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## In This Issue

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## In This Issue

Although they vary greatly in the questions they pose, in methodology, and in the degree and kind of controversy their arguments may provoke, the five articles in this issue of the *International Political Science Review* have one point in common: all address the relationship between popular attitudes and values on the one hand and the course of government on the other.

Do mass attitudes favoring freedom for others increase the likelihood of democracy? Because some have doubted that they do, Christian Welzel (“Are Levels of Democracy Affected by Mass Attitudes? Testing Attainment and Sustainment Effects on Democracy”) has brought an impressive array of new data together to substantiate the argument (made by himself and Ronald Inglehart in earlier work) that they do.

Are the individual members of a security community (a region “in which large-scale use of violence is very unlikely”) more likely to have attitudes of tolerance toward out-groups and trust toward one another? Yes, says Andrej Tusicisny, but notes also that in many respects the attitudes of members of such communities are not all that different from those in more isolated peaceful countries. In “Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously,” he finds no confirmation for the common assumption that they will be more strongly committed to democracy and more involved in civil society.

What about moral traditionalism and authoritarianism: are they really so strongly associated as is commonly assumed? Do these values produce highly similar results at the polls and shape governments accordingly? Not necessarily, say Willem de Koster and Jeroen van der Waal in “Cultural Value Orientations and Christian Religiosity: On Moral Traditionalism, Authoritarianism, and their Implications for Voting Behavior.” Although their opposites (non-traditionalists and non-authoritarians) “go hand-in-hand,” under certain circumstances moral traditionalists vote quite differently from authoritarians, as these authors show was the case in the Netherlands during the period studied in this article. Not everyone will agree with the authors’ arguments as to why this should be so, which makes the findings – and the arguments – all the more interesting.

And speaking of elections, do values and attitudes on the most significant issues confronting a nation ever really make their way forward into voting decisions and thus, possibly, into the course of government policy? Not if we judge by the quality of deliberation over the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in the five Israeli elections analyzed by Michal Shamir and Jacob Shamir in “The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

in Israeli Elections.” Although power was transferred with profound consequences, policy itself was, they claim, too little and too superficially discussed to receive either repudiation or legitimization from the public.

Finally, can a powerful outside leader impose his own definition of democracy on another nation’s citizenry, and thereby lead that citizenry to support the establishment of a new and different form of government? Not likely when that nation is led by a master politician with vast economic resources at his command, suggests N. Scott Cole in “Hugo Chavez and President Bush’s Credibility Gap: The Struggle Against US Democracy Promotion” especially if at least some of the arguments offered by the outsider are rather easily shown to be untrue. Then, says Cole, a “credibility gap” is inevitable, despite what may be the patent shortcomings of the indigenous leader.

Attitudes matter, say all five, sometimes less than believed and sometimes more, sometimes as expected and sometimes not. Democratic linkage is never sure.

Kay Lawson