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# Extending Citizenship to Emigrants: Democratic Contestation and a New Global Norm

Sybil Rhodes and Arus Harutyunyan

## Abstract

We argue that the growing literature on emigrant policies should be linked to more general theoretical discussions of the expansion of formal citizenship. State responses to emigrants' claims for membership and voting rights resemble patterns of citizenship extension to other previously excluded groups, such as those without property, racial minorities, and women, insofar as emigrant citizenship has developed as a consequence of competitive regimes and international norms. We assess the 'global-norm hypothesis' (the idea that increasing emigrant inclusion has resulted from the emergence of a new international normative standard) and the 'contestation hypothesis' (the argument that higher levels of regime competition make states more likely to extend citizenship to emigrants). The latter has two associated expectations: the 'window-of-opportunity sub-hypothesis', which holds that regime transitions provide an especially propitious context for implementing emigrant citizenship, and the 'democratic-endurance sub-hypothesis', which posits that competitive regimes are likely to extend emigrant citizenship in a gradual process over time. We use a combination of statistical analysis and case studies of Armenia, Mexico, Spain, and the USA to evaluate these causal hypotheses as well as some plausible alternatives found in the literature on expatriate policies.

## Keywords

citizenship, emigrants, diasporas, voting rights, democracy

Why do some states allow their expatriates<sup>1</sup> who acquire citizenship elsewhere to maintain their original citizenship? Under what conditions do states recognize the citizenship rights (such as the franchise) of and impose obligations (such as conscription) on their emigrant populations? We argue that democratic contestation may unleash processes that eventually lead states to extend citizenship to their emigrants. We test this argument through a combination of statistical analysis and case studies of Armenia, Mexico, Spain, and the USA.

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
Recent scholarship on the relations between emigrants and their homelands has shown that many states tolerate multiple citizenship and have developed programs to channel their participation in national political, civic, and economic life (Barry, 2006; Bauböck, 2005; Brand, 2006; Escobar, 2007; Faist and Gerdes, 2008; Fitzgerald, 2008; Jones-Correa, 2001; Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003). The emerging literature has suggested numerous factors that shape countries' emigrant policies, including international law (Faist and Gerdes, 2008), home-state politics and political institutions (Lafleur, 2010), politics in host countries (Renshon, 2005; Shain, 1999–2000), economic remittances (Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003), and 're-ethnicization' (Joppke, 2005).

Even as a scholarly research program devoted to expatriate policies has developed, the study of migration has remained somewhat on the margins of political science scholarship (Bleich, 2008). We seek to demonstrate that it belongs in the mainstream. Rather than viewing programs for emigrants as a highly specific policy area, we approach them as a particular instance of the extension of citizenship to a broader section of the population within a polity, similar to the previous extension of citizenship to the un-propertied, racial minorities, women, or the illiterate. Placing our analysis at this higher level of abstraction allows us to connect the study of migration with broader questions. Specifically, we contribute to theoretical discussions about the expansion of formal citizenship in democratic regimes, an abiding normative and empirical topic in political science (Howard, 2006). Although we acknowledge that emigrants' citizenship claims may present particular practical and normative challenges in comparison with other groups, we suggest that a similar political logic may influence state officials' willingness to respond to those claims.

We employ a broad theoretical framework based on a general model of democracy as a set of institutions that enshrine competition. Competitive regimes, we argue, provide incentives for state officials to extend citizenship to emigrants, either as a preemptive, top-down strategy or in response to pressure from emigrants themselves.

Our point of departure is the observation that citizenship policy has become more inclusive over time, arguably as a result of both democratic institutions and international norms.<sup>2</sup> Liberal democracy has historically led to the expansion of citizenship rights via strategic elite initiative (Plattner, 2001), prolonged struggle by previously excluded groups (Foweraker and Landman, 1999), or both.<sup>3</sup> Studies also show that democratization provides the disenfranchised with especially auspicious conditions for making their case for citizenship. At least in the period since the Second World War, transitions to competitive regimes generally have been, almost by definition, accompanied by the extension of citizenship rights to more groups. Countries that democratized in recent decades, for example, have been unlikely to deny suffrage to large segments of the population as countries that democratized earlier did (Ramirez et al., 1997). A 'norm of universality' (Doorenspleet, 2000: 390) now holds sway.

Has emigrant citizenship also recently become normalized as part of the very definition of democracy? The percentage of countries with international absentee voting has soared over the past 35 years, as Figure 1 shows. Comparable cross-national data on the timing of dual citizenship policies are unavailable, but tolerance of dual citizenship also seems to have increased in recent decades (Faist and Gerdes, 2008). Thus, a global norm of emigrant inclusion appears to have developed some 60 years later than occurred in the case of groups more commonly cited as falling under the rubric of universal inclusion, such as women or racial minorities. However, a possible alternative explanation for at least part of the increasing slope of the curve is that it simply reflects the fact that the number of democracies has grown rapidly in recent decades. Indeed, as is also depicted in Figure 1, since the 1970s the percentage of countries with at least minimally democratic institutions has increased at about the same rate as the percentage with international absentee voting.



**Figure 1.** Percentage of Countries with International Absentee Voting (IAV) and Percentage with Democracy, 1902–2008

Note: The number of countries in the world is calculated from the Polity IV database. The number of democracies is the number of countries with Polity2 scores of 1 or higher (Marshall and Jaggers, 2006).

We call the idea that increasing emigrant inclusion has resulted from the emergence of a new international normative standard the ‘global-norm hypothesis.’ We refer to the argument that higher levels of regime competition make states more likely to extend citizenship to emigrants as the ‘contestation hypothesis,’<sup>4</sup> which in turn has two associated sub-hypotheses. First, borrowing from Ramirez et al. (1997), who found that national independence provides a ‘window of opportunity’ for the establishment of women’s suffrage, we call the argument that regime transitions provide an especially propitious context for implementing emigrant citizenship the ‘window-of-opportunity sub-hypothesis.’ Second, we refer to the idea that competitive regimes are likely to extend emigrant citizenship in a gradual process over time as the ‘democratic-endurance sub-hypothesis.’ Our analysis evaluates these four causal hypotheses as well as some plausible alternatives found in the literature on expatriate policies.

We begin with a conceptual and empirical discussion of democracy, democratic contestation (our main independent variable), and emigrant citizenship (the dependent variable). We then present an assessment of our causal hypotheses with, first, some simple statistical analysis and, second, comparative case studies of four countries (Armenia, Mexico, Spain, and the USA).

## Democracy, democratic contestation, and emigrant citizenship

Few scholars have attempted to develop systematic schemas for the empirical comparison of formal citizenship policies, whether for emigrants or for other groups. There is no large body of literature about the quantitative measurement of citizenship comparable to that about democracy, for example. Indeed, in some ways formal citizenship appears to have been subsumed by discussions in the latter literature. There are classic and recent arguments that inclusion is a crucial dimension of democracy, conceptually (Dahl, 1971) and empirically (Coppedge et al., 2008). Still, many analysts continue to evaluate democracy primarily along the contestation dimension (Przeworski et al., 2000). As Doorenspleet (2000) points out, this tendency means that the literature has characterized as democratic clearly sexist or racist regimes.

Even if we think inclusion is crucial in democracies, there are good theoretical reasons for focusing on the contestation dimension of democracy as a separate analytical category with independent causal effects. Most importantly, competition has its own dynamic. Individuals and parties who must compete in electoral contests may advocate the expansion of the electorate in order to advantage their own political fortunes.<sup>5</sup> The adoption of institutions enshrining competition also provides resources to those engaged in citizenship struggles from the bottom up, such as the chance to negotiate support from competing elites or to make their case before freer judiciaries. The establishment of competitive regimes reflects the triumph of liberal thought, which in general views the extension of citizenship in a positive light (Plattner, 2001). Finally, employing an understanding of democracy as contestation allows us to avoid making the possibly tautological argument that inclusion begets inclusion.

There is a consensus in this literature that formal citizenship is a multidimensional phenomenon, consisting of membership criteria, rights, and obligations. To construct our dependent variable, we operationalize aspects of these dimensions that are especially relevant for emigrants.

Membership (or, borrowing from Brubaker (1992), 'filing' criteria) is by most accounts the most crucial dimension of citizenship. Almost no state disqualifies people from citizenship simply because they migrate beyond territorial boundaries. States become much more concerned when their emigrants acquire membership elsewhere. Thus, from the point of view of expatriates, the toleration of dual or multiple citizenships is a key element of the membership dimension.

We created a dichotomous variable based on the 2001 report 'Citizenship Laws of the World' by the United States Office of Personnel Management Investigation Services (USOPMIS). For most countries, this source provides a categorical 'yes' or 'no' answer to whether dual citizenship is recognized by law. We coded countries which allow dual citizenship only for limited groups, such as minors or emigrants residing in just a few other countries, as not allowing dual citizenship. Some 52 countries were recorded as tolerating dual citizenship, and 125 as not tolerating it.

Although membership criteria compose the most essential dimension of citizenship, it would be a nearly empty concept if it did not also include the idea of rights. The right to political participation is the most crucial formal citizenship right, as it allows citizens to influence their governments to recognize and respect other rights.

We use data from a recent report by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and the Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico to construct an indicator for emigrant voting rights (Ellis et al., 2007).<sup>6</sup> For purposes of comparability with dual citizenship (for which we had data as of 2001), we created a dichotomous variable reflecting whether countries had formally implemented international absentee voting as of that year. Some 83 countries were coded as having international absentee voting. An additional 18 countries implemented absentee voting between 2002 and early 2008.<sup>7</sup>

Military service is by some criteria the weightiest formal obligation that states impose on their citizens. We developed a dichotomous variable measuring conscription in the world in 2002 based on data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2002–03).<sup>8</sup> This indicator is imperfect for our purposes because it does not account for possible draft exemptions for expatriates or bilateral treaties permitting dual citizens to complete their military service in their countries of residence; however, the former case is likely rare and the second still implies an obligation for diasporas. A list showing how the countries in our database were coded for tolerance of dual citizenship, international absentee voting, and conscription is provided in the Appendix.

Past scholarship on different groups' struggles for citizenship has found that, once gained, the components of citizenship enhance such groups' other claims on the state (Ramirez et al., 1997).

This finding, along with the basic normative and interest-based models of competitive democracy that inform our contestation hypothesis, suggests that the membership, rights, and obligations dimensions of emigrant citizenship should be correlated with one another. That is, if emigrant rights are recognized, home-state officials have morally and politically compelling arguments in favor of imposing obligations such as conscription or taxation. If emigrants who adopt a second citizenship feel secure in their formal right to citizenship in their home countries, they are likely to feel entitled to pressure the home state for what they may view as inherent citizenship rights, such as voting. If emigrants can vote in the home country, politicians there are likely to feel more pressure to permit dual citizenship.

There are, however, reasons to expect that states may be reluctant to extend some or all citizenship dimensions to emigrants simultaneously. Most importantly, a country with conscription may not be inclined to permit dual citizenship to emigrants because officials or the public at large are concerned about the loyalties of the would-be dual citizens in a conflict. Indeed, an older global norm opposing dual citizenship appears to have reflected precisely these and similar apprehensions (Faist and Gerdes, 2008).

Are the three components of citizenship associated with one another in the real world? Our data reveal only a small, statistically insignificant, positive correlation between dual citizenship and absentee voting in 2001. Of the 52 countries that recognized dual citizenship, 50 percent made provisions for absentee voting internationally, while of the 115 countries that did not recognize dual citizenship, 46 percent implemented international absentee voting. This substantially null correlation indicates that countries do not perceive a trade-off between the membership and rights components of emigrant citizenship and also suggests that these two policies have, to some extent, different causes.

We observe a statistically significant, but weak, positive correlation (Pearson's  $r = .16$ ;  $p$ -value = .04) between conscription and international absentee voting (in the years 2001–02). Of the 78 countries in our dataset with conscription, 56 percent allowed their citizens to vote from abroad; of the 80 countries without conscription, 40 percent had international absentee voting. Our data also reveal a similarly small, but statistically insignificant, positive relationship between acceptance of dual citizenship and conscription. Thus, we find little evidence that countries see a trade-off between the obligation of military service, on the one hand, and rights and membership, on the other. Rather, it seems that countries that expect much in the way of the obligation to serve in the armed forces provide somewhat more in the way of the right to participation.

Our overall conclusion from these three correlations is that the components of emigrant citizenship show, at best, a slight tendency to be mutually reinforcing. As is the case with citizenship in general, the different components of emigrant citizenship appear to have causes that are different to some degree.

## The determinants of emigrant membership and rights

In this section, we present a simple cross-national analysis of some of the causes of (formal recognition of) dual citizenship and (formal provisions for) international absentee voting. To test our contestation hypothesis, we use the well-known indicator of competitive democracy Polity2 from the Polity IV dataset.<sup>9</sup> Polity2 measures the existence of institutions that permit citizens to participate in political decisions and limit the abuse of executive power (Marshall and Jaggers, 2006). Polity scores do not include information on civil rights and liberties or the breadth of inclusion. Thus, using this indicator saves us from the possible tautological trap of

attempting to prove that increases in civil rights or inclusion bring about more rights or inclusion for emigrants.

If older democracies were more likely to extend emigrant citizenship, even when controlling for the level of democracy, that would support the democratic-endurance sub-hypothesis. We created an 'age of democracy' variable based on the number of years since its most recent democratization (up until 2001) that a country had remained democratic.<sup>10</sup>

We include as a control variable the level of economic development, which we measure as the log of gross domestic capital per capita in 2001 in constant 2000 international dollars.<sup>11</sup> Our expectation regarding the effect of development was that there would be a positive correlation with emigrant membership and rights, as liberal policies in general are often associated with economic development. In addition, international absentee voting in particular requires substantial fiscal and, even more importantly, bureaucratic resources, both of which are more abundant at higher levels of development (Ellis et al., 2007).

The logit regression results for dual citizenship shown in Table 1 support the contestation hypothesis. In our Model 1, contestation is positive and significant even when controlling for economic development and the age of the competitive regime. These two variables are insignificant; they are somewhat collinear ( $r = .60$ ;  $p$ -value = .000). We drop each one respectively in Models 2 and 3. As our democratic-endurance sub-hypothesis would predict, Model 2 shows that the age of the competitive regime has a significant (at the 0.10 level) positive effect. Development, on the other hand, remains insignificant in Model 3. To summarize these results, the more democratically competitive a country is and the older its democracy, the more likely it is to tolerate dual citizenship.

The same independent variables display a different pattern in a logit analysis of policies regarding international absentee voting (shown in Table 2). Neither contestation nor the age of the competitive regime reaches significance when controlling for economic development. Only economic development has a significant (positive) effect.

Available data on the year international absentee voting was implemented allow us to conduct an additional simple analysis assessing the comparative merits of the three contestation-related hypotheses and the global-norm hypothesis (Ellis et al., 2007). Table 3 displays a cross-tabulation of the number of years before or after democratization that international absentee voting was implemented in 62 countries and the historical period in which each country became democratic.<sup>12</sup>

**Table 1.** Logit Models of the Impact of Contestation, Age of Competitive Regime, and Development on Recognition of Dual Citizenship in 2001

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Contestation	0.093** (0.045)	0.102** (0.043)	0.111*** (0.043)
Age of competitive regime	0.01 (0.006)	0.01* (0.005)	
Development	0.029 (0.225)		0.206 (0.192)
Constant	-1.844 (1.791)	-1.698*** (0.295)	-3.193** (1.575)
N (countries)	141	148	141

Notes: \*  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Entries are logit regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). The number of countries varies across the models because of missing data for the development variable.

**Table 2.** Logit Model of the Impact of Contestation, Age of the Competitive Regime, and Development on International Absentee Voting in 2001

Variable	
Contestation	0.01 (0.034)
Age of competitive regime	0.006 (0.007)
Development	0.41** (0.2)
Constant	-3.49** (1.579)
N (countries)	142

Notes: \*  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Entries are logit regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses).

**Table 3.** The Implementation of International Absentee Voting Before or After Democratization, 1800–2007

Years before of after democratization that international absentee voting was implemented	Number and percentage of countries in each historical period					
	1800–1928	1929–59	1960–74	1975–89	1990–2007	Total
25 or more years before	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	2 8.00%	2 3.23%
11–24 years before	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	2 8.00%	2 3.23%
6–10 years before	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	2 8.00%	2 3.23%
1–5 years before	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	1 4.00%	1 1.61%
0–5 years after	1 6.67%	1 11.11%	0 0%	5 45.45%	12* 48.00%*	19* 30.65%*
6–10 years after	0 0%	0 0%	1 50.00%	1 9.09%	4* 16.00%*	6* 9.68%*
11–24 years after	1 6.67%	0 0%	0 0%	3 27.27%	2* 8.00%*	6* 9.68%*
More than 25 years after	13 86.67%	8 88.89%	1 50.00%	2 18.18%	–	24* 38.71%*
Total	15 100%	9 100%	2 100%	11 100%	25 100%	62 100%

Note: \* Not comparable because of right truncation.

The concentration of cases in the lower half of the table vindicates the contestation hypothesis. Almost 90 percent of the countries with international absentee voting developed the policy after the transition to a competitive political regime.

As shown in the far right column, slightly more than 30 percent of the countries implemented international absentee voting in the first five years after democratization, while about 40 percent implemented it in the first 10 years of democracy. This would appear to support the window-of-opportunity sub-hypothesis as well. However, when we look at the historical breakdown of these numbers, we see that the window of opportunity seems to apply only to recent democratizers. In



fact, at least according to available data, the development of international absentee voting during the window of opportunity occurred in only one case of an early democratizer (Australia, which implemented the policy in 1902).

The high percentages in the penultimate row indicate that if the window of opportunity passes without the implementation of international absentee voting, emigrants may be in for a struggle lasting 25 years or longer – consistent with the democratic-endurance sub-hypothesis. However, it is equally possible that these percentages reflect the influence of a global norm.

To summarize, the information in Table 3 somewhat strengthens the evidence in favor of the contestation hypothesis for international absentee voting, somewhat weakens the window-of-opportunity hypothesis, and is consistent with both the democratic-endurance and global-norm hypotheses, although it is ambiguous as to the relative weight of the latter two.

## **A qualitative assessment of emigrant citizenship in four countries**

Our statistical analysis has uncovered interesting patterns, some of which support our hypotheses. However, various types of data limitations mean that our large-*N*, cross-national approach should be viewed as exploratory. For example, we lack information on the timing of dual citizenship policies altogether and our measures fail to capture some important aspects of the complex phenomenon of emigrant citizenship, such as emigrant-specific conscription policies. Some data, for example that on the timing of international absentee voting, may be somewhat problematic, as the historical record tends to become thinner with time. We therefore offer a complementary assessment of our main hypotheses using a qualitative approach.

A strong global norm would predict that countries very different from one another in other respects would implement similar emigrant-citizenship policies around the same time (the past 35 years). We selected four countries (Armenia, Mexico, Spain, and the USA) that democratized at different times and that also vary a great deal with respect to other historical, political, economic, and demographic variables likely to affect emigration policy, in order to subject the global-norm hypothesis to a method-of-agreement test. If all four countries extended similar citizenship packages to emigrants at the same time in spite of the wide variation in other independent variables, that would support the hypothesis of a global norm. We also use within-case variation in each country to evaluate our contestation, window-of-opportunity, and democratic-endurance hypotheses, as these would predict patterns in the timing of emigrant citizenship policies based on regime transitions in each country rather than the more homogeneous trend linked to a global norm.

Another option for testing the global-norm hypothesis would have been to attempt to control for some or all of the many other plausible independent variables suggested in the literature on emigrant policies. However, if we had selected countries that were alike in all of these ways, we would have no way of knowing whether a coincidence in the timing of similar policies was the result of the emergence of a world norm or of one or more of the other characteristics the countries share (for example, whether they reached a certain level of development or joined an international organization at the same time).

In addition to avoiding such problems, selecting heterogeneous cases provides more certainty that any association between the principal variables of interest is not an idiosyncratic finding applicable only to certain types of countries, and therefore provides more confidence in the generalizability of our causal inferences. A second advantage of this type of case selection is that it allows us to explore the causal potential of other independent variables (such as the relative size of emigrant populations and their reasons for leaving their home country) that we were not able to include in the quantitative analysis.

Beyond the simple test of whether the timing of citizenship policies fits our hypotheses, the narratives provide us with the opportunity to use process tracing to determine whether there exists a causal chain consistent with the hypothesized relationship between our principal independent and dependent variables of interest (George and Bennett, 2005). Because, ultimately, all state policy is the result of human agency, the clear portrayal of such causal paths requires identification of the actors involved. Therefore, to the extent possible in each case, we (1) identify the actors (both within and outside the state) involved in the struggle for emigrant citizenship; (2) evaluate whether democratization provided an opportunity for these actors to achieve some or all of the components of emigrant citizenship (as per the window-of-opportunity hypothesis); (3) evaluate whether more and longer-lasting democracy provided other opportunities to implement the various components of emigrant citizenship (as per the contestation and democratic-endurance hypotheses); and (4) assess international normative influences on actors' goals, strategies, and achievements (as per the global-norm hypothesis). We also discuss features in each case that suggest alternative explanations for emigrant citizenship policies. We present the case studies in the chronological order of their democratization.

## **Emigrant citizenship in the USA**

Although the USA has never experienced an emigration that is large relative to its overall population, the number of its citizens abroad has increased in the period since the Second World War to reach a large level in absolute numbers. By the 2000s, more than 6 million Americans were estimated to reside overseas (Knowlton, 2007).

By the contestation criterion, US democracy may be said to have begun with the end of its war for independence in 1783. The rules governing membership in the new nation were illiberal in many respects, but were relatively tolerant with regard to citizens abroad. Most notably, the Naturalization Act of 1790 declared that the children born abroad of male citizen fathers were citizens themselves as long as the father had resided in the United States at some point. This law, which was drafted by Thomas Jefferson, made dual citizenship achievable at least in a de facto sense for the children of (male) emigrants. As a significant number of the founding political elite (including Jefferson himself) had spent time in Europe, it is perhaps not surprising that the First Congress voted in favor of the measure. This legislation supports the window-of-opportunity hypothesis insofar as lawmakers took advantage of the need to define the membership rules of a new nation to extend emigrant citizenship, but it also suggests an alternative mechanism in the causal chain: emigrant citizenship may be a product of the personal interest of ruling elites.

Over the following century and a half little changed with regard to emigrant citizenship. The Civil War (1861–65) led some states in both the northern Union and southern Confederacy to implement measures for what might be considered, if we stretch the concept, international absentee voting for soldiers in enemy territory. Many of these laws were repealed or fell into disuse when the fighting ended; however, the outbreak of the First World War led most states to pass similar laws again (Miles, 2008). Although in practice it remained difficult for service members to vote from abroad, this pattern indicates that, consistent with our contestation hypothesis, legislators are sensitive to arguments that conscripts serving overseas should not be disenfranchised.

The period since the Second World War has seen numerous policy changes affecting membership and rights for US expatriates. The politics of these have intertwined with issues related to other

kinds of rights, including gender equality, the unity of the family, immigration, and support for the military. Advocates for women, parents, immigrants, soldiers, and veterans, as well as groups specifically claiming to represent citizens abroad, have made use of a variety of institutional avenues, including pressuring the national executive as well as the national and state legislatures and the courts.


Women's groups achieved an important victory in 1934 with the passage of a law permitting both male and married female parents to pass US citizenship to their children born abroad. The Nationality Act of 1940 extended this right to unmarried mothers. Although this was an advance for American expatriate women and their children, advocacy groups for citizens abroad subsequently viewed the 1940 legislation as a setback because it imposed certain requirements (related to employment and previous residence within US borders) on citizen parents who wished to pass on citizenship to their children born overseas. Since then, several of these groups have attempted to eliminate these limitations.

In the 1950s and 1960s, various Supreme Court cases relating to this issue were decided in a liberal direction. Congressional action continued this trend: legislation in 1966 and 1986 reduced the residency requirement for parents of children born abroad. Finally, the 2000 Child Citizenship Act made the process of citizenship acquisition for children less onerous. The 1950s and 1960s also saw judicial action that addressed dual citizenship specifically. In 1967, the Supreme Court ruling *Afroyim v. Rusk* established that the government could not refuse to allow citizenship to immigrants who had exercised citizenship rights in other countries. Although the plaintiff was an immigrant, this decision benefitted emigrants as well. Legislation in 1986 made it much harder to lose US citizenship – effectively, if not explicitly, permitting dual citizenship.

During the Second World War, the Congress responded to pressure from advocates for the military with a major piece of legislation, the Soldier Voting Act of 1942, to protect the franchise for soldiers risking their lives overseas. Additional measures specifically for soldiers were contained in the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955. In the 1970s, advocates for emigrants convinced Congress to expand the franchise to nonmilitary citizens abroad; the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act was passed in 1975. In 1986, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act consolidated the two mandates.

Consistent with our general framework of competitive democracy, in addition to recognizing their membership and political rights, beginning in the mid-20th century the USA has expected much in the way of obligations from its emigrants. The country is almost unique in imposing certain kinds of tax requirements on expatriates (*The Economist*, 2008). In 1952, it began to require citizens to pay taxes on income earned abroad above a certain cap; in 2006, Congress lowered the cap and added other measures increasing emigrants' tax burdens. In response, US emigrants' groups have made the elimination of 'double taxation' a priority in recent years (Knowlton, 2008). Since 1980 the USA also has required most dual-citizen males (along with all other male citizens) to register for the draft, although actual conscription has not occurred since 1973.

Figure 2 maps the most important legislation and executive-branch action regarding emigrant citizenship onto the trajectory of competitive or institutional democracy in the USA. (Judicial decisions are not depicted, but these follow the same general pattern as legislation.) Essentially, the chart reflects some acknowledgment of emigrant membership in the earliest years of the Republic, followed by a long period of dormancy (interrupted only by attention to absentee voting during the Civil War), and then a period of mostly cumulative liberalization (and some increase in emigrant obligations) beginning in the 1930s and 1940s.



**Figure 2.** Emigrant Citizenship and Democracy in the USA, 1790–2007

Notes: Depicted in corresponding order: 1790 – law grants citizenship to male emigrants' children born abroad; 1860s – conscription for the Civil War; 1860s – absentee voting for soldiers; 1934 – law grants citizenship to female married citizens' children born abroad; 1940 – law grants citizenship to female unmarried citizens' children born abroad and also establishes linkage requirements; 1940 – conscription for the Second World War; 1942 – Soldier Voting Act; 1952 – law requires taxation of emigrants; 1955 – Federal Voting Assistance Act; 1966 – law reduces residency requirements for citizen parents abroad; 1973 – conscription ends; 1975 – Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act; 1980 – Selective Service Act requires draft registration; 1986 – Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act; 1986 – law makes it harder to lose US citizenship; 1990 – new State Department guidelines for dual citizenship; 1993 – law retroactively grants citizenship to female citizens' children born abroad; 2001 – defense and voting legislation contains provisions to improve military and overseas citizens' absentee voting; 2006 – law raises tax rates for citizens abroad.

This expansion began too early for us to consider it a clear validation of the global-norm hypothesis. Indeed, we found no direct evidence that international norms affected actors in the US case. Aspects of the case are more consistent with the contestation and democratic-endurance hypotheses; however, neither of these explains the pattern of relative inattention depicted by the empty line on our graph prior to the long expansion starting in 1934.

We offer several ad hoc explanations for this timing. The growing absolute number of emigrants seems to have contributed to their growing assertiveness. The emigrant cause also was able to 'piggyback' on the shoulders of movements in favor of women, children, soldiers, and veterans. Finally, conjunctural factors such as wars helped structure opportunities for this kind of strategy.

## Emigrant citizenship in Spain

The largest Spanish population exodus, which was mostly for economic reasons (and sometimes to avoid conscription), occurred during the period 1850–1930. The Spanish Civil War (1936–39), which divided the country along ideological lines, also caused some emigration to Latin America

and within Europe. By the mid-20th century, about 3.5 million Spaniards had moved to the Americas. The rate of migration to Latin America began to decline in the mid-1950s, in large part because of worsening economic conditions in the destination countries and improvement in Spain. During the 1960s, several hundred thousand Spaniards migrated to other countries in Europe. Spain now counts about 1.5 million of its nationals abroad.

The Republican Constitution of 1931 contained a provision permitting Spaniards to naturalize in Portugal, Brazil, or Spanish America without losing Spanish citizenship. Coming as it did at the onset of Spain's most competitive regime to date, this generous acceptance of dual citizenship for most Spanish emigrants is fully consistent with our window-of-opportunity hypothesis.

Spanish emigrants played active roles in ideological disputes related to the Civil War and, subsequently, the authoritarian regime's repression of regional identities. In response to these activities, the Franco government passed a series of laws that stripped exiles of their nationality (García Arias, 2004). However, Franco also signed agreements permitting dual citizenship with various Spanish-speaking Latin American countries in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s. Nominally an assertion of a common Hispanic culture, the main impetus behind these agreements appears to have been an attempt to bolster the international presence of the regime, especially given that it had difficult relations with other countries in Europe (Joppke, 2005). Although tolerant in some ways, Franco's dual-citizenship policy was less liberal than that of the Republic in that it excluded political exiles, and emigrants in Brazil, Portugal, and the Spanish-speaking Latin American countries with which it did not sign treaties.

The economic and political influence of European democracies was an important cause of Spain's democratic transition in the late 1970s. By 1978, Spaniards had ratified a constitution ushering in a parliamentary monarchy. The wording of the new constitution formally permitted a full array of civil, social, and political rights, including international absentee voting, for Spaniards abroad who had not lost their citizenship. Thus, many emigrants received a spectrum of formal citizenship rights along with resident Spanish citizens during this window of opportunity. The practical difficulties of voting and exercising other rights from abroad limited the actual practice of these rights until the late 1980s and 1990s, however (Viqueira, 2004).

Organizations supporting expatriates and their relatives, as well as other groups devoted to human rights or other issues related to historical memory, began to lobby for emigrant-citizenship legislation in democratic Spain (García Arias, 2004). The authorities responded with a limited expansion of membership criteria in 1982. The new legislation allowed those emigrants who had lost their nationality to reclaim it for themselves and their children at Spanish consulates in Latin America without losing additional foreign nationalities they had acquired. It imposed a time limit, however; by the 1990s, many of the children and, especially, grandchildren of emigrants had not registered, and missed their opportunity (García Arias, 2004).

In 2003, the conservative government of José María Aznar and the Partido Popular (PP) liberalized the rules about citizenship acquisition for immigrants living in Spain as well as dual citizenship for emigrants. In 2004, the Socialist Party campaigned on the promise to expand emigrant rights further, calling for the extension of dual citizenship to the descendants of Spanish emigrants. Two years later, the Socialist government led by José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero passed the 2006 Statute for Spaniards Abroad, which granted nationality to the children (but not grandchildren) of Spaniards, no matter where they were born or where they live. The new statute also cataloged Spanish emigrants' rights to basic social services. Finally, the legislation renamed the Spanish Institute for Emigration the 'Repatriation' Office, reflecting the ultimate aim of encouraging emigrants to return, a response to Spain's declining fertility rate.

Spanish dual citizens abroad now have at least a formal claim to social and civil, as well as political, rights. They can and do vote in all elections, including those for municipal officials and deputies to the European Parliament, and, at least occasionally, their votes have had a significant impact on the outcome of elections. Expatriates have not achieved the provision of a separate seat or seats in the national and regional parliaments, but they have not abandoned the goal. In 2007, a Galician regional party (the Bloque Nacionalista Galego) presented a bill proposing the inclusion of citizens abroad when calculating the number of representatives in each region (*España Exterior*, 2007).

Spain requires relatively little of its emigrant citizens. It abolished conscription in 2001; however, even prior to that year, dual citizens generally were exempted if they had fulfilled any military service obligations in their second country of citizenship.

Figure 3 depicts the trajectory of political competition and emigrant citizenship in Spain since the beginning of the Second Republic. It illustrates the windows of opportunity for emigrants that resulted in some extension of citizenship during both transitions to democracy. Dual citizenship was also promoted by the Franco regime (although less so than under the Second Republic), and then expanded four years after democratization and once more 25 years later. Political and other rights were extended to emigrants in 1978 as a by-product of the new constitution, and again extended with the 2006 legislation.

The timing of the most recent legislation in Spain is consistent with the global-norm, contestation, and democratic-endurance hypotheses. However, the details of the case provide more evidence in favor of the latter two. The cause of emigrant citizenship was gradually advanced over time by party politics. More liberal advocates framed the issue as the beginning of a national debate over how to reckon with past abuses; others viewed it ethno-nationalistically as a way to offset declining birth rates. Because emigration originated disproportionately in certain areas, regional parties were especially likely to advocate emigrant voting.




Figure 3. Emigrant Citizenship and Democracy in Spain, 1927–2007

## Emigrant citizenship in Armenia

Armenia has an official resident population of about 3 million. The approximate number of Armenians living worldwide is at least twice as large, with the largest concentrations in Russia and the USA. The disproportionate ratio between ethnic Armenians abroad and Armenians residing in the state territory is the result of several waves of mass migration. The landmark cause of the vast emigration was the Armenian Genocide of 1915–17.

Between 1946 and 1947 about 90,000 to 100,000 Armenians, mostly from the Middle East, returned to Soviet Armenia (Mouradian, 1990). Despite official promises of a better life in the homeland, repatriated Armenians were forced to live in harsh conditions; several thousand had left Soviet Armenia by the 1970s.

The second mass migration took place after the fall of the Soviet Union and independence in 1991. Around 1 million Armenians left due to economic hardship or the desire to avoid obligatory military service because of the war in Mountainous Karabagh.


Early emigrant-citizenship legislation in the newly independent country provides some support for our window-of-opportunity hypothesis. The liberal government of President Levon Ter-Petrosyan (1991–98) permitted citizens to vote at consulates. The Ter-Petrosyan government also courted ethnic Armenians abroad, although it imposed a constitutional ban on formal dual citizenship. Given the threat of war in Mountainous Karabagh, officials were concerned that, if dual citizenship were permitted, local citizens would likely seek to avoid service in the Armenian army, thereby accelerating existing emigration and threatening state security (Ter-Petrosyan, 1997, 2000). Furthermore, constitutional experts believed that dual citizenship based on *jus sanguinis* violated the constitutionally guaranteed equality of citizens. The ban was seen as a pragmatic response to Armenia's unbalanced population distribution (Nazaryan, 1995).

A 1994 law regulating the 'Status of Foreign Citizens in the Republic of Armenia' nevertheless provided a close substitute for dual citizenship. This legislation allowed ethnic Armenians abroad to receive Armenian passports granting 'special residency status' for 10-year terms with the possibility of extension. Bearers of these passports were entitled to complete property rights, as well as social rights related to employment, health care and education; however, they were denied the political rights of voting, being elected, and joining political organizations. They were also exempt from compulsory military service.

In 1998, an alliance between the military and political forces opposed to policies favoring a peaceful solution to the war in Karabagh forced President Ter-Petrosyan to resign in a bloodless coup. As a consequence, the ruling coalition in parliament, the Republic Bloc, which had been dominated by the Armenian National Movement, dissolved. Pan-ethnic unification and the quest for a national identity based on ethnic criteria became dominant themes in political, intellectual, and religious discourses in the post-1998 government led by President Robert Kocharyan.

Several parties in the new ruling coalition interpreted the denial of dual citizenship rights to co-ethnics abroad as an unjust partition of one nation into citizens and outsiders. Furthermore, President Kocharyan and other high-ranking officials argued that the pre-1998 citizenship policies were responsible for low levels of investment on the part of the diaspora (Kocharyan, 1999). The dominant political discourse took on an ethno-nationalist tone, supporting emigrant-citizenship policies favoring the 'old diaspora' (that is, the victims of genocide).<sup>13</sup>

The discussion of expatriate-related issues in party politics is consistent with our contestation hypothesis. However, this debate did not lead to a cumulative expansion of all aspects of emigrant citizenship, but rather to a mixed bag involving rights reversals for citizens and new rights for the 'old diaspora.' Ethno-nationalists succeeded in passing a constitutional



**Figure 4.** Emigrant Citizenship and Democracy in Armenia, 1940–2007

Notes: As no Polity2 scores are available for Armenia prior to 1991, we use those of the Soviet Union. The 2007 laws grant dual citizenship and political rights without residency requirements to the old diaspora, ban international absentee voting, and establish a discriminatory conscription system.

amendment removing the ban on dual citizenship in 2005. The new legislation recognized dual citizenship based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*. Amendments also eliminated international absentee voting, while the ‘old diaspora’ was guaranteed comprehensive political rights (not including international absentee voting, which was ended for everyone) without any requirement of prior residence in Armenia. Finally, unlike the ‘old diaspora,’ existing citizens who adopted a second citizenship were not released from military service even if they had already served in another country.

The trajectory of emigrant citizenship and democracy in Armenia is depicted in Figure 4. The figure illustrates that the independent Republic of Armenia has extended emigrant citizenship much more than the Soviet Union did, which supports the contestation hypothesis. While the timing of the extension of rights and membership is consistent with the global-norm hypothesis, we found no particular evidence of international normative influence in the political process through which emigrant citizenship policy was developed. Rather, it appears that Armenians acquired the right to vote abroad (and ethnic Armenians a near substitute for dual citizenship) during the window of opportunity provided by democratization because of the liberal inclination of the government in place at the time.

Alone among our cases, Armenia experienced a reversal of the right to international absentee voting during a democratic regime. Because this reversal occurred during a period in which the overall level of democracy had recently declined, however, it constitutes only a weak refutation of the contestation hypothesis. It does not refute the democratic-endurance hypothesis because it occurred after less than a decade of democratic rule. The liberalization of dual citizenship in Armenia in 2005 ostensibly supports the contestation hypothesis, but the details of its extension (for example, privileging members of the old diaspora over resident citizens and the new diaspora) present an especially troubling normative challenge to the idea of civic equality.



## Emigrant citizenship in Mexico

Mexicans have migrated to the United States since the US–Mexican War in the mid-19th century. US imposition of stricter immigration controls during and following the world wars rendered much of this immigration illegal. By the beginning of the 21st century, around 10 percent of Mexican nationals (close to 10 million people) resided in the USA, and around half of this population lacked formal documentation. Only in recent decades has the Mexican state taken significant formal steps to protect some of the citizenship rights of its citizens abroad.


For most of its tenure, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which dominated Mexican politics during the period 1929–2000, tended to portray any suggestion of emigrant citizenship rights as utopian and impractical (Ross Pineda, 1999). The pattern of interaction between Mexico and its emigrants only began to change in the 1980s and 1990s, as opposition parties mounted serious challenges to the PRI's authority. In the 1988 presidential election, polls showed that expatriates favored the left-leaning Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD) candidate, Cuatémoc Cárdenas, over the PRI's Carlos Salinas de Gortari, lending moral support to the former's campaign. In recognition of this support and in response to pressure from emigrants, in 1990 the PRD became the first party to adopt a platform favoring the expatriate vote.

President Salinas (the official winner of the highly suspect 1988 election) began to court expatriates, both to prevent the USA from becoming a source of political discontent and to gain their support for policies such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Salinas added an official department for emigration to Mexico's Foreign Affairs Ministry in 1990.

Salinas' successor, Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000), also of the PRI, went further. He signed the 1996 Bucareli agreement between the three major parties and the government, which proclaimed a commitment to extend the franchise to citizens abroad. During the Zedillo administration, the Mexican emigrant population also won significant concessions regarding membership criteria and other (nonpolitical) citizenship rights. In 1996, the Mexican Congress changed the wording of the constitution in order to create the category of dual nationality. Dual nationals, however, were not granted the right to vote, which was reserved for citizens only. They were, however, now allowed to own property near the coasts and international borders, a right not permitted to foreigners (this restriction was thought to discourage naturalization in the USA). Effectively, the Congress ruled that nationality includes social and economic rights, and citizenship includes political rights. Military service remained compulsory for Mexican citizens residing in Mexico (although with numerous exceptions and exemptions). Dual nationals, however, were not required to perform military service. Indeed, a 1998 decree law declared that members of the Mexican military must not possess any other nationality (Legomsky, 2000). In 1997, the PRI lost its absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time. The party's loosening grip on power allowed the migrant voting issue to evolve. In 1999, the Chamber of Deputies voted on a proposal to allow citizens abroad to vote, but the Senate (with a PRI majority) voted down the measure. In the meantime, some subnational units went ahead with pro-emigrant reforms.

Toward the end of the 1990s, advocates of international absentee voting began to base some of their arguments on examples from other countries, and state officials took other countries' example into consideration. Indeed, we used data compiled in part by the Federal Electoral Institute in the cross-national study presented earlier in this article.

In the 2000 election, which transferred executive power from the PRI to an opposition party for the first time since the Mexican Revolution, the two major opposition parties (PRD and PAN) campaigned in the USA. Both the PRD and the PRI nominated several emigrants as candidates, but polls showed that the PAN's Vicente Fox was the preferred presidential candidate among expatriates.



**Figure 5.** Emigrant Citizenship and Democracy in Mexico, 1940–2007

Newly elected President Fox rewarded this support by committing to making it possible for Mexicans abroad to vote in the 2006 presidential elections. The law permitting absentee ballots was passed in 2005. Although the number of participants in the election was disappointingly small, the emigrant vote favored the PAN's Felipe Calderón, who received 58 percent of votes from abroad (Beltrán Miranda, 2006).

Figure 5 depicts the trajectory of emigrant citizenship and democracy in Mexico. Of our four cases, only in Mexico do both the timing and some details of the process (that is, the study of international absentee voting in other countries) of the extension of emigrant citizenship clearly indicate an international norm at work. Other aspects of this case support our window-of-opportunity and contestation hypotheses to an even greater extent. International absentee voting developed as a product of the struggle for a more competitive regime; expatriates employed a discourse of rights to convince opposition parties to take on the emigrant cause, which was won when the ruling party lost control of Congress and the executive. The decision to permit dual nationality had more of a top-down nature. However, it was not as immediately meaningful to the large numbers of Mexican emigrants who will not be eligible for it any time soon because they have no real prospects of naturalization in the USA (although it may matter to them for their children's sake).

## Conclusions from the case studies

We summarize the results of our case studies for each hypothesis and sub-hypothesis in Table 4. The table reveals overall strong (if not perfect) support for both the contestation hypothesis and the window-of-opportunity sub-hypothesis as applied to both dual citizenship and international absentee voting. The cases yielded less information about the democratic-endurance sub-hypothesis, but did not refute it. Aspects of the process in the USA somewhat refuted the global-norm hypothesis. Although the timing of some extensions of dual citizenship and international absentee voting in

**Table 4.** Emigrant Citizenship Hypotheses and Dual Citizenship (DC) and International Absentee Voting (IAV) in the USA, Spain, Armenia, and Mexico

Hypothesis	USA	Spain	Armenia	Mexico
Contestation	Supports (DC and IAV)	Supports (DC and AV)	Supports (DC and IAV)/only somewhat refutes (IAV)	Supports (IAV)/somewhat supports (DC)
Window of opportunity	Somewhat supports (DC)	Supports (IAV)/somewhat supports (DC)	Supports (IAV)/somewhat supports (DC)	Supports (IAV)/somewhat supports (DC)
Democratic endurance	Consistent with (DC and IAV)	Consistent with (DC and IAV)	Not applicable	Not applicable
Global norm	Somewhat refutes (DC and IAV)	Consistent with (DC and IAV)	Consistent with (DC and IAV)	Supports (IAV)/consistent with (DC)

Note: 'Consistent with' implies that the outcome may be attributable to an alternative hypothesis.

Spain and Armenia were largely consistent with the idea of a global norm, our narrative analysis of the process in those countries revealed no specific indicators of international normative influence. In Mexico, however, the implementation of international absentee voting clearly involved the application of a global norm.

The case studies also revealed additional factors that help explain how countries approach emigrant citizenship. Direct elite interests, cleavages related to gender, ethnicity or region, concerns about investment levels or declining population, the geostrategic interests of states, as well as historical factors related to the causes of emigration, its size, and the situation of emigrants in the countries where they reside may all affect state decisions about dual citizenship and absentee voting.

Finally, the case studies suggest some explanations for the basically null correlations we found between the various components of emigrant citizenship. Emigrant advocates may wish for comprehensive packages of membership and rights; however, as the US case showed, political opportunities caused by exogenous factors (such as major wars) may be more propitious for particular elements of citizenship (such as international absentee voting). Moreover, not all emigrants place the same value on the various components of citizenship: while advocates for the Armenian 'old diaspora' appear to put a premium on the membership dimension, Mexicans without prospects for naturalization in the USA have relatively little immediate use for dual citizenship. At the same time that they provide explanations for some differences in the configuration of citizenship packages, our case studies show that countries tend to have policy debates about dual citizenship, international absentee voting, and conscription that are substantively related and close to one another in time. (This tendency is shown by the clusters of squares, circles, and triangles on the individual country graphs in Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5.)

## Conclusion

This article has presented statistical and case-study evidence that supports the contestation hypothesis to a considerable extent. Although contestation is not the only cause of emigrant citizenship, we can be quite sure that competitive political regimes lead countries to take more and greater steps toward implementing its various components, whether through an elite-driven process or in response to grassroots activism. We also analyzed two sub-hypotheses related to the timing of the effect of competitive regimes on emigrant citizenship. Although available data did not provide

much quantitative support for the window-of-opportunity hypothesis as applied to international absentee voting, the case studies largely confirmed that transitions to competitive regimes provide a unique window of opportunity in which countries are especially likely to pay attention to at least some aspects of membership and rights. Regression analysis indicated that as democracy endures, the likelihood that countries tolerate dual citizenship increases; our case studies were consistent with the democratic-endurance hypothesis as applied to both dual citizenship and international absentee voting. A quantitative analysis of the timing of international absentee voting implementation supported the idea of a recent global norm. One of the four country cases clearly supported the global-norm hypothesis, while two more were at least consistent with it.

Factors other than those emphasized in our hypotheses also help explain emigrant citizenship. For example, our statistical analysis revealed that higher levels of development facilitate the implementation of international absentee voting. The case studies revealed several other variables that enter into states' calculus regarding membership, rights, and obligations for emigrant populations.

As occurred in the development of the international normative standard in favor of women's suffrage (Ramirez et al., 1997), the growing global norm of emigrant citizenship is likely to reinforce the pressure generated by democratic contestation for emigrant citizenship. Our findings, therefore, suggest that the political logic of emigrant citizenship in recent decades is similar to that affecting the extension of citizenship to groups that were excluded in the past. Demand for ever-increasing inclusiveness seems to be almost an inherent feature of competitive regimes.

## Appendix

**Table A1.** Countries with Dual Citizenship, International Absentee Voting, and Conscription in 2001

		International absentee voting in 2001			No data or no voting
		Yes	No		
Dual citizenship in 2001					
Yes	Australia	Mexico	Ant. & Bar.	Mali	
	Benin	New Zealand	Barbados	Morocco	
	Bulgaria	Peru	Belize	Nigeria	
	Canada	Portugal	Burkina Faso	Paraguay	
	Cape Verde	Romania	Costa Rica	Slovakia	
	C. Afr. Rep.	Russia	Cyprus	St. Kitts & Nevis	
	Colombia	South Africa	El Salvador	St. Lucia	
	France	Switzerland	Grenada	St. Vin. & Gren.	
	Honduras	Syria	Jamaica	Trinidad	
	Hungary	Togo	Jordan	Tuvalu	
	Ireland	Tunisia	Lebanon	Uruguay	
	Israel	Turkey	Maldives		
	Italy	United Kingdom			
	Ivory Coast	USA			
	Mauritius				
No	Afghanistan	Laos	Angola	Madagascar	Bhutan
	Algeria	Latvia	Andorra	Malawi	Brunei
	Argentina	Lesotho	Armenia	Malta	Cambodia

(Continued)

**Table A1.** (Continued)

International absentee voting in 2001				No data or no voting
Yes		No		
<i>Austria</i>	<i>Lithuania</i>	<i>Bahamas</i>	<i>Mauritania</i>	<i>China</i>
<i>Azerbaijan</i>	<i>Luxembourg</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>	<i>Monaco</i>	<i>Cuba</i>
<i>Bangladesh</i>	<i>Malaysia</i>	<i>Bolivia</i>	<i>Mongolia</i>	<i>Libya</i>
<i>Belarus</i>	<i>Marshall Isl.</i>	<i>Burundi</i>	<i>Myanmar</i>	<i>Qatar</i>
<i>Belgium</i>	<i>Micronesia</i>	<i>Cameroon</i>	<i>(Burma)</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>
<i>Botswana</i>	<i>Moldova</i>	<i>Chile</i>	<i>Nauru</i>	<i>Taiwan</i>
<i>Brazil</i>	<i>Mozambique</i>	<i>Congo Braz.</i>	<i>Nepal</i>	<i>UAE</i>
<i>Chad</i>	<i>Namibia</i>	<i>Congo Kins.</i>	<i>Nicaragua</i>	
<i>Croatia</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>Egypt</i>	<i>Pakistan</i>	
<i>Czech Rep.</i>	<i>Niger</i>	<i>Eritrea</i>	<i>Panama</i>	
<i>Denmark</i>	<i>Norway</i>	<i>Gambia</i>	<i>Pap. New Guin.</i>	
<i>Djibouti</i>	<i>Oman</i>	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Samoa</i>	
<i>Domin. Rep.</i>	<i>Palau</i>	<i>Guatemala</i>	<i>Seychelles</i>	
<i>Ecuador</i>	<i>Philippines</i>	<i>Haiti</i>	<i>Sierra Leone</i>	
<i>Eq. Guinea</i>	<i>Poland</i>	<i>Kenya</i>	<i>Solomon Isl.</i>	
<i>Estonia</i>	<i>Rwanda</i>	<i>Kiribati</i>	<i>Sri Lanka</i>	
<i>Fiji</i>	<i>São To. &amp; Prin.</i>	<i>Korea North</i>	<i>Swaziland</i>	
<i>Finland</i>	<i>Senegal</i>	<i>Korea South</i>	<i>Tanzania</i>	
<i>Gabon</i>	<i>Singapore</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Tonga</i>	
<i>Germany</i>	<i>Slovenia</i>	<i>Liberia</i>	<i>Uganda</i>	
<i>Ghana</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>Macedonia</i>	<i>Vietnam</i>	
<i>Guinea</i>	<i>Sudan</i>		<i>Zambia</i>	
<i>Guinea Biss.</i>	<i>Sweden</i>			
<i>Guyana</i>	<i>Thailand</i>			
<i>Iceland</i>	<i>Ukraine</i>			
<i>India</i>	<i>Uzbekistan</i>			
<i>Indonesia</i>	<i>Vanuatu</i>			
<i>Iran</i>	<i>Venezuela</i>			
<i>Japan</i>	<i>Yemen</i>			
<i>Kazakhstan</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>			
<i>Kirgizstan</i>				
No data	<i>Bosnia</i>	<i>Albania</i>		
	<i>Georgia</i>	<i>Comoros</i>		
	<i>Iraq</i>	<i>Ethiopia</i>		
	<i>Tajikistan</i>	<i>Turkmenistan</i>		

Notes: Countries with conscription are in italics. Conscription data are from 2002.

## Acknowledgments

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## Notes

1. We use the terms 'expatriates' and 'emigrants' interchangeably to refer to the citizens of one country who, for any reason, leave it to reside elsewhere, and to their descendants. We use the more historically charged 'diaspora' only in cases in which it is the preferred term in the common parlance (for example, in our analysis of Armenia).
2. For example, Paxton et al. (2003) find that suffrage in democracies has become more inclusive over time. This is an observation about a general tendency of democracy, not a deterministic argument that ever-expanding inclusion is part of an unstoppable historical process. There are instances in which democracies have become less inclusive; the disenfranchisement of felons in the USA is one example.
3. Some types of authoritarian regimes also may extend certain citizenship rights; however, the relationship between democracy and citizenship expansion appears to be more universal.
4. Our causal argument about the impact of democratic contestation is not inconsistent with the idea that inclusion is or ought to be an essential feature of democracy.
5. Recently, a small literature in political economy has developed game-theoretic models of the conditions under which competing elites will opt to extend the franchise (Jack and Lagunoff, 2006).
6. Data are from the appendix in Annex A of Ellis et al. (2007).
7. The source reports that 10 more countries are in the process of developing absentee voting processes or are considering developing them in the future. We adopted a strict standard and coded these countries as having absentee voting neither in 2001 nor 2008. The source also indicates that eight countries have no voting. These we recorded as missing values, under the logic that it does not make sense for a country without elections to have absentee voting.
8. Data for 2001 were not available. This source (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002–03) reported the presence of conscripts in the armed forces of 82 countries.
9. Polity2 assigns country scores on a scale ranging from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy). Scores were not available for countries with populations of less than 500,000. We therefore could not include them in this analysis. The proportion of these countries with dual citizenship and international absentee voting in 2001 did not differ significantly from the pattern worldwide.
10. Any year in which a country's Polity2 score reaches or surpasses a minimal threshold of 1 is coded as a year of democratization; we obtained results that were quite similar to the ones we present here using the alternative higher minimal threshold of 7.
11. Initially, we also included the importance of remittances to the economy, the level of fertility, and population growth (like our economic development variable, all from the World Development Indicators) as control variables. Because state officials in economies that rely heavily on remittances are likely to want to encourage emigrants to continue to send money (Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003), we expected the importance of remittances to correlate positively with recognition of dual citizenship and international absentee voting. Drawing on studies of ethnicity and nationalism (for example, Joppke, 2005), our expectation was that countries with declining fertility or population would tend to be more tolerant of dual citizenship, and be likely to court their emigrants via policies such as international absentee voting, in a nationalistic attempt to maintain or increase their populations with persons of the same ethnic or blood ties. We found no statistically significant relationship between remittances, fertility, or population growth and our dependent variables, however, and so we have omitted them in the results we present. It would have been interesting to include variables related to particular characteristics of the emigrant populations in these models; however, surprisingly, there are no clear hypotheses about the effects of such characteristics in the existing literature; furthermore, obtaining reliable measures would involve considerable difficulty.
12. As in the regression analysis, in the results we report, the democratization year is defined as the year a country reached a threshold of 1 in Polity2. Similar results were obtained when we used the higher threshold of 7.
13. According to the ethno-nationalist view, Armenians who left their country voluntarily, largely for economic reasons, do not constitute the 'true' diaspora. The post-genocide old diaspora, in contrast, represents the classical embodiment of a 'victim diaspora' formed by the traumatic and coerced departure of an entire population from their homeland (Cohen, 1997).

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