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What is This?

The Changing Challenge of Europeanization to Politics and Governance in Turkey

Kivanç Ulusoy

Abstract. This study reviews the transformation of governing structures in Europe over two centuries and examines the structural impact of the European Union (EU) on Turkish politics and polity. The Ottoman elites reformed governing structures during the 19th century and transformed a multinational and multireligious empire into a nation-state with a modern administrative structure similar to European examples. Today the Turkish governing elites are faced with a European challenge on similar terms, but with crucial differences in dimensions and impact. The EU conditions for Turkish membership are of a revolutionary character in that they require fundamental changes in the governing structures of the republican regime. Although Turkey–EU relations are evaluated in terms of EU conditionality, Europeanization poses a tremendous challenge to the nation-state and requires a transformation of basic governing structures and mentalities.

Keywords: • Europeanization • State transformation
• Administrative adaptation • Turkey

Introduction

This study reviews the transformation of governing structures in Europe over two centuries and examines the European impact on Ottoman/Turkish polity and politics. The current challenges of EU membership for Turkey are situated in the historical context of Turkey's response to the West. After an almost mortal crisis, the Ottoman Turks responded to the military effectiveness of and institutional models offered by the West by reforming the governing structures during the 19th century and transforming the state to fit the European model of the nation-state in the early 20th century. They were able to transform a multinational and multireligious empire into a nation-state with a modern administrative structure and coherent national identity. Today Turkey again faces a similar European challenge, but with crucial differences in the dimensions and power of impact.

Europe has always had an impact on Turkey. Turkey has always responded and adapted to changes in Europe. Geographical proximity, historical sensitivity, and legal/institutional ties with Europe condition the European impact on Turkey. Turkey's current political transformation can be attributed to Europe's long-time structural impact with a specific content. Similar to the process of transformation during the 19th century, the process of Europeanization has been changing the opportunity structures of Turkish politics. Rather than an imposition of criteria, the current European impact is a structural one as the EU mobilizes an indigenous process of transformation in Turkey. An adaptation of governing structures defines the logic of EU–Turkey relations today.

In the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit of the European Council in 1999, where Turkey was granted the official status of candidate country, the EU framework of conditionality defined the operational parameters of Turkey–EU relations. However, as the process of adaptation to European norms and regulations started in Turkey after 1999, it has been increasingly noticed that Europeanization has an expanding impact on Turkish politics, posing a tremendous challenge to the nation-state and requiring a transformation of basic governing structures and mentalities by pushing Turkey to create mechanisms for multilevel governance comparable to the present structures of European governance. The conditions for Turkish membership of the EU are virtually of a revolutionary character in that they require fundamental change in the basic governing structures of the republican regime. Though never publicly acknowledged, the reform laws of August 2002 were designed to complete Turkey's acceptance of the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership and initiated a democratic regime structurally different from the previous one in terms of the basic conceptualization of political community in Turkey.

"Europeanization" and the literature on EU enlargement principally argue that the democratization process in Turkey, as well as in other accession countries (previously the CEEC and today the western Balkans), is an externally induced, top-down, elite driven process administered through the mechanisms of EU conditionality. In fact, this claim can also be substantiated by the reports of the Council of Europe, the EU and some NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, the claims of academics, and even representatives of Turkish civil society or the economic community. The prospect of EU membership is univocally considered as the main causal factor of the recent progress in Turkey regarding democratic reform. Contrary to this general understanding, this article argues that the democratic change in Turkey since 2002 should rather be attributed to the mobilization of subnational groups at the European level and constitutes a bottom-up process, which goes back to the political transformation of Turkey in the post-1980 period. The Turkish democratization process is actually a domestic process and a bottom-up initiative at a subnational level, in particular of Turkish civil society groups such as the Kurds, the Alevis, and the non-Muslim minorities, and economic pressure groups as well as the Islamist parties.

The first section of this article will provide basic analytical and theoretical elements. The two-century long European impact on Turkey's polity and politics will be analyzed with respect to the conceptual framework defined by Europeanization. Underlining the particular significance of the emergence of European multilevel governance, this section will outline the relevant features of the impressive academic literature on Europeanization in order to put forward an hypothesis

regarding the European impact regarding Turkey's politics and political structure. The second section compares the past and present periods of reformation – the 19th century Ottoman reform and the post-1980 Turkish transformation – and suggests that continuity exists between these two periods as Turkey has consistently adapted to changes in European governance over the last two centuries. The assessment and the concluding parts will be devoted to an analysis of the impact of a new mode of European governance and the challenge of Europeanization on Turkey by outlining the country's adaptation of governing structures designed to respond to political and institutional changes at a European level.

The Challenge of Europeanization: A Framework for Analysis

The overall impact of the transformations at a European level is directed at the core of national political structures and at the rationality of national politics and policy-making of the member states and the neighboring countries of the EU. In Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso, Börzel and Risse define this process, recently labeled as Europeanization, as "the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions associated with problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of European rules" (2001: 3). They underline the operation of a crucial process at the European level with an impact not only on formal structures – such as national legal systems and national and regional administrations – but also on the shaping of informal structures – such as business–government relations, public communications, state identities, and citizenship norms. In this context, a key question becomes how European integration matters for the domestic polities, politics, and policies of the member states and the states (including the accession countries) located in the immediate neighborhood of the EU.

First of all, the necessity to articulate EU and national levels dramatically changes the rules and the structure of policy-making in the member countries (Mény Muller and Quermonne, 1996: 1–22). Defining it as "Europeanization", Ladrech (1994: 69) observes "an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making." The European impact actually goes beyond the policy dimensions and spill-over political cleavages, parties, and patterns of democratic legitimization and identity formation (Goetz and Hix, 2001: 15). It recontextualizes politics through creating new spaces for political maneuver, political recognition, and a general European agenda. This two-dimensional transformation in the politics and political structure of the European states shows itself in six particular ways: as a process of institutional adaptation within government in relation to the coordination of EU policy and strategy; as a process of transformation in the structural power of domestic actors including executives and technocrats, subnational actors and institutions, and a stronger civil society; as an adjustment of the domestic macro-economic policy regime, affecting state–economy relations; as an issue exerting a new dynamic within the domestic party system; as a pressure to redefine national identity; and as a strategic tool in the pursuit of foreign policy interests (Featherson and Kazamias, 2001: 15–16).

In a narrow sense, this study takes Europeanization to be "the shift of atten-tion of all national institutions and their increasing participations – in terms of the number of actors and intensity – in the EU decision making cycle" (Wessels and Rometsch, 1996: 328). In fact it is an asymmetric "process of structural change, variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests" (Feathersone, 2003: 3). In this context, while the transformation of domestic structures con-stitutes the dependent variable, the EU level institutions and forces form the independent explanatory factor. Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) outline three major mechanisms of Europeanization: institutional compliance, changing opportunity structures, and framing of domestic beliefs and expectations. While institutional compliance denotes that the EU prescribes a particular framework imposed on member states, changing opportunity structures allows for a redistribution of resources between national actors. Finally, the framing of integration is influ-ential in that it modifies the beliefs and the common understandings of domestic policy-makers. The European impact dismantles the structure of old coalitions of interest and traditional circuits of decision-making, while at the same time forcing changes and adaptations.

In a broader sense, Europeanization refers to exporting beyond European territory forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe, making European developments a key for understanding the rest of the world (Olsen, 2002: 924). The worldwide acceptance of the idea of the territorial state is a crucial example of this kind of Europeanization. While sometimes the diffusion of European models occurred through coercive mechanisms such as colonization, it has also taken the form of imitation and voluntaristic borrowing. As in most of the colonial experiences, European institutions penetrated and destroyed the institutions of other countries and undermined the coherence of established polities and societies. In response, the European expansion created political counter-mobilization and confrontations. In some cases, such as the Ottoman reform process, the receivers copied European models because of their perceived functionality, utility, and legitimacy. This was basically the diffusion pattern in the 20th and the 21st centuries, which mainly depended on the func-tionality of European forms and models of governance. Imitation is not mere mimicry; it follows a certain political logic as the diffusion process involves the distribution of power and capabilities and takes place within a framework of resources, incentives, and sanctions (Olsen, 2002: 937–40).

However, in order to better capture the conceptual significance of European-ization, the current level that the postwar transformation of governing structures in Europe has reached as a result of the integration process requires special emphasis. Marks et al. (1996) observed a structural transformation in Europe from the early 1980s onward, leading to a new form of polity, namely multilevel governance, which is defined by the multiplicity of governing levels – local, regional, national, and supranational – and the variety of actors, such as ethnic and regional groups, associations, and economic interests, operating across those levels. Underlining the capacity of subnational movements to transcend nation-states and to find autonomous recognition at the European level as a result of this multi-level governance structure, Hooghe and Marks (2001: 78) state that, "in the EU, domestic and international politics are almost seamless." A recent White Paper on European governance, proposing to open up the policy-making process to involve more people and organizations in shaping and delivering

EU policy, denotes a complete recontextualization of politics and transformation of political structures in Europe.[1] Currently, nation-states are incorporated into the European institutional scheme by reshaping territorial structures, empowering subnational governing levels, and mobilizing social and political movements.[2]

Moreover, the process of Europeanization shows its distinctive feature, which is the transformation of the power balances in the domestic polity, in the very process of the implementation of European directives and regulations. As Schmitter (1996: 35) predicted, "their effective implementation will still depend on the *bonne volonté* of a very divergent set of national, provincial and local agencies." However, rather than instruments of control, such as customs officials, policemen, or enforcement agencies, the EU relies mainly on the growth of institutional rules, the Court's interpretation, and the functioning of the market to prevent the passive resistance of national actors through delays, lax interpretation, fraud, corruption of the original goals, and the ill will of judicial authorities. Europeanization actually turns all political actors – subnational social and political movements, economic interest groups, and European citizens in general – into potential defenders of Community policies.

Perceived in terms of growing societal pressures and human rights issues with transnational dimensions, the challenge Turkey presently faces also has deeper roots in the transformation of state structures in Europe. Turkey increasingly feels the pressure of Europeanization toward the reform of the state and the creation of institutional mechanisms to channel denationalized social dynamics and allow adaptation to European norms. After almost a century, the Republic seems to have been successful in state-building and nation-building, having created a centralized administration and national economic structures as well as paths for bringing ethnic and religious groups into this institutional edifice. However, European governance brings with it a tremendous challenge: how to mobilize the civil society groups that were excluded from the centers of power by the fervent Westernization under the Republic. These include ethnic and religious communities, business, and revisionist political movements and parties. In this sense, the depth of the European impact on Turkish politics is more profound than is envisaged by the framework established by democratic conditionality that defines the EU strategy toward the accession countries. The reform packages issued by Turkey under European pressure challenge the very core of state power.

Furthermore, the European impact on Turkey is spontaneous and structural. It is closely related to the transformation of European governance in the sense that each time governing structures radically change in Europe, Turkey faces the dramatic challenges caused by these radical changes. European governance, as conceived throughout this article, has a two-century-long trajectory, from nation-state to the creation of a multilevel polity in Europe. When conceived in terms of their own two-century-long trajectory, both the Ottoman Empire and the Kemalist Republic had to deal with the impact of crucial changes in European governance. The redefinition of political community, the territorial restructuring of the state, and the recognition of the social, cultural, and political heterogeneity of the people are such changes. The pressure of Europeanization transformed the relations between democracy, civil society, and the state. This was evident in the transition from a multiethnic and multireligious empire to a republican regime in which citizens participated in a particular national order

defining a specific assembling of subnational interest groups vis à vis the state. Today the pressure of Europeanization in Turkey requires a shift from the sovereign, territorially delimited state to a more politically inclusive community. The European impact on Turkish politics not only provides new opportunity structures for democratizing forces, but also contributes to the state's ability to create the necessary mechanisms of governance for these challenging bottom-up processes.

As the "old" theories of the European integration process are too state-centric, "Europeanization" better explains the domestic transformation in Turkey by including societal factors in the framework of analysis. Similarly, the conditionality, designed by the EU to govern the adaptation of the accession countries to EU norms and regulations, provides us with only a partial explanation of the recent political transformation in Turkey (Schimmelfenning et al., 2003). However, Europeanization – and the multilevel governance concept – serve both as a normative narrative for countries such as Turkey in the accession process and as an empirical condition describing the social, political, and institutional transformation currently underway in the EU. In particular, the process of Europeanization changes and restructures interactions, helps transnational networks to emerge, and increasingly provides a new opportunity structure for civil society inside Turkey (Diez et al., 2005).

European (and also transnational) institutions have become very active in Turkey's national political scene from the 1980s onward as anchors of a process of political transformation largely driven by domestic actors (Tocci, 2005). In this sense, Europeanization, this new element, in addition to providing new opportunity structures for societal forces that had been previously marginalized (Kubicek, 2005: 374), becomes related to other structural elements, such as political ideology (identity politics), the legal system, and the party system, and stimulates changes in them all, finally triggering internal reforms. European channels are the pathways of such influence.

Instead of focusing solely on the quality of change, this article deals analytically with the specific reasons for the changes and the European conditions that have triggered such transformations in Turkey. In our framework of analysis, the European impact shows itself in two ways. Not only does the EU pressure Turkey toward the adoption of EU governance rules and structures, but it also provides opportunity structures that have enabled civil society to influence the Turkish polity and politics toward reform and democratization in a much more effective way. The EU's impact is structural in the sense that it has strengthened civil society actors, created for them a sphere for maneuver, and radically altered the context of political activity in Turkey. The transformation of Turkey's politics with respect to the principles of Europeanization and EU multilevel governance is occurring under direct pressure from the EU accession process and the influence of the societal factor mobilized through the political opportunity structures generated by this process and by the EU.

In sum, this article, while moving forward chronologically, simultaneously explores three different but related topics: how Europe has always had an impact on Turkey and why this impact is structural in nature; how Europeanization and the emergence of multilevel governance in the EU trigger democratization in Turkey; and why the current European impact goes beyond what we might expect from conditionality as an operational mechanism. In this context, addressing the

current debates in the Europeanization literature, the immediate theoretical questions that the article asks are generally "why?" and "how?" in seeking to explain which causal mechanisms and which specific conditions are responsible for the structural impact of the EU on Turkey's polity and politics.

The Pressure of Europeanization: A Two-Century-Long Tanzimat

Phase 1: Ottoman Reform in the 19th Century

There have been impressive attempts to analyze the processes of the modernization and secularization of Ottoman/Turkish political structures of the 19th century (Berkes, 1964; Findley, 1980; Lewis, 1961; Mardin, 1962; Zürcher, 1993). The Ottoman polity was modernized to cope with the political/institutional superiority of the European Great Powers as they moved toward the eastern Mediterranean from the early 19th century onward.[3] While European strength vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire became evident with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, the revolutionary ideas and nationalism inspired by the French Revolution infiltrated and mobilized the nations under Ottoman rule.[4] The reformist sultans and bureaucrats of the 19th century carried out a reform process which was given the name Tanzimat (Regulations).[5] Its immediate aim was to "save the state" and bring the Empire back to its old victorious days.[6] At the time the Empire was composed of culturally autonomous nationalities bound to each other by very loose administrative ties and a social space clearly divided into sectors of activity according to religious criteria. It was transformed as a result of radical changes in the economy and education.[7] While European economic penetration mobilized the already existing ethnic/religious groups toward creating their own nation-states,[8] the education of the Muslim population to provide the necessary staff for the expanding military and bureaucracy created a class of intellectuals and bureaucrats who linked their fate to that of the Empire.

The promotion of Ottomanism as a counter-ideology to nationalism, the reform of provincial administration, and an Ottoman constitution constituted the major elements of Ottoman reform efforts. The Ottomans tried to respond to the spread of nationalism in their territories with Ottomanism, based on identification with the Empire and the granting of full equality to non-Muslim subjects. The Tanzimat leaders believed that to save the Empire an egalitarian citizenship, a feeling of brotherhood, and a concept of patriotism had to be cultivated. The Rescript of Gulhane of November 3, 1839 (proclaiming security of life, liberty, and property), the Reform Edict of 1856, the nationality law of 1869, and the 1876 Constitution were all products of their reform efforts (Salzman, 1999: 45–51). Rather than religious ties and communitarian relations, Tanzimat brought an idea of citizenship on a purely territorial basis, celebrating the equality and brotherhood of all Ottoman subjects (Davison, 1954). However, the challenge of nationalist movements to the Ottoman system was more profound than was understood by the Tanzimat leaders, who regarded them simply as the result of dissatisfaction with local conditions, foreign provocation, or banditry.

The Ottomans realized that one of the most important reasons for European political strength was the organizational basis of the European nation-states. This led them to organize the government through a rational division of tasks and the creation of enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with ordinances and improve policy-making, coordination, and planning (Lewis, 1961: 40–128).

They also saw that improving public administration in the provinces would strengthen the implementation of reforms and remove the major source of subjects' discontent. A centralized system was needed to prevent the exploitation of the population by local landlords and increase the government revenues required for the reforms. However, a level of autonomy of local government was necessary for an efficient administration and in order to confront nationalism. Thus Midhat Pasa, a leading reformer in the circle of intellectuals and bureaucrats called the Young Ottomans and considered the most talented administrator of the Tanzimat, who was appointed to govern a model province of the Danube, did what he could to convert the Empire into a kind of federal state similar to Bismarck's Germany when confronted with the danger of separatism (Davison, 1954). Similarly, Reşit Paşa (1800–58), a major architect of Tanzimat reforms,[9] gave different degrees of authority to provincial governors according to their needs. The Province Law of 1864, modeled on the French system of departments, was issued to strengthen provincial administration. Redrawing the boundaries of provinces to make larger units and subdividing them hierarchically into sanjaks, kazas, nahiyes, communes, and villages, the administrative reform reorganized the governor's office into departments of civil, financial, police, political, and legal affairs (Ortaylı, 1983b). However, it soon became clear that constitutional changes and administrative reforms would not satisfy the Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians living under Ottoman rule: the desire for independence was at the core of their dissatisfaction.

Tanzimat also initiated a power struggle within the governing elite. This power struggle between the elite of the ancien régime, mainly composed of ulema and the heads of the religious communities, and the reforming bureaucrats was resolved in favor of the bureaucracy. The Rescript of Gulhane actually initiated a new century of Bab-i Ali (Ortaylı, 1983c]: 77–107) during which the Westernizing bureaucrats were the dominant figures of politics in the Empire. While centralization strengthened the bureaucrats with knowledge of Western languages, the secularization of education and law, and the bureaucratization process – such as making the Sheyhulislam an officer of the government and creating separate government departments to control charitable foundations – it also gradually reduced the powers of the elite of the ancient regime, the ulema. Tanzimat, which could be regarded as the first phase of the Europeanization of the Ottoman/Turkish polity, also produced serious resistance and reactions from established circles. A reactionary plot (Kuleli) organized in 1859 was an important example of this resistance, showing how the reforms provided a pretext for reactions based on support of Shariat.[10] The organizers of this plot, who included army officers, Muslim theologians, and students, denounced the government for its reform edicts prepared in overt submission to foreign influence. The incident revealed a major dilemma that the Ottoman/Turkish modernizers continuously faced: how to explain to the wider elite and the public that the reforms were being made to strengthen and save the state, not to submit it to foreign (mainly European) influence.

One of the main problems of Tanzimat was how to institutionalize the limits of the Sultan's power, realized in the Constitution of 1876 formulated by Midhat Pasha. However, even in this case the Europeanization of Ottoman political structures was never more than partial. Considering their ideas as a significant step of intellectual modernization beyond the West, Mardin (1962: 396–99) observed

that their feeling of "saving the state" – and their trust in the ability of existing institutions based on Islam to adapt themselves to the changes in the Empire – was so strong that the idea of representative government never attracted sufficient energy and determination. When the Sultan suspended the Constitution, the Young Ottomans silently accepted administrative posts instead of inciting a new revolt. Weiker (1968: 451–70) argues that the failure to understand the social context of European modernization made bureaucrats blind to the modifications in the Ottoman social structure that would be necessary to implement more serious reforms. However, observing some inevitable failures but criticizing the misconception that the reforms were ineffective, Lewis concludes that, "by 1871, the reform had already gone far enough to make a simple policy of reversion to the past impracticable. The destruction of the old power had been too thorough for any restoration to be possible; for better or for worse, only one path lay before Turkey, that of modernization and Westernization" (Lewis, 1961: 128).

Phase II: Consolidating Reform in the 20th Century

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was a prelude to the consolidation of the reform process of the previous century. Noticing the change in the Great Powers' strategy toward the partition of the Empire, the Young Turks moved against the regime of Abdulhamid II and restored the constitution, thinking that this would calm the non-Muslim subjects, prevent foreign provocations, and save the Empire (Ahmad, 1996: 4; Edip, 1930: 98–9). However, the Young Turk regime soon turned into a period of turbulence with a series of wars, conspiracies, provincial rebellions, and violent intercommunal clashes (Emin, 1930; Kansu, 2000). The Empire was finally drawn into World War I and collapsed. The birth of the Republic was sequential. The Lausanne Treaty signed between the Allied Powers and Turkey in July 1923, after the four-year nationalist struggle, brought an end to the Empire and recognized the creation of a new state under the leadership of Kemal. Out of wartime anarchy, external invasion, and the danger of disintegration, the Republic emerged as a Hobbesian state of security.[11] This security discourse, arising from the fear of an external plot to dismantle Turkey, became an integral part of the governmental discourse and strategy of the Kemalist regime in the following decades.

The new state as a political regime was based on six principles – republicanism, nationalism, laicism, populism, reformism, and étatism. Designed by its charismatic leader, Kemal, it forcefully consolidated the modernization of political structures and the secularization process of the 19th century. Founding a new state modeled on the European examples of nation-state was, in the logic of the Kemalist Republic, intended to realize a complete Westernization (actually Europeanization) of the social, cultural, and political spheres in Turkey. Underlining the continuity between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic, Ortaylı (1983a: 26) claims that one of the main reasons for the Republic's radicalism was the moderate character of the Ottoman reform process. Based on those six principles, the Republic emerged as a nationalist institutional edifice, completing the secularization process of the previous century and earning its place in Turkish history as an agent of political modernization and economic development. Recognizing only one form of identity, namely Turkish, the new state accepted the sovereignty of the people forming the nation as its basis and absolutely rejected the traditional polity by abolishing the sultanate and caliphate. It unified the legal and education systems,

abolished religious orders, and took control of religion. Finally, adopting an organic conception of state–society relations, the state initiated a major program of economic development and rejected social divisions on any grounds.[12]

When it is assessed from a current perspective, it is clear that, rather than democratization, the modernization of the state and secularization underlay the main dynamics of the Ottoman/Turkish reform process. The transition to a multiparty regime was a result of the pressure of post-war democratization in the West conditioning the growing rivalry within the governing elite after the death of Kemal in 1938 (Karpat, 1959). Later the regime adapted itself to changes by selectively incorporating social, cultural, and ethnic differences in the country and providing impressive economic growth.[13] When party mechanisms were unable to channel the political challenges brought by urbanization and industrialization, the basic structures of the Kemalist regime were enforced by military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Turkey was incorporated into the international system during the Cold War, becoming a member of international institutions and situating itself in the Western Alliance. In this context, while becoming a member of NATO secured its frontiers, Turkey signed an association agreement with the EC in 1963, establishing the main connection between Turkey and the EU and serving as the main mechanism of European impact. The Council of Europe – of which Turkey was a founding member in 1948 – acted as an additional arena for Turkey's incorporation into Western structures. The Turkish elite conceived relations with the EC in terms of two integral goals of the Republic: the continuation of a two-century-long process of secularization and ensuring a supportive instrument of national economic development (Eralp, 1993, 1994).

These ideals highlighted the cultural and economic basis of Turkey's European vocation since its radical inception through the Kemalist revolution of the 1920s. However, as relations with the EC were conceptualized in terms of national goals or as a foreign policy concern, only the postwar European transformation leading to radical changes in the state structures toward multilevel governance and its immediate effects on Turkey's political structure received close consideration. The governing elite were unable to understand and cope with the full extent of the centrifugal challenges now being posed to the nation-state. Turkey's closed economic structure and political system were coupled with security concerns under the Cold War conditions. The Cold War in the postwar era froze external relations but defined the context of the political struggle with fierce clashes between the Left and Right. Developmentalist understanding corresponded well with the underlying logic of the statist economy and empowered the bureaucracy further vis-à-vis the economic classes.

The post-1980 period requires special attention if the process of Europeanization is to be understood. While the international power structure was gradually transformed and the EU became much more proactive in transforming neighboring countries, the liberalization of the Turkish economy brought serious challenges from outside and mobilized domestic economic, social, and political powers toward further democratization.

Phase III: Democratization in the Post-1980 Period

Turkey entered the 1980s with the third military coup in the history of the Republic, this time intended to create a stabilization program which would compel the regime to accept a radical break in political and economic terms. The relations with the

EC gained significant momentum with Turkey's membership application in 1987, an application consistent with the social changes taking place and the gradual emergence of democratic governance (re-established in November 1983).

Together with a new political system, the new regime introduced an economic system fundamentally different from the previous one of import substitution. The membership application to the EC engineered by the Özal government was actually a strategic decision aimed at opening European markets for Turkish exporters. The business community and the governing elite also saw the desperate necessity of adapting to global norms, not only in the economy but also in politics, by completely restoring democracy. In this sense, relations with the EC occupied a crucial place on the agenda of the business community and the government. Deepening the relations with the EC was regarded as a significant step toward re-establishing the connections of Turkey with the global economy that had been cut off as a result of the coup in 1980.[14]

Coupled with the liberalization of the economy, a growing civil society, formed by economic, religious, and ethnic groups with transnational linkages mainly located in Europe, began to bring serious challenges to the Turkish political structure in the post-1980 period (Alpay, 2004; Kalaycıoğlu, 2004). The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s accelerated the dramatic changes already underway in the economy and politics. The increasingly loud voice of civil society owed a great deal to its transnational character. All of the domestic conflicts of Turkey have manifested themselves in the organizational landscape of various European countries, such as Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and the EU. Turkey's domestic conflicts penetrated to European borders in particular through migrant linkages. The economic, social, cultural, and political activities of Turkish diaspora groups in various European countries are widely documented (Abadan-Unat, 1997; Camuroglu, 1998; Gitmez and Wilpert, 1987; Lyon and Ucarer, 2005; Ögelman, 2005; Poyraz, 2005; Rath, 1988; Soysal, 1997; Şahin, 2005). The associational and political activities of the migrants in Europe vary from economic and cultural ones to those devoted to supporting or opposing the political regime in Turkey.[15] The responses of the European countries to those activities have varied over time and according to circumstances. For instance, the penetration of Turkey's domestic conflicts into Europe was so strong that Germany strictly banned all organizations tied to or associated with the PKK terrorist organization in 1993. The meeting of the Kurdish Parliament in exile in The Hague, the capital city of the Netherlands, on April 12, 1995 was another manifestation of Turkey's domestic politics at the European level.[16] In all cases, the democratic and free associational life of the European countries provided valuable political spaces for Turkish migrants.

The European integration process further expanded this political space for the migrants in general and the Turkish migrants in particular. For instance, a simple search for words such as "Turkey," "Alevi," and "Kurd" in EU documents leads to an impressive number of resolutions, interrogations, speeches, and other manifestations of Turkey's domestic problems in the European Parliament (EP). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s various MPs and political groups in the Parliament held debates regarding political conflicts indigenous to Turkey, even as the EP was gaining power within the EC/EU decision-making structure as a result of the Single European Act (1986) and the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) (Tsebelis, 1990). The acceptance of Turkey as an official membership candidate

at the EU's Helsinki Summit in 1999 significantly contributed to the increasing European involvement in Turkey's political problems, which had hitherto been regarded as domestic affairs. Treating Turkey's internal political developments as integral parts of European public spheres, EU representatives like Günter Verheugen and Olli Rehn responded to the questions of EP deputies relating to ethnic and religious conflicts in Turkey, now formally an accession country. As far as the formal and informal channels of the EU decision-making structure permit, MEPs have tried throughout the accession process to push the European Commission and the Council to exert serious pressure on Turkey to improve the living conditions and the social, cultural, and political rights of the Alevi and Kurdish communities.[17]

In fact, the Europeanization of Turkish domestic politics showed itself clearly in the growing tensions between Turkey and the EU as the country's political problems, such as the Kurdish question, gradually became problems for Europe. The EC became an important interlocutor for their resolution in this period. The military regime in Turkey was subjected to serious pressure for an immediate return to democracy and the restoration of the multiparty regime from the major European institutions such as the Council of Europe, the EC, and Amnesty International.[18] The EC's criticism of the human rights situation in Turkey became much fiercer with the country's application for membership in April 1987, contributing to the rise of European public interest in Turkey's politics (Arıkan, 2003: 114–25). As mentioned above, the EP, in particular, insisted on specific political and legal reforms regarding human rights and democratization just after the submission of the membership application, with a series of EP resolutions underlining that, in addition to the lack of parliamentary democracy and respect for human rights, Turkey's policies toward the Armenians, Kurds, Greece, and Cyprus were serious barriers to EU membership.[19]

This post-1980 period was characterized by three major challenges to the regime in Turkey: 1. the increasing pressure from the private sector on political ques-tions, such as democratization and the reform of the state; 2. a visible Islamization of social and economic life, culminating in the rise of the Welfare Party against the fervent secularist trends of the previous decades; and 3. the Kurdish problem, leading to a dramatic ethnic clash in the southeast and the questioning of the territorial integrity of the state.

One of the most important responses within Turkey came from TUSIAD, the main organization of large businesses in Istanbul, which emerged as a leading pro-democratizing force, issuing various reports on democratization that emphasized Turkey's European perspective together with the necessity of socializing Turkish citizens to accept basic EU norms in the social and political spheres. Faced with a failing state and the necessity of creating a consensus among the major social forces in Turkey for a radical reform initiative, TUSIAD made a wide range of proposals such as the reform of the constitution and party system, the demilitarization of politics, and the granting of language rights to Kurds.[20] The EU accession process provided the business community with external leverage to push the long-standing reform initiatives delayed by successive governments.

The religiously oriented Welfare Party was another crucial challenger on the Turkish political scene in the post-1980 period (Yavuz, 1997). This party's increasing popularity corresponded to the growing economic rivalry between Istanbul and the rest of the country, as shown by the rise of the MUSIAD – the Association of

Independent Industrialists and Businessmen – as a competing business organization to TUSIAD (Öniş, 1997). In this context, the relations between Turkey and the EC crystalized the domestic power struggle between the mainstream parties and newcomers to the Turkish political scene. The improvement of relations with the EC was considered crucial to sustaining Turkey's "Europeanness" against the Islamists (Eder, 1999). However, the Islamists saw that the EU presented a political opportunity structure which would enable them to challenge Kemalist secularism. This explains the Welfare Party's pro-EU turn (Tanıyıcı, 2003: 476–8) and the rise of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) as a leading party in the pro-EU coalition of forces in the post-2002 period (Dağı, 2005: 28–33).

In this period, the Kurdish question also became a major source of contention in EU–Turkey relations, particularly because of its transnational character. Turkey's Kurdish problem had been Europeanized through the media, a Kurdish parliament in exile, the activities of cultural institutes, and financial contributions to the guerrilla movement in Turkey from Kurds living in Europe. Kurdish activism derived significant support from European politicians and attracted the attention of European institutions such as the EP (Van Bruinessen, 1998, 2000: 27–8). In this context, the opportunity structures provided by the EU created a sphere of political maneuver for the Kurdish movement. European pressures on Turkey produced a path-breaking reform package in August 2002, in which capital punishment was abolished and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish – mainly Kurdish – was accepted.

EU leverage and the political opportunity structures provided by the accession process also Europeanized identity politics in the domestic sphere, as the Alevi movement demonstrates. The emergence and expansion of Alevi organizations beyond the boundaries of Turkey created significant pressure on Turkey's policies toward Alevis, beginning in the 1960s in Germany as Turkish migrants developed active enclaves and associations. By the late 1980s Alevi associations flourished in other European countries as well and the opportunity structures of the European integration process created a new context for the reinvigoration of the Alevi movement, especially as Turkey struggled to join the EU (Şahin, 2005: 474–8; Van Bruinessen, 1996).

The Helsinki Summit of the European Council in 1999 marked a major break both for Turkey–EU relations and the process of democratization in Turkey. The summit confirmed the candidate status of Turkey and placed Turkey within the framework of conditionality that defined the EU strategy toward the candidates for membership (Schimmelfenning et al., 2003: 506–9; Ugur, 2003: 165–83). While the EU showed its willingness to share the burden of convergence by setting up an accession partnership, Turkey was obliged to undertake two major commitments: the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria, designed in 1993 to ensure a candidate's adoption of EU norms, and the resolution of border problems in accordance with the UN Charter or through the International Court of Justice.[21] Searching for ways to resolve the border problems with Greece and the Cyprus issue, Turkey made significant constitutional changes in August 2002, including the abolition of the death penalty, the granting of property rights to minority foundations, and allowing freedom of expression in languages other than Turkish. Under the pressure of these reforms, the coalition government led by Bülent Ecevit collapsed. The elections of November 2002 resulted in victory for the JDP.[22]

The new government, although disappointed by the Council decision on Turkey in December 2002, was able to pass four major reform packages between January and July 2003, including crucial reforms in the areas of freedom of expression, cultural rights, freedom of association, and civilian control of the military.[23] While acknowledging the government's determination to accelerate the reform process, the Commission concluded, however, in its 2003 report, that the implementation of reforms was uneven.[24] Following the Commission's 2003 Report, Turkey progressed in the reform process through legislative changes and undertook measures to ensure the proper implementation of reforms relating to the fight against torture, freedom of expression, women's rights, trade union rights, and minority rights.[25] In its Communication to the Council in October 2004, the Commission considered that Turkey had sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria and recommended the opening of accession negotiations, while underlining that "the irreversibility of the reform process, its implementation in particular with regard to fundamental freedoms, would need to be confirmed over a long period of time."[26] The Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on December 17, 2004, and negotiations effectively started on October 3, 2005.

The recent changes in Turkish politics, as verified in the Commission's regular reports on Turkey, are actually a result of the mobilization of subnational ethnic and religious groups in Turkey at the European level. This situation is particularly evident in the last three Reports on Turkey (2005, 2006, and 2007) regarding the legal personality, property rights, and internal management of non-Muslim religious communities, the status of Alevis, and the broadcasting of Kurdish and other languages.[27] The pressure on Turkey to Europeanize is greater than ever and is now defined as adapting to European norms and governance structures that challenge the centrality of the nation-state and creating an institutional basis permitting ethnic and religious groups to make their political demands. This requires Turkey to engage seriously with the capacity of subnational social and political actors at the European level.

Examining how religious or ethnic minorities, separatists, neoliberals, state bureaucrats, and the military each determine the meaning of the terms "state," "nation," "civil society," and "multilevel governance" in the light of Turkey's European vocation makes it possible to delineate the parameters of change in state–society relations in Turkey. Those directing the change assume that the transformation of state structures and the rise of multilevel governance will constitute a bottom-up process rather than a top-down effect. Therefore, the European impact on the Turkish political structure will actually go deeper than the framework established by democratic conditionality. The coming decades will leave little space for Turkish governments wishing to deal with regional and local administrations and sustain the political community in the traditional way. The ongoing search for various ways of incorporating political pluralism into a redistribution of power from the center to the periphery and of strengthening civil society networks and articulating them with new political party lines to the governmental machinery is producing a very serious modern alternative.

An Overall Assessment of the Turkish Response to the European Challenge

After the French Revolution the Ottomans initiated an ambitious process of reform in an effort to create a state having the same organizational and ideological

strength as nation-states in Europe. In addition to reforms in the military and education, the Ottomans created a centralized administrative structure to govern effectively, attempted to apply a novel idea of citizenship based on equality and territoriality as opposed to separatist nationalism, and established a legal-institutional infrastructure to protect the rights of citizens. This institutional, legal, and ideological transformation restored the rule of the state vis-à-vis local and peripheral challenges and brought a series of political changes, leading to a limitation of the sultan's power by means of a constitution. However, under the pressure of European economic penetration and institutional superiority, the reform process carried out by the Ottomans could not sustain the state as it was. The Empire was dramatically challenged by separatist nationalism and gradually disintegrated. Defeated in a series of wars, it eventually collapsed during the Great War. However, this process of collapse went hand in hand with a process of revival. The nation-state in Turkey owed its organizational, institutional, and ideological strength mainly to the reform process initiated in the early 19th century and consolidated under the Republican regime. The Turkish experience corresponds to a multidimensional transformation of the state from a monarchy to a republic and from a multiethnic and multiconfessional population to a Turkish identity. In this first phase of Europeanization, democracy played a marginal role compared to modernization and secularization.

Today, Turkey is again under the pressure of Europeanization, which is coupled with the transformation of basic governing structures in Europe from nation-state to multilevel governance. Like the nation-state in the 19th century, Europeanization and multilevel governance today have structural impacts beyond the boundaries of Europe. Turkey is the first country to receive this impact as a challenge to its existing governing structures and mentalities, because of its geographical proximity to Europe, historical sensitivity to the changes in Europe, and its legal-institutional ties with the EU. After almost a century, the nation-state in Turkey faces an enormous challenge in trying to maintain its institutional monopoly while assembling ethnic and religious groups into a coherent identity. The mobilization of subnational groups at the European level seriously challenges the political project on which the nation-state in Turkey relies. Requiring a transformation of the Turkish state along European lines, Europeanization brings with it the radical institutional, legal, and political reforms needed to absorb the challenges of new governing structures in Europe and to channel the societal pressures coming from the peripheral areas. In contrast to previous periods, the distinctive feature of Turkey's current process of Europeanization is the installation of a radical democracy with rules, procedures, practices, mentalities, and guiding principles of governance. Today democratization constitutes the essence of Europeanization in Turkey.

Europeanization conditions profound changes in Turkish politics by providing channels of political opportunity to those societal sectors, such as Kurdish nationalists, Islamists, and other religious and ethnic groups, seeking autonomous representation and recognition, claims hitherto hindered by zealous top-down Westernization under the Republic. The redefinition of the political community, the empowerment of civil society, and territorial restructuring allowing for multilevel governance are all part of the package. There must be new opportunity structures supporting grass-roots participation and associability for societal forces such as the Kurdish nationalists and the Islamists. Extensive

denationalization of civil society – as stimulated by the operation of actors beyond Turkey's boundaries, mainly in Europe – brings new pressures for the creation of meso-governments at local and regional levels that are carefully integrated into the national government and function transparently, and the introduction of a broader idea of citizenship with respect to the recognition of ethnic and religious pluralism in Turkey.

The current reform efforts initiate an extremely delicate process for consolidating a democratic regime radically different from the previous one. Leaving aside the critical decisions on the abolition of capital punishment and the property rights of minority foundations, the acceptance of the use, education in, and broadcasting of languages other than Turkish has proved to be a path-breaking reform in terms of acknowledging the existence of, and accepting, flourishing identities other than the Turkish identity. The overarching Turkish identity defended by the fervent Westernization and modernization process is now challenged by Kurdish reactions, Alevi demands, and religious and ethnic pluralism. Different from the 19th century experience that brought institutional renovation and secularization to the Ottoman lands, today Europeanization is radically altering Turkey's political structure by initating a profound process of democratization, together with a return to the recognition of ethnic and religious pluralism, and this represents a major step away from a coherent Turkish identity. This process is not just a governmental enterprise or a top-down project. It mainly relies on bottom-up initiatives and on how vital political forces of society use, exploit, and exercise the opportunity structures set up by the reform packages.

The institutionalization of new governing structures and the consolidation of a radical democracy initiated by the reforms will inevitably be met with resistance by the guardians of the established political system in Turkey, as was the case in the 19th century Ottoman experience. The present Turkish experience is comparable to the Ottoman experience in terms of the sources, nature, and dilemmas of the reform process. The 19th century Ottoman experience provides us with some crucial clues as to the existence of a certain tension between the major sources of citizens' discontent and the efforts of state reform. These reforms did not adequately address the major causes of discontent among citizens, mainly because of the superficial treatment of problems by Ottoman officials whose chief motive was to save the state rather than seriously deal with the real problems and because the state reforms were imposed by outside powers. This is also true of the current Turkish reform process. Although the reform packages challenge the core of state power, the implementation of the reforms still seems uneven in areas such as freedom of expression and minority rights. In this sense, the AKP's policies are still in line with previous hesitant steps toward reform. As in the case of the modernization/Europeanization pattern of the Ottoman/Turkish reform process, there is a clear "path dependency" in this context of the resistances and the hesitancy to take firm steps toward reforming state structures and achieving democratization. Governing elites instrumentalized the processes of modernization/Europeanization in order to sustain their gate-keeping power rather than seriously dealing with the real democratic content.

European attitudes have also significantly contributed to the evolution of the fragile process of reform and democratization in Ottoman/Turkish politics in negative directions. As mentioned above, the main dilemma of the Ottoman/Turkish reform process has been the perception that Turkey is conducting this reform process under European pressure. This situation, while significantly

weakening its domestic dynamics, also provokes serious domestic resistance to the reform process. Throughout the first phase of Europeanization, the resistance was in the form of religious reactions. In the second phase, during which the reforms gained significant momentum in the aftermath of the post-1999 period, the internalization of the reform process has been uneven, in particular because of the lack of commitment by the governing elite, including the bureaucracy and a significant segment of Turkish society. Currently the EU's ambiguous position regarding Turkey's candidacy and the uncertainty regarding the outcome of membership negotiations contribute significantly to this situation and may seriously hinder the internal reform process. The process of democratization underway is extremely vulnerable to changes in the relations with the EU, which are still far from stable and do not permit assurances of steady progress toward membership. The EU negotiation strategy, framed by an unclear timetable and membership perspective, the emergence of discourses offering alternatives to membership for Turkey such as privileged partnership, and the perception that some of the leading EU members are absolutely against Turkey's membership on cultural grounds are seriously hampering Turkey's current process of change and adaptation toward more democratic standards of governance.

Turkey's democracy is still fragile and far from being consolidated. The EU strategy is exacerbating this already fragile situation. The uncertainty in Turkey–EU relations seriously affects the internal dynamism of the reform process and produces resistance to democratization. Inhibiting the societal aspects by excessively tying its dynamics to the prospect of EU membership, the reform process becomes extremely vulnerable to the still ambiguous European attitude toward Turkey. Furthermore, the present EU strategy fuels Eurosceptic feelings and seriously weakens the commitment of the pro-reform coalition of forces to push for the process of democratization. Alarming in terms of the prospects for implementing the already issued reform packages, the extremely shaky nature of the rewards promised at the end of the negotiation process contributes to the sharp decline of the EU's credibility within the governing elite and the wider public. The EU, which was once a significant external force for reform and democratization in the post-1980 period, is in danger of turning into a counter-instrument in the hands of the conservative circles ready to halt the deepening of democracy because of the EU's incoherent strategy toward Turkey. Even though membership negotiations began in October 2005, European credibility as an agency instigating deeper democratization is becoming extremely low. The present challenge in Turkey is whether the unity of the historic block of democratic forces can be maintained and the transformations required for the adoption of the new forms of multilevel governance can be shared and carried out by a larger section of the elite and the public under the current very hazy perspective of EU membership.

Notes

1. "European Governance: A White Paper," Brussels [COM (2001) 428 final].
2. See the extensive "Preparatory Work for the White Paper" published by the European Commission in 2002, outlining the major signs of the emergence of a new kind of governance at the EU level and its basic characteristics, such as multilevel structure, decentralization, participation of civil society, better regulation, and transparency. European Commission (2002), Preparatory Work for the White Paper, Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Commission.

3. For a comparative perspective of the Ottoman experience with the Chinese response to Western penetration, see H. İslamoğlu, "Ottoman and Chinese Modernities Compared: State Transformations and Constitutions of Property in the Quing and Ottoman Empires," in H. İslamoğlu (2007: 119–49).
4. For the impact of the French Revolution on the Ottoman Empire, see C. Issawi, "The Costs of French Revolution," in Issawi (1998: 119–31).
5. Mardin, eminent scholar of the Ottoman–Turkish political transformation, uses "regulations" as the exact translation of Tanzimat in his monumental work on the modernization of Ottoman intellectual life in the 19th century. Tanzimat, in this context, refers essentially to restructuring of the basic properties of the state from territorial administration to the steering of economic activities with respect to the principles of 19th century liberalism and constitutionalism. See Mardin (1962: 3).
6. Initially emerging in the 19th century from the necessity to resist the impact of the French Revolution by reforming the state, "saving the state" denotes a sentimental reaction that the Ottoman/Turkish governing elites displayed when faced with the European challenge of political-institutional superiority. It conveys a spontaneous reaction of those elites to transform basic governing structures and adopt the European mode of governance, precisely by using European techniques of government.
7. Ottoman society was organized around the "millet" system, establishing a system of communities based on religious congregation as much as a social and administrative framework. Whereas non-Muslims were organized in millets according to their religious affiliations, the Muslims in the Empire belonged to the umma, the community of Muslims.
8. Non-Muslim communities remained by and large segregated from Muslim society. The capitulations, grants made to Europeans conferring rights and privileges in favor of their subjects trading in the Empire, but also in favor of some non-Muslim communities under the protection of a respective European nation, strengthened the economic situation of non-Muslims. These groups were the most likely to form a bourgeoisie in the Empire. The bourgeois segments subsequently mobilized a quest for independent nation-states for the ethnic-religious communities that they belonged to.
9. For Reşit Paşa and his time, see Kaynar (1954).
10. For this reactionary plot, organized on September 17 1859, see İğdemir (1937).
11. The aborted Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, which outlined the territorial partition of Turkey among the Allied powers, became an embodiment of Ottoman collapse and Turkish national revival. Referred to as the "Sèvres Syndrome," this historical legacy symptomatically revealed itself in Turkey–EU relations, especially when they touched upon issues of high nationalist resonance, such as minority problems.
12. For the Kemalist message, see E.J. Zürcher (1993: 189–90).
13. For the Turkish postwar democratic experience, see E. Özbudun (1976) and F. Ahmad (1977).
14. Author's interviews with Ali Tigrel (ex-ambassador and businessman) April 25, 2002; Ali Bozer (ex-minister) May 15, 2002, and Cem Duna (ex-ambassador and businessman) May 17, 2002.
15. Some of these associations include anti-regime ones such as the Islamic Union of the National View; Federation of Islamic Clubs and Communities; European Federation of the Alevi Organization; Kurdish Student's Association in Germany; Kurdish Information Network; Islamic Kurdish League; Revolutionary Workers' Party, and pro-regime ones such as the Turkish Community in Germany; European Association of Turkish Academics; Federation of Democratic Idealist Organizations in Europe. For other examples, see Abadan-Unat (1997), Ögelman (2005), and Şahin (2005).
16. Turkey responded to this act by withdrawing her ambassador from the Netherlands for a period of time.
17. See www.europarl.europa.eu/search/simple.
18. Amnesty International (1985), *Turkey: Testimony on Torture*, London; Helsinki Watch Report (1987), *State of Flux: Human Rights in Turkey*, New York.

19. European Parliament, "Resolution on Turkey," May 20, 1988, pp. 205–7.
20. See, in particular, the report entitled "Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey," İstanbul: TUSIAD, 1997.
21. EC (1999), "Presidency Conclusions," Helsinki European Council, December 11, 1999, Brussels.
22. For the November 2002 elections, see Z. Öniş and F. Keyman (2003).
23. The Commission, in its 2002 Regular Report on Turkey, underlined the country's noticeable progress on political reform, but concluded that it did not fully meet the political criteria. Subsequently, the Council in Copenhagen offered a conditional date of the end of 2004 for the opening of accession negotiations. See EC (European Commission) (2002), "Regular Report on Turkey's Progress toward Accession," Brussels, pp. 138–9 [SEC (2002) 1412], and European Council (2002), "Presidency Conclusions," Copenhagen European Council, December 12–13, 2002 [SN 400/02].
24. EC (2003), "Regular Report on Turkey's Progress toward Accession," Brussels, p. 130.
25. EC (2004), "Regular Report on Turkey's Progress toward Accession," Brussels, pp. 16–18 and 29–44.
26. EC (2004), "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament," October 6, 2004, Brussels, p. 9 [COM (2004) 656 final].
27. EC (2005), "Progress Report: Turkey," November 9 2005, Brussels; EC (2006), "Progress Report: Turkey," December 8, 2006, Brussels.

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