions between former rivals may later build mutual trust between them. Ripsman (2005: 687) observed that "liberal mechanisms gradually transformed relations between the states of Western Europe by changing public and elite attitudes toward their regional partners" after 1954. This profound transformation can be illustrated by contemporary survey data. In a 1954 survey, 66 percent of French respondents with opinions on the subject believed that German rearmament was a danger in any form, while 28 percent believed it could be benign only with adequate safeguards. A survey organized in 1972 by the Institut français d'opinion publique (IFOP) reported that 86 percent of

French respondents with an opinion did not see Germany as a danger for France; thus, by that time, expectations of peaceful change were widely accepted by the population (Ripsman, 2005). The survey also revealed reasons for this change. When asked why they no longer feared Germany, 35 percent cited membership in the European Community.

Commonality of values plays some role in this process, but its contribution is weaker than has been assumed by the chief theorists of the field. In the cited survey, 23 percent of respondents no longer feared Germany because of "a change in German mentality" due to a "democratic regime" (Ripsman, 2005). Europe is the only security community with a significantly higher level of public support for democracy. It is thus not surprising that in this particular case, common appreciation of democracy contributed to an increase of trust among two member states. But, as this article shows, the effect of liberal values is not universal.

Ripsman (2005) also suggested that mutual trust may sustain a security community when the initially favorable structural factors change (as in Western Europe after 1989). As societal support for liberal values generally fails to differentiate between security communities and other peaceful societies, it would be perhaps more fruitful to concentrate future analytical efforts on what makes security communities special: greater tolerance of out-groups and, partially, greater trust. The analysis presented in this article has disproved some of the hypothesized correlations and confirmed others. But the issue of causality remains largely unexplored.

Appendix 1: Questions Used to Construct Composite Variables

Interpersonal Trust

"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?"

The variable is coded 1 ("most people can be trusted") or 0 ("you need to be very careful").

Tolerance of Out-Groups

"On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?"

Item 1: "People of a different race."
Item 2: "Muslims."
Item 3: "Immigrants/foreign workers."
Item 4: "People who have AIDS."
Item 5: "Homosexuals."
Item 6: "Jews."
Item 7: "Evangelists."
Item 8: "People of a different religion."
Item 9: "Militant minority."
Item 10: "People not from country of origin."
Item 11: "Gypsies."
Item 12: "Indians or Lebanese."
Item 13: "Chinese or Philippino Chinese."
Item 14: "Spiritists."

Item 15: “Protestants.”
Item 16: “Christians.”
Item 17: “Witchdoctors and related labels.”
Item 18: “Hindus.”
Item 19: “Haitians.”
Item 20: “Members of new religious movements.”
Item 21: “Kurds, Esids.”

The index is coded 1 (“high tolerance”) if the respondent did not mention any of the listed groups and 0 (“low tolerance”) otherwise.

Support for Democracy

Item 1: “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?”

“Having a democratic political system.”

Item 2: “I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them?”

“Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government.”

Item 3: “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?”

“Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.”

Item 4: “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?”

“Having the army rule.”

The scale of values of the composite variable runs from –3 (“low support for democracy”) to 3 (“high support for democracy”).

Economic Liberalism

“Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.”

Item 1: “Incomes should be made more equal.”
Item 2: “Private ownership of business and industry should be increased.”
Item 3: “The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.”
Item 4: “Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas.”

The mean of the scores forms the index "Economic Liberalism." The scale of values runs from 1 ("low support") to 10 ("high support").

Social Participation

"Which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for?"

Item 1: "Social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people."
Item 2: "Religious or church organizations."
Item 3: "Education, arts, music or cultural activities."
Item 4: "Labor unions."
Item 5: "Third world development or human rights."
Item 6: "Conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights."
Item 7: "Professional associations."
Item 8: "Youth work (e.g. scouts, guides, youth clubs etc.)."
Item 9: "Sports or recreation."
Item 10: "Women's groups."
Item 11: "Peace movement."
Item 12: "Voluntary organizations concerned with health."
Item 13: "Other groups."

The mean of the scores forms the index "Social Participation." The scale of values runs from 0 ("no engagement") to 1 ("high engagement").

Social Participation: A Less Restrictive Measure

"Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say ... which, if any ... you belong to."

Item 1: "Social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people."
Item 2: "Religious or church organizations."
Item 3: "Education, arts, music or cultural activities."
Item 4: "Labor unions."
Item 5: "Political parties or groups."
Item 6: "Local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality."
Item 7: "Third world development or human rights."
Item 8: "Conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights."
Item 9: "Professional associations."
Item 10: "Youth work (e.g. scouts, guides, youth clubs etc.)."
Item 11: "Sports or recreation."
Item 12: "Women's groups."
Item 13: "Peace movement."
Item 14: "Voluntary organizations concerned with health."
Item 15: "Other groups."

The variable is coded as 1 if the respondent belongs to any of the listed voluntary organizations and 0 otherwise.

Appendix 2: List of Surveyed Territories

European Security Community (ESC)

Austria
Belgium
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Great Britain
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland

North American Security Community (NAFTA)

Canada
Mexico
United States of America

South American Security Community (MERCOSUR)

Argentina
Brazil
Uruguay

South-East Asian Security Community (ASEAN)

Indonesia
Philippines
Singapore
Vietnam

Control Group (No Conflict Countries)

Albania
Belarus
Bulgaria
Chile
China
Dominican Republic
Iceland
Japan
Jordan
Korea
Morocco
New Zealand
Puerto Rico
Romania
South Africa
Taiwan
Tanzania
Ukraine

Control Group (Countries with Armed Conflict)

Algeria
Armenia
Australia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Colombia
Croatia
Egypt
El Salvador
Georgia
India
Iran
Israel
Macedonia
Moldova
Montenegro
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Russia
Serbia
Turkey
Uganda
Venezuela
Zimbabwe

Notes

1. Many of them were included in Adler and Barnett (1998a) and in Bellamy (2004). Among others, cited less frequently, Attinà (2000), Williams and Neumann (2000), Acharya (2001), and Möller (2003) may be named.
2. Some exceptions should be noted. For example, Ripsman (2005) cites surveys challenging constructivist claims about the emergence of a security community in Western Europe after World War II.
3. The median voter's impact on foreign policy may be modified by electoral rules and other factors, however.
4. To name but a couple of examples, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) explicitly plans to build a "security community" by 2020 (ASEAN, 2004), and even the Southern African Development Community (SADC), still plagued by organized violence, is sometimes described as a security community (Ngoma, 2005).
5. See the European and World Values Surveys Integrated Data File, 1999–2002, Release I (computer file), 2nd ICPSR version, European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association. The dataset is available from the ICPSR under the code ICPSR 3975.
6. In addition, 13 countries surveyed in 1995 were included in the dataset "to provide the broadest possible cross-national comparisons."
7. The list of questions from the survey used to construct the six composite variables can be found in Appendix 1.
8. Some nine days of violent clashes between the First Capital Command gang (PCC), with an estimated size of 85,000 to 125,000 members, and the police left more than 170 dead. The PCC is not an ordinary criminal gang, but rather "a political entity" and "a shadow army capable of challenging Brazil's elected government" (Chang, 2006).
9. There are several unclear cases. Some five countries (Japan, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, and Romania) sent troops only to operations sanctioned by the UN (the Gulf War and the US-led invasion of Afghanistan). The only armed conflict with the involvement of South Africa was a coup in Lesotho (1998), in which South African forces joined a Southern African Development Community task force requested by Lesotho's government. Since these military actions were legal under international law, I put all these cases into the "no conflict" group. Another questionable case is Australia, coded as involved in armed conflict because it also participated in the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.
10. Levene's test was significant for all the political and social values studied in this article, so I also used Welch and Brown-Forsythe tests in subsequent analyses. Both tests also proved a statistically significant difference between the examined groups of countries in the case of values other than trust. So, Tamhane's T2 post hoc test is used throughout the article to distinguish statistically significant differences in the mean values of the variables between the groups of countries studied.

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