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Lingling Qi and Doh Chull Shin

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Lingling Qi

Doh Chull Shin

Abstract

For decades, scholars of political culture have held that mass political attitudes have a profound impact on the process of democratization. In studying this impact, an increasing number of political scientists have recently theorized that the level of democratization a political system reaches depends on the extent to which its political institutions meet citizen demand for democracy. In testing such theoretical models of democratic demand and supply, however, many political scientists have mistakenly equated democratic demand with citizen preference for democracy over its alternatives. In this study, we first argue that popular demand for democracy is not the same thing as democratic regime preference or support. Instead, demand for democracy arises from dissatisfaction with democracy-in-practice. By analyzing the fourth wave of the World Values Survey, we then demonstrate that the critical orientations of democrats promote democratic development more powerfully than do the two attitudes – democratic regime support and self-expression values – that prior public opinion research has identified as the forces driving democratization.

Keywords

critical democrat, democratic support, democratization, mass attitude

Introduction

Do the political attitudes of a country's masses affect its process of democratization? If they do, what sorts of mass political attitudes matter most and in what ways? For decades, political scientists have sought to address these questions from a variety of perspectives (Almond and Verba, 1963; Booth and Seligson, 2009; Cleary and Stokes, 2006; Eckstein, 1966, 1998; Gilley, 2009;

Corresponding author:

Lingling Qi, 22 Hankou Road, School of Government, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China, 210093

Email: linglingqi@nju.edu.cn

Inglehart, 2003). Many of these scholars have claimed that a stable democracy depends on establishing an equilibrium, or congruence, between the performance of democratic political institutions and the mass expectations for those institutions. To test this congruence theory of democratic stability, a number of political scientists have recently proposed a demand-and-supply model (Dalton and Shin, 2006; Grindle, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Mattes and Bratton, 2007; Rose et al., 1998). This theory holds that democracy becomes stable when levels of citizen demand and institutional supply for democracy are in equilibrium. It also holds that democratization takes place when the citizen demand for democracy outstrips the institutional supply.

In testing the demand–supply model of democratization, previous studies have equated democratic regime support among the masses with their demand for democracy (Mattes and Bratton, 2007; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Welzel and Klingemann, 2008). Furthermore, with few exceptions, these studies fail to demonstrate that a higher level of democratic support has actually contributed to more democratization by raising the level of democratic supply (Hadenius and Teorell, 2005; Inglehart and Welzel, 2003; Mishler and Rose, 2001). We maintain that the problem with previous research is due largely to a misconceived notion of citizen demand for democracy.

In this paper, we argue that support for democracy as a regime is not the same thing as demand for democracy. The former constitutes, by and large, *favorable* orientations to democracy-in-principle, while the latter constitutes both that and *unfavorable* orientations to a specific implementation of democracy. Therefore, indicators of democratic support are not a valid measurement of democratic demand. We further argue that while mass political attitudes matter in the process of democratization, a mass embrace of democracy as ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Shin and Wells, 2005) does not spur on democratization. Instead, the mass political attitudes that advance democratization are support of democracy-in-principle and criticism of democratic endeavors that fail to meet the ideal. Specifically, not all supporters of democracy take part in the democratic political process and demand that elites supply more democracy. Those who demand more democracy are ‘critical democrats’ who are committed to democracy-in-principle and respond critically to deficiencies revealed by democracy-in-practice. The empirical results reported in this study suggest that these democrats, and not simply supporters of democracy, are the most influential in promoting the process of democratization. On the basis of these results, we argue that a combination of a commitment to democracy-in-principle and a criticism of democratic practices falling below the ideal is a more powerful measure of democratic demand than general support for democracy as a regime.

The article will proceed as follows: we open with a brief review of previous studies that have tested the model of democratic demand and supply using support for democracy-in-principle as an indicator of such demand. Following this review is a theoretical discussion of why critical democrats serve as democratic reformers who demand more democracy in transitional democracies. In the third section, we report on an empirical test of the relationship between critical democrats and democratization levels in transitional countries. Finally, we offer a summary of key findings and discuss their implications for future research.

Previous research on citizen demand for democracy

Research on mass support for democracy occupies a central place in the study of democracy and democratization (e.g. Booth and Seligson, 2009; Bratton et al., 2004; Chu et al., 2008; Diamond and Plattner, 2008; Gilley, 2009; Rose et al., 1998). Assuming that democracy as government by the people can emerge and flourish only when most of a country’s citizens desire to live in a

democracy, scholars of political culture have equated the rising level of favorable attitudes to democracy to mass pressure for democratic reform (Eckstein, 1966; Lasswell, 1951; Lipset, 1959). In advancing this congruence model of democratic development, Almond and Verba (1963), for example, endorsed citizen support for democracy as an indispensable element for its development. In subsequent studies as well, a rising level of favorable democratic attitudes is considered indicative of mass demand for institutions to supply more democracy, or of an incongruence between democratic demand and supply that favors more democratization (Booth and Seligson, 2009; Dalton and Shin, 2006; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Mattes and Bratton, 2007; Rose et al., 1998).

In testing this demand-driven model of democratization, a standard practice has been to measure citizen demand for democracy solely in terms of mass support for democracy as a regime. More specifically, democratic demand is measured in terms of the simultaneous acceptance of democracy and rejection of its authoritarian alternatives. Only when citizens embrace democracy as the preferred regime and reject authoritarian alternatives do they become unqualified supporters of democracy (Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Chu et al., 2008; Mattes and Bratton, 2007; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Shin, 2007). More recently, Welzel and Klingemann proposed the concept of ‘substantive demands’, which refers to citizen endorsement of the various freedoms underlying democracy (Welzel and Klingemann, 2008; Welzel, 2006). Even in this refinement, democratic demand remains, by and large, a one-dimensional phenomenon referring to democratic support.

In summary, support for democracy as the preferred regime tends to be conceived as normative support for democracy, which is characterized by a preference for democracy as an ideal system. The World Values Survey and other regional barometer surveys have amply demonstrated that there is a large gulf between such normative democratic support and practical support for democracy-in-practice. Those surveys also reveal that support for democracy-in-principle, unlike support for democracy-in-action, varies relatively little across either whole regions or countries within a region (e.g. Chu et al., 2008; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Norris, 1999; Rose et al., 1998; Shin, 2007). Little variation in such democratic regime support among regions and countries with vastly different levels of democratization success makes it difficult to explain how democratic attitudes matter in the process of broadening and deepening limited democracy; consequently, the demand–supply model based on democratic support offers only a weak explanation of the substantial differences in the aggregate levels of democratization (Inglehart, 2003; Inglehart and Welzel, 2003; Welzel and Klingemann, 2008).

To address these problems arising from misconceptions and inappropriate measurements of citizen demand for democracy, we need to investigate the complex contours of mass democratic attitudes. We argue that democratic demand is a two-dimensional phenomenon inclusive of support and dissatisfaction. Support alone does not make for democratic demand; it is contingent on how citizens feel about the performance of the existing democratic regime, whether satisfied or dissatisfied. In this sense, democratic demand represents a mixture of attitudes supportive of democracy-in-principle but dissatisfied with how it is being practiced. It is, therefore, critical democrats, not just supporters of democracy, who demand that their institutions and leaders supply more democracy.

The notion of critical democrats

The 1990s witnessed a new direction in the study of public support for political regimes in advanced democracies. For the first time, regime support was recognized as a multilevel phenomenon. Building on David Easton’s (1975) notions of diffuse and specific support, scholars recognized the

Table 1. A Typology of Citizen Attitudes to Democracy and its Performance

		Democratic Support	
		Strong	Weak
Democratic Satisfaction	Strong	Satisfied democrats (I)	Satisfied authoritarians (II)
	Weak	Critical democrats (III)	Dissatisfied authoritarians (IV)

need to differentiate deep-rooted commitment to the regime as a structure from frequently shifting attitudes toward it as a mode of governance. During this decade, citizens in the western democracies were found to become less allegiant to their regimes and increasingly critical of the way in which the regimes were performing (e.g. Budge, 1996; Dalton, 2004; Geissel, 2008b; Klingemann, 1999: 31–56; Norris, 1999). Their criticisms indicated desires to improve the existing democracy rather than replace it.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom that treats any political criticism as a threat to democracy, scholars began to recognize criticism as a valuable resource for improving the democratic process. Democracy as government by the people requires steady support from citizens for its sustainability. For its growth, democracy needs a healthy dose of political skepticism toward the regime and government. An appropriate amount of ‘political skepticism toward the political system, neither extreme rejection nor uncritical support for the system’ (Seligson and Carrion, 2002: 58), was seen as facilitating democratization (e.g. Cleary and Stokes, 2006; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Seligson and Carrion, 2002). For this reason, criticisms of democratic governance are considered an indicator of the perceived quality of a democratic government, not as an indicator of general support for democracy as a regime (e.g. Budge, 1996; Hart, 1978; Geissel, 2008b; Norris, 1999). Within the framework of demand-and-supply, it is this spirit of criticism that transforms democratic support into democratic demand.

In our study, therefore, democratic regime orientations are conceptualized as a two-level phenomenon. Following Norris’s (1999) analytic framework, we divide those orientations into the normative dimension of endorsing democratic principles and values, and the practical dimension of approving democratic practices. The former, called democratic support, refers to citizen preference for democracy in contrast to its alternatives. The latter, called democratic satisfaction, deals with citizen satisfaction with the performances of democratic institutions. By considering these two dimensions jointly, we propose four types of mass political attitudes. Table 1 shows how these types are distinguished from each other. Critical citizens represent the type in which citizens normatively support democracy as the preferred regime but are dissatisfied with the performance of the existing regime as a democracy (Geissel, 2008a, 2008b; Hofferbert and Klingemann, 1999; Norris, 1999).

According to this notion, critical democrats fully accept democratic values while rejecting authoritarian values. Such unqualified support for democracy alone is not enough to make a critical democrat. A strong sense of dissatisfaction with regime performance is an indispensable defining criterion because it leads to political criticism (Axtmann, 2001; Budge, 1996; Geissel, 2008b) and political skepticism (e.g. Seligson and Carrion, 2002). Only when democrats acknowledge the disappointing status quo are they likely to demand more and better democracy. As to democrats who are satisfied with regime performance (see Type I in Table 1), they have no reason to pressure

the incumbent leadership to reform their democratic system, perceived to be well-functioning (Eckstein, 1998). Dissatisfied authoritarians (Type IV in Table 1) have an incentive to protest but are likely to demand less democracy rather than more democracy. Their protest may even constitute a threat to democratic stability because they prefer authoritarian rule to democracy. In short, a combination of favorable attitudes toward democracy and a critical spirit toward its performance engenders the demand for the supply of more and better democracy.

Theoretical considerations: a demand–supply perspective

The proposed notion of critical democrats represents a reformulation of congruence theory into a dynamic model of democratization that holds that democratization follows ‘the logic of reducing the incongruence between citizen demand and institutional supply of democracy’ (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 187). According to this model, the movement toward more or less democracy depends largely on whether citizen demand outstrips institutional supply. When citizens are satisfied with the performance of their regimes and demand less democracy than what institutions supply, political systems are likely to stagnate or move toward less democracy. When citizens are dissatisfied with their regimes, and their demand for democracy exceeds what institutions supply, political systems are likely to move toward more democracy. Those who experience the tension between what they desire to have and what they actually have are motivated to demand more democracy and behave as democratic reformers. At the aggregate level, therefore, regimes with larger portions of critical democrats can be expected to achieve more democratic progress than those with smaller portions of such critical citizens.

Specifically, until a significant proportion of citizens become dissatisfied with the performance of their democratizing regime and demand more and better democracy, little incongruence between democratic demand and supply can be said to exist. It is when a growing proportion of citizens act on their dissatisfaction to demand more and better democracy that popularly elected leaders feel a democratic deficit or incongruence and respond by supplying a variety of institutional reforms (Reilly, 2006). Such dynamic interactions between ordinary people and their elected leaders are the key to unlocking the mysteries of democratization, which the original congruence model of democratic stability has left largely unresolved. Congruence theory is capable of addressing the issue of regime stability or instability, but it is not capable of explaining how the established equilibrium between democratic demand and supply can be broken and moved to a higher level of equilibrium or disequilibrium. By triggering the constant interactions between a country’s masses and its political leaders, critical democrats serve to reconfigure the demand–supply equilibrium. When supporters of democracy no longer expect more supply of democratization, they are likely to discontinue demanding more democracy. The disappearance of critical democratic demand, therefore, means equilibrium returns and there is no pressure for change.

In the real world of politics, we often observe a high degree of satisfaction with a current regime in those regimes where just such an equilibrium has democratization forces trapped. This has occurred in both authoritarian and newly transitioned regimes.¹ In China, for instance, an absolute majority of the population remains satisfied with its one-party rule, and this overwhelming satisfaction sustains the resilient authoritarianism in the country (Shi, 2008: 209–258). In Russia as well, a lack of criticism toward the current government has led to a derailed democracy, as Russians have failed to consolidate their young democratic regime (Fish, 2005; Rose et al., 1998). Thus, a shortage of critical or dissatisfied democrats not only obstructs democratic transition from authoritarian rule, but it also delays further democratic development after democratic transition. Other conditions

being equal, a smaller proportion of critical democrats in given countries implies less active demand for democratic institutional reform and less institutional supply of democracy. A larger proportion of critical democrats, on the other hand, implies greater active demand for democratic reform.

In a nutshell, the critical spirits of democratic supporters play a more important role in the real world of democratic politics than the unmotivated democratic spirits of the masses. Unqualified commitment to democratic ideas is not in itself sufficiently powerful to drive the engine of democratization. Instead, critical spirits of committed democrats are necessary to do it. Those spirits push citizen democrats to articulate their frustration and demand more democracy. Only when citizens demand that their political leaders supply the essentials of democracy does an incomplete democracy become complete (Shin and Tusale, 2007). In this regard, the dissatisfied-democrat theory developed here not only explains cross-national variation of democratic development but also solves the puzzle of democratization over time within regimes. The higher the proportion of critical democrats in those states, the higher the level of democratic development as well. As elite pacts and socioeconomic modernization do (Welzel, 2009: 74–90), changes in the proportion of critical citizens in a regime explain its democratization trajectory, that is, how a regime reaches a demand-and-supply equilibrium and breaks through towards the next equilibrium.

Critical citizens and democratic development: an empirical test

To analyze the role of critical democrats in the process of democratization, we assembled two sets of data for a sample of 46 transitional regimes (see Appendix 1, Table A.1 for a list of sampling countries and survey years). The first set, which deals with the independent variable of critical democrats, came from the fourth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS). The second set, which deals with the dependent variable of democratic development, came from the Polity IV project.² Advanced democracies in the West and non-democracies in other regions were excluded from our study. Also excluded were all political regimes that were not included in the fourth WVS, conducted in the period of 1999–2004.³

We identified critical democratic citizens in three steps. First, we measured support for democracy in terms of the extent to which respondents to the WVS accepted democracy and rejected anti-authoritarianism. Numeric responses to four items tapping pro-democratic orientations on a 4-point scale were summed and standardized into scores on a 1–100-point scale (see Appendix 2 for the wording of items). Numeric responses to three items tapping anti-authoritarianism on a 4-point scale were also summed and standardized into scores on a 1–100-point scale. By summing scores on these two scales, we measured the overall level of democratic regime support.

Second, we measured critical assessments of regime performance in terms of the extent to which respondents were satisfied or dissatisfied with the way democracy was developing in their country and the amount of confidence they could place in its three key democratic institutions – the legislature, political parties, and government. As in the case of democratic regime support, numeric responses to four items on a 4-point scale were summed and standardized into scores on 1–100-point scales (see Appendix 2 for the wording).

Third, we dichotomized ratings of democratic support and satisfaction into low and high categories, using as a cut-off point the median of those ratings, and we then placed respondents into four types of political orientations, as described in Table 1. For each of the 46 transitional regimes included, we calculated the percentages falling into the four types. Then we chose the percentage falling into the type ‘critical democrats’ (see Appendix 3, Table A 2 for descriptive data), those with high democratic regime support and low performance satisfaction, as the indicator of democratic




Figure 1. Critical Democrats and the Level of Democracy ($R^2 = .38$)

demand within each country. If critical democrats are critical to the development of democracy, levels of democracy are likely to be significantly higher in those transitional systems that have higher proportions of critical democrats than in those with lower proportions.

Considering the potential time lag between citizen demand for democracy and institutional supply of it, we chose to use Polity IV scores from five years after the survey year. For example, Croatia conducted its fourth wave of WVS in 1999, so its Polity score of 2004 is coded as the lagged level of democracy. Figure 1 shows in scattered plots the relationship between percentages of critical citizens and levels of democratization. The slope of their relationship indicates a strong positive relationship between these two variables: the higher the percentage of critical citizens in survey years, the higher the level of democracy five years after the survey. The R^2 coefficient reaches .38.⁴ Countries with the higher percentages of critical citizens were found to have achieved significantly higher levels of democratic development.

As discussed earlier, previous studies usually conceptualize political demand solely in terms of democratic regime support. In Figure 2, we examine the relationship between the average level of mass democratic support and Polity IV scores. As expected, they are positively associated with each other, but their relationship is much weaker in magnitude ($R^2 = .05$), even failing to gain statistical significance. This finding is a piece of credible evidence that critical democratic support is a stronger predictor of democratic development than is general democratic support. It also confirms that support for democracy-in-principle but dissatisfaction with its implementation is a more appropriate measure of democratic demand than general support for the idea of democracy.

To estimate the independent effect of critical democrats on the democratization of transitional democracies, we conducted multivariate regression analyses. For the analyses, we included as control variables a number of variables known in the literature to affect democratic development. These variables include socioeconomic development (e.g. Boix and Stokes, 2003; Lipset, 1959;




Figure 2. Democratic Support and the Level of Democracy ($R^2 = .05$)

Przeworski et al., 2000; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997), political institutions (e.g. Lijphart, 1999; Linz, 1990), citizens' adherence to self-expression values (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Welzel and Klingemann, 2008), and ethnic fractionalization of the society (Alesina et al., 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Norris, 2008).⁵

As an indicator of socioeconomic development, we logged the GDP per capita figure from the World Development Indicator (World Bank, 2008). For citizens' self-expression values, we used the scale developed by Inglehart and Welzel (2005). Two political institution variables measure types of government, one measuring either presidentialism (coded as 1) or parliamentary system (coded as 0) (Cheibub, 2007), and the other measuring either federalism (coded as 1) or unitary system (coded as 0) (Database of Political Institutions, 2006).⁶ Institutionalists have long debated the negative effect of presidentialism (e.g. Cheibub, 2007; Linz, 1990). The effects of federalism on democratic consolidation are significant, but the empirical results are mixed (e.g. Boix, 2003; Myerson, 2006; Treisman, 2000). Ethnic fractionalization data came from Alesina et al.'s (2003) article, which includes a global ethnic fractionalization calculation.⁷ We also add another control population. Evidence shows that a large population brings more pressure on resource allocation, economic development, and political mobilization and participation, which makes consolidating democracy harder (Bendix, 1973: 616–629; Tsai, 2006).

In Models 1 of Table 2 and Table 3, we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models to examine how the variable of 'critical democrats' affects democratic development independent of all the other variables considered. This is an aggregate level analysis.⁸ In Table 2, the dependent variable of 'democratic development' is measured in terms of Polity IV scores five years after the World Values Survey. In Table 3, the dependent variable is measured in terms of the change in the level of democratic development between the year when the WVS was conducted and five years later measured by Polity's annual ratings. Model 1 in Table 2 shows that the variable of critical citizens has a statistically significant positive effect on democratic development,⁹ as hypothesized. The critical

Table 2. OLS Models Explaining the Extent to Which Countries Democratized

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standardized Coefficient
Critical Democrats	.212 (.068)***	.5531***		
Democratic support			.021 (.093)	.0318
Self-expression value	2.91 (1.80)*	.2214*	.059 (2.16)	.0043
GDP per cap (logged)	1.29 (.662)*	.2677*	2.60 (.866)***	.5192***
Presidentialism	-1.48 (1.32)	-.1447	-.900 (1.45)	-.0848
Federalism	-.172 (.940)	.0290	1.25 (.916)	.2020
Ethnic fractionalization	-.818 (3.19)	-.0356	-1.34 (3.42)	-.0571
Population (logged)	.320 (.457)	.0996	-.124 (.5175)	-.0375
Constant	-.14.1 (12.0)***		-10.8 (14.6)***	
Observation (N)	43		43	
R-square	.574		.435	
Adjusted R-square	.477		.312	

Notes: For each model, entries in the left column are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; entries in the right column are standardized regression coefficients, which are calculated in Stata 10 by using "beta" code. In the sample, three countries do not have self-expression values, which decreases N to 43. We also detected Pakistan as an outlier. However, the result is not biased by the outlier. Thus, it is included in the analyses.

democrat variable remains significant but the significance level decreases in Model 1, Table 3. One possible explanation is that most Central and Eastern European democracies had already been rated as fully democratized in the year when the fourth wave of the WVS was conducted, so these countries could not show an increase in their levels of democracy.¹⁰ Theoretically, an unchanging Polity score in those countries equally indicates deepening democratic consolidation. Importantly, the critical democrat variable has a significantly positive influence on both the level of democracy and how much the level of democracy changes over time. Moreover, the value of its standardized coefficient is notably higher than any other variable, including the self-expression value, which Inglehart and Welzel (2005) characterize as the attitudinal variable shaping democratization most powerfully.

In Tables 2 and 3, Model 2 reports the results of multivariate regression analyses in which the average level of democratic regime support, measured as citizen preference for democracy in contrast to its alternatives, replaces the percentage of critical democrats as an indicator of democratic demand. In this model, democratic support is no longer a statistically significant predictor of democratic development. The R^2 coefficient in this model is 15 percent lower than that of Model 1 in Table 2,¹¹ which indicates that critical democrats affect democratic development much more powerfully than does democratic support.

The results of the multivariate analysis are strongly consistent with the finding presented in Figure 1 and show clearly that critical democratic spirits promote democratic development more strongly than either of the two attitudinal variables – democratic support and self-expression values – that were identified in prior public opinion research on democratization as the forces driving democratization. All these findings, when considered together, indicate that it is critical democrats, not all supporters of democracy or upholders of self-expression values, who play a critical role in advancing the process of democratization. The findings also indicate that the percentage of critical citizens is a better measurement for democratic demand than the level of democratic regime support.

Table 3. OLS Models Explaining the Changes in Democratic Levels

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standardized Coefficient	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standardized Coefficient
Critical Democrats	.0412 (.026)*	.3379*		
Democratic support			.001 (.051)	.0065
Self-expression value	.059 (.930)	.0140*	-.851 (.951)	-.1984
GDP per cap (logged)	-.529 (.441)*	-.2779*	-.366 (.426)*	-.1920*
Presidentialism	.824 (.640)*	.2349*	.866 (.669)*	.2467*
Federalism	-.172 (.940)	.1161	.321 (.402)*	.1537*
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.00 (1.62)	-.1144	-1.02 (1.70)	-.1166
Population (logged)	-.155 (.227)	-.1414	-.177 (.247)	-.1611
Constant	5.98 (6.31)**		5.88 (7.98)**	
Observation (N)	43		43	
R-square	.166		.119	

Note: For each model, entries in the left column are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$; entries in the right column are standardized regression coefficients, which are calculated in Stata 10 by using "beta" code.

To further demonstrate the mechanism of how critical democrats demand democracy, we examined the impact of critical democrats on political behavior. Specifically, we tested whether critical democrats, as compared with other types of citizens identified in Table 1, are more likely to participate in political activities such as petitioning, boycotts, and demonstrations. As reported in the three multivariate multilevel models in Table 4,¹² the critical democrat variable is a consistently significant influence on all these activities. Namely, critical democrats are the most actively involved in articulating their dissatisfaction, protesting the government, and demanding political reform. In contrast, the variable of self-expression values is not a statistically significant influence on every one of the three types of anti-governmental activities considered herein. Whereas citizens with higher self-expression values are vigorously engaged in signing petitions, they do not participate in more aggressive protest movements against the government (see Models 2 and 3 in Table 4). Again, these findings provide strong empirical support for our theoretical argument that the variable of critical democrats is a valid measurement of citizen demand for democracy, as well as a more powerful influence on democratization than self-expression values.

Conclusion

The past two decades have witnessed a major qualitative shift in the study of political cultures. With the proliferation of democratic political systems throughout the globe, the stability of established democracies no longer remains the central question of political science research. Instead, how the attitudes of a democratizing country's masses affect its process of establishing and deepening democracy has become a central concern in research and theory on political culture. To identify the attitudes having an effect and unravel their roles in the dynamic process of democratization, individual scholars and research institutes have regularly conducted waves of multiregional and global public opinion surveys, including the Afrobarometer, the Americas Barometer, the Arab Barometer, the Asian Barometer, the Latinobarometer, the New Europe Barometer, and the World Values Survey.

Table 4. Multilevel Models Explaining Petition, Boycotts and Demonstration

	Model 1 Petition	Model 2 Boycotts	Model 3 Demonstration
Individual Level			
Critical Democrat	.037 (.008) ^{***}	.015 (.006) ^{**}	.037 (.008) ^{***}
Self-expression value	.307 (.084) ^{**}	.125 (.078)	.002 (.087)
Age	.0001 (.00)	-.001 (.000) ^{***}	-.001 (.000) ^{***}
Gender	-.127 (.006) ^{***}	-.145 (.005) ^{***}	-.165 (.006) ^{***}
Education	.056 (.001) ^{***}	.029 (.001) ^{***}	.044 (.002) ^{***}
Income	.050 (.004) ^{***}	.017 (.003) ^{***}	.024 (.004) ^{***}
Urban	.006 (.001) ^{***}	.002 (.001) [*]	.011 (.001) ^{***}
Aggregate Level			
GDP per capita	.027 (.040)	-.022 (.036)	-.063 (.041)
Ethnic fractionalization	.330 (.167) ^{**}	-.019 (.154)	-.266 (.173)
Presidentialism	-.079 (.059)	-.126 (.054) ^{**}	-.099 (.061) [*]
Federalism	.064 (.035) ^{**}	.007 (.033)	.006 (.037)
Population	-.055 (.019) ^{***}	-.019 (.018)	-.041 (.020) ^{**}
Constant	2.39 (.595) ^{***}	1.94 (.548) ^{***}	2.73 (.616) ^{***}
Observations (N)	50405	49664	50883
Country Groups	46	46	46

Note: Maximum restricted likelihood estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001.

Analyses of these surveys have confirmed the long-held belief that mass attitudes and values significantly affect the process of democratizing political systems. In the large body of literature drawn from these surveys, however, there is no general agreement on the particular pattern or set of mass orientations that is most conducive to democratization (Heath et al., 2005; Mattes, 2007). Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996), for example, emphasize the popular embrace of democracy as the most essential ingredient for sustaining electoral democracy and deepening it into liberal democracy. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2005), on the other hand, claim that self-expression values featuring personal autonomy, interpersonal trust, and tolerance of other groups contribute to the development of effective democracy a great deal more than the general endorsement of democracy as the preferred regime. These and other conflicting findings in the literature call for a new perspective on the study of mass orientations as a force shaping the democratic development of political systems.

In an attempt to provide a more valid and meaningful account of how mass orientations affect the process of democratization, we have reformulated the original congruence theory of democratic stability into a dynamic demand–supply model of democratic development. We have also refined the notion of democratic demand from a conception depending solely on democratic regime preference to a conception depending on the multidimensional appraisal of democracy in practice. Specifically, we have conceptualized democratic demand as arising from ‘critical democrats’, who favor democracy-in-principle but are critical of their democratizing regime’s performance. In addition, we have validated this refined notion of democratic demand by examining its relationship with protests and other types of anti-governmental action. Finally, we have compared its relative power to predict variations in democratic development across countries and over time with that of the two psychological variables tapping, respectively, democratic regime support and self-expression values.

Our analysis of the World Values Surveys conducted in 46 transitional regimes reveals that critical democrats are more instrumental than self-expression values in motivating citizens to engage in

protest activities pressuring leaders to supply more democracy. More notably, it reveals that of all the attitudinal and contextual variables considered, critical democratic orientations are the most conducive to the democratic development of transitional regimes. Specifically, those orientations are significantly more conducive to democratization than either the general endorsement of democracy as the preferred regime, or the self-expression values of becoming a free and cognitively sophisticated individual, which Inglehart and Welzel (2005) found as the most powerful predictor of effective democratization. This particular mix of orientations, a favorable view of democracy-in-principle but a negative view of its implementation, is also significantly more conducive to democratization than any of the contextual variables tapping socioeconomic modernization, the make-up of political institutions, and the ethnic make-up of the population. On the basis of these findings, we conclude that critical democrats, who experience a wide gulf between their democratic aspirations for their countries and their countries' democratic achievements, constitute a crucial causal mechanism for linking the political orientations of individual citizens to the dynamics of institutional democratization.

What are the implications of our findings for future research seeking to link the orientations of individual citizens to the dynamics of democratization unfolding at the level of nations? Substantively, our findings make it clear that the mass orientations most conducive to democratic development are democratic political orientations, not the non-political, self-expression values of freedom, autonomy, and equality. As is widely known in the real world of democratic politics, not all upholders of self-expression values, in other words, those who are cognitively capable of articulating and expressing personal preferences, participate in the political process to demand more democracy. Among the cognitively capable, only those dissatisfied with the existing regime are likely to become democratic reformers, who are willing to participate in the political process and demand the improvement of its performance. Why a majority of the cognitively capable fails to become critical democrats, therefore, should be considered an important question for future research on political culture.

Theoretically, our findings confirm that mass democratic regime orientations serve as the cultural software for the operation of democratic institutions; they directly influence the extent to which political leaders and their institutions nourish democracy. Neither the cognitive empowerment of people nor their desire to live in a democracy directly motivates them to participate in mass movements demanding more and better democracy. As the theory of relative deprivation holds (Gurr, 1970; Muller and Weede, 1994; Sayles, 2007), it is a sense of democratic deficit or deprivation that can directly trigger citizen participation in such democratic movements. Critical democrats experience such a sense of democratic deficit.

Conceptually, moreover, our findings indicate that mass orientations to democracy are a multi-level and multidimensional phenomenon. As people react differently to the ideals of democracy and its practices, there is an urgent need to differentiate affective orientations to democracy as an ideal system from evaluative orientations to the practices of democratic governance, and to ascertain the distinct types of regime orientations. In this regard, demand for democracy among the mass publics should not be equated with their general preference for or their support of it. Nor should their acquisition of self-expression values be equated with their democratic demand. True democratic demand arises when, and only when, a nation's citizens perceive a failure on the part of their regime to realize their dreams for democracy.

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Notes

1. Democratization is a dynamic phenomenon with a series of sequential stages running from the liberalization of an old authoritarian regime and the emergence of a new democratic system, through the consolidation of that democratic regime, to its maturity. Each of these stages is shaped by a multitude of different forces, as Rustow (1970) correctly observed four decades ago. The present study, like earlier research by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), covers the entire process of democratization and seeks to determine whether critical democratic orientations among the mass citizenry are a more enduring influence on the process than eight other variables including self-expression variables. Therefore, it is not the purpose of our study to identify and compare the forces that uniquely affect each stage of democratization, such as that of democratic transition and consolidation.
2. Throughout our empirical test, we used Freedom House scores as an alternative measure of democratic development and treated it as a check on the robustness of statistical results reported. The correlation of democratic development level between Freedom House's and Polity IV measures of democracy in our sample of 46 transitional countries is .75.
3. The fourth wave of the World Values Survey includes a total of 71 countries. After excluding western-established democracies and other countries with missing data on our key variables, we have a smaller sample of 46 countries, which includes 10 authoritarian regimes, as identified by Polity IV measures.
4. Using Freedom House Scores instead of Polity IV democracy ratings, we obtained the correlation coefficient of .34 for critical democrats and .04 for democratic support variable. These results confirm the robustness of the relationship of the critical democrat variable with democracy.
5. A number of earlier studies have reported the significant impact of previous regime types on subsequent democratization (e.g. Bernhard and Karakoc, 2007; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Geddes, 1999). Using Geddes's typology of authoritarian regimes, we tested the impact of personalistic, single-party, and military authoritarian regimes but did not find any statistically significant differences among the three types of authoritarianism (the P-values of single-party and military dummies are .347 and .111 respectively).
6. We also tested other institutional variables such as bicameralism and effective party numbers. None of them gained any statistical significance in any of the models tested. To make our analyses parsimonious, we removed them from the models.
7. Theoretically, in studying the impact of ethnic diversity on democratic development, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol's (2005) measurement of ethnic polarization is superior to the conventional measurement of ethnic fractionalization. Their study, however, does not include most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which reduces the size of our sample by 22 countries. For this reason, we used the data compiled by Alesina et al. (2003).
8. The data assembled for statistical analyses include both aggregate and individual-level data. Methodologically, it is, therefore, desirable to carry out multilevel statistical analyses. The aggregate measurement of our dependent variable at the regime level, however, makes it more appropriate to employ the OLS method than a multilevel analysis technique.
9. To test the robustness of the findings reported, we performed on the variable of critical democrats the analyses of OLS regression with robust standard errors and robust regression. Results of these tests confirm the statistical significance of this variable in both models.
10. A separate model with the exclusion of Central and Eastern European countries reveals a higher level of statistical significance (.01) for the variable of critical democrats, which confirms the significant role it plays in the process of democratization. The number of total observations in the model, however, decreases to 24, which makes it difficult to meet the basic assumptions of large-N statistical models.
11. In both models, the value of R^2 is not inflated due to collinearity. The correlations between all independent variables are fairly low ($r < .3$) except the relatively high correlation between GDP per capita and the percentage of critical democrats ($r = .47$). Even for this coefficient and all others, the variance inflation factors remain below 2.26, a score that is considerably lower than 10, the level at which collinearity starts to pose a serious problem.

12. Because the predictors chosen for this analysis include those measures at the individual and aggregate levels, we employed the statistical technique of multilevel analysis that allows random effects of individual-level variables and their interaction across the two levels to account for variation in each dependent variable (e.g., Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Wells and Kriekhaus, 2006). The three dependent variables of petition, boycotts, and demonstration are all measured at the individual level with the fourth wave of the World Values Survey (V134, V135, and V136, respectively). We coded the critical democrat variable as '1' and others as '0'. For multilevel analysis of each dependent variable, we used Stata 10.

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Biographical notes

Lingling Qi is an Assistant Professor at the School of Government, Nanjing University, China. Qi studies comparative politics and international relations.

Doh Chull Shin is Korea Foundation Chair Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of Missouri. His recent publications include *The Quality of Life in Confucian Asia* (Springer, 2009); *How East Asians View Democracy* (Columbia University Press, 2008); *Citizens, Democracy, and Markets around the Pacific* (Oxford University Press, 2006) and *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea* (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Appendix I

Table A.1. The Sample

Country	Year	Country	Year	Country	Year
Albania	2002	India	2001	Romania	1999
Algeria	2002	Indonesia	2001	Russia	1999
Argentina	1999	Iran	2000	Serbia	2001
Armenia	1997	Jordan	2001	Slovakia	1999
Azerbaijan	1997	Kyrgyzstan	2003	Slovenia	1999
Bangladesh	2002	Latvia	1999	S. Africa	2001
Belarus	2000	Lithuania	1999	S. Korea	2001
Bosnia	2001	Macedonia	2001	Tanzania	2001
Bulgaria	1999	Mexico	2000	Turkey	2001
Chile	2000	Moldova	2002	Uganda	2001
China	2001	Morocco	2001	Ukraine	1999
Croatia	1999	Nigeria	2000	Venezuela	2002
Czech Rep.	1999	Pakistan	2001	Vietnam	2001
Estonia	1999	Peru	2001	Zimbabwe	2000
Georgia	1996	Philippines	2001		
Hungary	1999	Poland	1999		

Appendix 2. Survey questions for identifying dissatisfied citizens

A. Pro-democratic regime orientations

I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them?

- V169. In democracy, the economic system runs badly.
- V170. Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling.
- V171. Democracies aren't good at maintaining order.
- V172. Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government

B. Antiauthoritarian regime authoritarianism

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

- V164. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.
- V166. Having the army rule.
- V167. Having a democratic political system.

C. Assessments of regime performance

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

- V153. The government in (your capital).
- V154. Political parties.
- V155. Parliament (1 – a great deal; 2 – quite a lot; 3 – not very much; 4 – not at all).
- V168. On the whole, how much are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country: very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied, not at all satisfied?

Appendix 3

Table A.2. Descriptive Data

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Democratic Support	46	46.5933	7.85304	24.3256	62.543
Critical Democrats	46	32.4765	14.1455	0.2	55.64
Presidentialism	46	0.6087	0.49344	0	1
Federalism	46	0.67391	0.81797	0	2
Ethnic fractionalization	46	0.41476	0.21381	0.002	0.9302
Effective Parties	32	6.7454	14.3032	1.47845	84.168
GDP per capita	46	2667.13	2600.78	260.67	12762.2
Self-expression	43	-0.3887	0.38284	-1.0121	0.41845
Polity (five-year lagged)	46	4.36957	5.88919	-7	10
FH (five-year lagged)	46	8.5	3.44319	2	13
Polity (five-year change)	45	0.62222	2.16678	-9	7
FH (five-year change)	46	0.65217	1.28612	-2	4
Log GDP	46	7.45332	0.98277	5.56325	9.45424
Log pop	46	16.8784	1.62239	14.122	20.9827
Gender	133767	.51349	.049981	0	1
Age	133692	39.6632	15.5159	15	101
Education	131820	4.36751	2.29088	1	8
Income	115798	1.945923	.799693	1	3
Urban	91890	4.841441	2.58140	1	8
Petition	114953	2.222795	0.758961	1	3
Boycott	112320	2.573558	.6302745	1	3
Demonstration	115893	2.37444	.7139208	1	3